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This thesis critically examines the regulation of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) in the selected countries of South Africa, Kenya, Zambia and Namibia.  It 
investigates whether a jurisprudence may be developed through the implementation 
of the precautionary approach. This should be done in such a manner as to enhance 
the credibility of their biosafety legislation, but still promote biotechnology, with a 
view of possible replication across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
In the 1970s, advances in scientific innovations in biotechnology, resulted in the 
introduction of genetically modified (GM) seed into global agriculture. The inherent 
uncertainty of scientific experimentation generated controversy that polarised the 
international community into two camps. Those opposing include e vironmentalists, 
and some members of the public who argue that GMOs are potentially harmful to the 
environment and humans. Proponents such as biotechnology companies, claim that 
GMOs may increase farm yields and contribute to protection of the environment. 
Underlying the debate, are issues concerning international trade in GMOs. 
Most African countries are in a dilemma on whether to accept GMOs, and if 
so, how and to what extent such organisms may be regulated. In 2000, the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted to ‘govern’ trans-boundary movement 
of living modified organisms (LMOs, a different acronym for GMOs). It embraced the 
precautionary approach—often understood to mean ‘better safe than sorry’—which 
opponents consider a useful tool for addressing scientific uncertainty. Some 
proponents, however, regard it as a mechanism which may be used by states to 
unnecessarily restrict trade to suit their political interests. 
The success of the Protocol is dependent upon effective domestic 
implementation. Most African states are parties to it, but, for them, implementation is 
problematic for various reasons which include the lack of capacity and absence of 
workable biosafety legislation. The framework of this thesis is therefore anchored on 
a dilemma attributable to a set of three issues. 
First, biotechnology operates in the face of irreconcilable socio-economic, 
political and environmental values. African states need to protect their rich 












same time, they have large undernourished populations and their economies are 
largely dependent on agriculture. 
Second, the precautionary approach is a tool that may be used to achieve an 
effective balance between protection of the environment, human health and 
agricultural trade. While the Cartagena Protocol is founded on the precautionary 
approach, implementation of the approach in the selected countries is essential, but 
problematic, because there is confusion as to its meaning and purpose. The result is 
that their biosafety legislation is flawed, such that achieving an effective balance 
among the competing imperatives in regulation of GMOs remains a challenge. Thus 
there is a need to develop a coherent jurisprudence on implementation of the 
approach in such a manner as to enhance the credibility of their biosafety legislation 
but simultaneously promote biotechnology. 
Third is the democratic imperative for good governance founded on 
transparency in decision-making and effective public participation.  Some of the 
stakeholders including sections of the public and farmers are not adequately 
involved in decision-making. 
The analysis in the thesis reveals that the biosafety legislation of the selected 
countries, particularly Kenya and Zambia, provided a forum for testing the relative 
power of the opponents and proponents of biotechnology (most notably, the 
European Union (EU) and the USA respectively). The prize in this contest is control 
of global agriculture and the associated international trade. 
The thesis concludes that, although embracing the precautionary approach in 
biosafety legislation by African countries is imperative, its implementation requires 
transparency in decision-making and public participation, so much so that these two 
may even serve as incentives for effective implementation of the approach and may 
reinforce it. Courts will also play a key role in developing a jurisprudence relating to 















‘A thing is right, when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty 
of the biotic community. It does wrong when it tends otherwise’.1 
 
1.1 Contextualising the GMO Controversy and Regulation 
New technologies, biotechnology in particular, present opportunities and challenges 
to humanity. Balancing the potential benefits and potential harm often remains 
problematic. Countries must decide as to whether to accept or reject such 
technologies. If they accept they must consider the extent to which associated 
potential risks may be managed. 
While it is not possible to attain zero risk with any new technology, countries 
will be keen to ensure that potential harm is minimised. They need to assess what 
risks are to be considered and how they are to be minimised. This is where the 
precautionary approach (often referred to as ‘principle’) becomes critical. In the area 
of agricultural biotechnology, the approach takes two dimensions. There are purely 
scientific aspects that relate to ri k assessment and risk management on the one 
hand, and considerations that seek to reconcile public demands for safety and the 
need for public acceptance of biotechnology on the other hand.  Achieving an 
effective balance remains problematic particularly in the regulation of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), which are among the key products of biotechnology 
Regulation is part of governance. Mugabe describes governance here as the 
exercise of ‘economic, political and administrative authority’ to deal with GMO 
activities. It comprises ‘mechanisms, processes and institutions through which the 
public expresses its interests, exercises its legal rights and seeks to resolve its 
differences.2 Realisation of these goals is thus dependent on the existence of 
                                                 
1 Leopold A A Sand County Almanac: with Essays on Conservation from Round River (1970):262. 
2 Mugabe J ‘Governance of GMOs in Africa’ available at http://www.assaf.org.za/wp-












workable biosafety frameworks. In Africa however, the development of biosafety3 
legislation is in its infancy, even though countries have been obligated to do this 
since 1994. South Africa, Kenya, Zambia and Namibia are among the countries that 
have enacted such legislation. By so doing, these selected countries have taken 
decisive action with regard to the regulation of GMOs. In addition, legislation is, to 
some extent, a form of precaution. However, the difficult task ahead is how they may 
achieve effective implementation of that legislation. 
This thesis critically examines the regulation of GMOs in the selected 
countries and investigates whether a jurisprudence4 may be developed through 
implementation of the precautionary approach.5 This would need to be done in such 
a manner as to enhance the credibility of their biosafety legislation, and at the same 
time, promote agricultural biotechnology6 if appropriate, with a view to possible 
replication across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The focus of the thesis is on the 
introduction of GMOs into the environment. The thesis is written from a legal 
perspective and is therefore not an authority on detailed scientific phenomena. 
Genetically modified (GM) crops, such as cotton and maize, result from the scientific 
manipulation of genes to produce novel plants and organisms.7  A key issue 
regarding the alleged harm caused by such genetic modification is the debate about 
the potential adverse effects on the environment and humans. This remains a major 
concern to the international community. 
In 1992 the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was adopted.8 Art. 8(g) of the 
Convention requires that ‘as far as possible and as appropriate’ parties must 
‘establish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control the risks associated with 
the use and release of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from 
                                                 
3 The term biosafety refers to the safety of biological processes. 
4 The term jurisprudence is broadly used here to mean a system or practice of law. 
5 The precautionary ‘approach’ is often referred to as precautionary ‘principle’.  Thus, the term 
precautionary ‘approach’ is used in this thesis save where the context may dictate that the term 
precautionary ‘principle’ be used, such as in chapter three. At (3.5) a discussion on the terminologies 
of precautionary ‘principle’ and ‘approach’ is carried out. 
6 For purposes of this thesis, the term biotechnology is used to denote agricultural biotechnology as 
well as modern biotechnology.   
7 Article 3 (1) of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 39 International Legal Materials (2000):1027.  
The Protocol was adopted in 2000 and entered into force 11 September 2003. 
8 The Convention on Biological Diversity 31 International Legal Materials (1992): 822.  It entered into 












biotechnology which may pose potential harm on the environment and humans. 
Parties to the CBD subsequently adopted the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety that 
is founded on the precautionary approach as contained in Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration.9 Principe 15 is applicable to threats of serious or irreversible harm.  
Together with other mechanisms, the Protocol establishes minimum criteria for 
regulating transboundary movement of LMOs.10 
It means that at the international level, the precautionary approach is 
applicable within the thresholds established by principle 15 of the Rio declaration.  
Art. 26 of the Protocol provides for the taking into account of socio-economic 
considerations relevant to the impact of LMOs, particularly with regard to value of 
biological diversity to the local communities. Art. 23(2) of the Protocol provides that 
parties shall, in accordance with domestic law, consult the public in the decision-
making process regarding LMOs. 
In developing countries, the safety of food is an increasing concern, in that it 
should be both sufficient and nutritious. Hence, food security is a major concern of 
the early 21st century. The production of more food, however, requires an increase in 
the cultivation of land which adversely impacts on the natural environment. A 
balance must be struck between the production of ample food and the protection of 
the environment for the benefit of present and future generations. A degraded 
environment cannot sustain ecosystems and the species in it, including humans. 
Degradation is largely attributable to the loss of and threats to biodiversity11 
due to population increase,12 habitat loss, over-exploitation of natural resources, 
invasive alien species and climate change.13 A combination of these factors has 
made the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity a challenge.14 In addition, 
many natural ecosystems have been interfered with by humans, some to the point of 
                                                 
9 The Rio Declaration 31 International Legal Materials (1992):876. It was adopted in 1992 at Rio de 
Janeiro. 
10 Article 13 and Annex I of the Cartagena Protocol (n7). 
11 Speth G and Haas P Global Environmental Governance (2006):18. 
12 Meffe G and Carroll R ‘What is Conservation Biology’? in Meffe G and Carroll R (eds) Principles of 
Conservation Biology (1994):3-23 at 3. 
13 See ‘Global Biodiversity Outlook No 3’ (2010) Executive Summary available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/gbo/gbo3-final-en.pdf (accessed 24 March 2010). 












disintegration.15 As a result, poor people in developing countries bear the brunt of 
the adverse effects of ecological degradation,16 such as floods, droughts and other 
unpredictable environmental crises which have contributed to a decline in food 
production and an increase in its prices.17 Some analysts, assert that this will make 
low-income families in Africa ‘poorer, hungrier or both’.18 
There are about 800 million undernourished people in the world,19 of which 
200 million live in Africa.20There is an urgent need for new technologies to increase 
crop yields21 without increasing land use, improve the nutritional quality of food and 
reduce crop losses.22 Analysts such as Schuman argue that such technologies 
would develop ‘hardier, more productive seeds [and] new techniques to conserve 
dwindling water resources...’23 In the 1970s, scientists introduced genetically 
modified (GM) crops that included maize, cotton and soybean into global agriculture 
in an attempt to (primarily) increase food production. 
Biotechnology24 is an emerging knowledge-intensive field which makes 
possible specific man-moved changes in deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or genetic 
materials in plants, animals and microbial systems, leading to useful products and 
technologies.25 Using biological processes such as genetic engineering or modern  
biotechnology enables scientists to isolate and combine multiple copies of a piece of 
DNA or an entire gene,26 from one organism to another in a way that could not be 
                                                 
15 Meffe G and Carroll R (n12) at 3. 
16 See ‘Global Environmental Outlook’ GEO Report No 4 (2007):11 available at 
http://www.preventionweb.com.net/files/2298_GEO4ReportFullen.pdf (accessed 20 February 2011). 
17 Schuman M ‘A Future of Price Spikes’ 178(4) TIME Magazine 25 July 2011 p.48. 
18 Ibid at 49. 
19 Phipps R, ‘Safety for Human Consumption’ in Ferry N and Gatehouse M Environmental Impact 
Assessment of Genetically Modified Crops (2009) 278-295 at 279. 
20 See ‘The Challenge of African Agriculture’ InterAcademy Council available at 
http://www.interacademycouncil.net/CMS/Reports/AfricanAgriculture/6993/6995.aspx (accessed 18 
April 2009). Notably, the hunger crisis at the Horn of Africa is a major concern for the United Nations.   
See Poblete-Enriquez ‘UN Appeals for $500M to Fight Hunger in the Horn of Africa’ available at 
http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2011/07/un-appeals-for-500m-for-famine-aid-in-horn-of-
africa/ (accessed 23 July 2011). 
21 See ‘The Challenge of African Agriculture’ (n23). 
22 Phipps R (n19) at279. 
23 Schuman M (n17) at 50. 
24 In this thesis, the term biotechnology is used interchangeably with the term genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs). 
25 See Agenda 21 Chapter 16 ‘Environmentally Sound Management of Biotechnology’ available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/ (accessed 20 April 2009). 
26 Kinchy A, Kleinman D, and Handelsman J ‘Introduction: from Maize to Menopause’ in Kleinman D, 












achieved naturally or because the technology makes it easier to transfer information 
between organisms. 
GM crops resulted in global controversy rooted in scientific uncertainty, fear 
and distortions concerning their safety for the environment and humans. For 
example, ongoing reports of physical ‘land-mine like’ explosions of non-organic 
watermelons that had been injected with growth chemicals may exacerbate 
suspicions concerning the safety of GM food.27 Even if the watermelons were not 
genetically modified, the introduction of growth chemicals could have caused the 
explosions. This is sufficient to scare consumers and the general public concerning 
the safety of chemically treated and GM food. 
Biotechnologies represent ‘extraordinary scientific ingenuity, invention and 
technical brilliance and seem to offer solutions to social and economic problems 
ranging from hunger to disease...these advances and developments challenge our 
very understanding of science and the responsibilities of scientists and technologists 
to people and the environment.’28 Thus reconciling public demands for safety of GM 
crops and food,29 with the need to promote scientific innovation and trade, remains a 
sensitive issue for regulation globally. The issue is exacerbated by increasing 
recognition of social values as legitimate concerns in environmental governance.30 
Genetic engineering is a tool that enables scientists and biotechnology 
companies to identify, manipulate and make use of genetic resources for economic 
ends,31 through patenting and resultant temporary monopolies. For example, in 
1982, Boyer and Cohen produced the first genetically engineered organism which 
they patented, and allegedly enabled Stanford University to earn 300 million 
dollars.32 Thus the interests of industry appear to impact and influence the 
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(accessed 24 May 2011). 
28 Kinderlerer J ‘Globalisation, Intellectual Property Rights and Biotechnology’ (2009) in a speech he 
delivered at his inaugural lecture at the University of Cape Town on 13 May 2009 (copy in file with this 
researcher). 
29 Stewart R ‘GMO Trade Regulation and Developing Countries Acta Juridica (2009):320-380 at 323; 
Thomson J Seeds for the Future (2006):109 CSIRO Publishing Collingwood (Australia). 
30 Sands P Principles of International Environmental Law (2003):9. 
31 Rifkin J The Biotech Century (1998):8. 
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development of GM crops, safety testing and other issues relevant to governance of 
GMOs.33 Even so, over the years the controversy concerning the potential risks and 
the alleged benefits of GM crops remains largely unresolved. 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, environmental protection was a 
critical issue for the international community. This is largely attributable to dwindling 
non-renewable energy reserves due to overpopulation, logging, grazing and 
development such as industrialization, harmful accumulation of global warming 
gases and devastation of biological diversity.34 In addition, most economies in 
developing countries are dependent upon agriculture to remain viable. The 
protection of the environment must however be reconciled with other legitimate 
activities such as agriculture. 
People need food, clothing and housing, all of which derive from agriculture or 
from oil based products (and oil is running out). The irony is that a growing 
population requires more food, while clearing more land for agricultural purposes 
causes many strains, including those on biodiversity.35 For over 10 000 years, 
agriculture has consisted of ‘a set of ideas, a set of tools and a set of selected 
species’.36 Over the years however, agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa has failed to 
demonstrate its sustainability and continues to present challenges. 
Furthermore, the conflict between safety and profit imperatives creates 
tension, making the regulation of biotechnology largely a political issue.37 In seeking 
to reconcile the varying interests, states are expected to promote biotechnology but 
at the same time regulate the ecological and social impact of biotechnology generally 
and GMOs specifically. Attempts by the international community to achieve an 
effective balance, within a web of intertwined socio-economic, environmental, 
cultural, political and other concerns underlying the regulation of GMOs, remain 
problematic. While the Cartagena Protocol (the Protocol)38 provides for the use of 
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34 Rifkin J (n31) at 32. 
35 The importance of biodiversity is discussed at (2.5). 
36 Swanson T and Johnson S Global Environmental Problems and International Environmental 
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the precautionary approach as the guiding criterion. However, in many countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the approach may not always be applied effectively in 
decision-making. . The effect is that regulation may not achieve an objective balance 
between potential risks and benefits of biotechnology. 
The precautionary approach is a risk management tool that may be used by 
decision-makers to take action in the face of scientific uncertainty.39 Arguably, such 
measures may include delaying, postponing or even rejecting an activity. Risk 
regulation however requires the striking of a balance among the three phases of risk, 
namely risk assessment, risk management and risk communication.40 This is a 
complex process which has made the identification, assessment and managing of 
risks a major challenge for international environmental policy making, 41 in particular, 
the regulation of GMOs. 
1.1.1 Risk Assessment, Risk Management and Risk Communication 
In environmental governance, risk exists where there is a possibility of adverse 
outcomes.42 Risk assessment estimates the probability and severity of the risk to 
human health, safety and the natural environment.43 It is a scientific process carried 
out by experts for the purpose of achieving four main objectives, namely hazard 
identification, hazard characterization, exposure assessment and risk 
characterisation44. 
Risk assessment plays two important roles in implementing the precautionary 
approach. It can be used to understand in a better way the risks of an activity and to 
compare options for prevention. It may also be used in conjunction with the 
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40 Ibid at 17-20. 
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(1992):15. 
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involvement of the public to prioritize activities such as hazardous waste cleanups 
and restoration of activities.45 These are achievable when the driving forces of policy 
and decision-making are precaution and prevention as opposed to risk.46 Thus, from 
a scientific perspective, effective implementation of the precautionary approach is 
dependent upon independent and objective risk assessment. 
In assessing risks however, experts use quantitative methods whose 
objectivity and reliability to provide all the answers is hampered by various factors. 
Bell and McGillivray identify three factors; First, risk assessment operates on 
assumptions that are often determined with reference to subjective and unscientific 
criteria. Second, the differing assumptions that underpin risk assessment may lead 
to different conclusions. Third, scientific risk assessment fails to take into account the 
public perceptions of risk which are not necessarily based on objective criteria.47 
This partly explains why Art. 15 of the Protocol requires that risk assessment be 
carried out in ‘a scientifically sound manner’. 
Furthermore, the dominance of experts in risk assessment has the effect of 
framing issues somewhat narrowly either as technical or scientific, reducing 
consideration of socio-economic and political dimensions.48 Moreover, the public 
perception of risk is multi-dimensional and qualitative, with particular risks meaning 
different things to different people, depending on their underlying interests and the 
context of the risk.49 Additionally, any resulting environmental harm is likely to affect 
everyone in the impacted environment, hence the need for risk management. 
Risk management is concerned with finding ways to eliminate, react, alleviate, 
mitigate, transfer or learn to live with the risk50. There are two primary approaches 
used in risk management: (i) preventive approaches that concentrate on eliminating 
the cause of the risk at its source and (ii) approaches based on the precautionary 
approach that impose higher thresholds which require the adoption of control 
                                                 
45 Ticker J and Raffensperger C ‘The Precautionary Principle in Action A Handbook’ available at 
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46 Ibid.  
47 Bell S and McGillivray D Environmental Law (2006):53. 
48 Anderson K and Wene C ‘The RISCOM Model in Practice – Recent Experiences from New Areas 
of Application’ available at 586-593 at 587, available at 
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measures before harm is proved.51 Equally important, risk management should aim 
at achieving a high degree of legitimacy because of the democratic right of citizens 
to hold decision-makers accountable for their actions.52 
The precautionary approach plays a crucial role in attempts by the 
international community to resolve the dilemma concerning GMOs. African countries 
need to develop acceptable criteria ‘to weigh risks/ benefits while considering 
agricultural productivity, environmental and human health concerns’.53 These and 
other concerns relevant to biotechnology are discussed below. 
Risk communication has increasingly become important in addressing risks, 
because of the growing public demands for transparency and the right to know.54  In 
addition, fear associated with potential harm of GM food and increasing media and 
public attention, especially in Europe (and parts of Africa) has made risk 
communication, an essential component of addressing environmental risks.55 
Complications arise when the media simplifies issues on risk to attract public 
attention, resulting in the latter making demands that the regulator may not comply 
with.56 Such demands may be manifested in public protests for outright rejection of 
GMOs. The demands would be difficult to fulfil, particularly if they are made when 
government policy and legislation are in place, and commercialisation of GM crops 
has or is about to take place. 
1.1.2 The Global GMO Controversy: an Overview 
The GMO debate covers many areas including promoting scientific innovations, 
environmental issues such as threats to biodiversity, transparency and public 
participation in decision-making, control by large biotechnology companies over 
food and societal issues of cultural diversity and resistance to globalization in 
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agriculture.57 The factors causing the GMO controversy are discussed under 
broad intertwined themes including ethical concerns;58 safety for humans and 
the environment;59 and socio-economic as well as political concerns.60 
Ethical issues relate to the moral status of interfering with nature, hence 
creating a sense of blasphemy as some people, sections of religious groups  in 
particular, equate genetic engineering to ‘playing God’.61 The patenting of living 
organisms (even temporarily), issues of accountability and the right of the 
public to know the type of food we eat are ethical issues at the centre of the 
debate. 
Uncertainty concerning the safety of humans and the environment is a major 
concern. GM crops come from scientific experiments, where scientific uncertainty is 
a common characteristic attributable to many factors. These include lack of or 
insufficient scientific understanding of the subject matter, limited knowledge 
concerning the GM organism in question and methodological uncertainties that arise 
from the choice of methods of detection and identification of the effects.62 
Interference with the genetic content of food by scientists within an environment of 
uncertainty is a sensitive issue. People know intuitively that living organisms 
constitute the last resort and the remaining hope for regenerating the planet.63 
Genetic manipulation of food may therefore have unknown potential adverse effects 
on the health of humans and of the environment.64 However, the thesis argues (and 
as stated at (8.4), rapid and continuous advances in technologies as well as the 
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consumption of GM food over the last few decades weighs heavily against suspicion 
on safety of such food. 
Environmental protection is a matter of global concern particularly because 
mankind is facing three crises simultaneously – the decrease of Earth’s renewable 
energy reserves, global warming and the steady decline in biological diversity.65 
Loss of or threats to loss of biodiversity is of particular concern because biodiversity 
supports life and the well-being of both humans and the environment.66 
The inherent uncertainty in science creates distrust and fear in the public 
about the safety of GM food for the environment and humans. Distrust and fear have 
given rise to negative perceptions among consumers, religious groups, civil society 
and the public about safety of GM food.67 Negative perceptions have, over the years, 
resulted in resistance (including violent protests) to GMOs in many parts of the 
world, most notably, in Europe.68 The effect is that acceptance of GMOs remains a 
contentious issue in many jurisdictions including some of the countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. These include Zambia,69 Zimbabwe70 and Kenya.71 By way of 
contrast, there is hardly any overt evidence of the demand for GM food by 
biotechnologists, GM farmers or the public in Africa72  However, and as shown at 
(2.2), increasing production of GM crops in countries such as the USA, Brazil and 
Argentina clearly suggests the GM technology is entrenched in global agriculture. 
This strongly suggests that the e is an increase in demand for GM seed by farmers. 
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Socio-economic issues relate to a wide range of interests. This is mainly 
because biotechnology is a set of disciplines characterised by a heterogeneous 
coalition of actors, institutions and interests competing for control of the technology 
for commercial advantage73 and for benefits which may impact on the way of life of 
peoples around the world. Thus, advancements in biotechnology seem to go hand in 
hand with, globalization, international trade and maximization of profits. These are 
characteristics of capitalism, an ideology widely believed to benefit the economies of 
many countries including major world powers. Further, being embedded in scientific 
experiments, it is only reasonable that innovations in biotechnology be encouraged 
and protected within legally permissible and reasonable limits. The associated 
ingenuity of scientists and the leading role of science in socio-economic and political 
development are major factors that necessitate such protection. 
Protection of innovations in biotechnology, mainly through patenting has, 
however, resulted in the monopolisation of the global seed market by multinational 
companies. Such companies include Monsanto, Syngenta, DuPont-Pioneer, and 
Bayer which own most of the world’s commercial seed.74 By 2005, for example, 
Monsanto became the world’s largest seed firm and in 2007 it increased its control 
through the purchase of Delta and Pine Land, the largest cotton seed company.75 
Investments in research and the development of GMOs (both of which are 
expensive76), the tests undertaken to assess safety (if not carried out in a 
scientifically sound manner) and the means of distribution, are among other means 
of control.77 
The commercial interests and monopolies in GMOs therefore seem to have 
enabled the biotechnology industry to establish a strong financial base. Such a base 
is crucial in promoting GMOs globally. However, both promotion and resistance to 
GMOs require enabling legal frameworks. Developing such frameworks is 
cumbersome because issues such as the use of biotechnology by whom and for 
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whose benefit remain contentious. Hence, questions such as how and to what extent 
to regulate GMOs and using what criteria, largely explain the global controversy 
concerning GMOs. 
These and other concerns become political when individual states decide on 
whether to accept or reject GMOs. Moreover, a state is the custodian of its natural 
resources and hence has the responsibility to protect and conserve biodiversity. The 
political leaders are or should be accountable to the people in matters concerning 
safety of the environment and humans when GMOs are viewed with suspicion by 
consumers and the public. In 2005 in Switzerland for example, voters rejected GMOs 
in a referendum that sought to determine whether a moratorium should be placed on 
GM food in that country.78 
1.1.3 Framing the Global GMO Debate 
The GMO controversy has divided the international community into two camps: 
proponents led by the USA, Canada, Argentina and more recently Brazil79 and 
sceptics (commonly referred to as opponents) led by the European Union (EU).80 
Allegedly relying on the concept of substantial equivalence, the proponents, 
particularly the USA, have adopted a liberal pro-science approach towards GMOs.81 
The concept of substantial equivalence requires that ‘if a novel GM food can 
be shown to be fundamentally equivalent in composition to an existing food then it 
can be regarded as safe as its conventional equivalent’.82 Juma does not agree with 
claims by critics that substantial equivalence is a preconceived commitment to avoid 
properly examining crops and food modified by biotechnology.  He instead argues 
that it is a conclusion reached when crops and food have been shown ‘not to be 
different from their conventional counterparts in terms of any significant parameters 
involving molecular composition, potential allerginicity or toxicity, and nutritional or 
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dietary impact’.83 Once such a conclusion has been reached, no additional or 
exceptional regulatory regime is needed.84 
Since the US government policy identifies the risks posed by GM Food to 
human health and the environment as essentially the same as those in foods derived 
from conventional methods, no new legislation has been passed to specifically 
regulate biotechnology products.85 The proponents further claim that, genetic 
modification may contribute towards increased food production and improved food 
quality, foods from which allergenic or toxic substances have been removed, 
significant environmental benefits, and a wide range of other alleged benefits.86 As a 
result, proponents of biotechnology– industry in particular, have put intense pressure 
on developing countries to speed up acceptance and production of GMOs without 
delay.87 In contrast, developing countries view this vulnerability as a way of using 
their soil for testing products that have been rejected in the North.88 
By way of contrast, opponents of biotechnology have used (and possibly 
misused) the precautionary approach as a way of requiring protective regulation 
when current knowledge is insufficient to assess potential risks.89 Critics who include 
the Independent Science Panel on Biosafety 90 claim that the introduction of new 
genes and gene products from bacteria, viruses and even genes made entirely in the 
laboratory, into crops, including food crops, poses potential risks.91 
Some opponents argue that artificial constructs introduced into cells by 
invasive methods result in random integration into the genome, giving rise to 
unpredictable random effects including gross abnormalities in animals and plants, 
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unexpected toxins and allergens in food crops. These attributes make quality control 
impossible.92 In addition, the alleged instability of transgenic lines makes risk 
assessment difficult.93 Other critics further allege that the release of GMOs into the 
environment may adversely affect biological diversity and that the socio-economic 
consequences may potentially be severe.94 They thus question the patenting of living 
organisms on ethical grounds.95 Whether these views are representative of the views 
of most scientists is difficult to determine particularly because the GMO debate 
attracts different views among and even within stakeholders, on one hand.  Such 
views could otherwise be on the margin of scientific credibility on the other hand. 
The differences in opinion concerning GMOs have given rise to conflicting 
hopes, values and interests,96 making the GMO debate an emotive issue worldwide. 
Biotechnology affects both public and private interests, including those of states,97 
consumers,98 scientists,99 multinational biotechnology companies,100 civil society101 
and the general public. It has given rise to seemingly irreconcilable socio-economic, 
ethical, cultural, environmental, political and other concerns that have made its 
regulation a complex issue globally. Furthermore, technologies (including 
biotechnology) have acquired a will and strength of their own; they are ‘tending to 
dominate and bend to its necessities even the most powerful human rulers and 
groups’.102 Technologies comprise instruments of power (which include financial and 
political influence) resulting in domination and using society to underpin them.103 
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The mass media also plays a significant role in arousing negative perceptions 
concerning GMOs in the public domain. The media’s main role is reporting events 
and educating the public104 but a lack of informed and balanced media reporting 
creates suspicion. Many media sources do not have the capacity to make the 
complex environmental issues understandable while others are interested in matters 
that may easily attract bigger audiences.105 To attract attention, issues concerning 
potential benefits and risks are often exaggerated. For example a section of the 
media in Kenya published information with the title ‘Tough Rules to Govern 
GMOs’.106 This heading appears biased and could be misleading.  It created the 
impression that the Biosafety Act No 2 of 2009 that had just been enacted provided 
for strict regulation of GMOs. The heading could be applauded by the proponents of 
biotechnology.  It could also terrify the general public as it may be understood to 
mean that GMOs are so dangerous that they require tough rules.  Still, none of all 
these propositions could be true or false. 
Terms like ‘mutant’ and ‘Frankenstein’ foods have been used to convey the 
risks associated with GMOs, while terms like ‘value added’, ‘safer’ and ‘better quality’ 
have been used to reinforce potential benefits.107 When journalism feeds on 
controversy, its popular gladiatorial appr ach divides people into opposing camps.108 
These trends have tended to influence consumers and the general public to view 
biotechnology as either good or bad,109 aggravating the controversy. As a result, 
establishing and maintaining a ‘perceived balance’ between the potential risks and 
benefits of GMOs is a major global concern for the regulation of biotechnology.110 
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1.1.4 The Regulation of GMOs 
Governments have a responsibility to ensure human safety from hazards including 
the potential harm associated with GMOs. The function of law is mainly to establish 
limitations if not prohibitions.111 Often, it should promote the consistency in, 
accountability for and transparency of decision-making and control the discretion of 
decision-makers.112 Biotechnology raises questions such as: how to regulate it and 
to what extent; the criteria to use and in whose interest is the regulation? Moreover, 
environmental law reflects political aims and goals defined by scientific criteria.113 Its 
framework  is a reflection of the values, culture, and institutions that invariably 
influence how states define their interests.114 Thus in implementing environmental 
protection policies, regulatory agencies are essentially carrying out a political 
balancing process of conflicting interests.115 However, translating science into the 
normative language of policy and ultimately law is cumbersome.116 
While the regulation of biotechnology is provided for in Agenda 21,117 hard 
law regulation of biotechnology is mainly traceable to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD).118 The CBD obligates parties to establish or maintain means to 
regulate, manage or control the risks associated with living modified organisms 
(LMOs) resulting from biotechnology that could adversely affect biological diversity, 
‘taking also into account the risks to human health’.119 Being a framework 
Convention, the CBD urged pa ties to consider the need for and modalities of a 
protocol that would specifically govern LMOs120. Subsequently, its Cartagena 
Protocol (the Protocol) was adopted by parties to the CBD, 121 to regulate the 
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transboundary movement of LMOs.  The negotiations on the Protocol were however 
complicated, among other things, by disagreements on applicable criteria for the 
regulation. A strict regime would seem to impede the promotion of biotechnology 
while a weak one would seem to enhance it. Only parties to the CBD are legible to 
be parties to the Protocol. For example, the USA which is non-party to the CBD is 
not a party to the Protocol.  It participated and still does as an observer. 122 It is 
therefore neither bound by the CBD nor the Protocol yet its influence in the GMO 
debate cannot be overemphasised. 
Proponents of biotechnology sought a regime founded on scientifically sound 
risk assessment.123  From a practical perspective, this seemed to suggest that 
biotechnology was a purely scientific discipline governed solely by scientific criteria. 
Such an argument would possibly have been plausible if the scientific innovations in 
GMOs were restricted to laboratories. The introduction of GMOs into the 
environment is another matter. The environment is common heritage and supports 
the well-being of all species including humans. Everyone has rights and obligations 
as well as legitimate expectations relating to it. Moreover, nature is more than a 
resource for humans.124 
Opponents sought a strict regime founded on the precautionary principle – a 
regime that would provide holistic governance for biotechnology. They viewed the 
principle as placing emphasis (at least in part) on ‘transparency, accountability, 
foresight, recognition of uncertainty, and quick, appropriate proactive action to 
prevent harm’.125 By way of a compromise, the Protocol adopted both criteria – the 
scientifically sound risk assessment126 and the precautionary approach.127 Other 
mechanisms include Advance Informed Agreement (AIA)128 which takes into account 
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the socio-economic considerations in decision-making,129 public awareness and 
participation130 and the Biosafety Clearing House.131 
The precautionary approach adopted by the Protocol is what has been laid 
down in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration,132 which provides ‘[w]here there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation’. By adopting the precautionary approach, the Protocol seeks to ‘ensure 
an adequate level of protection in the field of safe transfer, handling and use of living 
modified organisms133 resulting from biotechnology’ that may adversely affect 
biological diversity and human health.134 Establishing whether there will be serious 
or irreversible environmental damage requires an assessment of scientific, social 
and economic factors while taking into account the public’s perceptions and values in 
respect of GMOs.135 
Furthermore, the Protocol obligates each Party to ‘take necessary and 
appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement their obligations 
under this Protocol’.136 Such measures require domestic implementation. Moreover, 
the Protocol is premised upon a system of functional national biosafety frameworks, 
and information exchange.137 In addition, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties138 (which is declaratory of customary international law139) requires that 
‘[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good 
faith’. 
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By ratifying the Protocol, the Parties, including the selected countries, are 
themselves, bound to comply, in good faith. Consequently, the adoption of the 
precautionary approach in domestic biosafety legislation is obligatory. The 
precautionary approach is a tool intended to enable the Protocol to achieve its 
objective. Since its entry into force in 2003, the effective implementation of the 
Protocol together with its precautionary approach is yet to be  fully realised. 
To implement the Protocol, the selected countries have adopted biosafety 
legislation that reveals the different approaches to biotechnology. Some are 
promotional while others were strict. The approaches manifest the conflicting 
attitudes and priorities concerning GMOs, as well as the shifting attention of the 
associated controversy to the selected countries and Sub-Saharan Africa in general. 
These varying attitudes and priorities have an impact on the relevance and hence 
the credibility of the existing and emerging biosafety regimes, particularly in relation 
to the various approaches towards domestic implementation of the precautionary 
approach. 
Biotechnology is a revolutionary science which has given rise to a powerful 
industry and it has great potential to reshape the world around us.140 Having 
changed agriculture, what we eat141 and politics, for biotechnology to be accepted, it 
requires the reshaping of society.142 Apparently, this is a process that requires 
among other things, time, holistic legislation and public acceptance of GMOs. Time 
because GM food is already entrenched in the global food chain; holistic legislation 
and public acceptance due to fears concerning the safety of such food. South Africa 
and Burkina Faso are currently among the few  countries in SSA that commercially 
grow GMOs. Countries such as Kenya, Zambia, Uganda, Malawi, Nigeria, Ghana, 
and Mali have been conducting research and field trials on GM crops that include 
maize, rice, wheat, cotton and sorghum.143 
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Ultimately the key challenge is not how we can learn to live with biotechnology 
but ‘whether and under what conditions’ we want it to be part of our lives.144 A 
population biologist, Godfray, takes the view that biotechnology may be a politically 
contentious issue, due to resistance from environmentalists, but it may be part of the 
food solution.145 The development of biosafety legislation in the selected countries is 
therefore at a defining moment. By adopting biosafety legislation, the selected 
countries have taken decisive action with regard to GMOs. Issues concerning the 
extent to which such biosafety regimes satisfy the criteria of a good biosafety 
regulatory system ie being ‘understandable, workable, equitable, fair, adaptive and 
enforceable’,146 remains a challenge to scholars and other stakeholders, as long as 
the debate on potential risks and benefits continues. 
In attempting to establish how and the extent to which biosafety legislation in 
the selected countries may be said to be workable, the thesis uses the precautionary 
approach as a tool for analysis. The extent to which the legislation seeks to balance 
issues concerning safety of GMOs on the environment and humans on one hand 
and the need to promote scientific innovation on the other hand remains 
controversial. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The point of departure, then, is that in order to serve a meaningful purpose, new 
technologies should be accepted by the public but there are barriers that hamper 
acceptance.147 Biotechnology has given rise to seemingly competing yet legitimate 
interests that impact on the adoption and application of biosafety legislation in 
various jurisdictions. The design and implementation of a national biosafety system 
attempts to balance or align public policy goals, perceptions of safety and risk and 
economic, political and technical realities.148 
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Over the past three decades, developing countries have adopted national 
biosafety frameworks and guidelines, often in an ad hoc manner.149 There was need 
and pressure, mainly from industry, to commence research activities before relevant 
legislation was in place.150 Changing from ad hoc and reactive legislation to 
proactive substantive legislation should arguably satisfy two requirements. 
First, under the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
the incorporation of the Protocol in domestic legislation is obligatory. Additionally, the 
effectiveness of international regulation is dependent upon the willingness of parties 
to comply with their obligations under the Protocol. The Protocol has put in place 
relevant binding criteria for regulation, an element of which is the precautionary 
approach. 
Second, are public demands that biotechnology should serve the interests, 
needs and priorities of the people in each country. In practical terms, a major source 
of public interest, need and priority is food. Important questions range from what 
food, what quality, what quantity, to issues concerning access to food. Biotechnology 
seeks to provide part of the solution but the controversy over GM food continues. 
Since the 1990s the international community, governments, scientists, 
biotechnology companies, civil society groups and other stakeholders have grappled 
with the issue of how to promote the responsible use of biotechnology.151 The 
conflict between safety and profit making creates tension, making regulation largely 
a political issue.152 In seeking to reconcile the varying interests, states are expected 
to promote biotechnology at the same time regulating the ecological and social 
impacts of the industry.153 Objectivity and rationality can hardly be achieved without 
adequate public participation which brings into question the legitimacy of political and 
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scientific institutions.154 Moreover, the imposition of risk calls for some sort of 
consent and opportunities for the public to make voluntary and informed choices. 
Public involvement is therefore required in matters with potential long-term effects 
such as GMOs.155 
Governments have an obligation not only to inform the public of the decisions 
made but also to ensure that it has access to adequate information, to enable it to 
participate meaningfully in the decision-making processes.156 According to Jones, 
this may minimise the emotion and disinformation that characterises the GMO 
debate (particularly through the media), and enable people to make informed 
decisions based on facts rather than imagination.157 In Africa however, decision-
making in the regulation of biotechnology is sometimes dependent on the extent of 
political influence that multinational biotechnology companies and selected 
individuals may muster in a country.158 
In attempts to achieve a balance, two things may make a significant 
contribution. The first is the use of the precautionary approach as a tool for 
managing the scientific uncertainty inherent in biotechnology. The second is good 
governance, a process that encompasses public accountability and transparency in 
decision-making. It requires that public demands for safety and making 
biotechnology relevant to local needs and priorities be addressed. The 
implementation of the precautionary approach and good governance significantly 
enhance the credibility of decision making. 
Thus, the problem for discussion in the thesis is anchored on dilemma 
attributable to a set of three issues: 
First is the global GMO controversy that pits proponents and opponents 
against each other. This has given rise to a transatlantic political divide between the 
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United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU) mainly concerning the 
manner and extent to which GMOs may be regulated. The extent of and criteria for 
regulation remain contentious 
The USA is not a party to the CBD hence not a party to the Protocol, yet its 
influence on developments in biotechnology cannot be underestimated. Its global 
leadership in biotechnology as well as its domination of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)159 on the one hand and the EU’s resistance to GMOs on the 
other translates into a global power struggle160 for the control of food and markets 
among other things. As a result, the conflict between biosafety under the Protocol 
and trade under the WTO regime is yet to be resolved.161 
The effect is that international regulation of biotechnology is taking place 
within a political environment in which each side of the transatlantic political divide 
appears to have vested commercial and political interests to protect. In that 
environment, African states have found themselves caught in ‘crossfire’.162 They 
have a rich biodiversity to protect and huge populations to feed, sections of which 
are undernourished and even starving, as evidenced by the current food shortage 
crises in the Horn of Africa and Kenya. Relying on these factors, the USA has sought 
to legitimise its push for GM food in SSA, while the EU citing health concerns and 
the need to protect organic food imports, urged Zambia to reject GM food.163 
The latter factors that underpin the political economy of biotechnology are 
essential in appreciating the development of biosafety legislation in the selected 
countries. The transatlantic divide clearly manifested itself in the negotiations on the 
Protocol.164 The development of biosafety legislation in some of the selected 
countries appears to represent the unfolding, in Sub-Saharan Africa, of this political 
divide over GMOs. Such legislation may seek to implement the Protocol, while at the 
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same time serve testing the balance of power between proponents and opponents of 
biotechnology. 
Developing biosafety legislation within such a politicised environment in the 
selected countries appears to be as complex as biotechnology itself. Seeking to 
address local concerns for alleged increased food production using biotechnology 
against opposition on grounds of safety and amid external pressure for or against 
flexibility in the regulation, presents both opportunities and challenges. 
Second, is the controversy concerning the precautionary approach. Critics 
such as Pieterman and Hanekamp take the view that it is rejected on several 
grounds, including allegations that due to its many formulations, it has serious flaws 
with regard to logic and rationality. Furthermore, it lacks legal and moral quality by 
reason of being ambiguous with no clear meaning.165 The ferocity of the debate 
concerning the precautionary approach  is driven by competing political and 
economic interests and is heightened by the intrinsic ambiguities in its varying 
formulations.166 
Opponents such as Sunstein assert that the principle is ‘ a crude and often a 
perverse way of promoting desirable goals’ thus reducing its effectiveness and 
workability.167 Others argue that the principle is embedded in arbitrariness and may 
be manipulated for political gain;168 it is absolutist, unscientific and may be used to 
hold science hostage to group politics169 or be misused to justify protectionist 
commercial interests.170 
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Proponents of the precautionary principle such as Fisher, argue that it is, in 
general, relevant to risk regulation, a process that consists of three distinct but often 
overlapping activities ie standard setting, the application of those standards and 
enforcement.171 Implementing the standard setting process and reconciling facts, 
science and scientific uncertainty are intricate because they are often influenced by 
broader issues such as the legitimacy of regulation, globalisation, public participation 
and the interface between science and policy.172 These imperatives must be viewed 
against another role of the precautionary approach of providing guidance by 
assigning the benefit of the doubt in favour of human health and the environment.173 
Justice Stein concludes that the principle is one of the most remarkable 
developments of the last few decades and a milestone in the history of international 
environmental law.174 Thus, adoption or failure to adopt the principle in biosafety 
legislation arguably impacts on the credibility of such legislation. 
The precautionary approach stands between setting standards, application of 
those standards and enforcement175 on the one hand and enhancing the credibility 
of legislation on the other hand. The latter created a paradox of using a contested 
principle to address a controversial technology involving competing interests that 
may negatively impact  on transparency in decision-making. Though contested, its 
implementation is a milestone in GMO regulation. It is material in assessing the 
functionality of the Protocol and the credibility of domestic biosafety legislation. Thus 
implementation remains theoretical unless it is translated into reality for decision-
making. 
Third, institutional governance must be tested using the democratic imperative 
for good governance.  For purposes of the thesis, good governance in respect of 
GMOs governance is discussed from the perspective of transparency in decision-
making and public participation, which includes access to information.176 Improved 
access to information and public participation in decision-making enhances the 
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quality and the implementation of decisions and strengthens public support for such 
decisions.177  Arguably, it is during decision-making that theory relating to 
implementation of the precautionary approach, as well as legitimate expectations of 
the public in relation to GMOs, translates, or should translate, into reality. Moreover, 
the protection of the environment will only be enhanced globally when two rights go 
hand in hand— the right to information and the right to participation.178  A major 
concern however is that many African countries lack credible regulatory instruments 
and institutions for risk assessment in relation to the GM technology.179 In addition 
institutions should have the competencies that are commensurate to their regulatory 
mandate.180 
According to Justice Barak, reality entails ‘recognition of law in its entirety and 
the relationship between it and society’s values and principles, the ability to balance 
conflicting demands and to give expression to what is fundamental and basic’.181 
Within this context, it may be argued that in practice, it is the decision-maker who 
determines the benefits and safety of GM crops intended for commercial release.182 
Consequently, the precautionary approach’s impact will ultimately depend on how far 
it becomes effective in legislative, administrative and judicial law-making within 
national jurisdictions and regional bodies183 Part of the barrier is that ‘[t]here are 
people and organisations who use certain terms just to please donors while on the 
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ground they have a different work ethic ... one needs to see how they are reflected in 
the national documents to judge the commitment of countries to the ideal’.184 
Effectiveness is a relative concept, which here means good outcomes185 that 
must arguably emanate from government response that is transparent, participatory 
and based on freely available scientific and statistical information.186 Moreover, in 
order for science to become or remain relevant in democratic societies that depend 
on informed decision-making, scientists must communicate with the public for two 
main reasons namely revealing the socio-economic and safety impacts of 
biotechnology as well as the related moral dilemma.187 
Decision-making becomes complicated because the major stakeholders in 
risk decision-making (politicians, biotechnology investors, scientists, civil society and 
the public) should jointly engage in identifying the problem, suggesting options, 
assessing those options and reaching consensus.188 Consensus should be guided 
less by vested interests that originate from their role as risk producers and more by 
balancing it with broader social interests such as safety and environmental 
protection.189 Attempts to reconcile these varying interests in decision-making may 
make transparency difficult to achieve, particularly where there is unequal 
representation of the various stakeholders. This leaves the question of transparency 
by whom, to whom and under what terms unanswered.190 Lack of transparency may 
however be remedied at the level of risk management which has the potential to take 
place in the public domain.191 
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The public are more likely to be interested in broader issues than mere 
technical (biotechnological) criteria in mind. 192 Thus within its key institutions, society 
needs to incorporate the full range of relevant considerations including values and 
ethics that form part of the public interest.193 In viable or even emerging 
democracies, issues such as those concerning decision-making in biotechnology, 
should be dealt with openly and transparently with the public playing key roles.194 In 
any event, risk management provides an umbrella under which information from 
different sources can be combined in order to reach and implement a comprehensive 
decision.195 Part of the challenge for African countries is that ‘the general public and 
farmers in particular are not informed about the nature of the technology, its potential 
benefits and risks, and rarely do they participate in deciding on what crops or 
problems biotechnology research and development should focus on’.196  Thus, the 
manner and extent to which public involvement may contribute to effective 
implementation of the precautionary principle especially in decision-making, forms an 
integral part of this thesis. 
Dunleavy’s proposition in respect to research for a doctorate is that ‘you 
define the question: you deliver the answer’.197 Thus this thesis attempts to answer 
with respect to the precautionary approach as provided for in the Protocol, whether 
and, if so, how, to what extent and with what effect it has been implemented in South 
Africa, Kenya, Zambia and Namibia for purposes of GMO regulation? 
1.3 Objective 
The main goal of this thesis is to examine the regulation of GMOs in an African 
context focusing on the selected countries of South Africa, Kenya, Zambia and 
Namibia. The thesis investigates and proposes the effective implementation of the 
precautionary approach in enhancing biosafety legislation relating to GMOs within 
the selected countries with possible replication across SSA. This will benefit key 
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stakeholders including governments, consumers, the public and biotechnology 
investors in respect of introducing GMOs into the environment. Furthermore, the 
legislation may then aid decision making through balancing potential risks and 
benefits and hence contribute to adequate protection the environment and humans 
against potential harm associated with GMOs, while encouraging investment in 
biotechnology. 
The study analyses and identifies emerging trends in implementation of the 
precautionary principle among countries with varying attitudes towards GMOs. 
Based on this analysis, the study aims to investigate whether African countries can 
develop workable biosafety regimes that embrace the precautionary principle and 
still promote biotechnology. The thesis aims to make recommendations on how 
theory concerning the approach may translate into reality in decision-making for the 
purpose of making biosafety legislation more relevant in addressing the interests, 
priorities and challenges of the selected countries and SSA in general. 
To achieve its objective the thesis attempts to answer the following three 
pertinent specific questions: 
(i) What makes GMOs a controversial issue globally and how does the 
controversy impact on development of biosafety legislation in the selected 
countries? 
(ii) In attempts to resolve the GMO controversy, what are the emerging trends in 
the implementation of the precautionary approach in the selected countries and 
what accounts for such trends? 
(iii) From the perspective of precautionary approach, how may the regulation of 
GMOs in the selected countries be made more accountable and responsive to 
the people’s interests, needs and priorities? 
1.4 Rationale of the Study 
This thesis uses the precautionary approach as a tool for analysis because of its 
central role as the guiding criterion in regulation under the Protocol. Analysing the 












an opportunity for assessing the willingness, or lack thereof, in the selected countries 
to develop credible biosafety regimes. The approach is not only concerned with the 
views of scientists about the relevant data or how risk assessment is undertaken, but 
also with ‘how the decision-making institution balances science, scientific uncertainty 
and the normative aspects of decision-making in the exercise of its discretion’.198 To 
be relevant, the decision-making should safeguard the interests and priorities of all 
stakeholders in relation to GMOs. Moreover, developing countries have much more 
at stake in resolving the GM food conflict than do developed countries as the 
potential benefits and risks are greater in the former than in the latter.199 Thus this 
study is important for six main reasons. 
First, the alleged uncertainties, related fears, lack of data and ecological 
complexity associated with safety of GM food dictates that a balance must be sought 
between potential risks and benefits.200 Consequently there is a need for application 
of the precautionary approach in the regulation. Unfortunately, many African states 
are caught up in a GMO ‘cross fire’201. They find themselves in a dilemma largely 
attributable to differences in opinion between the USA and the EU. The opposing 
camps are working in one way or another to influence biosafety legislation in Africa. 
Furthermore, legislation in the selected c untries has significant trade implications 
for both sides of the transatlantic divide. 
Second, by analysing the evolving struggle for GMO governance in the 
selected countries, this thesis seeks to account for the emerging trends in the 
implementation of the precautionary approach. Those trends impact the credibility of 
biosafety legislation and may also shed light on the functionality of the Protocol in the 
selected countries. 
Third, in Africa, as biosafety legislation is in its infancy, this study provides an 
early opportunity to attempt a comparative study where no similar study was found to 
have been conducted. The study is topical mainly because, in 1992, the international 
community expressed its willingness to ‘enact effective legislation’.202 Since then, 
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states have adopted various instruments including the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)203 with its Kyoto Protocol204 and the 
CBD205 and its Cartagena Protocol.206 
Thus the concern of the international community is increasingly shifting from 
norm-setting to implementation of such norms.207 By assessing the emerging trends 
in the implementation of the principle, this study aims to provide a roadmap that may 
enhance the development of a jurisprudence relating to the principle across SSA. 
Focusing on the precautionary approach in an African context serves a number of  
purposes. 
• It enhances a proper understanding of some of the thresholds imposed by the 
Protocol 
• The lessons to be learnt from the emerging trends regarding implementation 
of the approach constitute an invaluable source for future reference, in 
particular, to enable some states to reconsider their attitudes towards the 
principle. 
• In their hand book Applying the Precautionary Principle208 Deville and Harding 
take the view that the hand book is useful to a wide range of people including 
those in government and local government who apply the principle in 
decision-making. Inspired by the handbook, the thesis aims to be of relevance 
to all GMO stakeholders including, scholars, relevant government agencies, 
decision-makers and the public who may be keen to participate in the GMO 
activities. 
Fourth, the precautionary approach seeks to address scientific uncertainty in 
the regulation of GMOs for the purpose of minimising or alleviating serious or 
irreversible damage to the environment and humans. However determining the 
                                                 
203 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 31 International Legal Materials 
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204 The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005. It is available at 
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Declaration and the Law of the Marine Environment (2003):43-50 at 43.  












seriousness or irreversibility of such damage involves social, scientific and economic 
considerations all of which require involvement of all stakeholders, particularly their 
perceptions and values.209 Further, there is a dearth of research creating the link 
between precaution, participation and sustainability.210 By focusing on 
implementation of the principle and examining its relevance within the context of 
institutional governance, this study attempts to establish the important link between 
precaution and public participation. It also demonstrates that such implementation 
will not serve a meaningful purpose in the absence of a supportive administrative 
structure. The latter encompasses transparency in decision-making, meaningful 
public participation and access to information. 
Fifth, the development of an agenda on the international regulation of 
biotechnology was arguably instigated by developing countries211 and thus was a 
brain child of those countries. Hence, this study provides an opportunity to assess 
the progress made and the benefits gained by African countries from such 
regulation. This thesis examines the GMO controversy within an environment where 
many people are poor, others malnourished, most of them illiterate or semi-illiterate, 
with limited or no knowledge about GMOs. 
In areas such as the North Eastern Province, Turkana and other parts of the 
Rift Valley in Kenya people have almost no food. Their concern is thus availability, 
access to and quantity rather than quality and choice of food. The relevance of 
debate on GM food is likely to be meaningless and irrelevant in the face of starvation 
and undernourishment. 
Taking into account the data used in this study, the findings, the conclusions 
and recommendations made are based on a practical rather than an abstract 
perspective. This thesis aims to be useful to countries in three important ways. The 
study may be used to replicate useful regulation and develop a jurisprudence relating 
to the principle as follows: 
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• For countries which have no legislation governing GMOs, it provides a 
benchmark to develop workable biosafety regimes. 
• For countries which have some legislation governing GMOs, it provides a 
basis for enhancing the credibility of existing legislation. 
• For countries which have GMO regulations and bills relating to GMOs, it 
provides a roadmap to enactment of substantive biosafety legislation. 
 
In all three situations the study aims to aid the selected countries to identify, 
understand and overcome the challenges to expect in GMO regulation. 
Sixth, some African countries have embraced GMOs with varying degrees of 
caution, others are on the ‘fence’ and a few are strongly opposed.212 The varying 
approaches in the selected countries exhibit interesting attributes that stimulated this 
study. South Africa is the leading promoter of GMOs in Africa. It enacted the 
Genetically Modified Organisms Act in 1997 and thus has a well-established and 
regulated biotechnology industry. South African farmers have ongoing plans to 
extend large scale commercial agriculture into twenty three African countries 
including Congo and Malawi.213 Thus, policy, legislation and GMO activities in South 
Africa are likely to influence developments on GMO activities in other African 
countries.214 South Africa has amended its existing biosafety legislation to comply 
with international instruments, key of which is the Protocol. Furthermore, South 
Africa’s approach to implementing the precautionary principle, will indicate the 
potential trend for regulation of GMOs in SSA 
Kenya is the most advanced and supportive country in East Africa in relation to 
GMO activities215 with GM crops such as cotton216 and maize awaiting 
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commercialization. Hence countries in the East African Region, most notably, 
Tanzania, have adopted a ‘wait and see’ tactic, buying time to observe the 
developments taking place in Kenya.217 As early as 1995, Zambia was already 
studying biosafety guidelines and regulations being developed in Kenya.218 Thus, a 
comparative study such as this is both desirable and essential for those three 
categories of countries identified earlier. 
Further, Kenya is one of the countries where biotechnology research and 
development (R&D) activities were far ahead of substantive biosafety legislation. 
Adopting such legislation in an environment where R&D activities are advanced 
makes reconciliation with the public demands for safety and democratic 
requirements for accountability, an intricate process. 
Zambia, however, is a vehement opponent of GMOs. In 2002 when severe 
drought in Zambia caused starvation, government refused to accept GMO food from 
the USA arguing that it was better for its people to die of hunger than to eat 
‘contaminated’ food. Such food was to be acceptable only if it was milled and 
imported into the country in the form of flour. While Zambia is party to the Protocol, it 
is an example of a country that has developed biosafety legislation from the 
perspective of resisting GMO. The way it implements the precautionary principle 
provides a basis for analysis which is biased against the introduction of GMOs. 
Namibia is also a party to the Protocol and it enacted its biosafety legislation 
after entry into force of the Protocol. Namibia, South Africa and Kenya have implicitly 
reflected the precautionary approach in their legislation. In contrast to the two 
countries where biotechnology activities are increasing rapidly, in Namibia such 
activities appear to be slower despite the fact that all three countries are proponents 
of GMOs. 
The varying attitudes described so far towards the precautionary principle and 
regulation of GMOs, form a basis for investigating whether the principle impedes or 
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facilitates the development of biotechnology and its regulation. The study provides 
an opportunity to examine how and the extent to which the selected and other 
African states may develop or otherwise improve their biosafety regimes. The study 
objectively analyses all the relevant issues including claims for accountability and 
transparency. 
1.5 Methodology 
This study is comparative.  It uses the precautionary approach as a tool for analysis 
of GMO regulation in the selected countries. Data was collated from primary and 
secondary sources using extensive literature. A thematic approach is employed in 
analysing issues in order to avoid repetition, for example, in chapter five, public 
participation as a theme is discussed for each of the selected countries. The 
descriptive aspects of the thesis relate to background and factual information while 
the analytical aspects critically engage with the issues raised. 
Primary sources at the domestic level in particular, are authoritative 
statements of legal rules by government bodies.219 These include legislation, bills, 
policies, regulations, official government documents, opinions of courts and decided 
cases. At the international level, relevant primary sources include treaties, protocols 
and declarations by states. 
Secondary sources are used to explain, interpret, develop, locate or update 
primary sources.220 They may contain critical analyses as well as useful comments 
of varying degrees of persuasiveness.221 Secondary sources used in this study 
include books, journal articles, Internet materials, reports, conference papers and 
newspaper reports from reputable sources. Environmental law is a field where the 
speed and scale of legal and regulatory change is significantly fast.222 Thus internet 
and newspaper reports provide useful, up to date, information. 
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This study examines the regulation of GMOs in the selected countries from the 
perspective of the precautionary approach. It does not claim to cover exhaustively all 
aspects of the approach, in the regulation of GMOs. Writing from a legal background 
also means that the thesis cannot claim to effectively deal with intricate scientific 
terms or issues, except in so far as such terms or issues are the subject of legal 
scrutiny. Further, taking into account the issues of terminology concerning the terms 
precautionary ‘principle’ and ‘approach’,223  the latter is used in the thesis except 
where circumstances, such as the historical developments (discussed in chapter 
three), dictate that the former be used. 
Relevant areas of international law, including one of its major components, 
international environmental law, are discussed as they give legitimacy to the 
application of precautionary principle. Further, they contain customary international 
law and treaty obligations requiring implementation of the principle in the selected 
countries. Limited aspects of sociological jurisprudence are examined for the 
purpose of developing a theoretical conceptual framework for the thesis. 
Institutional governance of GMOs in the selected countries provides what may 
be termed as the acid test used to assess, whether, and if so how and to what extent 
implementation of the principle may facilitate decision-making through effectively 
balancing potential risks and benefits of GMO introduction. It is within this context 
that two main areas of institutional governance relevant to decision-making are 
discussed ie decision-making institutions and public participation, including access to 
information. 
1.7 Structure 
The thesis systematically discusses the issues raised, starting with broader socio-
economic, environmental, ethical and political issues then moving to more specific 
ones, such as legislation governing biotechnology. This approach has three main 
advantages: 
                                                 












• It provides an appropriate context for discussing the imperatives that underpin 
regulation. 
• It forms a basis for comprehensive understanding of the implementation of the 
precautionary approach in an African context because challenges to the 
approach are not restricted to developing countries. 
• It is used to develop a theoretical framework224 that guides the thesis. 
                                                 













CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN THE GMO CONTROVERSY 
‘It must be borne in mind that food is not only an agricultural or 
trade commodity but also an essential emotional, political and 
public health issue’1 
 
2.1 Understanding the GMO Debate 
Since their introduction, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have been mired in 
controversy particularly on how to achieve a balance between potential risks and 
benefits. Complicating this debate is the existence of competing socio-economic, 
environmental, ethical and political interests which have polarised the international 
community into two opposing camps: the proponents and opponents to GMOs.  This 
in turn has presented challenges in their regulation. 
Understanding the source of the conflict, however, requires getting to grips 
with the arguments presented by both camps. This chapter therefore analyses these 
various interests and how they impact on the regulation of GMOs. Such a discussion 
lays the ground for a critique of the implementation of the precautionary principle in 
subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
Tool Making and Biotechnology 
Tool making is not a recent phenomenon in human history. Tools such as fire and 
nuclear technology result in both benefits and harm. Genetic engineering is one such  
tool of the twentieth century that has resulted in global controversy particularly 
concerning its alleged benefits and risks in agricultural biotechnology. The 
controversy is exacerbated because what we eat has a history – not merely a history 
of food but a history in culture and society.2 For this reason, values and culture are 
                                                 
1 ‘Ethics of Modern Development in Agriculture Technologies’ Opinion No. 24 (2008):18 The 
European Group of Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/doc...(accessed 18 September 2009). 












areas over which conflicts arise when a state (or any other people) promote or 
impose its values on another civilization.3 
The dilemma of protecting the environment and human health against the 
contested potential harm of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) without 
hindering scientific inventions and international trade remains problematic. As Rifkin 
observes, human beings make history by making a choice from among ‘competing 
possibilities and priorities’.4 In addition, all technologies develop within given 
economic, political, intellectual and other contexts, without which the technology will 
be abortive.5 Moreover, agriculture itself is perceived as a ‘difficult’ sector for many 
reasons, but mainly because of the many areas it covers, various farming systems, 
agro-ecosystem and the various interests involved.6 In addition, potential risks are 
essentially hypothetical as they do not relate to specific causalities but rather with 
probabilities and complex interrelationships. This makes it difficult to judge when 
such risks are real enough for politics to respond, let alone how.7 
These and other considerations imply that attempts to explore the possibilities 
and face the challenges of any technology will not only attract increased interest in 
that technology; it may enhance its chances of success or failure. Further, it may 
validly be argued that the desire of opposing camps to promote (or even defend) 
their interests and perspectives in relation to biotechnology has enhanced the zeal 
with which these opposing camps operate. 
The actions and responses of each camp may have a positive or negative 
impact on the development of biotechnology; it will probably have both. A clear 
understanding of the conceptual issues that impact the complexity and regulation of 
biotechnology is imperative. By analysing the conceptual issues, the thesis places 
the precautionary approach in its appropriate context in the regulation of 
biotechnology. Before discussing them, an overview of the problem in African 
agriculture is important. It provides justification for the introduction of GMOs into the 
continent. 
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2.2 The Problem with African Agriculture 
About 80% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) live in rural areas where 
70% depend on agriculture for food production through farming.8 Most are engaged 
in small scale farming that provides employment for 60% of the population. 9 
Agriculture is the ‘cornerstone’ of most African economies, being the biggest source 
of foreign exchange10 and the main generator of savings and tax revenues.11 It 
remains central in efforts to achieving the poverty targets of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in the continent.12 These include eradication of extreme 
poverty, ensuring environmental sustainability, combating HIV/AIDS, Malaria and 
other diseases.13 
Africa is a continent rich in natural and human resources but due to famine 
attributable to food shortages,14 disease and growing populations, almost 200 million 
people are undernourished.15 More than 60 percent of the undernourished live in 
countries that include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, 
Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. 
Other factors that hamper agricultural productivity include: lack of a dominant 
farming system on which food security largely depends, heavy reliance on rain as 
opposed to irrigation; lack of functional competitive markets; under-development in 
agricultural research and development (R&D) and infrastructure; poor soil fertility, 
and predominance of customary land tenure16. In Zambia for example, the 
                                                 
8 See ‘The Crisis in African Agriculture: a More Effective Role for EC aid?’ (2005):6 available at 
www.practicalaction.org.uk (accessed 16 May 2009). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Barker J ‘Agribusiness and Agrarian Change’ in Barker J (ed) The Politics of Agriculture in Africa 
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agriculture sector is facing enormous challenges and endless problems which 
require urgent intervention by government and all the stakeholders.17 
In addition, civil wars (some of which are mainly sponsored by western 
powers trying to control the region’s mineral wealth18), political instability and other 
factors such as lack of access, negatively impact on food security. As a result, the 
need for increased food production is imperative. Whether science and technology 
may make a difference is a possibility to be examined.19 
Over the years cultivation of GM crops has been on the increase globally. 
Figure 120 on the next page is a schematic presentation of the global GM crop up 
take by the year 2010. It shows that the uptake of GMO crops globally is increasing 
steadily. The year 2010 marked the 15th annivsersary of the commercialisation of 
biotechnology crops.  In a Report21 for that year compiled by the International 
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA), the accumulated 
hectarage from 1996 – 2010 exceeded an unprecedented milestoneone billion 
hectares globally. In 2010, developing countries grew 48% of the global 
biotechnology crops. ISAAA attributes the increase to ‘consistent and substantial, 
crop productivity, economic and environmental welfare benefits. This assertion is 
perhaps true in respect to the mega-countries growing GM crops. These include 
USA, Brazil, Argentina, India, Canada and South Africa. 
2.3 The Status of GMOs in Africa: An Overview 
Increased interest in GMOs in developing countries is attributable to the recent 
dramatic increases in food prices and the threat to developing country agriculture 
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posed by climate change.22 In Africa three countries led by South Africa have 
commercialised GMO crops 
 
The other two are Burkina Faso and Egypt. Field trials for GM crops are also being 
conducted in countries that include Morocco, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
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and Zimbabwe.23 Uganda may soon adopt biosafety legislation24 which will make 
commercialisation of bananas and other GM crops possible. 
Currently in South Africa GM crops are commercially grown in various parts of 
the country. For example, maize is grown by Agro, BASF, Carnia, Pannar and 
Monsanto in places that include Delmas, Nelspruit, White River, Skeersport and 
Potchefstroom. Other GM crops grown by various companies across the country 
include cotton, soyabean, potatoes, tomatoes, apples and canola.25 
In Kenya experimenting with GMO foods has been going on in a number of 
places including Kiboko, Alupe, Busia, Kabete and Mwea research centres.26 The 
adoption of the Biosafety Act of Kenya will enable the country to commercialise GM 
crops in the country. These include cotton and maize which have been undergoing 
field trials at the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) and other parts of the 
country. 
The increasing uptake of or interest in GMOs in some of the African countries 
such as South Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Burkina Faso, dictates that as many 
stakeholders as possible should understand and appreciate the controversy 
surrounding GM food and the need for h listic approaches towards their regulation. It 
should however be noted that there was resistance to the commercial release of the 
GM potato27 and the introduction of GM sorghum28 in South Africa. In Kenya, there 
were protests to the enactment of the Biosafety Act.29 The protests  are still going on 
due to fear by the public and civil society that GM maize may be imported even 
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24 See ‘Uganda Minister Assures on Biosafety Bill’ (2008) available at 
http://biotecuganda.com/articles.php?id=5 (accessed 23 November 2009).   
25 See ‘Where in South Africa are GE Crops Growing?’ available at 
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before the regulations under the Biosafety Act are approved.30 Zambia has remained 
at the forefront on rejection of GM food as aid.31 The varying attitudes towards 
GMOs must be understood within the perspectives that underpin environmental 
protection in general. 
2.4 Varying Environmental Perspectives 
The manner and ways in which states, individuals, groups and other stakeholders 
view nature (hence, the environment) is material in assessing their reasoning, 
responses and actions in relation to biotechnology. The different ways in which 
humanity views nature, has resulted in the emergence of various environmental 
perspectives. At the outset, it is therefore necessary to identify these perspectives 
(or ethics), which in one way or the other, underpin the regulation of biotechnology. 
Bell and McGillivray have identified four perspectives as follows. 
• Environmental, that places emphasis on protection of the environment or 
biodiversity, and where there is no conflict with such protection, human health. 
• Economic, that places emphasis on taking action where it is economically 
efficient based on an analysis of the costs and benefits of individual options. 
Effectively, it is an accounting framework that prescribes the types of costs 
and benefits to consider, how to assess and aggregate them.32 
• Social and cultural, that questions attitudes to natural scientific assessments 
of risk, and that is one of the reasons why risk (and hence precaution) is 
construed culturally. The social and cultural perspective promote stakeholder 
consultation in order to arrive at objective decisions on what is acceptable. 
• Scientific, that adopts a ‘technocratic’ approach which postulates 
environmental issues and disputes can be resolved scientifically and purports 
to reach ‘objective’ and conclusive opinions about such matters.33 
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These perspectives have an impact on how people in different places view the 
environment. They tend to influence the balancing of the social-economic, 
environmental, cultural and other concerns relevant to the regulation of 
biotechnology. For example, environmentalists such as Greenpeace and the 
Independent Science Panel (ISP)34, give priority to the protection and conservation 
of biological diversity. This is an issue of major concern to the international 
community. A brief discussion of the subject is useful in placing the GMO 
controversy in its appropriate context. 
2.5 Biological diversity 
Biodiversity comprises all living beings from the most primitive forms of viruses to the 
most sophisticated and highly evolved animals and plants. 35 It is usually considered 
in three categories: genetic diversity that refers to variability within a species; species 
diversity that refers to the variety of living organisms on earth or in a given area of 
study and ecosystem diversity which refers to diversity and health of the ecological 
complexes within which species occur.36 Biodiversity is therefore as varied as it is 
complex. Art 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)37 defines biological 
diversity as: 
‘the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, 
between species and of ecosystems’. 
Threats to biodiversity take place ‘when one of the members of the ecosystem is 
eliminated, causing degradation to the ecosystem in unanticipated ways or a series 
of events lead to the degradation of the environment’.38 However, an ecosystem is a 
complicated organism whose functions depend upon dynamic interaction among its 
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parts and such interactions are hardly understood.39  Such threats are mainly 
attributable to over-harvesting, habitat destruction, pollution and improper 
introduction of alien plants and animals.40 These anthropogenic activities have 
resulted in three crises that simultaneously threaten humanity: a dwindling of the 
Earth’s non-renewable energy reserves (due to overpopulation, logging, grazing and 
development activities), a risky build up of global warming gases and continuous 
decline in biological diversity.41 Increase in population in Africa, is of major concern 
because the more the people the more the strain on biodiversity. For example the 
need for more food necessitates the clearing of more forest land thus negatively 
affecting biodiversity. 
The benefits of biodiversity are elusive and due to its complexity, economists 
have failed to identify acceptable ways of computing such benefits.42 Biological 
diversity impacts on conservation in two main ways. (i) effective species 
conservation is dependent upon effective conservation of the ecosystems of which 
such species form part43 (ii) conserving diversity should be broad based (as opposed 
to narrow and artificial conservation) in such a manner that allows species systems 
to develop and interact freely.44 
The importance of biodiversity for the benefit of humans and other species 
cannot be overemphasised. Biological diversity serves many purposes of which 
Raven identifies two. All our food, medicines, most of our building materials such as 
timber, clothing, and chemical feedstocks are derived from biodiversity. The other 
one is that the communities and ecosystems that comprise biodiversity safeguard 
our watersheds, stabilize our soils, impact on climate change and provide insects 
(such as bees45) that facilitate pollination of our crops.46 It is the differences within 
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the species that we use that are important when stresses change. Biodiversity must 
be safeguarded so as to keep and maintain breeding varieties that are capable of 
resisting diseases and threats such as climate change.47 
Further, biodiversity is of intrinsic value; it has ‘ecological, genetic, social, 
economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational aesthetic values…’ and it is 
important ‘for evolution and maintaining life sustaining systems’48 For this and other 
reasons, analysts recognise that: 
‘Our natural world is a thing of beauty largely because of the 
diversity of living forms found in it. Artists have attempted 
to capture this beauty in drawings, paintings, sculpture, and 
photography, and poets, writers, architects and musicians 
have created works reflecting and celebrating the natural world’49 
 
Loss of biodiversity presents one of the most serious threats to the world’s 
long-term sustainability.50 Agriculture, forestry and grazing are the most destructive 
agents accounting for the exploitative use of more than half of the world’s land 
surface.51 In contrast however, biological resources constitute the foundation upon 
which we build civilizations as nature’s products support diverse industries in areas 
such as agriculture, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, pulp and paper, horticulture, 
construction and waste management.52 Locally, Africa’s biological richness is 
material in alleviating poverty, enhancing food security, promoting industrial 
innovation and contributing to development of new medicines.53 Biodiversity may 
therefore be described as mainly being biological insurance for ecosystem 
processes.54 
Further, loss of biodiversity increases the chances species of extinction;.55  it 
threatens our food supplies, opportunities for recreation and tourism, sources of 
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wood, medicines and energy. Moreover rather than being an obstacle, protection of 
the natural environment is a core element of development as cumulative and 
irreversible degradation of the biosphere on which life is dependent upon,56 leads to 
destruction both of humanity and the environment itself.  During the recent 
International Diversitas Biodiversity and Society Conference experts confirmed that 
loss of biodiversity in the earth system is taking place at an accelerating rate and that 
such loss erodes the integrity of ecosystems and their capacity to adapt in a 
changing world. The experts took the view that accelerated global loss of biodiversity 
poses ‘a serious risk to human wellbeing and a squandering of current assets and 
future opportunities.’57 
Lack of knowledge and the imminent loss of, and threats to biodiversity have 
made the conservation and sustainable use of global biodiversity an awesome 
challenge to humanity.58 Invariably, poor people living in the developing countries 
suffer most from the adverse effects of environmental degradation.59 
Both the CBD and the Protocol seek the protection and conservation of 
biological diversity among other things.60 In its 83rd plenary meeting, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations declared 2010 the International Year of Biodiversity 
thereby setting in motion a process of re-examining the urgent need to conserve the 
earth’s ecosystems.61 
Thus, the strength of each country’s conservation ethic is measured by the 
wisdom and effectiveness of its legislation in protecting biological diversity.62 
Conserving biological diversity is an investment in immortality63 and is a key concern 
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for sustainable development.64 It is a central issue in the regulation of biotechnology. 
Most of the issues that underpin the GMO global controversy revolve around it.  
2.6 Biotechnology: Causes of the Global GMO Controversy 
The causes of the GMO controversy are as varied and as complex as biotechnology 
itself. These include, differences in opinion on potential risks and benefits of GMOs, 
ethical issues, public perceptions about GMOs, socio-economic considerations, 
globalization and political considerations. 
2.6.1 Potential Risks and Potential Benefits of Biotechnology 
The debate about potential benefits and potential risks of GM crops takes place 
between two extreme camps which view such crops as either good or bad. 
Opponents view them as potentially harmful to global agriculture, the environment 
and human health.65 Proponents argue that there are few, if any, new risks in the 
GM technology; they  regard  GM crops as  the saviour of both global agriculture and 
the environment.66 Moreover the benefits and risks associated with GM crops are 
difficult to quantify, making it almost impossible to determine whether and the extent 
to which biotechnology may provide a sustainable solution to food problems in 
developing countries.67 
In resisting the GMO technology, opponents argue that predicting ecological 
consequences is difficult du  to variations in environments, complexities of 
ecosystems and the large numbers of species that exist within most environments.68 
Moreover, the proper functioning of viable ecosystems is the underpinning of 
sustainable development and the maintenance of human life and the quality of that 
life.69 In addition, there are uncertainties associated with the occurrence, magnitude, 
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timing and significance level of potentially adverse effects.70 Underlying assumptions 
and the framing of research questions may also contribute to further uncertainty and 
ignorance.71 Ultimately, the introduction of GMOs may adversely impact on the 
ecological stability of a given ecosystem. 
For example,  when cultivated GM farms are cleared of weeds with chemical 
sprays against which the crops are protected by transgenes; food for birds is 
reduced, resulting in a decline in population of such birds.72 
Insects are instrumental in promoting significant ecological and agricultural 
processes that include pollination of crops, weed control, and insect pest control. 
Thus 
‘biological diversity represents a rich, untapped resource for future uses 
and benefits, and many as-yet-unknown species may someday provide us 
with products. A reduction in biological diversity decreases this treasure 
prematurely and permanently’.73 
The introduction of alien species is another concern particularly to African 
states. Opponents argue that GMOs may cause or contribute to loss of biodiversity 
by reason of being alien species.74 This assertion may not be true in its entirety.  For 
instance, maize is not indigenous to Africa as it originated from Mexico yet it is a 
staple food for many people as well as animals. Schaal asserts that the tropics have 
the greatest natural biodiversity in the world with different types of plants, animals, 
fungi, bacteria and the biological relationship among species is complex. She argues 
that in the tropics: 
‘species often have highly specialized ecological niches and are 
frequently closely tied to other species in the community by feeding 
relationships, by competition, parasitism or mutualism. These intricate 
connections between species potentially make tropical species and 
communities vulnerable when biological perturbations occur. The concern 
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is that tropical communities may highly [sic] be sensitive to 
perturbations’75 
This ground for opposing GMOs can be contested because the conventional maize 
found in many parts of Africa originated in Mexico. It is unrealistic to regard maize as 
alien especially since it is now planted in many parts of the continent and constitute 
staple food for the majority of people in the continent. 
The proponents of biotechnology contend that that the problem of alien 
species may be avoided by using local genes that belong to the same environment 
and are hence friendly to the ecosystem in question. For instance, in 2008 at a 
symposium held at the University of Cape Town, Thomson argued that field trials of 
transgenic maize in Western Kenya are intended to produce traits of maize that 
derive from the local varieties. She argued that this would enhance acceptability of 
such maize to the local communities and make risk assessment more reliable and 
less cumbersome.76 
Another concern that biotechnology, being industrialised agriculture 
‘dependant on high technology’ could plunge the world into a state of helplessness in 
case something  went wrong.77 The likelihood of losing large numbers of plant 
species (about 60, 000 to 100,000 already threatened) due to factors that include 
climate change, habitat loss, invasive alien species, has led to the establishment of 
the Millennium Seed Bank – a project which aims to preserve species thought to be 
threatened with extinction or are extinct in the wild, among other things.78 
Gene flow usually caused by transfer of pollen remains a matter of concern 
mainly for organic farmers and consumers. Pollen is usually carried by people, wind, 
animals and water.79 The main issues raised about gene flow are twofold. It can alter 
the gene pool of native (and possibly related) species, resulting in homogenization 
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that may give rise to loss of critical genetic biodiversity.80   The other concern is that 
gene flow may result in loss of genetic variation within an ecosystem. This may 
compromise the ability of wild populations to adapt to biological or physical 
environmental changes.81 This may amount to genetic ‘pollution’ or ‘contamination’.82 
For example, in remote areas of Mexico, transgenes were detected in organic food 
and maize fields.83 Such developments, accompanied by domination of GM crops by 
private biotech industries and lack of sufficient knowledge about the biological effects 
of gene flow, have exacerbated uncertainty concerning potential risks and benefits of 
biotechnology.84 
In Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada85 the plaintiffs - organic farmers  brought a 
class action on behalf of all organic grain farmers of Saskatchewan Province 
claiming damages allegedly resulting from the development and commercial 
introduction into Canada of GM Canola by the defendants. The plaintiffs claimed that 
the ‘advantageous presence’ of GM Canola in fields of organic grain  made it 
impossible for organic farmers to guarantee that Canola grown as organic did not 
contain traces of GM Canola seed with the result that Canola could no longer be 
grown for the organic market. The defendants denied the claims and argued that the 
plaintiffs had no cause of action.86  They further questioned the legality of the class 
action and argued that the named plaintiffs were not appropriate representatives of 
the plaintiffs.87 They also sought further and better particulars regarding the 
standards or regulations the plaintiffs relied on in support of their claims.88. Justice 
Smith dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on the grounds that the pleadings failed to 
disclose a reasonable cause of action in negligence, strict liability or trespass. 
While the plaintiff’s claim was based on alleged contamination resulting in 
economic loss it also raised broader underlying concerns which were not 
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substantively brought before the court. These included protection of traditional 
farming practices, appropriate balance of rights and responsibilities, safety of GMOs, 
and access to information.89 
Proponents of biotechnology however maintain that GM agriculture will result in 
reduction in the use of pesticides and herbicides thereby minimising any adverse 
effects of such pesticides and herbicides on other species.90 Developing countries in 
the tropics have very high levels of pesticide application91 on account of the 
predominant traditional methods of agriculture. If the contention that use of 
biotechnology in reducing application of pesticides is acceptable, it would logically 
follow that countries within the tropics (especially in Africa) with rich biodiversity yet 
with many starving people need GMOs more than countries in the western world 
whose biodiversity is immensely depleted. In contrast, to the extent that transgenic 
crops are inherently part of large scale farming systems, they may significantly 
contribute to the reduction of genetic diversity, mainly because regular gene flow 
from a uniform crop is more likely to displace native genetic diversity.92 
The proponents further argue that organic agriculture is not sustainable; it 
leads to reduced yields and has left half the population in SSA starving, meaning that 
it cannot solve world food shortages.93 GM crops in Africa have only been 
commercialised in South Africa, Egypt and Burkina Faso. Whether such food will 
alleviate the hunger problem in Sub-Saharan Africa remains to be seen. Kenya has 
recently adopted biosafety legislation94 and commercialisation is expected soon. In 
other areas, some countries such as Zambia remain vehemently opposed to GMOs. 
Taking into account that GM food has been consumed for more than twenty years as 
indicated at (2.6.5), an objective assessment by stakeholders is needed to determine 
its benefits rather than maintaining an attitude of ‘blanket’ rejection of such food. 
Further, the concept of substantial equivalence as articulated by the Royal 
Society entails that the safety of GM foods must be assessed in comparison with 
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their conventional counterparts.95 In scientific language, the conventional counterpart 
is regarded as the control.96  As indicated earlier97 once GM food is shown to be 
substantially equivalent to its conventional counterpart, it is considered as safe as its 
conventional counterpart. The concept of substantial equivalence may therefore be 
regarded as a guiding principle in risk assessment for determining whether a GM 
food or food product is as safe as the traditionally bred non-GM counterpart.98 If, 
(using chemical analyses) a GMO has been classified as ‘substantially equivalent’ it 
is regarded as posing no new health risks and will then be approved for commercial 
use.99 This means that once a GMO has been declared substantially equivalent the 
burden of proof shifts to the person who questions such a finding. In practical terms, 
the people who may be affected are some of the consumers who may be unaware of 
such a finding, especially if the food is not sufficiently labelled. 
Opponents of the concept of substantial equivalence argue that biotechnology 
companies are free to compare whatever is the most expeditious for claiming 
substantial equivalence and to carry out the least discriminating tests that would 
conceal any substantial difference.100 Analysts such as Ingeborg and Traavik further 
criticise the concept of substantial equivalence on three main grounds. First, it lacks 
precision and control with respect to transgene integration. Second, it is founded on 
narrow frameworks, which will ultimately affect the design, implementation of 
methods, choice of variables/indicators and timescales of the study. Third, the use of 
substantial equivalence avails neither the means to detect alterations in gene 
expression patterns of endogenous genes nor the establishment of whether the 
inserted constructs or parts of it move within the recipient genome. They conclude 
that the concept may therefore be regarded as an attempt to scale down the 
complexity of the risk to manageable proportions, using traditional science to solve 
the complexity of the issue at hand. 101 
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In contrast to substantial equivalence, the precautionary approach questions 
the credibility of the risk-related scientific advice and requires identification of the 
areas where scientific understanding is lacking and the level of such ignorance. 102 
The principle shifts the burden of proof to the person who claims that a GMO is 
substantially equivalent to its conventional counterpart. 
In order for GM technology to deliver the alleged benefits, GM crops and food 
must not only be supported politically, but farmers must be willing to plant the crops, 
consumers must be willing to eat the food, and it must be capable of providing the 
required nutritional values.103 The ability of these non-political factors to reinforce 
each other provides an added advantage because a demonstrable increase in 
nutritional value will instance enhance consumer and public acceptance of GM food 
thus leading to increased producer uptake.104 
2.6.2 Socio-economic Considerations 
As we argued elsewhere, socio-economic considerations are as varied as they are 
complex due to the varying ethical, cultural and economic dimensions they take.105 
In the context of biotechnology, socio-economic considerations cover a wide 
spectrum of concerns relating to the actual and potential consequences of 
biotechnology including impacts on: 
‘income and welfare, cultural practices, community well-being, traditional 
crops and varieties, domestic science and technology, rural employment, 
trade and competition, the role of transnational corporations, indigenous 
peoples’ knowledge, food security, ethics and religion, consumer benefits, 
and ideas about agriculture, technology and society’.106 
In SSA for example, small scale farming plays a key role in food production 
and provides employment for local people. For biotechnology to provide sustainable 
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solutions for peasant farmers, their interests and priorities must be taken into 
account. Many of them are poor people who hardly can afford to pay for farm 
expenses. Relevant questions that arise include whether and the extent to which GM 
crops may improve the lives of the farmers. 
Thus, socio-economic considerations touch on almost all aspects of human 
life. The inevitable overlap and conflict of interests makes decision-making in 
biotechnology an intricate process. In addition and as Khwaja argues, existing socio-
economic conditions in a state are material factors that influence the country’s policy 
decisions. He further argues, the divergence in socio-economic conditions between 
developed and developing countries has given rise to a ‘conflict of concern and 
interest’ regarding the role of socio-economic considerations in the regulation of 
biotechnology.107 These and other characteristics made inclusion of socio-economic 
considerations in international regulation of biotechnology inevitable. 
The manner and extent to which socio-economic considerations are taken into 
account during decision-making determines the weight states give or purport to give 
to such considerations in regulation of biotechnology. 
The fundamental issue in decision-making is the extent to which the alleged 
benefits outweigh potential risks or vice-versa. This is one of the main challenges in 
the regulation of biotechnology globally which comes from failure by international 
and domestic regulatory regimes to define what constitutes socio-economic 
considerations and difficulties in balancing socio-economic considerations with 
cultural, ethical and political imperatives.108 
Further, socio-economic considerations are inextricably interlinked hence 
difficult to compartmentalise.109 It is therefore not surprising that neither the CBD nor 
the Protocol provides a definition of socio-economic considerations. At the domestic 
level, determining socio-economic considerations and which take priority requires 
careful balancing of various interests relevant to the regulation of biotechnology. 
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Such balancing requires objective criteria (including precaution) and transparency in 
decision-making. 
2.6.3 Ethical Considerations in Biotechnology 
Ethics form an integral part of philosophy whose central theme, according to Kagan 
is: how should people live yet attempting to answer that question may seem 
‘arrogant, pretentious or embarrassing’.110 Hence, this study does not claim to offer 
an exhaustive definition of ethics. For purposes of this discussion, ethics may be 
defined as moral principles that control or influence a person’s behaviour111. Ethics is 
concerned with deciding what is morally acceptable and what is not; 112 contain a 
moral prohibition on causing serious harm to the innocent.113 Ethics are significantly 
involved in judgements about science, risk and uncertainty114 but become 
problematic for a number of reasons. 
The complexity of ethical considerations and the manner in which ethics 
impacts on various aspects of human life make it rare to find ethical experts. 
Williams takes a more strict view. He asserts that ‘[t]here are notoriously no ethical 
experts and it is not in the least clear how there could be ethical witnesses’115 
Arguably, getting ethical witnesses is even trickier as different people hold different 
views on the subject. The other reason concerns recognising whether or when an 
issue becomes ethical in decision-making116. This is mainly because there is no 
universally acceptable criterion for determining what kind of life people want or what 
amounts to good life. 
Finally, ethics keep on changing from time to time owing to changing human 
lifestyles, priorities and interests. For example, in ancient Greece, great philosophers 
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such as Aristotle held the view that making money for its own sake or for any other 
purpose other than for basic necessities such as food was unnatural and erroneous 
hence, unethical.117 In more recent times however (owing to socio-economic 
changes in human life), charging interest on money lent is the order of the day in 
business. Another example derives from the Renaissance (fourteenth to sixteenth 
century), when humanity viewed the environment as ‘indifferent, undifferentiated and 
mindless’, as a result of which western society ‘sought to exploit nature for higher 
things’,118 such as the development of capitalism. 
These are among the factors that aggravated anthropogenic activities which 
led to the depletion of natural resources leading to degradation of the environment. 
Ultimately an environmental crisis evidenced by global warming, climate change, 
loss of or threats to loss of biodiversity and other hazards, is a major concern of the 
international community. Currently, critical issues include how to control, minimise or 
eliminate altogether such hazards for the benefit of present and future generations. 
These changes in the actions of some human beings from being predators to 
conservers and protectors of the environment attract a conservation ethic which 
‘aims to pass on to future generations the best part of the non-human world’. To 
know this world is to gain a proprietary attachment to it. To know it well is to love and 
take responsibility for it’119 
The changes in attitude illustrate that ethical considerations regarding the 
environment are continuously changing. However, one of the key ethical questions 
that is difficult to resolve is the extent to which humanity should exploit the 
environment for legitimate activities such as agriculture, without posing serious 
danger to human’s health, future generations and the environment? 
In SSA for instance, land available for agriculture is diminishing gradually, 
water scarcity is a perennial problem in many countries - including the selected 
countries, traditional methods of natural breeding in agriculture (such as 
hybridization) that reached their apex during the green revolution (1950-1980s) have 
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not solved the hunger problem. The green revolution had its proponents and critics. 
Whereas proponents of new technologies such as the Rockefeller Foundation are 
convinced that technology bypassed Africa, critics such as GRAIN120 insist that 
technology did not do so: it failed.121 Currently, resistance to biotechnology in a 
number of countries including Zambia and Benin illustrate this. 
As mentioned in chapter one, art. 27(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR)122 provides for the right to ‘freely participate in the cultural life of the 
community… and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits’. Such a right 
extends to scientific advancements in agricultural biotechnology, raising doubts on 
claims by opponents that the new technology lacks ethical legitimacy. 
2.6.4 Key Ethical Issues in Biotechnology 
Ethical issues here are varied and cover the food we eat, our health, the 
environment and our own nature.123 Pertinent questions include whether people 
have a right to know the type of food they eat, whether manipulation of plants and 
animals to create new organisms amounts to playing God and whether patenting 
living organisms is ethically acceptable (individuals owning such fundamental 
building blocks of living systems, even temporarily). It is against this background that 
key ethical issues leading to resistance to biotechnology must be understood. 
2.6.4.1 Biotechnology and Food: The Right to Know 
In 1778 Thomas Jefferson said ‘If people let the government decide what foods they 
eat and what medicines they take, their bodies will soon be in a sorry a state as are 
the souls of those who live under tyranny’.124 Biotechnology raises many critical 
issues concerning food. Some of the issues are religious, others aesthetic and 
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others cultural.125 The right to know seemingly cuts across all such issues. It is 
argued that consumers have or should have a right to know and to choose the type 
of food they want to eat. Based on alleged scientific uncertainty concerning safety of 
GMOs, consumers may want to know, as far as possible, ‘where their food was 
grown, who grew it, when they grew it, why they grew it and how they grew it’.126 
Labelling has two counteracting effects: it increases transparency, consumer 
information and choice on the one hand. It implies that GM foods are inherently less 
safe than food produced by traditional agriculture or ‘organic’ foods. On the other, 
establishing and monitoring a labelling system raises the cost of food production.127 
Thus, the presence or absence of labelling indicates the weight a regulatory regime 
places on the right of consumers to know.128 By providing for mandatory 
identification and labelling, the biosafety regime of Zambia129 appears to ensure that 
consumers know the type of food they may purchase while the silence of South 
Africa’s and Kenya’s regimes on labelling seem to suggest otherwise. 
The right to food is recognised and provided for in international instruments 
and constitutions in most countries, yet the right to know remains contentious 
globally. Two things need to be noted at the outset: the right to know is neither a 
major concern of international in instruments nor in domestic legislation; secondly, 
we are dealing with two main groups of people with different interests: the hungry 
and the starving and those who are not. If the right exists, both groups should be 
entitled to it and the right to choose the type of food they eat. Moreover, the right to 
choose is a material consideration enabling people to lead lives based on their 
religious, cultural and even political beliefs.130 
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International human rights instruments such as the International Convention 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognise and provide for the 
right to adequate food131, the right to be free from hunger132 and the right to life.133 
To o ensure freedom from hunger, ICESRC encourages member states to ‘make full 
use of technical and scientific knowledge… in such a way as to achieve the most 
efficient development and utilization of natural resources’134. In 1996 and in many 
other forums, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has reaffirmed the right to 
access safe and nutritious food, consistent with the fundamental right to be free from 
hunger.135 
None of these instruments and declarations makes specific provision for the 
right to know or choose the type of food one should eat. Silence strongly suggests 
that the international community is more concerned with food security in a broader 
sense leaving details about the right to know or to choose and issues of labelling for 
other fora or for individual states. 
Introduction of GMOs has particularly complicated the issue of the right to 
know for two main reasons. First, food labelling and identification - one of the means 
through which people may know and choose, still remain contested issues under the 
Cartagena Protocol. Proponents of GM food take the view that such food do not 
pose any higher potential threats than their conventional counterparts and hence 
safe to eat. Opponents, civil society groups and individuals are keen to ensure 
freedom to know whether food on shelves is modified. 
Second, pollination associated with gene flow from GMO crops may 
‘contaminate’ organic or conventional crops. In such cases GMOs may limit the right 
of farmers to choose to grow non-GM crops.136 Should contamination take place, 
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one can hardly separate non-GM from GM crops, making consumer choice 
impossible. Contamination associated with cross pollination is particularly 
problematic because it is a natural process carried out by wind that nobody can 
effectively prevent especially in open fields. Whether contamination gave rise to a 
duty of care was a critical issue in Hoffman vs. Monsanto Canada.137 Pollen from the 
defendants’ GM Canola was alleged to have infiltrated the plaintiff’s organic canola. 
In real life situations, people who are starving have little or no choice on the 
type of food they eat. In cases of severe famine, starving people may have no 
opportunity to know that the food contains GMOs and even if they knew, many will 
readily accept such food. In essence, only people with enough food or the ability to 
acquire enough food may be said to have the ‘capacity’ to choose. 
Applying the wisdom of Aristotle to the pursuit of happiness, O’Toole argues 
that to claim that particular people are happy, one must be sure that such people 
have adequate food, clothing and shelter.138 It would therefore not be fair to feed 
starving people with GM food and claim that they accepted the food. Such 
acceptability is based on necessity rather than choice. It may be described as 
economic ‘unfreedom’ resulting from poverty that makes an individual powerless in 
the matter.139 Moreover, as acreage of GMOs increases globally, the right of poor 
and starving people to choose may be diminishing. 
Poor people may be deprived of the right to know or the capacity to choose, 
whether or not such a right are provided for in international instruments, domestic 
legislation or both. The situation in some countries in SSA provides an in-depth 
illustration. 
2.6.4.2 The Right to Know: An African Context 
In contemporary African societies, the right to know in real situations on the ground 
creates a paradox. Africa needs to conserve its biodiversity and at the same time 
feed its high and increasing population. The continent stands at two extremes: it has 
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one the richest biodiversities in the world;140 it has the highest number of a starving 
and malnourished population globally.141 Many of its people are ‘unable to choose, at 
the very least, or do not have enough to eat’.142 It is in a dilemma on what takes 
priority, when and how. In addition, and for reasons that fall outside the scope of this 
study, the continent is lagging behind economically; imperilled by warfare, political 
instability and poor governance, notably the notorious case of Zimbabwe and now 
the global economic crisis (that could have an adverse impact on the continent for 
the next five years143). These social-economic factors have earned many parts of 
Africa a reputation of poverty, disease and war, yet there are many other African 
peoples who have neither starved nor been involved in war and live ordinary 
peaceful lives.144 
Thus poverty, disease and war present many socio-economic problems with 
no foreseeable workable solutions. They negatively impact on agricultural production 
giving rise to an increasing food crisis exacerbated by the current global increase in 
food prices, unpredictable oil prices and the imminent world financial recession. 
What happened in Zambia in 2002 and what is happening in Congo and Kenya are 
classic examples that provide real life situations illustrating the dilemma African 
states are facing concerning GMOs. 
In Zambia in 2002 – owing to severe drought in Southern Africa, the 
government rejected relief food comprising maize suspected of containing GMOs. 
The political leadership took the view that it was better for people to die of hunger 
than to eat ‘contaminated’ food. Because the famine threatened lives, the 
government reluctantly allowed the maize on condition that it was ground and 
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delivered as flour. The maize was ground in South Africa. Since then Zambia has 
taken a strict view on the regulation of GMOs.145 
In the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), the situation is pathetic. Owing to 
persistent political and ethnic strife, government imports more than 99% of its food 
mainly from France. In attempts to alleviate the food crisis, the government has 
offered South African farmers 99 year leases of farmland free of charge on10 million 
hectares. These farmers will plant crops such as maize and Soya and also rear 
animals. They are under no obligation to sell their products locally.146. While these 
attempts are intended to minimise or alleviate the food crisis, they are temporary and 
success is unpredictable. In addition, the farmers will be at liberty to import seeds, 
thereby raising the important question of guarantees are to ensure that GMOs are 
not introduced without biosafety legislation. 
In Kenya in 2007-2008, disputed presidential and Parliamentary election 
results gave rise to post election violence resulting in deaths and other devastating 
consequences. Farms were deserted and people became internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) especially in the Rift valley – the country’s bread basket.147 
Many people, especially IDPs and those in dry areas such as Turkana seem 
to be starving. This forced the government to publicly declare the famine a national 
disaster, admitting that more than ten million people needed food relief, blaming the 
election violence, the global energy crisis and rain failure.148 Where would the food 
come from and what would be the way forward? Put in simple terms: the common 
man wants food. This prompted the government to import maize urgently from South 
Africa and Tanzania. 149 The American Ambassador is reported to have said ‘…the 
US was willing to bring food as long as it got a nod from Parliament’.150 South Africa 
is the largest producer and exporter of GM maize in Africa - there is neither a 
guarantee nor evidence to suggest the maize imported to Kenya from South Africa 
was not GM. 
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In ancient Greece, philosophers such as Aristotle would have accepted the 
first option on the grounds that GMOs are meant to provide food – a basic need of 
the people. However, they would reject GMOs if they were essentially for profit- 
making. Aristotle believed that doing something for the purpose of making or 
acquiring money was unnatural and erroneous, hence, unethical, whereas making 
money was regarded noble if the intention was to provide necessities of life such as 
food151. Charging interest on money lent was seen as a form of ‘robbery’ but today is 
generally thought to be ‘reasonable and fair’.152. This is a clear illustration of the 
argument that as peoples’ lifestyles and circumstances change, ethics and ethical 
considerations continue changing. Arguably the changing attitudes apply to GM food. 
Population increase is a big problem in many African states. It is widely 
believed that of the all the commands God gave to humanity, the command to 
multiply like sand153 has been obeyed most particularly in many African countries. In 
Africa proponents of agricultural biotechnology take the view that GMOs will 
contribute to alleviating hunger, starvation and poverty.154 The critical issue however 
is whether African states should embrace GMOs to address hunger, starvation and 
poverty or reject them on grounds that include ethical considerations. This is a 
difficult question because globally, people view GM food as either good or bad. This 
thinking is erroneous because new technologies and scientific innovations are 
continuous phenomena in human life. Appropriate regulation that embraces the 
precautionary approach in regulation may minimise resistance to GMOs. 
2.6.4.3 The Moral Status of Nature 
People view nature in different ways thereby raising varying, overlapping and at 
times conflicting ethical issues. Some people regard it as benevolent and intrinsically 
useful; others see it as hostile and of no intrinsic value yet others see it as morally 
neutral.155 In the mid-Nineteenth Century, Marsh writing from a theological and 
naturalist point of view saw interference with an existing order of a higher power as a 
situation in which: 
                                                 
151 Singer P How are we to Live? (1997):68. 
152 Ibid at 48-49. 
153 Genesis chapter 22 verse 17 and chapter 15 verse 5. 
154 Thomson J Seeds for the Future: The Impact on Genetically Modified Crops on the Environment 
(2006):109. 












‘Man is dealing with dangerous weapon whenever he interferes with 
arrangements pre-established by a power higher than his own. The 
equation of animal and vegetable life is too complicated a problem for 
human intelligence to solve, and we can never know how wide a circle of 
disturbance we produce in the harmonies of nature when we throw the 
smallest pebble into the ocean of organic being.’156 
Environmental historians, among them Radkau, argue that - the strongest 
human impulses grow out of an interaction of ‘love and fear’: environmental 
awareness becomes an urgent passion when the love of nature combines with fear. 
He further argues that anxiety about nature is most acute when it is anxiety about 
one’s own welfare; it becomes a matter of public concern when it poses a serious 
threat to humanity and the nation. He concludes that this kind of interconnection of 
anxieties gave rise to the present day environmental movement.157 
Love for nature may not be as easy to determine compared to its absence. 
The cumulative effect of anthropogenic activities that gave rise to the global 
environmental crisis provides evidence that man had no love for nature. The need for 
man to satisfy his own desires leading to depletion of resources and environmental 
degradation may have made man happy or wealthy, but crisis threatens man’s 
survival and is a source of immense fear. Currently, issues concerning the extent to 
which nature should be respected, tolerated, manipulated or treated remain 
problematic. 
Nature has another moral dimension - religion. According to the BABAS 
Report,158 many religious groups worldwide recognise and believe in the power and 
authority of God as the creator of the universe and everything in it. They view 
creation as divine and without errors. Attempts to ‘improve’ the perfect natural 
through biotechnology are viewed by sections of religious people as an affront to 
God’s creation and may amount to ‘playing God’. 159  It also seems to create another 
impression: God creates, man destroys. 
Genetic engineering which has ability to determine what a living organism 
may look like and what it is capable of doing, has made evolution ‘a conscious 
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process’ in which new organisms are being created consistent with human will rather 
than by way of the natural laws of survival.160  These processes give mankind the 
ability to create novel plants and animals with properties they could never have 
acquired naturally.161 In so doing genetic engineering breaches the boundaries of 
natural species thereby violating the natural integrity of species.162 
In Muslim states where religion is regarded as a cornerstone of societal 
behaviour, the question whether GMOs may be regarded as halal or haram seriously 
impacts on acceptance of such food. 163 It is worse if the food contains swine genes. 
164 In Kenya for example, Muslims are worried that they will not know whether the 
rice they buy from shops is ‘contaminated’ by pig genes or not and the Hindus will 
not know which foods in the stores contain genes from cows.165 Vegetarians may 
also reject fruit and vegetables modified with animal genes.166 These sentiments 
strongly suggest that the types of food people eat constitute part of their values. 
As Thompson argues, values (whether religious, cultural or aesthetic) are an 
important aspect of peoples’ lives and are fundamental in their ability to maintain a 
sense of ‘constancy, identity, and faith in their daily practice’. He asserts that threats 
to such values create a sense of helplessness and disrespect thereby undermining 
beliefs that give rationality to daily habits.167 He concludes that ‘[b]y not labelling, 
disclosing, or even discussing the new biotechnology-based order of food products, 
purveyors of these new commodities threaten a way of life.’168 
By interfering with an established food order, biotechnology may undermine 
cultural and religious beliefs, particularly of those opposed to it. If such interference 
is to be legitimised, the right to know the nature of the food in question becomes 
imperative. Absence of such a right becomes a major source of distrust and 
suspicion by consumers and the general public. The distrust and suspicion tends to 
confirm fears concerning GMOs thereby leading to resistance and in many 
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instances, rejection of this new technology. These fears and suspicion should 
however not be restricted to GMOs, because, over the centuries, plant and animal 
selection and breeding has produced crops and animals that would not, and could 
not, have arisen through natural selection and hence not ‘natural. The thesis argues 
that in practical terms, it would be unfair to view GMOs as being more potentially 
harmful than their traditional breeding counter parts.  
Objections to genetic engineering on religious grounds may be legitimate but 
pose the difficult question as to how such religious interests may be reflected in 
policy and be protected by biosafety legislation. Objections on religious grounds also 
raise jurisprudential issues about the minimum level of morality which biosafety 
legislation should contain. This researcher argues that sufficient public involvement 
is a strong force that is necessary for the development of credible biosafety regimes 
embracing the precautionary approach. Labelling will also enhance the freedom of 
choice on food. As discussed in chapter six, public participation may give the public 
a sense of ownership of the new technology as much as labelling may enable those 
opposed to it on religious grounds to exercise their right to choose. It should be 
noted however that it is not possible for biosafety legislation, or any other law, to 
exhaustively cover all the interests of the affected or interested stakeholders. 
2.6.4.4 Patenting Living Organisms 
This is the fourth dimension of ethics. A patent is a property right granted by the 
state excluding others from use or benefit of the patented invention without the 
consent of the patent holder.169 The monopoly arising from a patent is limited and it 
is granted in exchange for disclosure of technical information by the patent holder.170 
As opposed to property rights in tangible things such as land, intellectual property 
confers rights in intangible things such as ideas, innovations, signs and 
information.171 Patents are applicable to knowledge that may be registered and be 
used in industry.172 
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Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are not a recent phenomenon in human 
civilization. Jessop observes that Ancient Greece and Rome recognised industrial 
property rights and imposed ethical obligations on the authors of ideas; the medieval 
patent was a controlled privilege for financial benefit of local rulers and the 
mercantilism patents encouraged importation of technology and accruing income 
was for the benefit of the state.173 Political leaders convinced themselves that they 
had a stake in the new knowledge.174 For example, English monarchs granted 
monopoly privileges to inventors and importers of new technology in return for 
payment of royalties to the Crown, 175 enabling the monarchs to harvest where they 
never sowed. Under capitalism, patents guarantee monopoly privileges to individuals 
and legal persons on inventions and related intellectual products for commercial 
advantage.176 
Over time and due to the proliferation of new technologies, patents have 
become an integral part of scientific inventions. Justification for patents is based on 
the belief that they provide incentives to investors and enhance their investments in 
(R&D).177 Patenting living organisms resulting from biological innovations have 
however given rise to a long-standing controversy.178 The concerns include whether: 
• it is morally acceptable to patent living organisms which, many believe, were 
created by a higher authority than man 
• patenting them would make GMO seeds more costly thereby reducing the 
potential benefits of biotechnology 
In respect to costs, patenting of seeds is one of the ways through which small 
scale farmers particularly in the developing countries may be deprived of their right 
to save and plant seeds from the previous harvest. Further, more than 80 per cent of 
the patents granted in the developing countries belong to persons from the 
developed countries, usually multinational corporations.179 This has caused 
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inequalities between the rich and the poor and between the developed and 
developing countries.180 Additionally biotechnology companies are keen to patent 
novel GM seeds, but reluctant to label GM food because it may hamper acceptance 
and the proliferation of such food. 
While protection of IPRs has a long history, the adoption of the (Agreement 
on) Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),181 by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), was a manifestation of the need to have a modern 
regime governing IPRS among its members. Its objectives include ensuring that the 
protection and enforcement of IPRs contributes to the ‘promotion of technological 
innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technological knowledge for the 
mutual benefit of producers and users and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare’.182 In formulating or amending their laws, TRIPs urges members 
to promote public interest in sectors of vital to their socio-economic and technological 
importance but in a manner consistent with it.183 The Agreements makes provision 
requiring right holders not to abuse such rights.184 Analysts take the view that IPRs 
should be granted within fair and ethically acceptable limits.185 Should TRIPs not live 
up to these expectations, and considering that the development of intellectual 
property law is shifting towards ‘monopoly’ rather than ‘competition’,186 a situation 
may arise where: 
‘intellectual property rights could be transformed from a tool for the 
promotion of innovation and competition, into a protectionist barrier in 
favour of the dominant enterprises: that is to say, into a factor that restricts 
supply and slows down the dynamic processes that generate innovation, 
while also reducing consumers’ alternatives of choice’.187 
Thus, care should be exercised in determining the real and the underlying intentions 
of the patent holders in biotechnology or applicants, especially in developing 
countries. 
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2.6.5 Public Perceptions about GMOs 
The term perception embraces interests and involvement, understanding of and 
attitudes towards biotechnology; it includes the images, hopes, fears, expectations 
about biotechnology. 188 Human beings are endowed with an inherent sense of 
imagination and are capable of worrying about potential risks which in one way or 
another influence their behaviour.189 Who will take the risks, what are the potential 
benefits for undertaking such risks, is the extent of potential damage known and who 
makes the ultimate decision whether or not the risk should be assumed. 190 These 
unanswered questions that complicate public perceptions about GMOs. 
There are many factors that influence public perceptions concerning potential 
harm of GMOs. These include media coverage, the perceived importance of the 
issue to the community (health related issues create more significant public concern 
than land degradation), and the perceived magnitude and spatial scale of impacts.191 
The tendency of scientists192 and biotechnology companies to hoard information 
concerning potential harm is a major factor. In Eastern Africa perceptions about 
GMOs are informed by factors such as alleged benefits, potential risks, unfamiliarity, 
uncertainties and lack of confidence in the capacity to ensure safety.193 Perceptions 
concerning potential harm are therefore linked to the kind of information194 (if any) 
the general public receive (and from whom) or the lack of it. Information obtained 
from the Internet sources through unauthenticated sources, may contain half truths 
that confuse or mislead the public, leading to problems that have been described as: 
‘[not] the violent conflict between parts of the truth but the quiet 
suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil; there is always hope when 
the people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to 
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one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the 
effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. … [e]very truth which 
men of narrow capacity are in earnest about, is sure to be asserted, 
inculcated, and in many ways even acted on, as if no other truth existed in 
the world, or at all events none that could limit or qualify the first’195 
Moreover, the public invariably presumes that an opinion which is compelled to 
silence is true.196 
Biased media coverage also plays a significant role. Zambia for example, is a 
country afflicted by widespread poverty; public awareness of biotechnology remains 
very low due to high levels of illiteracy; there is a lack of dialogue on science policy 
and a media dominated by politics as well as fragmented information about the 
implications of GM crops.197  Further, the accuracy of media reports seemingly 
depends on the level of understanding of biotechnology by the writers of such 
reports and their sources of information. Owing to these half truths, there is 
insufficient understanding of the potential risks (and benefits) of GMOs, thereby 
giving rise to suspicion about the safety of GM food. In evaluating the British 
Broadcasting Corporation’s reporting on science, Jones questions the impartiality of 
media reporting.  He suggested that objective reporting should be balanced, for 
example: 
‘Gm crops are a risk to health (no convincing evidence, after twenty years of 
study; that they will contaminate other potato, varieties (almost all varieties of 
commercial potato are grown from tubers rather than seeds; no risk of cross-
contamination;... that conventional varieties may also have disease or insect 
resistance (partly true, but the point of GM is to bring them together),...that GM 
is unnecessary and ineffective (why are there a hundred million hectares of 
such crops?);... that most agricultural research money is devoted to genetic 
modification (wrong)’.198 
Information compiled by the media cannot be a substitute for reports of 
experts. Only a few journalists have been ‘schooled sufficiently to make these 
complex issues understandable’, and only a global environmental data bank may be 
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an authentic source of information that may be accessed electronically by journalists 
all over the world.199 Yet even if such a global data bank was to be established, 
many states may be reluctant to provide sufficient and accurate information. For 
example, under the Protocol, the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH)200 seeks to serve 
as a means through which information is made available on scientific and other 
issues relevant to living modified organisms (LMOs). The BCH plays the role of a 
data portal. However, Parties to the Protocol, including the selected countries, have 
hardly posted information to the BCH. 
Over the years, states have hardly complied with their treaty obligations 
concerning exchange of scientific information under the Protocol. It may be too 
ambitious to expect a global environmental data bank to achieve much success, let 
alone its establishment and acceptance by states. Further, access to such a global 
data bank will mainly benefit developed countries that have well established Internet 
services. People in local villages in most developing countries where Internet access 
is scarce may not benefit. 
It is also necessary to appreciate that in ordinary life – the general public 
(including many non-molecular biology scientists and other professionals) may not 
have sufficient knowledge about GMOs. For the general public to express negative 
reactions to potential risks, it does not require university education or a doctorate. 
People do not usually like gaps resulting from lack of understanding of GMOs. They 
tend to fill such gaps with their own ideas and phenomena, the main one here being 
fear. 
Analysts argue that fear, ‘does not pop out of the heavens and hover in the 
ether before blanketing itself across huge segments of cities and societies; it has to 
be lived and made’.201 Fear may be a disease itself. Sunstein asserts that like other 
emotions, fear can be infectious.202 Having been created by the media or other 
sources including social groups, fear, this study argues, has become one of the main 
factors that influence public perceptions. It increases resistance to GMOs. 
                                                 
199 Susskind L Environmental Diplomacy (1994):136 Oxford University Press Oxford. 
200 Article 20 of the Cartagena Protocol 39 International Legal Materials (2000):1027.  
201 Pain R and Smith S ‘Fear: Critical Geopolitics and Everyday Life’ in Pain R and Smith S (eds) 
Fear: Critical Geopolitics and Everyday Life (2008):2 Ashgate Hampshire (England). 












The fear of uncertain potential risks associated with GMOs on humans is a 
good example. Such risks include increased allerginicity and resistance to 
antibiotics, all of which contribute to resistance against GMOs.203 A media report in 
Tanzania, alleged that ‘there is suspicion that the steep rise in allergies and many 
other health problems is not due solely to environmental irritants, but to GM 
products, as well’.204 Such reports may be far from being accurate and yet the 
impact on the minds of people exposed to GM food is enormous. Whether such fears 
are unfounded and unscientific - as once claimed by former US President George 
Bush205 or not, ardent opponents perceive biotechnology as proof that humankind is 
‘digging its own grave’.206 
The notions about fear associated with GMOs are however contradicted by 
writers such as Hoban who argue that the alleged fear emanates from what he terms 
as ‘myths’ manifested in campaigns waged by two main groups: the organic industry 
that stands to benefit from uncertainty concerning GMOs and groups such as 
Greenpeace that finds the biotech industry a convenient target for its attacks against 
capitalism, agribusiness and advances in science. He contends that these groups 
claim to speak for consumers yet they are trying to influence public opinion to 
promote their own selfish interests. He c ncludes that ultimately, the criteria for most 
consumers’ food preferences will remain taste, value, nutrition and convenience as 
opposed to seed genetics.207 Such criteria presuppose that farmers shall have 
already accepted and grown GM food and such food shall have been eaten before 
consumers can evaluate its taste and related aspects. 
While there are differences of opinion concerning whether the fear is justified 
or not, the cumulative effect is that environmentalists, the public, some consumers 
and other opponents of biotechnology end up viewing GMOs as potentially harmful 
to health and the environment, hence unacceptable. This in turn jeopardises 
‘legitimate’ commercial and other interests of the biotechnology industry, GMO 
                                                 
203 Africa Environmental Outlook 2 (2006):315 UNEP available at http://www.unep.org/dewa/africa 
(accessed 28 July 2009). 
204 Daily News (Tanzania) 15 July 2009 p.10. 
205 Smith J Seeds of Deception (2003):1.  
206 Sterckx S Biotechnology, Patents and Morality (1997):2 Ashgate Aldershot (UK). 
207 Hoban T ‘Addressing Today’s Core Issues for Better Food and Industry Growth’ Forum Fourth 













patent holders, scientists and other proponents, resulting in fear of losing business. 
This antagonism underlies the scepticism in each camp leading to difficulties in 
achieving acceptable levels of transparency in law-making and decision-making 
especially in countries such as South Africa and Kenya that are keen to promote 
GMOs aggressively. 
Complications arise because fear of potential risks cannot be alleviated by 
scientific facts but may be mitigated by trust.208 Over the years, the public has 
witnessed risk assessments of chemical discharges, waste disposal and mad cow 
disease. These resulted in a lack of confidence in, and mistrust of, political 
institutions, corporations and scientists as sources of reliable information.209 The 
argument does not end there because trust is ‘elusive and fragile...trust is hard to 
earn, easy to lose and, once lost, nearly impossible to regain’.210 Trust is also 
important because losing it is synonymous to self-destruction of the entire 
biotechnology industry.211 
2.6.6 The African Dilemma Concerning GMOs 
Many African states still remain sceptical about GMOs but, they share two common 
attributes: a rich biodiversity and an ever growing  starving and undernourished 
population. Food shortages, the effects of climate change that include drought, 
continuing loss of soil fertility, failing farming methods, civil wars such as in Somalia,  
have given rise to a compelling need to increase food production in the continent. 
Should the claim that GMOs contribute to increased farm yields be acceptable 
to many states, and taking into account worldwide changing attitudes towards GMOs 
(discussed in the next chapter), it is reasonable to conclude that embracing GMOs in 
Africa is an upward rather than a downward trend. The pressing food crisis is slowly 
compelling some states to embrace GMOs, resistance notwithstanding. Apart from 
South Africa where there has not been vehement resistance to GM crops (except 
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recently in respect of the GM potato212 and the Super Sorghum project213), continued 
resistance to or reluctance to embrace GMOs (or both) may be minimised by 
adoption of credible biosafety legislation. This is an important and logical starting 
point. Moreover, it is erroneous to view resistance from negative perspectives only 
as it arguably creates a sense of competition and improved quality of the products in 
question. Credible of biosafety legislation may hardly be achieved in the absence of 
or lack of effective implementation of the precautionary approach as an essential 
criterion for the regulation. Attitudes such as those amounting to ‘sitting at the fence’ 
or ‘wait and see’ appear to have no place in efforts to address the hunger problem in 
Africa. 
2.6.7 Globalization, Corporate Power and Trade 
Biotechnology operates in a highly globalized world.214 The global economy and 
country specific political and social circumstances play a key role in making 
biotechnology a risk or a benefit.215 The risk may be manifested in an increase in the 
poverty gap within and between societies, loss of biodiversity and negative impacts 
on the ecosystems. The benefits to the local population may be improved food 
security and reduced malnutrition.216 
An understanding of biotechnology’s political economy - the relationship between 
state regulators and market actors in particular,217 is essential in placing the 
regulation of GMOs in appropriate context. In that relationship, the imperatives of 
safety and trade occupy the centre stage. Hence, the conceptual framework218 of 
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this study will neither be complete nor satisfactory in the absence of a brief 
discussion on how globalization impacts on biotechnology. 
There are many perspectives through which globalization may be analysed – 
social and cultural, political, historical and so forth. As a result, definitions and 
interpretations of the term globalization vary. Here globalization is defined as ‘the 
integration of the world economy- markets, nation states and technologies in a way 
that is enabling individuals, corporations and non-states to reach the world farther, 
faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before.219 The integration impacts on the 
economy of states and the environment especially with regard to risks. The 
interpretation and appreciation of risks must be viewed against the extent to which 
they promote or hinder globalization. 
Modern science and technology (both of which owe their origins to western 
civilization) had the exploitation of nature for utilitarian ends as their major driving 
force.220 Exploitation is a key attribute of capitalism which aims to maximize profits 
and in this case, at the expense of the environment. Capitalism has given rise to 
various things. These include, investment in enormous technologies with little regard 
for the environment, powerful corporate interests whose main goal is to grow by 
generating profit (including profit from failing to avoid environmental damage they 
cause) and governments that are subservient to corporate interests and the growth 
imperative.221 These attributes of capitalism have given rise to an economic and 
political reality that is immensely destructive of the environment.222 
Corporations have a big role to play in advancing capitalism. Analysts assert that 
‘If capitalism is a growth machine, corporations are doing the growing. If growth is 
destroying the environment, then corporations are doing most of the destroying.’223 
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Large corporations are dominate advances in economic globalization; they generate 
half of the gases that cause global warming; they are engineering a power shift, 
moving economic and political power away from ‘national, states and local 
governments and communities toward unprecedented centralization of power for 
global corporations, bankers and global bureaucracies’.224 
Economic globalization is inherently harmful to the environment as it is 
characterised by ever-increasing consumption and exploitation of resources without 
adequately addressing issues of waste disposal.225 Biotechnology is supported by 
the ‘triple helix’ of states, scientists and the biotechnology industry that promote 
GMOs globally.226 The effect is that many governments may have lost the ability to 
control the flow of money in and out of their countries, the same way they have 
difficulties controlling the flow of ideas, technology and goods.227 Moreover, 
promotion is being done in an environment of striking disparities between developed 
and developing countries, which has weakened the ability of the latter to negotiate 
and protect their interests.228 
The capitalist reality is reflected in the ability of giant multinational 
biotechnology companies and powerful states to influence (and perhaps indirectly 
dictate) the terms upon which developing countries adopt GM crops. For example, 
after World War II, the global economic hegemony of the USA was largely 
attributable to exports in automobiles, new products including nuclear energy 
equipment, military technology and information technology.229 Biotechnology 
provided a new avenue that would strengthen that hegemony and also sustain its 
dominance in global food politics. Moreover, the West seeks to retain its preeminent 
position and defend its interests in the global economy by defining those interests as 
the interests of the international community.230 Such interests may be promoted 
through various entities including large biotechnology companies. 
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Further, multinational corporations are capable of influencing governments 
and other groups to represent and protect their interests under the pretext that 
success of multinational corporations is, presumably, for the benefit of ‘everyone’.231 
The unanswered question is who constitutes ‘everyone’? 
In most parts of Africa, it would be erroneous to include peasant farmers who 
constitute the majority of the poor people among the list of ‘everyone’, unless such 
peasants substantially benefit from biotechnology.232 In the absence of benefit, the 
term ‘everyone’ may refer to a few people in government, a few organizations and 
selected individuals multinational biotechnology companies use to protect their 
interests. In practice therefore, the claim that the activities of multinationals seek to 
benefit everyone may not be true because corporate executives give priority to the 
corporation’s interests as opposed to acting out of concern for anyone else233. 
Thus, globalisation and the increasing power of transnational corporations 
such as those that have invested in the GM technology and its products, have 
already altered our lifestyles, what we eat and communicate by reason of their 
continued monopoly over seeds, chemicals, processing, and the genetic foundations 
of the world food systems.234 This explains why such multinational corporations may 
not be keen, of their own accord, to invest in areas where the returns are low.235 By 
2009 in South Africa for example, GM crop cultivation stood at maize 63% of the 
total crop, cotton 98% and soybean 85% of the total soybean acreage.236 To say the 
least, these crops are high income earners compared to indigenous African food 
crops such as sorghum and millet. 
The establishment of the World Trade organization (WTO)237 is seen as a 
manifestation of neoliberalism whereby, the responsibilities of states shift from 
protecting citizens (which protection was the practice under liberalism) to 
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strengthening their place in a competitive world economy.238 Critics take the view 
that the greatest power of WTO lies in its dispute settlement body which has upheld 
corporate interests over those of people and the environment, resulting in increased 
opposition to the WTO regime.239 
In the Biotech case240 for example (discussed in chapter four), the EU sought 
and the US objected to the application of the precautionary principle in defence of 
the ban it had placed on importation of GM food to Europe. The WTO Panel rejected 
the EU’s reliance o the principle on the grounds that it had not attained the status of 
a principle of general application in international law. By so doing, the Panel seemed 
to confirm that, in its present form, the WTO regime is not a tool for protecting the 
environment.241 As discussed at (4.4), the WTO is primarily a trade regulation rather 
than an environmental protection regime. It remains a creation of powerful 
neolibralist forces (supported by the USA242) that control a globalized economy. 
Thus, introduction of GMOs into a globalized trading system generates controversy 
on how to achieve an effective balance between free trade in agriculture and food 
safety.243 In that system, many governments have been far more effective 
representatives of their countries’ business interests than their citizen’s 
environmental concerns.244 
2.7 Political Considerations 
The rules that make environmental law are a consequence of the establishment of 
political aims and goals and the setting of scientific standards which form a 
framework for the law.245 In essence, then, the regulation of GMOs has almost 
everything to do with politics. At the domestic level decisions on whether to embrace 
GMOs and if so, on what terms is political. It impacts on the quality of the relevant 
policies and biosafety legislation. Workable biosafety frameworks require favourable 
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political will. To the extent that the GMO debate raises contentious issues 
concerning safety for humans and the protection of biodiversity and ecosystems,246 it 
remains fundamentally political. 
Decisions at the domestic level that relate to GMOs have an impact on the 
international trade. These may relate to risk assessment and restrictions on trade 
which become problematic especially if they are inconsistent with the WTO 
regime.247 Currently, any negotiation of environmentally related regimes that affect 
transnational economic transactions ‘even in the slightest manner’ is influenced and 
shaped by the complex web of obligations regulating international trade on one 
hand. Owing to environmental and public health concerns on the other hand, 
international trade related negotiations also trudge through the muds of international 
politics.248 Trade bans such as the EU moratorium on GM food from the USA that 
resulted in Biotech249 case are trade disputes with political undertones. One of the 
reasons is because the commercialisation of GM crops and their products intensifies 
economic competition between world powers.250 
Under customary international law, when a state ‘admits into its territory 
foreign investment or foreign nationals’ it is under an obligation to protect such 
investments or nationals.251 The obligation is neither absolute nor unqualified,252 
leaving room for the exercise of discretion. Protection of foreign investment and 
foreign nationals is an issue that touches on international relations. Unfair treatment 
may negatively affect such relations. In South Africa and Kenya a number of 
biotechnology companies have invested in research and development (R&D), partly 
in pursuance of national interests. However, host governments have responsibility to 
protect such investments. Failure to do so could become a political issue between 
the territorial host country and the investing country. Moreover, biotechnology raises 
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issues such as the thresholds of regulation which are ‘politically contentious’.253  
Some these issues are schematically presented in the next page. 
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Figure 2 on the previous page is a schematic presentation of the conceptual issues 
discussed in this thesis. It shows the conflicting interests and pressure from 
proponents and opponents of biotechnology. It illustrates that public involvement is 
essential if transparency is to be achieved and be seen to have been achieved. 
Access to information has been described as ‘sunshine’ that enables society to hold 
government and government officials accountable for their actions.254 
2.8 Developing a Theoretical Conceptual Framework 
Taking into account the issues discussed in this and the previous chapter, this 
researcher develops a conceptual framework that guides the study as a whole. It is 
founded on two fundamental considerations: the key assumptions and jurisprudential 
criteria, both of which materially contribute towards an attempt to achieve the 
objective of this study. 
2.8.1 Key Assumptions of the Study. 
There are four key assumptions that guide this study 
• Biotechnology remains a controversial issue globally. Its globalized nature has 
tended to weaken the ability of the selected countries to achieve an effective 
balance between safety and rade in the development of their biosafety 
legislation. 
• The precautionaryapproach is a tool that may be used to resolve part of the 
controversy but its domestic implementation remains problematic. 
• In order to translate theory into reality, effective implementation of the 
precautionary approach requires transparency and accountability in decision-
making. In that process, meaningful public participation that encompasses 
access to information plays a key role. 
• African countries can develop workable and transparent biosafety regimes 
that embrace the precautionary approach and still promote biotechnology. 
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2.8.2 Reconciling the Varying Interests: Jurisprudential Criteria 
Scholars including Hahn and Sunstein assert that when taken seriously in decision-
making, the precautionary principle can be paralyzing thereby providing no direction. 
In contrast, they argue, it may be used to balance costs against benefits, and thus, 
provide the basis of an effective approach for making intricate decisions.255 These 
two opposing perspectives strongly suggest that the precautionary approach may be 
likened to a double- edged ‘sword’ at the disposal of the decision-makers in the 
regulation of biotechnology. This assertion is consistent with the views expressed in 
1897 by Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. He equated law to 
a dragon, arguing that: 
‘When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, 
you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what his strength is. But to 
get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him 
and make him a useful animal’.256 
Inspired by this analogy and taking into account the controversy surrounding 
regulation of biotechnology - the precautionary approach in particular, counting the 
‘teeth’ and ‘claws’ strongly suggests that the precautionary approach must be 
analysed ‘in the day light’ (objectively) both within a historical context and its 
domestic implementation in the selected countries. This is done for the purpose of 
assessing the normative value of the approach in domestic biosafety regimes and its 
relevance in seeking to address the varying interests that impact on regulation of 
biotechnology in the selected countries. 
Legally prudent jurisprudential criteria may be used to identify the attributes of 
the rules of law which may be used to reconcile some if not all the interests 
associated with the regulation of biotechnology. This inevitably raises a number of 
pertinent issues in the minds of jurists. One such issue is how to build a scientific 
theoretical framework that stands the test of time - one that may be used objectively 
in counting the ‘teeth and claws’ of the precautionary approach. Such a framework 
requires criteria that must be sought in the science of the law – criteria with attributes 
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that the study may use to test theory against reality in domestic implementation of 
the precautionary approach in the selected countries. 
What then are the attributes that characterise the science of the law today? 
The answer seems to lie in sociological jurisprudence as expounded by Roscoe 
Pound, who has identified three attributes (among others) the science of the law has 
developed that may be used to assess the credibility of legislation. Pound argues 
that legislation may be analysed from three main perspectives: 
• a functional attitude, asking not merely what law is and how it has 
come to be but what (in all its senses) it does, how it does it, and how 
it may be made to do it better; 
• the study of law in all its senses in relation to the whole process of 
social control and 
• the study of the actual social effects of ‘legal institutions, of legal 
precepts, and of legal doctrines.257 
He further argues that from a functional dimension for example, a jurist will need to 
know: 
• how the law works in practice assessing whether it leads to beneficial 
or harmful consequences; 
• whether such consequences are consistent with or oppose culture and 
• whether such consequences appraise values justly or unjustly.258 
These attributes are critical in assessing both the content and the practical effect of 
the rules of law that purport to embrace the precautionary approach in the selected 
countries. By reason of being founded in jurisprudence, such criteria are a product of 
the development of legal theory over the centuries and have therefore stood the test 
of time. 
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This chapter has examined the ethical, socio-economic, environmental and political 
factors that account for the GMO controversy. The overlapping nature of these 
issues confirms that food is not only an agricultural or trade commodity but also an 
essential emotional, political and public health issue. Reconciling these imperatives 
to achieve an effective balance between safety for the environment and humans on 
one hand and international trade in food on the other hand, complicates regulation of 
GMOs. Acceptable levels of tolerance may be achieved, and this is mainly 
dependent upon levels of risk acceptable to society. 
To address the controversy discussed in this chapter, the international 
community developed a set of environmental legal principles intended to strike a 
balance between competing interests in the regulation of GMOs. One of them is the 
precautionary approach, which is a risk management tool.  Hence the following 














THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH: ORIGINS AND ATTRIBUTES 
 
‘If you have to test the depth of a river, 
do not put both legs into the water’1 
 
3.1 Scientific Uncertainty, Decision-making and the Precautionary Approach 
Most environmental issues, including the safe use of biotechnology, involve complex 
analyses of scientific, technical, socio-economic and political factors, making it 
difficult to achieve perfect knowledge when making laws in respect of a given threat.2 
There is, therefore, need for a criterion that guides decisions in the face of scientific 
uncertainty. An example of such is the precautionary approach which evolved over 
the past four decades within the international environmental law regime. Today, it is 
increasingly invoked as a basic tool of risk management and an essential guide to 
decision-making on issues as varied as biodiversity loss, climate change and food 
safety.3 The following is an analytical discussion of the precautionary approach 
which will illuminate issues concerning its definition, attributes, philosophical and 
legal foundations in international law. 
3.2 The Precautionary Approach and the Concept of Precaution 
In the mid - 1950s, an America composer Aaron Copland was asked whether music 
has a meaning. ‘Yes’ he replied. The questioner asked him if he could say what the 
meaning was in words ‘No’ concluded Copland4. This implied that while Copland was 
a renowned musician, it was difficult and perhaps impossible to explain the meaning 
of music in words. This is equally applicable to the precautionary approach, because 
its meaning, content and scope are contestable and invariably problematic. While 
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science does not provide all the answers thereby giving rise to uncertainty,5 the 
precautionary approach is itself ambiguous if not uncertain. 
Precaution is not a recent phenomenon in human history.  Many people take 
precautionary measures, such as insurance for their vessels in case of an accident 
to mitigate loss of life and property, quarantine to avoid the spread of contagious 
diseases, and compliance with traffic light signs to avoid collisions. They wear 
seatbelts and motorcycle helmets even when chances of being involved in an 
accident are remote.6 Another example is the establishment of the Svalbard 
International seed vault (seed bank) on a remote Arctic island in Norway, for the 
purpose of storing over three million different crops, should a catastrophe befall 
humanity.7 These are examples of precautionary measures that explain humanity’s 
inherent response to uncertainty. The rationale for such response is that potential 
risk is involved. In such circumstances, precautionary measures are arguably 
intended to minimise or provide a means of recovering the costs of the injury or loss 
that may occur. 
The precaution that forms the core of this study is that which concerns the 
international community in relation to environmental protection. Risk or potential risk 
may materialise and cause harm to the environment and human health. Owing to 
ecological complexities discussed n chapter two, severe harm may cause 
irreversible damage or loss. In environmental protection and in the regulation of 
biotechnology in particular, the precautionary approach seeks to address scientific 
uncertainty in decision-making.8 A closely related principle is that of prevention which 
addresses risks where there is evidence of harm–it seeks to prevent harm before it 
occurs in lieu of seeking remedies and compensation.9 The principle of prevention 
applies when seeking to prevent known risks while the precautionary approach is 
applicable when seeking to prevent potential risks.10 
                                                 
 5 Kinderlerer J ‘Regulation of Biotechnology: Needs and Burdens for Developing Countries’ (2008) 
available at http://www.unep.org/Biosafety/Documents/Btregulation (accessed 20 June 2008). 
6 Sunstein C Laws of Fear (2005):13 Cambridge University Press Cambridge (UK).  
7  See ‘Seeds of Hope’ The Economist 24-30 June (2006) p.92. 
8 Hunter D et al (n2) at 405. 
9 Ibid at 404. 
10 Cooney R ‘The Precautionary Principle in Biodiversity Conservation and Natural Resources 












3.2 The Role of Principles in Law 
Comprehensive definition in law of the terms principle, rules and policy, falls outside 
the scope of this study. For purposes of this study however, brief definitions would 
suffice. Dworkin defines a principle as a standard that is to be adhered to, not 
because it will serve certain economic, political, or social interests that are deemed 
desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or some other perspective of 
morality.11 Often the term principle is used for the more general fundamental norms 
of a legal order while concrete provisions are called rules.12 
Policies may be propositions that describe goals.13 Policy is a form of 
standard that sets out a goal to be achieved, usually an improvement in some socio-
economic , political or cultural feature within the community (though some goals are 
negative, in that they require that the status quo be maintained).14 Principle and 
policy overlap when the former is construed as stating a social goal and when policy 
is construed as stating a principle.15 Principles seek to protect a common or 
individual good – an attribute that renders them value-centred.16 
Rules are however viewed from a functional approach and when they 
intersect, one of them must be invalid, argues Dworkin.17 The decision as to which 
rule is valid must be made by appealing to considerations beyond the rules 
themselves. Such consideration  include preference for rules made by the higher 
authority, the latter rule, the more specific rule or the rule supported by the more 
important principles. Dworkin concludes that, at times, it may be difficult to 
distinguish rules from principles as both may play the same role and the difference is 
in form only.18 
For purposes of this study the precautionary approach is construed both as 
setting standards and a tool for achieving goals consistent with policy. Principles of 
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international law go a step further. They are normative and cannot be regarded 
merely as guiding ideas and they always include definite rules of conduct 
irrespective of the form in which they appear. 19 Regarding principles as not being 
normative in character will in essence deprive them of their intrinsic value.20 
Conversely, principles are invariably difficult if not impossible to define. They 
embrace a variety of legal tenets and norms of a differing nature and normative 
authority, some are established rules of customary international law while others are 
emerging rules.21 While sovereignty over natural resources is an example of an 
established rule of customary international law, the precautionary approach 
represents principles that are difficult to define and may be interpreted in many ways. 
In international environmental law, the pattern of state conduct has given rise 
to an emerging set of principles that provide for minimum standards of acceptable 
behaviour in attempts to protect the global environment.22 Such principles include 
the preventive principle,23 co-operation,24 sustainable development,25 polluter 
pays,26 public participation,27 common but differentiated responsibility28 and the 
precautionary principle.29 
                                                 
19 Bobrov R ‘Basic Principles of Present-day International Law’ in Tunkin G (ed) Contemporary 
International Law (1969):36-58 at 37. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Paradell-Trius L ‘Principles of International Environmental Law’ 9(2) Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law (2000):93. 
22 Swanson T and Johnson S Global Environmental Problems and International Environmental 
Agreements (1999):233. 
23 Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration International Legal Materials 31 (1992) 876. 
24 Ibid Principle 5 recognises the need for international cooperation in  attempts to eradicate poverty 
as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. 
25 See the dissenting judgement of Justice Weraamantry in Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros (Hungary / Slovakia) (1997) ICJ Reports 140. Also see Swanson T and Johnson S (n22) 
at 237. 
26 The principle requires that those responsible for pollution bear the costs of its consequences. 
27 Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration provides thus ‘[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with the 
participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level…’ See the discussion in chapter six. 
28 Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration (n23); Article 4 of the 1992 United Nations Climate Change 
Convention (UNFCCC) 31 International Legal Materials (1992):851. The principle recognizes that the 
special needs of the developing countries must be taken into account in the development, application 
and interpretation  of the rules of international environmental law.  The principle seeks to balance a 
state’s contribution to the creation of a particular environmental problem and its ability to respond to, 
prevent, reduce and control the threat. See Swanson T and Johnson S (n22) at 237.  












In many instances however, courts cite principles as the basis for accepting 
and applying a new rule’.30 In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case31 for instance, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) emphasized the need to take into account 
sustainable development in determining riparian rights between Hungary and 
Slovakia. Invariably therefore, rules and principles of law provide the ‘flesh, blood, 
organs and bones of international law’ and scholars can only study parts of this body 
as the ‘mind’ of international law is difficult to understand.32 
In the context of international environmental law, Paradell-Trius identifies 
three roles for principles. First, international environmental law cannot achieve its 
objective of addressing complex socio-economic issues that inform the current 
environmental crisis through clear and precise legal rules that are applicable in all 
circumstances. Instead, he argued, the international environmental law regime 
worked better through application of general norms and principles which were best 
suited to meet environmental challenges rather than specific and detailed rules.33 
This explains why most multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) contain 
principles that constitute an integral part of such instruments. For example, the 
precautionary principle is best envisaged as a tool that provides guidelines for 
formulating a decision on a problem as opposed to challenging standard decision 
rules.34 Hence, principles facilitate the international law-making process as they 
allow it to continue in an incremental manner and amidst disagreement and 
uncertainty.35 In the customary international law-making process, principles act as 
magnetic poles that may attract and influence state practice.36 
Second, principles contained in framework conventions serve primarily to 
define the parameters for new obligations and to facilitate further negotiations on 
more detailed commitments.37 For example, Art.19 (4) of the Convention on 
                                                 
30 Dworkin R (n11) at 28. 
31 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hungary / Slovakia) (1997) ICJ Reports 226 para.140 
37 International Legal Materials 162. 
32 Dugard J International Law a South African Perspective 3ed (2005):15. 
33 Paradell-Trius L (n21) at 96. 
34 Steele K ‘The Precautionary Principle: A New Approach to Public Decision-making?’ 5 Law, 
Probability and Risk (2006):19. 














Biological Diversity (CBD)38 urges Parties to consider the need for a Protocol to 
regulate the transboundary movement of modified living organisms (LMOs). 
Meanwhile, the Convention adopted principles including those relating to public 
education and awareness39 as well sovereignty over natural resources40 all of which 
are relevant to the regulation of biotechnology. 
Third, principles may enable decision-makers, especially the courts, to 
interpret the law in such a manner as to reflect or be consistent with policy.41 For 
example, in BP Southern Africa case,42 the court held that socio-economic 
considerations were an integral part of environmental responsibility. Such reasoning 
is arguably attributable to the judicial thinking of Judges, and the socio-economic as 
well as political interests, they may be keen to safeguard. 
Posner identifies nine theories of judicial behaviour or thinking that influence 
decision – making. These include, attitudinal theory that gives rise to judicial 
decisions that are based on political preferences, the strategic theory where 
decisions are made having in mind the anticipated reaction to those decisions by 
other judges, legislators and the public, and the ideological theory in which there are 
disputants from different premises thereby giving rise to dissenting judgments. Other 
theories include the economic theory whose decisions reflect the principal-agent 
struggle for independence and the pragmatism theory that gives rise to decisions 
based on the effects the decision is going to have rather than on the language of the 
statute or of a case or a pre-existing rule.43 
Effective balancing of these theories requires a good judge who, when 
exercising judicial discretion, makes the law that ‘best bridges the gap between law 
and society and best safeguards the constitution and its values’.44 When such judges 
                                                 
38 The CBD 31 International Legal Materials (1992) 822. 
39 Article 13 of the Convention on Biological Diversity International Legal Materials 31 (1992):822. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Paradell-Trius L (n21) at 96. 
42 BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs 
2004(5) SA 124 (W) paras 151 D/E – 151F. 
43 Posner R How Judges Think (2008):19-57. The other three theories of judicial behaviour Posner 
discusses are: the sociological theory that focuses on small group dynamics; it combines strategic 
and attitudinal theories, psychological usually overlaps with other theories but it focuses on the 
importance and sources of preconceptions in shaping responses to uncertainty and the 
phenomenological theory borrows from both pragmatic and legalist theories. 












give expression to the fundamental values of the system, they give expression to the 
values that, in their eyes, seem proper and basic.45 
Ultimately, courts have an important role to play in developing jurisprudence 
on principles (such as the precautionary principle) that underpin environmental 
governance. It then follows that the use and development of environmental law 
principles is dependent upon the level of awareness of the public towards 
environmental protection in society. Such awareness will be reflected in the 
environmental values normative legislation may seek to protect. Realisation of such 
values is arguably dependent upon the mind set of Judges which mind set is as 
important as the decisions they make. 
Environmental law principles contribute towards coherence of a this regime by 
enhancing the ideal of rationality as they provide a specific character to the law.46 
For example, when reparation for ecological damage is moulded by the preventive 
principle, it changes the classical understanding of liability such that fault may be 
determined on presumptive evidence and liability assumes a collective as opposed 
to an individual or personal character. 47 Thus in the absence of environmental 
principles such as preventive principle, the polluter pays principle and the 
precautionary principle, environmental damage that is justifiable on collective rights 
would lack rationality in law. 
Principles are important tools that enable states to set acceptable criteria on 
protection of the environment in multilateral treaties with flexibility. They provide 
regulatory guidelines that states are willing to accept without feeling that their 
sovereignty is threatened. This enhances adoption and ratification of such treaties. 
At the national level however, and as will be seen in the next chapter, principles 
become normative to the extent that they form a basis from which specific rules of 
law derive. Under the Zambian Biosafety Act48 for instance, the power of the 
                                                 
45 Barak A The Judge in a Democracy (2006) at 105. 
46 Sadeleer N Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (2005):265. 
47 Ibid. 












Authority to reject an application on grounds of public interest, appears to derive 
from and further strengthen implementation of the precautionary approach.49 
3.3 The Precautionary Approach in International Environmental Law 
The precautionary principle is one of the many principles50 that are ‘cornerstones’ 
upon which international environmental law has developed, especially since the early 
1970s. In order to fully understand the nature and essence of the precautionary 
approach, it is first essential to examine its origins and historical development in 
international environmental law. History (unless manipulated to serve political and 
other interests) serves an important purpose in revealing conceptions about the past 
that form a basis for dealing with the present and the future.51 It is also material in 
placing the precautionary approach in its appropriate context in this study 
3.3.1 Origins of the Precautionary Approach 
In the fourteenth century a catastrophe, the Great Pestilence52 or the Black Death53 
commonly known as the Plague (a largely airborne disease) wiped out large 
numbers of the population in Europe, Asia and parts of Africa.54 While others thought 
the Plague was caused by corruption (the term used then to connote pollution) of the 
atmosphere, others thought that movements of the planets caused it while others 
believed that it was a punishment from God. One of the precautionary measures 
people took at that time was to avoid touching and even trading with the infected.55 
In 1990 at the Bergen Conference,56 the then opposition leader in Norway, 
Gro Brundtland, supported the debate on the precautionary approach arguing that it 
took a long time from decision-making to implementation to experience its practical 
                                                 
49 Section 18(4) Biosafety Act No 10 of 2007 Republic of Zambia.  
50 Discussed at (3.2) 
51 Schlesinger A The Disuniting of America (1992):46-47. 
52 Generally see Gasquet F The Great Pestilence (1893). 
53 Ziegler P The Black Death (1969):17. 
54 Gasquet F (n52):160. 
55 Ziegler P (n53):17. 
56 The Bergen Conference on ‘Action for a Common Future’ was held in Bergen Norway in May 1990 













effects and it cost more to restore environmental damage than to prevent it.57 During 
the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development 
(UNCED), His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama of Tibet stated ‘In the seventeenth 
century, we began decrees to protect the environment and so we may have been 
one of the first nations to have difficulty enforcing environmental regulations’.58 
These two examples and many more suggest that the precautionary approach 
has been in existence for a long time though perhaps in rudimentary forms. If this is 
the case, it is justifiable to argue that present day notions of the precaution may have 
borrowed from medieval and middle age practices in addressing imminent harm. 
Until the late 1960s, it was assumed that the impact of human activities on the 
environment could be determined accurately; it soon became clear that science 
could not come to the firm conclusions needed to protect the environment effectively 
and cost-effectively.59 This assimilative nature of the environment was based on four 
assumptions, namely, science could reliably predict threats to the environment; it 
could provide technical solutions to mitigate such threats once they were accurately 
predicted; enough time remained to act and finally, such action should embody 
efficient utilization of scarce financial resources.60 It was soon realised that this 
approach had failed as conclusive scientific proof came too late.61 In some cases 
such as oil spills at sea, the chang ng nature of the pollutants could not easily be 
determined. 
Thus, the precautionary approach saw a paradigm shift from the assimilative 
approach to one based on four elements comprising risk, damage, scientific 
                                                 
57 Cameron J and Abouchar J ‘The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and 
Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment’ 14 Boston College International and Comparative 
Law Review (1991):1-28 at 4. 
58 Statements of His Holiness XIV Dalai Lama of Tibet on 7 June 1992 at Rio de Janeiro Brazil in 
Collected Statements available at 
www.tibet.net/diir/eng/enviro/2004/pdf/His%20Holiness%20%20environment.pdf (accessed 2 April 
2008). 
59 See ‘Precaution from Rio to Johannesburg’ (2002) United Nations Environment Programme for the 
Geneva Network available at: 
www.environmenthouse.ch/docspublications/reportsRoundtables/Precaution%20Report%   
(accessed  2 April 2008). 
60 McIntyre O and Mosedale T ‘The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International 













uncertainty and differentiated capabilities.62 This new approach was embraced on 
two main grounds: first, it was a response to a growing appreciation of scientific 
uncertainties about environmental degradation since people could no longer rely 
entirely on scientific certainty to determine response measures, and second, some of 
the consequences of such degradation were irreversible.63 Moreover, recent threats 
such as those associated with GMOs, ozone depletion, climate change, loss of or 
threats to loss of biodiversity and other threats such as endocrine disrupting 
substances and persistent organic pollutants (POPs) had given rise to a new 
generation of risks.64 These new risks have posed challenges including the inability 
of scientists to predict with precision the nature and extent of potential damage.65 
Current notions of the precautionary approach are traceable to the former 
West German jurisprudence beginning in the 1970s at a time of social democratic 
planning.66 By embracing the concept of precaution, the Social Democrat-Free 
Democrat Coalition (SPD-FDP) government was linking environmental protection to 
the efficient and prudent management of an economy and a society in which 
advance planning was an essential component.67 
Early conceptions of the precautionary approach (known as Praecaution 
vorsorge) were based on the belief that the state was obliged to avoid environmental 
degradation by careful forward planning.68 The destruction or threat of destruction of 
forests - which Germans cherished69 - exacerbated the situation. As a result, in the 
1980s the German government used the precautionary approach to justify vigorous 
policies to minimize or alleviate harm or potential harm from acid rain, global 
warming and pollution of the North Sea.70 At that time, both precaution and 
                                                 
62 See ‘The Precautionary Principle from Rio to Johannesburg’ (n59). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Sadeleer N (n46) at 3. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Jordan A and O’Riordan T  ‘The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary Environmental Policy and 
Politics’ in Raffensperger C and Tickner A (eds) Protecting Public Health ns the Environment (1999): 
15-35 at 19. 
67 O’Riordan T ‘The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Management’ CSERGE Working Paper 
92-03 available at http://www.cserge.ac.uk/sites/default/files/gec_1992_03.pdf 
 (accessed 13 June 2009). 
68Jordan A and O’Riordan T (n66):19. 
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prevention were merged into the term vorsorge.71 It is widely known that by 1976 
and thereafter in Germany, vorsorgeprinzip had become a fundamental principle of 
general application in environmental policy and law, but defining the precautionary 
approach remained problematic. 
3.3.2 The Problems of Defining the Precautionary Approach. 
Lack of an acceptable uniform definition of the precautionary approach makes it 
unclear what it means and what is required of governments, scientists and other 
stakeholders.72 The precautionary approach is a useful tool for regulating technology 
and its products. Moreover, resolving the inherent dilemma as to its meaning and 
content is complicated partly due to lack of a formal acceptable definition for either 
the ‘principle’ or ‘approach’, making it unclear what either means and what each 
requires of governments, scientists and other stakeholders. 
Defining the precautionary approach remains problematic with the result that 
no single acceptable definition has been developed in the international 
environmental law regime. It is necessary to find out why this is the case as absence 
of an acceptable definition leads to varying interpretations of the approach. 
Problems in defining the precautionary approach are attributable to many 
factors. Differences in opinion between opponents of GMOs such as the European 
Union (EU) and proponents such as the United States (US) account for much of the 
controversy. While opponents of GMOs take a strict view of the approach, 
proponents view the approach as one that may be misused by governments to 
unnecessarily restrict trade.73 These differences in opinion have affected the manner 
and extent to which the approach has been embraced in various instruments and 
agreements. A few examples will suffice. 
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In 1987 at a Second Regional Conference for the Protection of the North 
Sea,74 parties acknowledged in the preambular paragraphs of the agreement 
reached by them that: 
 
‘in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the 
most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which 
may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a 
causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence;…’75 
In 1992 the Rio Declaration76 in Principle 15 embraced the precautionary 
approach in the following terms: 
‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation’77 
The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCC)78 in Art.3(3) provides that: 
‘The parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with 
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at 
the lowest possible cost’79 
                                                 
74 The conference took place in London 24-25 November 1987.  The Agreement was reached by 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Britain, Northern Island and the EU 
(which was the EC then). The proceedings are available at 
www.vliz.be/imisdocs/publications/140155.pdf (accessed 8 September 2009). 
 
75 See the Conference proceedings available at 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/05/78/43/4ffaa7cc.pdf  
 (accessed 8 September 2009). 
76 The Rio Declaration 31 International Legal Materials (1992):876 
77 Ibid Principle 15. 
78 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 31 International Legal Materials 
(1992):851.  It was adopted in 1992 entered into force 21 March 1994.  












The Paris Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic or the OSPAR Convention80 recognises the need for parties 
to apply: 
‘the precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventive measures are to be 
taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances ... 
introduced into the marine environment may bring about hazards to human 
health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems .. or interfere with other 
legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive evidence of a 
causal relationship between the inputs and the effects.’81 
In 2000 the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety82 embraced the precautionary 
approach as contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and provided that: 
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information 
and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a 
living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to 
human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as 
appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified organism in 
question as referred to in paragraph 3 above, in order to avoid or minimize 
such potential adverse effects.83 
In 2000 the EU issued a Communication on the precautionary principle as follows: 
‘The precautionary principle applies where scientific evidence is 
insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation 
indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the 
potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant 
health may be inconsistent with the high level of protection chosen by the 
EU’.84 
The EU statement embraces the concept of proportionality, which makes it different 
from other formulations. 
From these five examples, it is apparent that defining the precautionary 
approach is problematic for a number of reasons. Referring to precaution as 
                                                 
80 The OSPAR Convention was adopted 22 September 1992 and entered into force 25 March 1998.  
It  is available at 
http://www.ospar.org/html_documents/ospar/html/OSPAR_Convention_e_updated_text_2007.pdf at 
(accessed 24 July 2009). 
81 Ibid article 2(2).  
82 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 39 International Legal Materials (2000):1027. 
83 Ibid Article 10(6). 
84 See the ‘Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle COM (2000)’ 













‘principle’ as in the EU Communication and as an ‘approach’ in most of the other 
instruments, may cause problems in understanding and interpreting the effect of the 
concept. The World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge (COMEST) 
takes the general view that there is no significant difference between the two as 
principle connotes the philosophical foundations of precaution while approach is its 
practical application.85 
Had this view been acceptable, differences in opinion over adoption of 
precaution as a principle or approach would not have a risen between proponents 
and opponents of GMOs during the negotiations on the of the Protocol. As discussed 
in chapters two and three, opponents sought strict regulation. Hence, in the 
negotiations discussed in chapter four, the EU and the Like-Minded Group made 
futile attempts for a strong definition of the approach. This was vehemently opposed 
by the Miami Group led by the USA which lobbied for exclusion of the approach 
altogether. Opposition to ‘principle’ suggests that its use would have resulted in 
adoption of a strong international biosafety regime or the collapse of the 
negotiations, which after all stalled in 1999 at Cartagena. 
Academics such as Birnie and her co-authors take the view that by insisting 
on adoption of ‘precautionary approach’ rather than ‘precautionary principle’, states 
such as the USA regard ‘approach’ as offering greater flexibility and being potentially 
less restrictive than the ‘principle’ on the one hand. On the other hand, ‘principle’ is 
viewed as appropriate in situations of high uncertainty with a risk of irreversible harm 
attracting high costs and ‘approach’ is appropriate in situations where uncertainty 
and potential costs are merely significant and the harm unlikely to become 
irreversible.86 
In instruments such as the Protocol which adopted the precautionary principle 
using the wording of ‘approach’, the intention of the contracting parties was to end a 
stalemate (over the use of ‘principle’ or ‘approach’) that was one of the factors which 
threatened the collapse of the negotiations.87 Failure to adopt the Protocol would 
have meant that international efforts to regulate biotechnology were futile and could 
                                                 
85 See ‘The Precautionary Principle’ (2005):23 COMEST Report United Nations Educational Scientific 
and Cultural Organization available at www.unesco.org/shs/ethics.... (accessed 13 March 2009). 
86 Birnie P, Boyle A and Redwell C International Law and the Environment (2009):155. 












hardly have been revived in the face of stiff resistance from the USA and other 
proponents of GMOs. 
The other reason is that use of ‘precautionary measures’ as in the UNFCC 
and ‘preventive measures’ as in the OSPAR Convention, makes it difficult to 
ascertain whether a definition of the precautionary approach should or should not 
refer to or include preventive measures. Preventive measures are often associated 
with the preventive principle. While the two concepts may closely be related as 
discussed further at (3.5), adoption of the precautionary principle in most 
international environmental law instruments does not include ‘preventive measures’ 
but ‘precautionary measures’. 
In essence, lack of an acceptable definition of the precautionary approach 
suggests that states are determined – as they have been - to maintain flexibility in 
international treaty making. Such flexibility would allow powerful actors such as the 
EU and the USA to influence adoption of versions of the precautionary principle that 
would largely serve their interests especially in the developing countries in the 
regulation of GMOs. Moreover, environmental law is itself complex and as dynamic 
as the ecosystem it seeks to protect, hence, susceptible to constant change.88 
Defining the precautionary approach therefore remains elusive and cumbersome. 
Thus, the precautionary approach may be regarded as a ‘fluid’ mechanism 
whose parameters are so wide that only individual states will decide (subject to the 
thresholds imposed by the Protocol) the extent to which the principle may be 
applicable domestically. Setting acceptable limits – if this is possible – is not only for 
the legislature to determine, but importantly the decision-making body. 
Biotechnology policy (where it exists), may give useful guidance on application of the 
precautionary approach in the regulation.. 
3.3.3 The Precautionary Approach: A working Definition 
Recent UNESCO’s prepared the COMEST report in which the the Commission 
formulated a working but lengthy definition as follows: 
                                                 












‘When human activities may lead to morally unacceptable harm that is 
scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or 
diminish that harm. Morally unacceptable harm refers to harm to humans 
or the environment that is threatening to human life or health, or serious 
and effectively irreversible, or inequitable to present or future generations, 
or imposed without adequate consideration of the human rights of those 
affected. The judgement of plausibility should be grounded in scientific 
analysis. Analysis should be ongoing so that chosen actions are subject to 
review. Uncertainty may apply to, but need not be limited to, causality or 
the bounds of the possible harm. Actions are interventions that are 
undertaken before harm occurs that seek to avoid or diminish the harm. 
Actions should be chosen that are proportional to the seriousness of the 
potential harm, with consideration of their positive and negative 
consequences, and with an assessment of the moral implications of both 
action and inaction. The choice of action should be the result of a 
participatory process’.89 
Analysts such as Weiss support this definition arguing – among other things – 
that it acknowledges that the level of prospective benefits of the action being 
assessed should influence the level of precaution. The definition, he further argues, 
discusses in detail the standard of proof to be applied to the scientific evidence if 
such evidence is to trigger precautionary action. He concludes that the definition is 
clear enough to guide decision-making in practical situations.90 This thesis argues 
that only implementation at the domestic level may reveal trends that will inform state 
practice. 
3.3.4 Common Attributes of the Precautionary Approach 
Problems of defining the precautionary approach appear to have made it difficult, if 
not impossible, for international environmental law instruments to attempt any such 
definition. In the negotiations before adoption of the Protocol for instance, the 
contracting parties were divided on whether or not the precautionary approach was 
to be adopted, and if so, in what form and to what extent. These questions caused a 
dilemma that would have been aggravated by any attempts to define the 
precautionary approach. 
While definition of the precautionary approach is problematic, the various 
definitions contain certain discernable elements that trigger the taking of 
precautionary measures. The COMEST Report identifies such common elements as 
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those that include: existence of considerable scientific uncertainties concerning 
causality, magnitude, probability and nature of harm; some form of scientific analysis 
is mandatory; application of the precautionary approach is limited to unacceptable 
hazards; interventions are required before possible harm occurs or before certainty 
can be achieved; and interventions should be proportional to the chosen level of 
protection and the magnitude of the possible harm.91 
Trouwborst identifies three legs of what he terms ‘the precautionary tripod’ as: 
a threat of harm, uncertainty and action.92 Such threats may be attributable to global 
warming, loss of biodiversity, disease and so forth.93 Hence, application of the 
precautionary approach becomes imperative when there is a threat whose 
consequence to the environment or the species that live in it are uncertain and action 
needs to be taken either to prevent potential harm or minimize harm. The three 
components that trigger application of the precautionary approach are discussed 
below. 
(a) Uncertainty 
The intricate workings of the natural environment and the causal mechanisms 
attributable to its transformation, as well as the sheer complexity of the global 
ecosystem, make scientific uncertainty a common feature of any legal system on 
protection of the environment.94 Thus it is often difficult to know what will happen if 
certain restrictions are imposed and what may happen if such restrictions are not 
imposed.95 Hence, scientific uncertainty is a complex phenomenon which complexity 
has been explained thus: 
‘in the open dynamic environments where humans live and operate, 
knowledge often has limits, and scientific certainty is difficult to attain. 
Uncertainty itself comes in many varieties, nonscientific as well as 
scientific. Some kinds of uncertainty can be addressed and reduced; 
others cannot’.96 
                                                 
91 COMEST Report (n85):13. 
92 Trouwborst A Precautionary Rights and Duties of States (2006):30. 
93 Sandin P ‘Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle’ 5(5) Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 
(1999):889-907 at 891. 
94 Lazarus R (n88) at 19. 
95 ibid at 19-20. 
96 Tickner J and Raffensperger C ‘The Precautionary Principle in Action: A Handbook’ available at 












Scientific uncertainty may arise from many sources. Lazarus identifies three: 
One, spatial dimensions of ecological injury where the scope of change is too big; 
the larger the spatial dimension the greater the likelihood of an increase in the 
number of potentially contributing sources and other variables complicating 
identification of cause and effect. Two, ecological injuries may take place over long 
periods of time thereby resulting in dissipation of information and memory but 
importantly, intervening activities such as global warming, make identification of 
cause and effect difficult. Three, environmental law’s role to protect human health 
from harm caused by environmental contamination is complicated because 
determining the types, levels and periods of exposure to contaminants that cause 
harm to human health is difficult even using the best regime of scientific research.97 
Other scholars view uncertainty only in its three main forms: technical 
uncertainty that arises from lack of scientific understanding; epistemological 
uncertainty associated with limited knowledge concerning the GM organism in 
question and methodological uncertainties that arise from the choice of methods of 
detection and identification of the effects.98 
Tickner and Raffensperger, however identify different categories of 
uncertainty classifying them as scientific and non-scientific. Scientific categories 
include: 
• Parameter uncertainty that arises from missing or ambiguous 
information in specific informational components of an analysis. Such 
uncertainty may be reduced by gathering more information or by using better 
techniques; 
• Model uncertainty that arises from gaps in scientific theory or 
imprecision in the models used to bridge information gaps; 
• Systematic or epistemic uncertainty associated with unknown effects of 
cumulative, multiple and or interactive exposures. 
They identify non-scientific categories as those which include: 
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• Smokescreen uncertainty is attributable to strategies of those who 
create risks; they conceal the effects of a specific substance or activity to in 
favour of their vested interests; 
• Politically induced uncertainty (or negotiated science99) that arises from 
deliberate neglect on the part of agencies responsible for protecting health 
and the environment. The agency may decide not to study a hazard, limit the 
scope of its analysis, downplay uncertainty in its decisions, or hide uncertainty 
in quantitative models and finally 
• Indeterminacy where the uncertainties involved are of such magnitude 
and variety that they may never be significantly reduced.100 
Further, scientists working in various jurisdictions or disciplinary boundaries 
often discover that their assessment of causes and consequences differ from those 
of counterparts in other countries and fields. This is mainly due to their historical 
experiences, intellectual priorities, standards of proof or definitions of safety, all of 
which lead to different interpretations. As a result, invoking such in-depth and 
consequential divergences is a recipe for conflict rather than harmony.101 
Save for the non-scientific uncertainty, the categorization of sources of 
scientific uncertainty is neither materially distinct nor contradictory. For instance, the 
sources of scientific uncertainty identified by all the above scholars are associated to 
scientific research. These sources of scientific uncertainty may therefore be 
regarded as being complimentary yet distinct from non-scientific sources of 
uncertainty. 
These categories of uncertainty present varying challenges to decision-
makers in two respects particularly among African states where biosafety legislation 
is still in its infancy. First, the precautionary approach is applicable to scientific 
uncertainty. Levels of uncertainty would be minimized depending on many factors 
including levels of capacity building, financial resources and issues of governance 
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particularly the effective implementation of biosafety legislation where it exists. Such 
legislation should also be credible. Many African states are lagging behind and need 
support here. Hence, African states that are willing to embrace the GM technology 
need substantive provisions on the precautionary approach to address scientific 
uncertainty sufficiently. 
The second category which is non-scientific uncertainty poses greater 
challenges. Obvious culprits here are government agencies charged with the 
responsibility of evaluating risk assessment reports. In many cases in the selected 
countries, such agencies are empowered to carry out risk assessment.102 Such 
agencies are largely manned by scientists but many of the decisions they make may 
be informed by a political agenda.  In such circumstances, there may be no 
guarantee that such decisions may not be influenced by extraneous considerations 
for political advantage. 
(b) Threats to the environment and human health 
The core element that triggers application of the precautionary approach is the 
existence of a threat or potential threat. The threat may be one that leads to damage 
or irreversible damage. Principle 15 of the non-binding 1992 Rio Declaration makes 
provision for application of the precautionary principle where there are ‘threats of 
serious or irreversible damage’ to the environment. In so doing the Rio Declaration 
sets thresholds that were adopted by the Cartagena Protocol. These thresholds are 
problematic because neither the CBD nor the Protocol or any other instrument has 
attempted to define the meaning, scope and content of the two words ‘serious’ and’ 
irreversible’ or any of them. 
The problem is exacerbated as no guidance has been given on how to 
determine what constitutes serious or irreversible damage. Arguably, these are 
matters of fact left for scientists and decision-makers to determine based on 
available data. And to this extent, important issues that include the sources, quality 
of and expertise of collecting relevant data are critical. Even if credible data were 
availed, decision-making is a complicated process that attempts to reconcile 
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competing socio-economic, political and other interests that may often or ultimately 
override scientific considerations. 
The thresholds of serious or irreversible damage poses further challenges to 
the efficacy of the precautionary approach. The important question is whether states 
should wait until threats rich serious or irreversible levels before they can apply the 
precautionary approach to reject or restrict a GM or any other activity that may be 
harmful to the environment. This issue is addressed by the provisions of Art. 2(4) of 
the Protocol which recognizes ‘the right of a party to take action that is more 
protective of the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity than that 
called for in this Protocol…’ The effect is that if the threshold of ‘serious and 
irreversible’ damage is not reached in a particular case, it is not governed by 
international law but national law. 
In essence, a party to the Protocol has the discretion to decide which 
threshold(s) serve its interests so long us such thresholds do not go below the 
minimum standards set by the Protocol. Phrases such as ‘harm’ or ‘injury to the 
environment’ may be used to weaken or strengthen the thresholds that trigger 
application of the precautionary approach.103 In other cases, the phrase ‘any 
damage’ could impose higher thresholds in application of the precautionary 
approach. In Zambia for example, the Biosafety Act has provided for a higher 
threshold for application of the precautionary approach by requiring that ‘where there 
is reason to suspect threats of any damage…’104 Applicable thresholds are crucial in 
assessing permissible criteria for applying the precautionary approach in the 
selected countries. 
(c) Action 
An integral part in implementing the precautionary approach is the concept of 
proportionality that entails ‘a comprehensive, systematic analysis’ of the threat and 
the available alternatives.105 In essence, the concept requires that measures based 
on the precautionary approach must not be disproportionate to the desired level of 
                                                 
103 Cameron J and Abouchar J (n57):22. 
104 Section 18(3) Biosafety Act No 10 of 2007 (n101). 












protection and must not aim at zero risk, something which rarely exists.106 Hence, 
measures that are  too cautious may offend the precautionary approach. The action 
to be taken therefore depends on how much precaution is needed taking into 
account factors such the seriousness or irreversibility of the threat and the level of 
uncertainty concerning such a threat.107  The more uncertain the threat the greater 
the degree of precaution required.108 Decision-makers need to determine how much 
risk is acceptable and the best option available.109 The options may include, further 
research, completely halting the activity, preventing, controlling, mitigating.110 The 
guiding criterion is that the action taken ought to be cost-effective.111 
Determining the best option requires a cost-benefit analysis―a decision 
support mechanism that assesses the range of costs and benefits that inform the 
decision.112 Essentially, it is an accounting framework that identifies the types of 
costs and benefits to be taken into account, how to evaluate and aggregate them.113 
If the cost-benefit analysis is done from an economic perspective rather than 
financial (which benefits the investor), it should include impacts on the environment 
which identified in an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).114 
A decision-making process cannot therefore be an effective tool for protecting 
the environment and human health if it fails to take action whenever significant 
scientific uncertainty is present.115 It should be accompanied by effective monitoring 
over a period of time for purposes of identifying and addressing expected and 
unexpected consequences.116 
Arguably, the action taken is what counts from the perspective of the general 
public. The decision-maker may intelligently balance the various interests but the 
outcome is what is arguably significant in assessing the suitability of such a decision. 
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Effective public involvement is a reliable basis for rationality in decision-making. It 
may as well be said that the action taken must not only be objective, but must be 
seen to be objective. 
3.4 The Precautionary Approach in International Environmental Law 
By imposing a general obligation on states not to cause harm to the environment, 
and having been adopted in many instruments on protection of the environment, 117 
the precautionary approach may correctly be viewed as being part and parcel of the 
current international environmental law (IEL) regime. Theapproach has developed 
mainly through soft and hard law instruments. Its status in international law has been 
the subject of debate. It is essential to deal with that issue before embarking on the 
other aspects relevant to its development in IEL. 
3.4.1 The Status of the Precautionary Approach in International Law 
International law owes its origin largely to treaties or agreements between nations 
and of accepted custom.118 The authority, binding nature and weight of the 
precautionary approach in international environmental law must be considered in the 
context of its status in international law. This is critical because only binding rules 
form part of the international law regime.119. . 
A principle that is established as part of customary international law provides 
the basis of an international action, the validity of which emanates from the legal 
obligations the principle creates.120 However, the precautionary approach has 
essentially developed through international declarations121 for protection of the 
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environment but these declarations did not, (and legally could possibly not) declare 
such status of the approach in international law. This raises subtle and complex 
problems as it involves acts by states within the legislative process,122 because 
custom is not declared but it evolves from state practice, which usually (save for 
instant custom) takes time. It is however a natural wish of states and other 
stakeholders to know the precise extent of their rights and duties under international 
law. 123 
Significantly, it is in international law that the process of coordination and 
ultimate integration of different regulatory traditions and attitudes to biotechnology 
are embedded.124 For instance, in Biotech,125 the EU sought to rely on application of 
the precautionary principle but the USA, Canada and Argentina objected. The WTO 
Tribunal upheld the objection on the grounds that the principle was not part of 
customary international law. 
Custom and treaties are important sources of international law.126 
International law becomes effective when states are willing comply with existing 
customary international law and treaty obligations. While treaties create specific 
rights and binding obligations that are negotiated and agreed upon on the, 
effectiveness of new customary international law is largely dependent upon 
willingness of states to be bound by such rules. 
3.4.1.1 Custom 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) describes custom 
as ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’. Evidence that a custom in this 
sense exists in the international community can be found only by examining state 
practice on of how states relate to one another, attempting to understand why they 
do so, and in particular whether they recognise an obligation to adopt a given 
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course.127 Brownlie enumerates sources of custom as including diplomatic 
correspondence, policy statements, press releases, official manuals on legal 
questions and resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations.128 In 
applying these forms of evidence to establish the existence of an international 
custom, the important consideration is whether there is general recognition among 
states (not necessarily every state, as this may not be practicable) of a certain 
practice as being obligatory.129 Moreover, states can only be bound by customary 
rules that such states have accepted and recognised but ‘recognition of a particular 
rule as a rule of international law by a large number of states raises a presumption 
that the rule is generally recognised’.130 
The criteria for determining what constitutes rules of customary international 
law are fairly well settled. Uniformity and consistency of practice; generality of 
practise and intention of states to be bound by such practice, which intention is 
commonly referred to as opinio juris provide acceptable criteria.131 
In the Asylum case132, Columbia granted asylum to a rebel leader, in its 
Peruvian Embassy, and sought his safe conduit, a plea Peru rejected. Columbia filed 
a case against Peru and sought to rely on custom peculiar to Latin American states 
in relation to asylum. The court noted that a party that relies on a custom must prove 
that the custom has been established in such a manner that it also binds the other 
party.133 Columbia’s claims failed on the grounds that it had failed to prove constant 
and uniform usage the custom it sought to rely on. The evidence adduced before the 
court was uncertain, contradictory with so much fluctuation and discrepancies in the 
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exercise of diplomatic asylum. Moreover, the custom could not be invoked against 
Peru which had otherwise repudiated the custom by its failure to ratify the 
Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939. 
In its Advisory Opinion to the United Nations concerning The Legality of the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons134 the ICJ observed that international customary 
law ‘must be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of states’. 
Opinio juris is a legal criterion for distinguishing legal rules from mere social usage 
and it refers to the subjective belief acknowledged by states that a particular practice 
is binding on them.135 
In the second phase of the South West African cases136 the ICJ noted that: 
‘…not only must the acts concerned “amount to a settled practice”, but 
they must also be accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis. Either 
the States taking such action or other States in a position to react to it 
must have behaved so that their conduct is evidence of a belief that this 
practice is rendered obligatory by existence of a rule of law requiring it’.137 
It must however be noted that as criteria for determining the existence of 
customary international law, state practice and opinio juris are complimentary.138 
Further, while not all treaties give rise to customary international law, certain bilateral 
and multilateral treaties that embrace generalizable rules may have that effect.139 
For example Articles 1(1) and 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter140 may be a source 
of customary international law by reason of the requirements to maintain 
international peace and to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states 
respectively. These are generalizable rules that seek to achieve a common goal – 
international peace. 
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Article 1(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties141 defines a treaty as 
‘an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed 
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instruments and whatever its particular designation’ 
Brownlie refers to some treaties as ‘law making’ as they create legal 
obligations the observance of which does not dissolve the treaty obligation. He 
distinguishes them from a single enterprise treaty in which fulfilment of its objectives 
terminates the obligation. He asserts that law-making treaties create normative rules 
that govern the future conduct of the parties in terms of legal propositions which 
establish obligations that are mainly the same for all the parties.142 
Treaties create rights and obligations for parties. By ratifying a treaty, a state 
expresses its consent to be bound by such a treaty internationally.143 In cases where 
non-parties comply with rules contained in treaties, it is often presumed that such 
compliance does not arise from treaty obligations but rather that such a rule is on the 
process of becoming or has become part of the general law of nations.144 Thus, 
treaties may codify existing customary international law and/or lead to the creation of 
new customary international law, especially when such instruments are intended for 
adherence by states generally and are widely accepted in practice.145 
The importance of custom and treaties in the formation of international law 
cannot be overstated. On the one hand, custom does not amend a treaty but is 
capable of amplifying and supplementing it.146 On the other hand, treaties have 
priority over conflicting customary rules but only in relations between parties to the 
treaty.147 
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Having considered custom and treaties as key sources of the law of nations, 
three important issues arise concerning the precautionary approach: whether the 
approach has been elevated from one of general application to one of customary 
international law, and if so, does the approach reflect existing customary law or has it 
lead to creation of new rules of customary international law?; what is the impact of 
rejection of the precautionary principle in Biotech148 by the WTO Tribunal in relation 
to the principles’ status in customary international law? 
Is the Precautionary Approach a Rule of General International Law or Does it 
Create New Rules of Customary International Law? 
Adoption of the precautionary approach or inferences drawn from it in international 
instruments and declarations provide proof of the willingness of states to protect the 
environment for the benefit of present and future generations. The need to Protect 
the environment gained momentum in the 1970s as evidenced by the 1972 
Stockholm Conference at which states declared that such protection was ‘the urgent 
desire of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments’.149 This 
was a tremendous paradigm shift from the Renaissance notions in which humans 
were regarded as predators of the environment.150 
International cooperation on protection of the environment may therefore be 
said to be a new approach occa ioned by or potential effects associated with 
increasing degradation of the environment. Such cooperation is witnessed by the 
large number of parties Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs).151 It is 
evidence of the commitment (theoretically at least) of states to be bound by the 
obligations (including those imposed by the precautionary approach) contained in 
such instruments. Ratification of such treaties however is one thing; compliance is 
another. 
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By the 1970s the status of the precautionary approach was uncertain in 
international law. Four aspects of state practice strongly suggest that it is gradually 
emerging into the realm of customary international law. First, there was its increased 
adoption by a wide range of international environmental law instruments. Soft law 
instruments included the Rio Declaration.152 Hard law instruments included the 
United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC),153 the Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,154 and its Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer.155 In these last two, the precautionary approach was 
affirmed in the preambular paragraphs and the actions called for in both instruments 
are founded on the approach.156 
Second, Agenda 21157 and other declarations concerning the principle of 
sustainable development made a substantial contribution in elevating the status of 
the precautionary approach in international law. For example, in its Delhi meeting in 
2002, the International Law Association noted that sustainable development involves 
a comprehensive and integrated approach to economic, social and political 
processes whose primary aim is to achieve sustainable use of the natural resources 
of the earth and protection of the environment. It embraces due regard to the needs 
and interests of future generations’ as a core component.158 By providing that the 
precautionary approach be ‘widely applied by states according to their capabilities’159 
the Rio Declaration intended that it was to be applied in addressing both global 
environmental risks, such as climate change and, in furthering sustainable 
development.160 
In the 2000 Declaration of a New Millennia at the UN, Heads of State and 
Government resolved that ‘[w]e must spare no effort to free all of humanity, and 
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above all our children and grandchildren, from the threat of living on a planet 
irredeemably spoilt by human activities, and whose resources would no longer be 
sufficient for their needs’.161 This commitment impliedly embraces the precautionary 
approach. The declaration is closely linked to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
observation in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros that there was ‘need to reconcile economic 
development with protection of the environment’ as a precondition for sustainable 
development.162 In his dissenting judgement, Judge Weraamantry argued that the 
precautionary action, which has the aim of protecting the environment for the benefit 
of present and future generations, is widely believed to be an essential condition for 
achieving sustainable development.163 
In Vellore164 the Supreme Court of India noted that while the ‘evolving’ 
precautionary principle is accepted as part of international environmental law ‘the 
circumstances of its application in any potential situation will be influenced by the 
circumstances of each case’. In addition, authors claim that the precautionary 
principle has been elevated to one of customary international law which itself may be 
amorphous and uncertain.165 
In the Beef Hormones case166 for example, the WTO Appellate Body 
expressed the view that while the precautionary principle is considered a principle of 
customary international law, it could not be used to override the explicit wording of 
article 5.1 and 5.2 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement167) that makes provision for risk assessment.168. 
Whereas this reasoning is a true reflection of international law, it confirms the 
proactive nature of the WTO regime in protecting commercial interests. Third, many 
jurisdictions and other bodies have embraced the precautionary approach in 
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domestic legislation. In 2002 for example, the EU sought to achieve a level of 
protection of the environment and humans, based on proportionality. It issued a 
Communication embracing the precautionary principle as follows: 
‘[W]here preliminary objective scientific evaluation, indicates that there are 
reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on 
the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with 
the high level of protection chosen by the community’169 
Section18 of Biosafety Act of Zambia170 provides that: 
‘(3)Lack of scientific evidence shall not be used as a basis for not taking 
preventive measures where there is reason to suspect threats of any 
damage to socio-economic considerations, human and animal health, non-
genetically modified crop, biological diversity or the environment. 
(4) The Authority may reject an application under this part on grounds of 
public interest’171 
These developments lead to an irresistible inference that, while the origin of the 
precautionary principle is traceable to German domestic law, its growing importance 
is attributable to treaty obligations contained in various multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs). Since states are the creators of , and the main actors in 
international law as well as the subjects f the legal regime they have created, it 
arguably follows that the content and rules of international law may largely depend 
upon the ‘consensus’ of nation-state officials as to what the content of the law is.172 
Such state officials interpret and apply the law in decision-making. These officials are 
agents of the state and are likely to apply international law norms in a manner 
consistent with the interests and values of the political leadership. 
The challenge may be greater for developing countries most of which lack the 
capacity to implement international environmental norms. In addition, many of them 
have weak democracies. This means that the manner and extent to which the 
precautionary approach may be applied in decision-making largely depends on the 
views such state officials hold concerning the approach. 
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Traditional customary international law largely arose from need and the focus 
was largely on international peace and security. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, 
the 1919 League of Nations Covenant as well as the 1945 United Nations Charter 
were all primarily intended to ensure that there was international peace and security 
and international cooperation.173 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties174 
confirms the willingness by states to be bound by their treaty obligations and 
answers the need for a treaty codifying the formation of and compliance with treaties 
among other things. 
These obligations to comply with treaties may be said to have emanated 
mainly from respect for state sovereignty, hence the notion of equality of all states. 
This being the case, it is tenable to argue that the precautionary approach is a recent 
phenomenon in international law. It developed along with increasing global 
awareness of the need to protect the environment and the compelling desire to use 
its resources in a sustainable manner. 
Fourth, scholars have increasingly taken the view that the precautionary 
principle has been elevated from a principle of general application to one of 
customary international law. Cameron and Abouchar argue that the principle had 
successfully informed and should increasingly inform the effective creation and 
implementation of significant policies for protection of the environment. They 
concluded that there was sufficient state practice particularly in addressing scientific 
uncertainty in which the precautionary principle was the correct legal and policy tool 
for decision-makers.175 
Trouborst takes the view that the precautionary principles embodies a norm of 
customary international law but determining what this means is another matter.176 
Renn is a little cautious. He argues that if for any other reason the precautionary 
principle has not attained that status in international law, it can hardly be disputed 
that, as the principle has expanded in scope so has it is its significance.177 Those 
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who refer to it as an ‘approach’ sometimes deny that it has been elevated to a 
‘principle’ of customary international law.178 
In effect, it is yet to be established whether or not the precautionary approach 
has become part of customary international law. Its close link with the principle of 
sustainable development (which has become part of customary international law), 
suggests that the approach could be creating new rules of customary international 
law. The more environmental degradation threatens international peace and security, 
the faster emerging international environmental law principles may become part of 
customary international law. The above finding and assertion have an impact on the 
third issue concerning the WTO Panel’s rejection of the approach in Biotech. 
The Effect of Rejection of the Precautionary Principle by the WTO Tribunal in 
Biotechnology 
It is custom that emanates from a treaty (not the treaty itself) that binds non-parties 
in international law.179 In the Biotech case 180 the EU sought and the US objected to 
the reliance on the precautionary approach as justification for the moratorium on 
GMO imports to Europe. The WTO Tribunal upheld the objection on the grounds that 
the status of the precautionary principle was not certain in international law. The 
regime does not recognise or adopt the precautionary principle in its instruments 
predominantly because the principle is viewed as one that states may use to restrict 
international trade unnecessarily, including trade in agriculture. 
With regard to the precautionary approach, The WTO tribunal was deciding a 
customary international law issue. The Protocol specifies a treaty obligation. There is 
no hierarchical relationship between the WTO regime and the protocol regime. In 
essence, rejection of the precautionary principle by the WTO Panel cannot be used 
as basis of assessing the status of the principle in international law. Even if it was to 
be claimed that the Tribunal erred in rejecting the principle, one could still argue that 
the Panel legitimately expressed its views on a that is yet to become part of 
customary international law. Those views do not affect implementation of the 
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precautionary approach in the regulation of biotechnology as provided for under the 
Protocol. 
3.5 Which Way: Precautionary ‘Principle’ or Precautionary ‘Approach’? 
The terms precautionary ‘principle’ and precautionary ‘approach’ are contested 
terminologies in international environmental law. In 1997, before adoption of the 
Protocol, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21181 referred to 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration as the ‘precautionary principle’ Principle 15 of the 
Rio Declaration itself provides for application of the ‘precautionary approach’ ‘where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage’. In adopting the programme, the 
United Nations General Assembly noted that its focus was to ‘accelerate the 
implementation of Agenda 21 in a comprehensive manner and not to renegotiate its 
provisions or to be selective in its implementation’.182 Having reaffirmed that Agenda 
21 remains the fundamental plan of action for achieving sustainable development, 
there seems to be no doubt that, the two terminologies ‘principle’ and ‘approach’ are 
used interchangeably for purposes of implementing Agenda 21. 
The Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1999183 obligates the 
government to apply the precautionary principle, and requires that ‘lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation...’ with respect to serious and 
irreversible harm to the environment and humans.184 Canada was an active 
participant in the period leading to Rio,185 yet during the negotiations on the Protocol, 
it was the spokesperson for Miami Group, which objected to the use of the term 
principle in favour of approach. 
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Thus, role of the precautionary approach may only become clear in its practical 
application.186 In the light of this, Trouwborst states that: 
‘[a]nalysis of the practice of states has shown that the only real difference 
seems to be the terminological distinction itself. The two terms stand for 
the same concept and have the same basic characteristics. No 
substantive differences can prima facie be detected between 
commitments to apply the ‘precautionary principle’ and commitments to 
apply the ‘precautionary approach’187 
Arguably, whether an instrument or legislation refers to the precautionary principle as 
‘principle’ or ‘approach’ does not make a significant difference; implementation may. 
Further, the term ‘precautionary approach’ was used in Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration at the insistence of the USA,188 which, all along, acted from its observer 
status.189 Whenever the EU Commission claims that the precautionary principle is a 
‘principle’, the US government prefers to phrase precautionary ‘approach’.190 These 
differences in terminology between the USA and the EU were more pronounced 
during the negotiations on the Protocol. Owing to the disagreement between the EU, 
which sought a strict regime, and the USA which was reluctant to adopt even a weak 
regime, it was no wonder that the latter was keen to ensure that as much flexibility as 
possible was achieved in the international regulation of biotechnology. It is therefore 
tenable to argue that negotiations on the Protocol were part of a political process that 
had broader and varying interests to protect.191 
Adoption of the precautionary’ approach’ rather than ‘principle’ in the Protocol 
seems to be part of the political compromise reached to avoid collapse of 
negotiations on the Protocol.192 The precautionary principle was reluctantly accepted 
by the USA (which is not a party but used its observer status), on condition that it 
was framed as an approach rather than principle. It sought to ensure that the 
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precautionary principle did not attain the status of customary international law. The 
USA, was trying to do the improbable because custom formation does not depend 
on the formation of a treaty. Even if the Protocol was not to establish the principle, 
this does not prevent custom from establishing it outside the treaty. 
Some scholars draw a distinction between approach and principle based on 
weak and strong versions respectively. They argue that weak versions are those in 
which, the taking of precaution is preceded by the balancing of benefits and the 
costs of taking action. Strong ones are those that would prohibit any action, resulting 
in significant or irreversible environmental harm regardless of the cost of doing so.193 
Still others argue that the precautionary approach is preferred as it seems to offer 
greater flexibility and could be less potentially restrictive than the ‘principle’.194 In 
contrast, other scholars take the view that the Protocol expresses ‘the use of the 
precautionary principle with sufficient clarity’.195 This assertion draws no distinction 
between ‘approach’ as used in the Protocol and ‘principle’ in general. 
In 2004, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
asserted that only when the precautionary principle is stated in formulations such as 
‘inspire’ a policy instrument or that decision-makers ‘may have regard to’ the 
principle or where the Principle is merely included in the preamble of an instrument, 
can the principle be ‘ignored or overridden’.196 This suggests that in practice, 
reference to the precautionary principle as an ‘approach’ does not prejudice the 
principle’s application in decision-making. 
Thus, the difference between ‘principle’ and ‘approach’ is a subject over which 
no consensus has been reached.197 The distinction is regarded as semantic.198 This 
thesis does not claim to offer a solution. Instead it argues that the international 
environmental law regime has neither sought to distinguish the terminologies nor 
imposed different obligations on states corresponding to each terminology. Thus, 
                                                 
193 Bell S and McGillivray D, Environmental Law (2006):77; Sunstein C, Laws of Fear (2005):18-19. 
194 Birnie P et at  (n86) at 155. 
195 Egziabher T ‘Like –Minded Group’ in Bail et al The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Reconciling 
Trade in Biotechnology with Environment & Development (2002): 115-123 at 122. 
196 Cooney R ‘The Precautionary Principle in Biodiversity Conservation and Natural Resources 
Management (2004):25 IUCN Policy and Global Change Series No 2 ISBN 2-8317-0810-9. 
197 Birnie P et at (n86):155. 












consistent with the Protocol, the term precautionary approach is used in this thesis 
save where the context may dictate that the term ‘principle’ be used. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the origins and attributes of the precautionary approach. 
Founded on the concept of precaution, the approach was proactively enunciated in 
the domestic law of Germany primarily for conservation purposes. When uncertainty 
as to the existence of harm or potential harm culminates in a threat that requires 
action, application of the precautionary approach is called for in environmental 
governance. 
New and increased risks to the environment attributable to climate change, 
ozone depletion, loss of or threats to loss of biodiversity and unknown but potentially 
harmful risks (such as those associated with GMOs), have made adoption of the  
approach  in international environmental law imperative. Increasing adoption of the 
precautionary approach in various MEAs, the Protocol in particular, leaves no doubt 
as to its importance as a risk management tool. 
However, the meaning, content and terminology of the precautionary 
approach remain contested, especially in the regulation of biotechnology largely 
because the approach is like a double edged ‘sword’. It may be used for legitimate 
purposes, such as protection of the environment and humans from potential harm 
associated with GMOs. It may be used to restrict agricultural trade unnecessarily in 
ways that may offend the WTO regime. The following chapter therefore critically 














THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH IN THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
‘We need to be cautious until we have enough 
evidence that technology can be trusted’.1 
 
4.1 International regulation of biotechnology 
International regulation of biotechnology has a long history essentially characterised 
by controversy. In the 1970s, genetic engineering emerged as a revolutionary 
invention in biotechnology that some observers believed, would radically transform 
industry and agriculture.2 Soon after field trials in the 1980s and commercialisation of 
GMOs in the 1990s, genetic engineering was mired in controversy.3  Adoption of the 
precautionary approach under Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its 
Cartagena Protocol is indicative of the belief by the international community that the 
approach is a useful mechanism for regulation.  It has increasingly been used as 
justification for international controls and significantly benefits humanity yet it could 
worsen other aspects of the environment or public health.4 
Against this backdrop, this chapter discusses the precautionary approach as 
enshrined in the international biosafety regime, most notably the CBD and the 
Protocol. This is intended to shed light on the contentious issues that arise in the 
implementation of the approach in the selected countries. Being an issue of global 
concern, international regulation of biotechnology basically sought to prevent, 
minimise or alleviate potential transboundary damage arising from international trade 
in living modified organisms (LMOs). The thesis first examines the legal basis of 
state responsibility in respect of transboundary environmental damage. 
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State Responsibility for Transboundary Environmental Damage 
A state may be liable to another state for environmental damage arising from the use 
of its territory. Responsibility for such damage is traceable to customary international 
law set out in the Trail Smelter Arbitration and the Corfu Channel case. 
The Trail Smelter Arbitration5, sought to settle the claims of the USA arising 
from damage caused domestically to crops, pasturelands, trees, agriculture and 
livestock from sulphur dioxide fumes emitted and carried by wind from the Smelting 
Plant of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada at Trail in British 
Columbia. Issues concerning fumigation and the resulting damage were submitted in 
1928 to a Joint American – Canadian Commission set up in 1909. The Commission 
made recommendations that were not accepted by the two states. The matter was 
subsequently referred to an arbitral tribunal. In finding Canada liable the Tribunal in 
its final decision of 11 March 1941 concluded that: 
[N]o state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the 
properties of persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence 
and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.6 
In the Corfu Channel case7  United Kingdom filed a complaint against Albania 
concerning the safety of the Corfu Chanel in the territorial waters of the latter. During 
the war; mines were planted in the Channel. Albania removed the mines, raising a 
presumption that the Channel was safe for ships. Thereafter two British war ships 
were hit and damaged by the mines. 
The United Kingdom claimed that the mines had been laid with the complicity 
or knowledge of the Albanian government. While the Court found it impossible to 
prove who had laid the mines in question, Albania had kept a continuous and careful 
watch over the Channel raising an irresistible presumption that it was aware of the 
existence of such mines. Such knowledge gave rise to responsibility on the part of 
the Albanian government and as a result, the court held that ‘it had been a duty of 
the Albanian government to notify the world in general of the existence of the 
minefield and to warn the approaching British naval units of their imminent danger’. 
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The Court held that such knowledge created responsibility on the part of the 
Albanian government to ‘warn other nations of the existence of such danger in its 
territorial waters. The Court further observed that the duty arose from ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’ and moreover, it was the ‘obligation of every state not to 
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states’.8 
These two cases illustrate the need for states to take responsibility for acts 
taking place in their territories which acts may cause damage to the land and 
peoples of other states. Such responsibility contributed to the development and 
adoption of the precautionary approach. It emphasizes the need to take 
precautionary measures to ensure that activities taking place within a states 
jurisdictional areas or the state’s control do not result in environmental damage to 
other states and their environments.9 By adopting the precautionary approach (as 
well as the requirement for notification) in regulating GMOs, the Protocol is a case in 
point where the international community has sought to prevent transboundary harm 
that may be associated with such products. 
4.2 The Precautionary Approach in the Rio Declaration and in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
The Rio Declaration10 and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)11 were 
negotiated simultaneously at Rio in 1992.  Principle 15 of the Declaration sought to 
enhance protection of the environment by providing for application of the 
precautionary approach ‘[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage’ 
and that ‘lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’.  The approach was 
adopted with the hope that states would apply it widely according to their capabilities.  
The former was a soft law instrument and the latter hard law. This meant that states 
which were not parties to the CBD would in good faith embrace the approach as 
provided for under the Declaration by reason of their customary international law 
obligations. It also suggests that by embracing the approach through a non-binding 
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instrument, the international community was keen to ensure that states embraced it 
within an environment of flexibility.  Moreover, once states adopt the approach in 
domestic law, it binds such states in their international relations, in this case, with 
respect to GMOs. Since then, the precautionary approach of the Rio Declaration has 
become an invaluable source of the criterion for regulation in many international 
instruments such as the Protocol and domestic legislation in many countries. 
The CBD is recognised as a landmark treaty in the conservation of biological 
diversity and sustainable use of biological resources.12 It has three primary 
objectives: conservation of biological diversity; sustainable use of its components fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources. The 
third objective has three components: access to genetic resources, transfer of the 
relevant technologies and funding.13 
The three objectives of the CBD seek to achieve a balance between 
conservation, sustainable use and sharing of benefits.14 Further, it provides an 
overall sense of direction with a view of ensuring that balanced decisions are 
taken.15 The issue of transfer of technologies was however, problematic since it’s 
meaning was to be developed fully, through state practice.16 Such practice would, 
ultimately, lead to the development of customary international law that governs 
biotechnology. A protocol to the Convention was, in the circumstances, an 
appropriate avenue for creating obligations, compliance with which would provide the 
criteria and parameters of determining how and to what extent states should regulate 
biotechnology. 
Consequently, the Convention created a framework and the parameters within 
which a protocol was to be adopted. Article 19(3) persuaded (rather than obligated) 
the parties to consider the need for and modalities of a protocol with a view to setting 
out appropriate procedures, especially those relating to advance informed 
agreement in the field of safe transfer, handling and use of living modified 
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organisms.17 In 1994 at Nassau, Bahamas, two committees were mandated to 
consider the need for and modalities of a protocol on biosafety. In May 1995, a panel 
of experts met in Cairo. This was followed by a meeting of an ad hoc group of 
biosafety experts in Madrid in July 1995. The latter recommended the establishment 
of a biosafety Protocol.18 Thus, the Convention served three important roles relating 
to regulation of biotechnology. 
First, it obligated parties to ‘establish and maintain means to regulate manage 
or control’ the risks associated with the use and release of LMOs resulting from 
biotechnology that could adversely affect biological diversity and human health.19  
The CBD further required parties to exchange information about the use and safety 
regulations of the country into which LMOs were to be introduced.20 These 
provisions were intended to regulate LMOs in the absence of a Protocol and still bind 
parties to the CBD who are not parties to the Protocol. 
Second, Art 19(3) of the CBD laid a roadmap for adoption of a biosafety 
Protocol. Further, it promoted the concept of Advance Informed Agreement (AIA). By 
so doing, the convention arguably sought to ensure the safe use of biotechnology. 
Thus, parties are required to establish or maintain means to regulate, manage or 
control the risks associated with the use and release of LMOs which are potentially 
harmful to the environment taking also into account human health.21 In addition, Art 
28 gives general power to parties to cooperate ‘in the formulation and adoption of 
protocols’ to the Convention. This implies that the Conference of the Parties (COP) 
may adopt protocols, should such protocols promote realisation of the Conventions 
objectives. 
Third, having adopted and ratified the Convention, the parties were under 
obligation in international law not to act in a manner inconsistent with the object and 
purpose of the Convention, in compliance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
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Treaties.22 Adoption of the CBD set forth binding obligations which included the 
requirement that parties ‘establish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control 
the risks associated with the use and release of living modified organisms...’.23  
Contrary conduct by parties would not only frustrate the object and purpose of the 
Convention, it would delay or otherwise hinder the effectiveness of the instrument.  
This provision obligates parties to the CBD but non-parties to the Protocol, to ensure 
safety in activities concerning LMOs. However, effectiveness of the CBD, and in turn 
the Protocol, is hampered by influential states such as the USA, which are large 
exporters of LMOs but have signed and not ratified the Convention. 
The CBD currently has 193 parties including the European Union. This 
confirms the serious concern of the international community for biodiversity as well 
as human health and the need to conserve and protect biological biodiversity. 
Adoption of the Cartagena Protocol was specifically intended to address issues 
concerning the safe use of biotechnology. 
4.3 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
The Protocol was signed in 2000 and entered into force on 11 September 2003. It 
has been ratified by 163 Parties including the selected countries. However major 
growers of GM crops, such as Canada and Argentina have ratified the Convention 
but are yet to sign and ratify the Protocol. In addition, the United States has not 
ratified the CBD and thus not eligible to become a party to the Protocol.   The 
negotiations on the Protocol provide an in-depth understanding of the contentious 
nature of biotechnology. 
4.3.1 The Negotiations on the Protocol 
Issues of safety concerning GMOs were already a matter of international concern 
during the negotiation and adoption of the CBD. However, it was not until 1995 at the 
second conference of the Parties (COP) to the CBD at Jakarta, Indonesia, that the 
report of the experts was considered. Ultimately, an open-ended ad hoc Working 
Group on Biosafety (BSWG) was established and was mandated to draft a protocol 
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on biosafety.24 The negotiations were acrimonious as disagreements arose over 
cross-cutting issues that included: the precautionary principle, socio-economic 
considerations, liability and redress, identification and labelling; risk assessment and 
risk management and trade.25 Other major issues included the Advance Informed 
Agreement (AIA), treatment of non-parties, the scope of the Protocol and the 
relationship of the Protocol with other international treaties and in particular, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) regime.26 
The disagreements during the negotiations on the of the Protocol led to 
emergence of five negotiating groups that Burgiel identifies as (i) the Miami group 
comprising the major actual and potential exporters of LMOs - USA, Canada, 
Argentina, Chile, Australia and Uruguay. They sought a Protocol limited in scope and 
based on strict scientific criteria for risk assessment; (ii) The EU which sought a strict 
and comprehensive regime for regulation of biotechnology; (iii) The Like-Minded 
Group comprising most of the developing countries which sought a strict biosafety 
regime along the lines of the EU (iv) the Compromise Group consisting of Norway, 
New Zealand, Switzerland and Mexico which sought a middle ground and (v) the 
Central and Eastern European countries led by Russia and Hungary which sought a 
compromise but often supported the EU and Compromise Group.27 
Other stakeholders including environmental non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) such as Greenpeace, Consumer International and Friends of the Earth, 
supported a strict biosafety regime as they were worried that GMOs might cause 
unintended ecological damage.28 In contrast to NGOs, industry groups such the 
Global Industry Coalition which represent an international group of biotechnology 
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industries were opposed to a strict regime on the grounds that stringent restrictions 
on food would slow economic development yet hardly contribute to ecological 
protection.29 
Emergence of these five groups had a profound impact on the negotiations. 
First, the negotiating groups had varying priorities and interests thereby making the 
negotiations an intricate process. There was disagreement on two fronts. The first 
one had two issues: the content of the intended agreement and whether there was a 
need for ‘a legally binding [international] biosafety instrument at all.’30 The second 
one was the stalemate that emerged over critical issues such as the scope of the 
Protocol, adoption of the precautionary approach, the AIA procedure and other 
issues gave rise to an imminent collapse of the negotiations at Cartagena. Moreover, 
the Miami Group insisted that they did not want to adopt an instrument that was not 
workable.31 Third, this was a clear indication of the zeal with which proponents of 
biotechnology were keen to ensure that a weak international regime on regulation of 
biotechnology was achieved that largely served their interests. The Miami Group 
sought to achieve this goal by opposing inclusion of the precautionary approach in 
the text of the protocol. 
In opposing inclusion of the precautionary principle, the Miami Group - the 
USA in particular - was worried that the principle would be used to justify arbitrary 
nonscience-based trade restrictive measures.32 The Group delegations were mainly 
from the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade.33 It is no surprise therefore that the 
Group viewed the negotiations largely from a trade rather than an environmental 
perspective. With biotechnology companies on its side, the Group was keen to 
ensure that the Protocol did not impose burdensome restrictions on the bulk 
commodity trade.34 
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In contrast, the EU officials were mainly from the environment, agriculture, 
economy and foreign affairs. While the EU spoke for its member states, delegations 
from the member states were all present.  Coupled with the halting of approval for 
GMOs under Directive 90/220 (that was founded on precautionary decision-making) 
and other factors including increasing public pressure against such organisms, the 
EU had, through the Protocol, found an opportunity of including the precautionary 
principle firmly in a legally binding international instrument.35 
Owing to increasing public protests against GMOs in Europe and the USA, 
the Miami Group had to make more concessions at Montreal to pave the way for the 
adoption of the Protocol.36 By 2000 when the Protocol was adopted, the Group had 
exploited the scientific uncertainty debate to its advantage and this enabled it to 
weaken regulatory provisions in the Protocol.37 Three examples illustrate how it 
achieved this goal. First, through the adoption of ‘advance informed agreement’ 
instead of the more commonly used ‘prior informed consent’, the latter being 
associated with hazardous substances such as waste and banned chemicals. 
Second, reference to ‘genetically modified organisms’ was replaced with ‘living 
modified organisms to deflect attention away from genetic modification. Third, the 
adoption of the precautionary approach which the Group viewed as one that gave 
flexibility instead of ‘principle’, which they saw as a strict mechanism for regulation. 
These shifts in terminology did not mean that the GM controversy was 
resolved or that it posed lesser challenges, especially in the political and economic 
matrix of the debate. A classic example was Japan that was part of the Compromise 
Group. It had close import/export ties in corn, cotton, soybeans and canola with the 
USA and Canada, yet if it sided with the EU’s preference for a precautionary 
principle, it would accelerate global momentum against biotechnology. The result 
was that though Japan was under pressure from the USA to support the new 
technology,38 it finally supported the EU and the Like Minded Group.39 The pressure 
put on Japan (by the United States) to reject a strict biosafety regime was 
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reminiscent of the predicament developing states were to find themselves in as they 
sought to implement the Protocol in their jurisdictions. 
Attempts to avoid collapse of the negotiations at Montreal and the need to attract 
ratifications to enable the Protocol to enter into force appear to have been among the 
factors that influenced the final adoption of the Protocol. It was finally adopted at 
Montreal with the hope that future negotiators would ensure that their decisions 
would promote its object and purpose.40 
Issues of liability and redress that remained unresolved since the adoption of 
the Protocol have been addressed by adoption of the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur 
Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, on 16 October 2010 at Nagoya, Japan.41 The Supplementary Protocol’s 
liability regime is based on fault.42 It is yet to enter into force. 
4.3.2 The Objective of the Protocol 
The objective of the Protocol is: 
‘In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of 
this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in 
the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms 
resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into 
account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary 
movements.’43 
The objective serves two important purposes: first, it provides a point of reference or 
bench-mark for assessing activities undertaken under the treaty and second, 
implementation of the treaty as well as its further development must comply with the 
objective.44 By specifically adopting the precautionary approach as the guiding 
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criterion in relation to activities that ‘may have adverse effects…’, the Protocol 
extends protection to situations where adverse effects are certain and have been 
known and where the threats are probable.45 It is interesting to note that the Protocol 
made the precautionary approach binding using the wording of a soft law instrument. 
The Protocol was adopted primarily for the purpose of protecting the 
environment and human health from the potential harm arising from the use, 
handling and transboundary movement of LMOs.46 Application of the precautionary 
approach, AIA, exchange of information and the taking into account socio-economic 
considerations are among the key mechanisms adopted by the Protocol to enable to 
enable it to become effective. The thesis briefly examines the first three, while socio-
economic considerations are dealt with in the next section. 
4.3.3 The Precautionary Approach 
The objective of the protocol already mentioned earlier47 embodies the precautionary 
approach which forms the basis of regulation under the Protocol.  Owing to the 
uncertainties in the meaning and purpose of the precautionary approach, states have 
taken into account their own capabilities and their economic and social priorities in 
deciding whether and to what extent they may apply precautionary measures.48 
Some scholars including Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell argue that the purpose of 
the precautionary approach is to assist in ascertaining whether a risk is reasonably 
foreseeable and whether it requires a response. They further argue that issues such 
as how to control the risk and what level of risk is socially acceptable, are policy 
questions better answered by politicians and society as a whole rather than 
scientists or courts.49 It means the content of international law instruments is 
informed by the extent to which states feel obliged to surrender part of their 
sovereign powers in compliance with the principle of cooperation but importantly, to 
promote environmental protection. This thesis argues that once states have ratified 
international instruments, it follows that the thresholds of regulation established 
                                                 
45 Ibid at para 168. 
46 Article1 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 39 International Legal Materials (2000):1027. 
47 At (4.3.2). 
48 Birnie P, Boyle A and Redwell C International Law and the Environment (2009):163. 












under such instruments are presumed to be the acceptable levels of risk for the 
parties. 
By providing for the precautionary approach, the Protocol enables states to 
exercise a wide, but not unlimited discretion, including rejection of an LMO where 
scientific proof on safety is lacking, inadequate or uncertain. The value judgement of 
each member state becomes crucial in determining how and the extent to which the 
precautionary approach is implemented. Such judgement may however be subject to 
abuse and hence offend the objective of the Protocol and result in undesirable 
consequences including unnecessarily restricting trade. 
4.3.4 Advance Informed Agreement 
Advance informed agreement (AIA) (notification,50 acknowledgement of receipt51 and 
written consent),52 is intended to ensure that the party of import makes an informed 
decision before importing an LMO during its first transboundary movement from the 
exporting party. An informed decision is arrived at after considering a risk 
assessment carried out in a scientifically sound manner. Risk assessment as 
provided for under Annex III has a detailed and complex scientific procedure, which 
invariably makes the whole process expensive for developing countries. Although 
the Protocol makes provision requiring the party of export to pay the costs of risk 
assessment if the party of import so requires,53 such payments may prejudice the 
objectivity of the risk assessment. 
Article 10(6) of the Protocol provides for the operative aspects of the precautionary 
approach by providing that: 
‘[l]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific 
information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential effects of 
a living modified organism... shall not prevent that party from taking a 
decision, as appropriate... in order to avoid or minimize such potential 
effects’. 
In essence, AIA is arguably a form of precaution which embodies the precautionary 
approach in varying degrees. 
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The AIA procedure does not apply to pharmaceuticals54 or products intended 
for food, feed and processing (FFPs).55 They are not for release into the environment 
and therefore fall outside the terms of the CBD. Food aid falls under FFPs and is 
consequently subject to the simplified procedure, which merely requires notification 
under the Protocol.56 This gives flexibility to states to decide whether or not to accept 
them.  Whether African countries should adopt biosafety legislation that makes it 
easier to import GMO food as food aid is thus largely a political question, which is 
closely related to the socio-economic considerations discussed at (4.3.7). 
4.3.5 Exchange of Information 
The exchange of information is critical to the functioning and success of the Protocol. 
The Biosafety Clearing House (BCH) was established with the intention to, (among 
other things) ‘facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental and legal 
information on, and experience with, living modified organisms’.57 The BCH is 
therefore a central portal through which information is received and disseminated to 
interested parties using the latest available technologies. The BCH could serve an 
important role yet; its success largely depends on the willingness of member states 
to provide information and there is no guarantee that the information supplied will be 
objective. Moreover, where such information exists, it is in the hands of government 
controlled institutions in recipient states and hence, the decision as to which 
information should be released, is political. Some states may lack institutional and 
financial capacities to enable them to acquire the necessary information. 
Under the Protocol, a competent authority may also act as a focal point.58 
This role is critical particularly in relation to dissemination and exchange of 
information both with the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH) and among parties and 
non-parties. The BCH is mandated to ‘facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, 
environmental and legal information…’ and ‘to assist the parties to implement the 
Protocol…’59 The nature and content of information relayed to the BCH is material in 
determining the transparency of the competent body of a country. For instance, it is 
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surprising that most of the parties in Africa (and other parties) have posted little or no 
information to the BCH. Biosafety legislation, regulations and the policies of many 
countries are hardly available on the BCH website.60 
Absence of such information would imply that parties are not effectively 
complying with the Protocol and that the information is not easily available to other 
parties and stakeholders. The ‘secrecy’ with which some states deal with biosafety 
issues may account for failure to post the required information to the BCH. In Kenya 
for instance, the Biosafety Bill 2005 had been pending for long. It was not easily 
available to the public nor has it been available for scrutiny and there is no evidence 
that this may happen. Observers note that ‘there has been so much secrecy that 
most stakeholders do not even know where they should go to get a copy of the 
Bill’.61 Zambia has recently passed a Biosafety Act62 yet it has not been posted to 
the BCH Portal. Only Cameroon and a few other African countries have made their 
biosafety laws or regulations available either on the BCH portal or other websites. 
4.3.6 Institutional Governance 
Article 19(1) requires each party to designate one or more competent national 
authorities that shall be ‘responsible for performing the administrative functions’ 
required by the Protocol and which shall be ‘authorized to act on its behalf with 
respect to those functions’. In the light of these provisions, the effectiveness of the 
Protocol is premised on a functioning national framework and information 
exchange.63 
Decision-making is one of the crucial functions of competent authorities. The 
structure and powers of such bodies; their independence; expertise and the 
adequacy of the personnel of such bodies and the fiscal as well as legal tools and 
mechanisms for regulation of biotechnology are among important aspects that 
account for the efficacy of such bodies. In practise, the balancing of competing 
interests arising from biotechnology is felt most at the level of decision- making. In 
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the absence of a robust and transparent institutional framework, implementation of 
the Protocol (which constitutes the very basis for success of the Protocol) will be 
weak and irrelevant both in regard to compliance with the Protocol and serving the 
domestic interest. The ability of competent bodies to exercise impartiality to establish 
and maintain transparency constitutes the ‘acid test’ for such bodies. Interference 
from the executive and in other cases corruption, are among the serious 
impediments to the proper functioning of competent bodies in African countries that 
have or are in the process of developing biosafety legislation. 
4.3.7 Socio-economic Considerations 
Socio-economic considerations are as varied as they are complex. The different 
ethical, cultural, economic and other dimensions (already discussed in chapter two) 
present a multiplicity of values and challenges that many countries grapple with in 
their efforts to develop biosafety legislation. The unending debate on the risks and 
benefits of biotechnology is a classic example. The complexity is attributable to many 
factors including failure by international and domestic regulatory regimes (in Africa 
and possibly in many other countries) to define what constitutes socio-economic 
considerations. Other issues that may explain the complexity include how to balance 
the competing interests associated with biotechnology and what criteria to use. 
Establishing and maintaining a balance between protection of commercial 
interests and the need to conserve biodiversity creates a puzzle at the centre of 
socio-economic considerations in biosafety legislation. The puzzle takes many 
forms. These include the meaning and essence of socio-economic considerations 
and whether it is feasible to develop jurisprudence for socio-economic considerations 
for Africa in particular. 
The meaning and essence of socio-economic considerations differ from one 
country (and region) to another depending on ecological and various human factors. 
These factors are viewed in terms of the actual and potential consequences of 
biotechnology.64 They include the impact of biotechnology on the well being of the 
community, the farmers income and welfare, cultural practices, rural employment, 
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trade and competition, indigenous peoples, food security, ethics, and religion.65 
Other socio-economic considerations include population growth and poverty.66 
While the list of socio-economic considerations can hardly be exhausted, the 
Protocol limits its application to the impact of LMOs on ‘the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, especially with regard to the value of 
biological diversity to indigenous and local communities’.67 This suggests that the 
international biosafety regime is keen (on the face of it at least) to protect the 
interests of the people closest to the area where an LMO is to be introduced or 
transported. It is however incumbent upon governments to evaluate and determine 
their priorities in this context. 
The actions of society usually impact on social realities, which in turn affect 
socio-economic considerations. Moreover, in real life, the benefits and risks 
associated with biotechnology take socio-economic forms though they are articulated 
for political purposes expressed by way of environmental and health issues.68 This is 
a key point at which science, politics and the law collide. The collision is mainly 
attributable to divergences of opinion over the purpose of socio-economic 
considerations in relation to biotechnology. In South Africa for instance, the debate 
on whether GMO sugar should be released for commercial use has become a 
political issue rather than a scientif c investigation as such a move could threaten the 
sector’s local and export markets.69 
Socio-economic considerations are intended to assist developing countries 
cope with societal changes that may occur as a result of the introduction of 
biotechnology.70 They are a ‘central driving force in the biotechnology debate’.71 
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Thus, they form an integral part of the Protocol.72 Hence, they are material in 
propping up the nature and character of domestic legislation. It is therefore argued 
that the value and priority given to socio-economic considerations in domestic 
legislation provides a concrete basis for applying the precautionary approach. 
Scholars such as Forsman argue that it is through the precautionary approach 
that decision-making can be based on non-scientific data. The principle legitimises 
the inclusion of non-scientific actors and elements in decision making.73 This is 
particularly pertinent as risk assessment under the Protocol is to be carried out ‘in a 
scientifically sound manner’ and in accordance with Annex III of the Protocol.74 
Annex III makes provision for risk assessment on a case-by-case basis depending 
on the LMO concerned, its intended use and the likely receiving environment. 
Hence, risk assessment under the Protocol is concerned with scientifically proven 
impacts of an LMO on a particular environment. 
The absence or insufficient consideration of the socio-economic aspects of an 
LMO in decision making seems to make the Protocol a protectionist tool serving the 
interests of the powerful proponents of LMOs. Unless states objectively balance the 
environmentalist perspective with scientific, economic, social, and cultural 
perspectives,75 promulgating predictable and workable biosafety legislation in Africa 
could be difficult to achieve. Socio-economic considerations provide ‘justification for 
parties to exercise sovereign rights to take measures that are more protective of their 
biodiversity as envisaged by Article 2(4) of the Protocol. Balancing of the socio-
economic considerations as against other competing interests such as international 
trade has been, and still is, one of the main unresolved issues of the Protocol.76 
The conflict over socio-economic considerations is clearly reflected in the 
Protocol. The differences in opinion among the negotiating parties resulted in the 
adoption of a compromise provision, which provides that: ‘the parties…may take into 
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account… socio-economic consideration…’ in decision-making.77 The provision 
gives member states a qualified discretion when dealing with socio-economic 
considerations in decision-making. The decision to take into account socio-economic 
considerations must be consistent with the country’s international obligations (such 
as in trade) and the socio-economic considerations to be taken into account are 
those arising from the impact of LMOs on biodiversity, especially its value to 
indigenous and local communities. In effect, the Protocol does not provide a 
comprehensive regime on socio-economic considerations. It has no provisions by 
whom, how and when an assessment of socio-economic considerations should be 
made. 
Each country has its own value judgements relating to socio-economic 
concerns relating to the benefits and potential risks of biotechnology, among other 
things. Consequently, the question as to how to meaningfully integrate socio-
economic considerations in biosafety legislation and hence, develop a jurisprudence, 
raises more questions than can be answered. 
At a regional level, the non-binding African Model Law (AML) has two key 
provisions that relate to socio-economic considerations. The first is that a competent 
authority is required to ensure that ‘no approval shall be given unless it is considered 
and determined’ by that authority that the GMO or its product will not have adverse 
socio-economic impacts. Furthermore, the authority is to ensure that the GMO in 
question or its product will ‘accord with the ethical values and concerns of 
communities and does not undermine community knowledge and technologies’.78 
The second relates to risk assessment and requires that ‘no decision on any 
application to import, transit…’ a GMO or its product, may be made without 
assessment of the risks to human health, biological diversity and the environment, 
‘including socio-economic conditions and cultural norms’.79 
The African Union Biosafety Project aimed to help African countries comply 
with their obligations under the Cartagena Protocol mainly by promoting the African 
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Model Law (AML) as a common framework for biosafety regulation in Africa.80 The 
varying attitudes and approaches to regulation of biotechnology still remain a barrier 
to implementation of the AML. For example, in 2010, South Africa’s farmers grew 13 
million tonnes of maize which include a surplus of four million tonnes that cannot be 
exported to neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi (all 
of which suffer chronic food shortages) due to regional worries about GM crops.81 
The maize is likely to be exported to China as chicken feed.82 Moreover, there may 
be sufficient food, and even a surplus, but the marketing methods do not favour the 
poor people in South Africa.83 
4.4 The Interplay between Biosafety and International Trade 
Issues concerning the regulation of biotechnology have never been more 
contentious than in the area of international trade. This is inevitable particularly 
because of the dilemma arising from the need on the one hand to regulate 
biotechnology to protect the environment and human health and on the other hand to 
promote and safeguard international trade in GMOs and its products. 
4.4.1 The WTO Regime 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) 84 is an organization created to implement the 
1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is based on 
binding rules (hard law) that are enforced through a well established international 
disputes settlement system.85 The Cartagena Protocol was adopted when the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) regime was already in force. 
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The underlying philosophy of the WTO is trade liberalisation for the purpose of 
eliminating protectionist and other barriers to trade,86 in order to promote growth and 
development.87 The organization seeks to ensure that it provides a mechanism for 
governments to reduce their own trade barriers.88 Its main task is to facilitate the 
negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of international trade liberalization.89 The 
WTO facilitates the implementation and operation of Multilateral Trade Agreements, 
provides a forum for negotiations, administers the dispute settlement understanding 
(DSU) and the surveillance of Multilateral of Trade Policies. It is also charged with 
responsibility to cooperate with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) ‘to achieve greater coherence in global economic policy-making’.90 Being a 
regime established independently of the United Nations, the WTO is undoubtedly the 
single most powerful organization at the centre of the international trade globally. By 
2006 it accounted for 97% of international trade.91 
These roles also confirm that the WTO is not only an agent of globalization but 
establishes an essentially capitalist-oriented and capitalist-owned regime. 
Historically, capitalism accounts for most of the current environmental degradation. 
In effect, the raging debate on how to establish and maintain a meaningful balance 
between regulation of biotechnology and protection of the environment and humans 
is intricately linked to the issue as to which takes precedence between human health 
wealth. 
The issue concerning human health and wealth raises more questions than 
answers. In so far as regulation of biotechnology is concerned, four examples may 
suffice to illustrate the intricacy. First, during the negotiations on the Protocol, the US 
Secretary for Agriculture said that ‘we want to make sure that whatever is agreed in 
Montreal is complimentary to WTO procedures and rules. We would not want to see 
anything that is in conflict’.92 Second, the vehement opposition by the Miami Group 
to the inclusion of provisions concerning the precautionary principle during the 
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negotiations on the Protocol clearly presented the dilemma that complicated 
international attempts to regulate GMOs. 
Third the varying attitudes regarding the precautionary approach in the 
domestic biosafety legislation of the selected countries is a manifestation of the 
continuing dilemma as to which takes precedence: protection of the environment and 
human health or international trade in GMOs. Four, opponents of the WTO regime 
(such as environmentalists including Greenpeace93) take the view that the 
international trade rules it governs are prejudiced against environmental interests.94 
It appears that powerful states such as the United States were keen to ensure that 
the WTO regime prevailed over the Cartagena Biosafety regime, while the EU and 
most developing countries sought a Protocol that was independent of the WTO 
regime. 
4.4.2 The Clash between WTO and the Protocol 
The dilemma between international trade and regulation of biotechnology partly 
derives from the nature of the regimes that govern these competing imperatives. 
Taking into account the legitimate nature of the two imperatives: protection of the 
environment and eliminating economic protectionism by States,95 the clash between 
the Protocol and the WTO regime is inevitable The WTO regime is therefore a 
symbol of globalisation, free trade and corporate interests96. It operates within an 
environment where the world has become increasingly interdependent. This has 
resulted in great wealth as goods are produced where their costs are lowest, 
consumers have more choices, institutions of production are disciplined through 
competition, and producers may realise the advantages of economies of scale.97 
The core mandate of WTO revolves around trade and trade liberalisation with 
a view to ‘reducing discrimination between national and foreign goods and services, 
and between foreign suppliers of similar goods’.98 These interests are manifested in 
many areas including trade in agriculture (that encompasses biotech foods and 
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related products) where the WTO is believed to have achieved a realistic expectation 
for trade-rule discipline.99 By promoting and safeguarding trade interests of states 
and other stakeholders, WTO (in theory at least) arguably seeks to improve the 
economies of states. Improved economies may contribute to improved lives, reduce 
food insecurity, starvation and other development barriers. 
In contrast, the Protocol seeks to reconcile protection of biological diversity on 
one hand and international trade in LMOs on the other. By adopting the 
precautionary approach, the Protocol introduced a mechanism that proponents of 
GMOs (such as the Miami Group) not only resisted during negotiations but 
continually seek to downplay. They view it as a tool that may be used to restrict trade 
unnecessarily. In effect, the Protocol introduced protective regulation which would 
restrict markets so that the demands for market creation and market restriction were 
pointing in opposite directions.100 Thus, the challenge is: 
‘to distinguish between those environmental measures that are needed to 
protect the environment and those that are a disguised restriction on 
trade, to determine whether there are altern tive environmental protection 
measures that can protect the environment…effectively but are less trade 
restrictive, and to determine when obligations in trade law may have the 
effect of forcing countries to degrade the environment against their will, 
sometimes irreversibly.’101 
This is possibly why the proponents of GMOs resisted adoption of the precautionary 
principle in the negotiations on the Protocol. 
The WTO is a formal regime that is well established. In contrast, international 
environmental law instruments are dispersed, making it imperative that their 
effectiveness be measured in terms of their compatibility with the trade regime and 
not vice versa.102 However GATT did not limit the general power of states to restrict 
trade in GMOs. As a result member states were at liberty to restrict market access to 
GMOs of both foreign and domestic origin, consistent with the principle of national 
treatment.103 However adoption in 1994 of the Application of Sanitary and 
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Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)104 changed this situation and made 
import restrictions subject to a number of requirements105 discussed below. 
4.4.3 The SPS Agreement 
The SPS Agreement embodies the sovereign right of states to ‘take sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health’ provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 
SPS Agreement.106 By restricting consistency of national SPS measures to the SPS 
Agreement, the WTO regime sought to ensure that states are bound by the 
requirements provided for under the SPS Agreement. Hence, the critical issues 
revolve on the key requirements of the SPS Agreement that are relevant to GMOs 
and how such requirements impact on the Protocol. Three examples will suffice. 
First, Article 2(3) of the SPS Agreement obligates parties to ensure that the 
SPS measures taken by them ’do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between 
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail...’ and that such shall not be 
applied ‘in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international 
trade’. The issue of measures that constitute a disguised restriction on trade raises 
several other questions such as what criteria are applicable in determining measures 
that do and measures that do not constitute a disguise. In addressing this issue, Art 
5(5) requires members to ‘avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it 
considers to be appropriate in different situations...’ 
Second, in order to minimise ambiguities and in furtherance of the WTO 
mandate, Art. 2(2) of the SPS Agreement requires Members to ensure two things: 
any SPS measures are applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health; measures are based on scientific principles and a 
measure is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, save in accordance 
with the provisions of Art 5(7) that provides for provisional SPS measures where the 
relevant scientific evidence is insufficient. The requirement to take into account 
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scientific principles, is closely linked with the provisions of Art 5 (2), which requires 
members to take into account available scientific evidence in assessing risks. 
In order to harmonize SPS measures among members, Art. 3(1) of the SPS 
Agreement requires them to adopt international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations where they exist. By empowering Members to adopt measures 
with higher thresholds,107 the SPS Agreement made international standards, 
guidelines and regulations minimum criteria for risk assessment. The standards, 
guidelines and regulations recognised by the Agreement are those established by 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission in respect to food safety, the International 
Office of Epizootics in respect to animal health, and the International Plant Protection 
Convention in respect to plant health.108 
By adopting scientific criteria as the basis of risk assessment, the SPS 
Agreement sought to ensure that measures to protect human, animal and plant 
health were not used as a disguised barrier to trade.109 Even when scientific 
evidence was insufficient, in which case the measures founded on the precautionary 
approach should be applied, the Agreement implies application rather than making 
specific provision for the precautionary approach. The effect is that the Agreement 
provides for the taking of provisional measures pending the carrying out of ‘a more 
objective assessment of risk and reviewing the SPS measures ‘within a reasonable 
period of time’.110 
While both instruments seem to have some commonality because of 
embracing scientific criteria for protection, human health and biological diversity, 
potential conflicts such as those concerning food safety bring to the core the high 
stakes by reason of policy concerns of both regimes and also for the development of 
international law.111 Such differences have not been profound than in aspects 
concerning the adoption of and implementation of the precautionary approach. For 
example, during the Uruguay Round negotiations that culminated in conclusion of 
the SPS Agreement, the European Community (now the EU) sought to incorporate 
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the precautionary principle but due to pressure from the USA, the EU agreed to 
subordinate the principle to the scientific risk assessment criterion.112 
In 1996 when the EU imposed a beef-hormones ban on US meat imports 
culminating in the Beef Hormones Case,113 the WTO Appellate Body found that the 
EU had failed to base the ban on a scientific risk assessment in contravention of the 
requirements of Art 5(1) of the SPS Agreement. It rejected the EU’s claim that the 
ban was adopted to protect human health.114 The Appellate Body found that the 
precautionary principle upon which the EU relied in support of the ban could not 
override the requirement of a scientific risk assessment.115 The thesis argues that 
risk assessment under the Protocol is inherently precautionary. By adopting the 
precautionary approach, the Protocol places emphasis on implementation of such 
measures in decision-making and also creates a binding obligation in international 
law.  
4.5 African Regional Approaches to the Regulation of GMOs 
GMO activities and the associated dilemma are issues that African countries are 
grappling with for three main reasons. First, GM food as well as the debate 
concerning their potential harm and alleged benefits originated in the developed 
world. However, hardly any country or region is an ‘island’ with respect to issues that 
concern protection of the environment and human health, not least—African 
countries with a rich biodiversity to safeguard and a high undernourished population. 
Second, African countries have agricultural trade and related interests 
between themselves but most notably with developed countries. Third, economic 
vulnerability and lack of political capacity portrays some African countries as victims 
of proponents that seek to test and develop GM products which have largely been 
rejected in the North.116 Such proponents also want markets for such food. Many 
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African countries have the potential to be the testing grounds and also provide 
markets but safety remains a major concern.117 
Introduction of genetically modified (GM) foods into Africa without proper 
understanding of and sufficient information concerning such food would place the 
continent in a vulnerable position in respect of the potential harm associated with 
such food. Lack of resources, infrastructure118 and regulatory regimes119 worsens 
the situation. Urgent action is needed. Thus, as discussed earlier, the Like-Minded 
Group, to which most developing countries belonged during the negotiations on the 
of the Protocol, sought a strict international biosafety regime.120 The regime would 
embrace the precautionary approach, take socio-economic considerations into 
account in decision-making and would involve a consideration of other international 
trade agreements.121 
In 1999, due to the contentious nature of the negotiations, African parties to 
the CBD members of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union – AU) 
began a process that would lead to the development of the African Model Law on 
Safety and Biotechnology (AML).122 In 2000 the negotiations stalled, thereby 
confirming the sceptism of African countries that no Protocol would be adopted. 
Nonetheless, this provided further impetus towards the adoption of the AML. 
Arguably, the AML was to become a tool that would guide AU member states in 
developing holistic biosafety regimes and address inadequacies in the Protocol. In 
July 2001, in Lusaka, Zambia, the Council of Ministers of the AU endorsed a non-
binding AML and urged member states to use it as a benchmark for enacting 
domestic biosafety legislation.123 
In its preamble, the AML recognises that biotechnology promises to improve 
human well-being yet ‘its potential adverse effects on human health, biological 
diversity and in general the environment are causing growing public concern’. Key 
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features of the AML include a broader scope than the Protocol that covers all stages 
from developing to commercialising GMOs.124  Others include the precautionary 
approach,125 the polluter pays principle,126 advance informed agreement,127 a 
mandatory requirement that in decision-making the Competent Authority takes into 
account the views and concerns expressed by the public,128 strict liability.129 It also 
provides for risk assessment that covers human health, biological diversity, the 
environment in general including socio-economic and cultural considerations.130 
Since 2003, the AU has been working with the German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ, representing the German government) to come up with projects 
that would facilitate implementation of the Protocol and the AML.131 One of the 
projects is the drafting of the revised 2008 AML that is awaiting comments from 
governments and other stakeholders before it is endorsed by the AU.132 
The revised AML draft takes into account the general trends in the 
international arena and also among African countries that have adopted biosafety 
legislation.133 In contrast to the AML which has no objective, the revised draft has a 
two-pronged objective. It seeks to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of safety 
of biological diversity, human and animal health, social-economic conditions and 
ethical values in respect of GMOs resulting from biotechnology.134 Further, it is 
intended to enable parties to the Protocol to implement its provisions.135 The revised 
draft has more elaborate provisions on public participation,136 risk assessment137 and 
risk management.138 Liability has been extended to the provider, supplier or 
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developer, in addition to the applicant.139 Under the revised draft, liability is fault 
based (ie requiring proof of negligence) as opposed to the strict liability140 (which 
does not require proof) under the AML. 
At the 12th Session of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment 
in June 2008, the Ministers endorsed revising the AML. They urged the AU 
Commission to promote issues of biosafety in a manner that would reflect African 
common positions regarding biotechnology.141 The project also established a 
biosafety unit within the AU Commission at Addis Ababa with the aim of integrating 
biosafety issues into the mainstream political and institutional structures of the AU.142 
The AU has been working closely on matters of biosafety with the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was established in 2001. NEPAD aims to 
place the continent within an appropriate context in the globalised market economy. 
In 2004 the AU and NEPAD established a High-level African Panel on 
Biotechnology (APB) with a mandate to advise the continent on scientific, policy and 
legal issues concerning the development, commercialisation and use of 
biotechnology.143 The APB seeks to promote open multi-stakeholder dialogue on the 
various issues associated with biotechnology.144 In 2007, it published a Report 
Freedom to Innovate145 that examines the role of biotechnology in the transformation 
of African economies. Taking into account lack of or inadequate legal frameworks on 
the continent, urgent action led by Africans was needed.146 In 2005, through 
NEPAD’s office of Science and Technology (with the support the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation and in collaboration with Michigan University), the AU established 
Networks of Expertise in Biosciences. It is a planning and coordinating agency 
mandated to provide government regulators with access to the most up-to-date 
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training and science based-information to regulate biotechnology.147 Its main goal is 
to ensure that: 
‘its societies have the capacity to assess if, and when and how 
biotechnology products may be judged to pose no safety risks to the 
environment and human health; the ability to regulate these ...products 
using the latest science and applying the highest standards of global 
practice’148 
One of ABNE’s centres is the West African Biosciences Network (WABNet) based in 
Senegal which specialises in research on agricultural biotechnology.149 
ABNE has embarked on a five-year work plan from July 2009 to June 
2014 for the purpose of building functional biosafety systems in Africa through 
empowering regulators with science-based information.150 In addition, the 
International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) has 
been mandated by the AU and NEPAD (with funding from Bill and Melinda 
Gates foundation), to strengthen and expand biosafety systems in SSA. Its 
regional Centre in Africa is in Cape Town.151 The AU working with NEPAD has 
developed an African Strategy on Biosafety that seeks to harmonise laws and 
procedures for a Pan-African biosafety system.152 The Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) have been earmarked as the implementing arm of the 
Strategy.153 
RECs and Prospects for Harmonisation 
Harmonisation seeks to ensure that the African continent reaches a consensus on a 
common approach to the development of biotechnology. Its benefits include capacity 
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building support through designated regional centres of excellence, promoting 
synergised regulatory approval procedures, mitigating against potential impacts of 
GMOs on trade, access to emergency food and improving information sharing.154 It 
may enable African states to become a formidable force in international negotiations 
concerning biosafety. A common stand may enable individual states to engage 
realistically amongst themselves in matters that require regional action. 
There are disagreements among AU members concerning acceptable 
thresholds of regulation. However, most are in favour of harmonisation in certain 
technical areas such as detection labs and common border procedures.155 In this 
way, harmonisation will not interfere with the individual countries decision-making, 
public participation and case-by-case risk assessment.156 The reverse is that 
harmonisation may be used to create a unified regional GMO approval system that 
would expedite introduction of GM food into the continent.157 
Further, there is still considerable disagreement among states and across 
regions regarding the likelihood of adverse effects and the scientific competence to 
assess and address them adequately.158 Even in such an assessment, objectivity 
would remain a thorny issue especially because of the dominance by scientists 
(many of whom have vested interests ranging from research, development and 
commercialisation of GMOs to the development of the relevant policies and 
regulatory regimes). The other factor is that the transatlantic regulatory divide 
between the proponents and opponents of GMOs has significant influence on the 
development of biosafety regimes in Africa. 159 The ensuing differences in cross-
border biosafety policies (and law, where applicable) may hamper trade among 
countries in Africa.160 
                                                 
154 Karembu M, Wafula D and Waithaka M ‘Status of Biotechnology Policies and Biosafety Legislation 
in the COMESA Region’ available at www.isaaa.org (accessed 12 March 2010). 
155 Swanby H (n152) at 5. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Moola S and Munnik V ‘GMOs in Africa: Food and Agriculture Status Report (2007) African 
Biosafety Centre available at www.biosafetyafrica.net (accessed 8 January 2009). 
158 Mugwanga J ‘Alone or Together? Can Cross-national Convergence of Biosafety Systems 
Contribute to Food Security in SSA? 22 Journal of International Development (2010):352-366 at 353. 
159 Ibid at 353. 
160 Wafula D ‘Harmonising Biosafety Regulations within Africa’ (2007) available at 
http://www.sciedev.net/en/agriculture-and-environment/opinions/harmonising-biosafety... (accessed 












At the sub-regional level efforts to harmonise the regulation of biotechnology 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are slow with few individual countries enacting biosafety laws. 
As stated in chapter one, only a few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that include 
South Africa, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Namibia, and Cameroon have enacted 
such laws. Others such as Botswana have adopted a ‘no hurry attitude’.161 
The continent’s largest trading bloc, the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), has endorsed a Regional Approach to Biotechnology 
and Biosafety Policy in Eastern and Southern Africa (RABESA).162 RABESA seeks 
to use the regional centres of excellence to access and disseminate technical 
information and also address issues that arise from trade and access to emergency 
food aid that concern GMOs.163 
Within the SADC, the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) 
Ministers have established the South African Advisory Committee on Biotechnology 
and Biosafety (SABBAC).164 The Committee’s mandat  is to develop guidelines that 
would assist SADC member states to develop their capacity to test, detect and 
monitor GMOs and also safeguard such member states against potential risks 
associated with GMOs.165 The Southern Africa Regional Biosafety programme 
(SARB) in partnership with SADC and USAID, also provides technical training in 
biosafety regulatory implementation. SARB is a unit of USAID’s funded Agricultural 
Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP) whose main goal is to facilitate 
commercialisation of GM crops in the developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition.166 The different social, economic, technological and political 
forces at play in the region as regarding GMOs are still a barrier in attempts towards 
harmonisation.167 The leading role of South Africa within the political and other 
structures of SADC , is likely to influence the direction harmonisation may take. 
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In Eastern Africa, the East African Community (EAC)’s Council of Ministers 
have established a technical Committee of Experts to address biosafety issues and 
draft a regional policy on GMOs.168 EAC has also prepared other related 
documentation including harmonised Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.169 Other 
initiatives that cover East and Central Africa are those that are partly funded by 
USAID. These include the Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS), the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the International Service for National 
Agricultural Research (ISNAR).170 USAID also funds the Association to Strengthen 
Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa (ASARECA) which facilitates 
collaborative research between countries in Africa that are associated with 
ASARECA, US public, private sectors and international agricultural research 
centres.171 Most of these organisations have significant representation in Kenya 
which is viewed by most stakeholders as the gateway to the introduction of GMOs in 
other countries in the region. 
The Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) is one of the most proactive RECs 
on matters of biosafety, with the support of USAID especially in relation to cotton and 
food aid.172 A key player in the region, the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa 
(FARA), may significantly promote the interests of the biotechnology industry by 
reason of being a network of African agricultural institutions and a partner of the 
World Bank.173 FARA leads the regional centre of excellence and it is the lead body 
for agricultural research within the larger African Agriculture Development.174 It also 
works closely with the Comprehensive Agriculture Development Programme 
(CAADP) of NEPAD, which aims to enhance agricultural research and development 
for the purpose of promoting new technologies. 175 
Harmonisation: in Which Direction? 
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The initiative of the AU in seeking to revise the AML is an indication of the 
willingness by its member states to take a more realistic approach in relation to 
biotechnology. Moreover, since its adoption, member states such as Kenya and 
Namibia have developed biosafety legislation but none of them replicated the AML in 
their biosafety regimes.176 Zambia did. Even the current Ugandan Bill has little or no 
resemblance to the AML.177 It has no provisions on the precautionary approach, 
suggesting that the forces against adoption of the principle in Africa are stronger 
than the AU can handle. 
While the revised AML draft has elaborate provisions in areas that include 
public participation, the change of liability from strict to fault, lacks objectivity as 
consumers are not responsible for innovation. This change of attitude suggests that 
the AU is trying to align its approach on biosafety with practical reality based on the 
developments in biosafety legislation in some of the member states to the AU. For 
example, neither South Africa, nor Kenya or Namibia has embraced strict liability in 
their biosafety legislation. In addition, the recently adopted Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur 
Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety178 is based on fault as opposed to strict liability.179 
The AU is establishing common initiatives that may benefit member states 
that are keen to develop workable biosafety regimes. In addition, by working closely 
with NEPAD, which is perceived by many as being largely pro-GMOs, the AU is 
demonstrating a gradual shift from its strict stand in the regulation of biotechnology. 
Further and as discussed in chapter seven, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNEP) is helping a number of countries in Africa to develop biosafety 
regimes through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), both of which promote 
GMOs. 
These concerted efforts however tend to tilt towards promotion of GMOs at 
regional and national levels. Initiatives to incorporate biosafety issues into 
mainstream political and economic structures of the AU are desirable. However, the 
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ongoing (legitimate) funding by the various proponents of biotechnology seems to 
indicate that promotion of GMOs is on the increase in the continent. Should this 
trend continue, and taking into account the current food crisis in a number of 
countries, including Kenya, regulation will tend to take promotional rather than strict 
approaches. The trend is introducing elements of flexibility, an essential attribute of 
credible biosafety legislation. 
The extent to which the AU/NEPAD and the UNEP/GEF initiatives may 
succeed depends on a number of factors, which include the tension among member 
states’ commitments to the goals of the RECs.180 The tension has resulted in political 
mistrust among such members.181 The willingness of states to play an active role in 
the harmonisation initiatives is another. To be workable, the anticipated harmonised 
regime should embrace the precautionary approach. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The adoption of the Protocol remains a milestone in the global regulation of GMOs. 
This discussion of the controversy that erupted when the Protocol was being 
negotiated, has shed some light on the challenges that African countries face in 
seeking to attain a harmonised regional biosafety regime. It highlighted the African 
countries’ lack of capacity to and the conflicting attitudes towards GMOs and in 
particular on the precautionary approach. 
By embracing the precautionary approach, the AML adopted a holistic 
approach in the regulation of biotechnology. Efforts to revise it and the emphasis the 
AU has placed on RECs in relation to the regulation of GMOs are part of the 
initiatives intended to promote harmonisation in their regulation. However, the 
Protocol and the AML’s adoption of the precautionary approach may be of little use, 
unless the approach is meaningfully incorporated in the legislation of the selected 
countries. This assertion is tested in the next chapter.
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THE INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON BIOTECHNOLOGY IN 
THE SELECTED COUNTRIES 
‘The policy of being too cautious is the greatest risk of all’1 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian politician (1889-1964) 
 
5.1 Incorporation of international law in General 
Treaties enable states to resolve barriers on cooperation, agree to a specified course 
of conduct and to obtain commitments on what states are willing to do in future.2 
According to the pacta sunt servanda principle, a state is obliged to give effect to the 
international treaties in its municipal law, where those agreements provide that 
‘effect’ must be given to their provisions. Hence, a state cannot invoke the provisions 
of its internal law as justification for failure to perform.  Compliance with international 
law instruments can thus be determined by looking at the status of international 
treaties in domestic law, in other words, their incorporation into municipal law and 
enforcement by domestic courts. 3  This Chapter therefore discusses the 
incorporation, in selected countries, of the Cartagena Protocol (the Protocol) which 
provides for the precautionary approach. 
Determining what amounts to effective implementation is often difficult for two 
main reasons. First, over-protection of biodiversity may result in hunger and 
economic loses while under-protection threatens global resources and society in 
inequitable and destructive ways.4 Thus, as Jawaharlal Nehru observed, ‘the policy 
of being too cautious is the greatest risk of all’.5 An effective balance is called for 
between safety against potential harm of GMOs and the legitimate expectations of 
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the farmers for possible increased food production. The test might as well be, as in 
the case of pollution, not how much to allow but how much may be prevented.6 
Secondly, in order for the Protocol and the resultant domestic biosafety 
legislation to be relevant, such legislation should recognise and objectively balance 
the needs and priorities of the stakeholders. However, it would be unrealistic to 
contend that more protective action includes a desire to achieve zero risk. Owing to 
ecological complexities and inherent uncertainty in scientific innovations, achieving 
zero risk is an impossible task, hence the need for risk assessment and risk 
management. It is against this backdrop that the importance of the incorporation as 
well supplementation of the Protocol is to be analysed. 
The Protocol regime can hardly achieve its objective of ensuring safe transfer, 
handling and use of living modified organisms (LMOs), in the absence of meaningful 
implementation by parties. Moreover, success of the Protocol is largely dependent 
upon a system of functional national biosafety frameworks.7 Such a goal may be 
achieved in one of the two ways implementation of the Protocol in existing domestic 
law or adoption of domestic biosafety legislation where there is none. This might not 
achieve the goals of the Protocol. It would depend on its content. 
Incorporation of the Protocol serves four main purposes.  
First, the manner and extent to which the selected countries have purported to 
adopt the Protocol , is material in assessing compliance with their obligations both 
under the Protocol and under customary international law. Arguably therefore, it is 
through such manner and extent that the real intentions of the individual parties may 
be revealed. 
Incorporation of international instruments is done with a view to fulfilling treaty 
and invariably, customary international law obligations of states. Thus incorporation 
of the Protocol is obligatory, and this applies to its provision such as its objective, 
which is founded on the precautionary approach. 
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When parties incorporate the Protocol or provisions of it into domestic law, 
One such provision is the objective that is founded on the precautionary approach.8 
Therefore, adoption of the precautionary approach in domestic biosafety legislation 
is not merely a treaty obligation but also one under customary international law. 
In Trail Smelter 9 the Tribunal held that ‘…no state has the right to use or 
permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury… to the territory of 
another…’10 Thus, the Tribunal laid down two important principles: states have a 
duty to prevent trans-boundary harm and that they have an obligation to pay 
compensation for harm resulting from breach of such duty.11 It is widely believed the 
rule enunciated in Trail Smelter formed the basis of international regimes on pollution 
law. 
Being a guiding criterion for the regulation of biotechnology under Art 8(g) of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and under the Protocol, embracing the 
precautionary approach must be seen as an essential component of the 
performance of treaties (in good faith) as envisaged by article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention. Analysts take the view that such performance is to be by organs of state 
thereby putting a states’ rights and obligations into effect with a view to promoting 
the treaty’s object and purpose which object and purpose encompass a ‘treaty’s 
aims, its nature and its end’.12 Thus, domestic implementation of the Protocol by 
parties is obligatory. The content of the obligation derives from the content of the 
Protocol. 
Compliance with treaties is governed by recognised and settled rules of 
international law. For example, the principle of pacta sunt servanda (treaties must be 
kept) is a rule that has been recognised and applied since time immemorial.13 To 
date, no case is known of a tribunal which has repudiated the rule or questioned its 
validity.14 Art. 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties15 provides thus 
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10 Ibid at 1965. 
11 Wood S in his review of Bratspies R and Miller R (eds) Transboundary Harm in International Law: 
Lessons from Trail Smelter Arbitration (2006) published in Osgoode 45(3) Hall Law Journal  
(2007): 637-645 at 638. 
12 Villiger M Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2009):366, 427. 
13 Ibid 363 and 365. 












‘[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith’. The principle applies without exception to ‘every treaty’ including 
its annexes and appendices; it is applicable during the treaty’s lifetime including 
entry into force, application and termination; it is seen today as the cornerstone of 
international relations16  It worth to noting that the United States of America (USA) is 
a major exporter of GMOs yet it is not a party to many global environmental treaties,  
a factor that negatively impacts on effectives of instruments such as the CBD and 
the Protocol. 
Good faith itself lacks normative quality but it requires parties to act ‘honestly, 
fairly and reasonably’ while the principle of pacta sunt servanda determines and 
provides authoritative criteria for the conduct of the parties.17 However, art. 26 ‘is 
forcefully, yet elegantly’ drafted with no exceptions or conditions that would make it 
contentious as to place its validity in question’.18 If each of the selected countries 
were to act honestly, fairly and reasonably, consistent with the principle of Pacta sunt 
servanda, domestication of the precautionary approach, at least as provided for by 
the Protocol, would not be problematic. 
Further, it would be almost impossible to assess the extent to which domestic 
legislation enables a state’s compliance with its international obligations.19 Ultimately 
what matters is how national measures are executed in practice.20 In this sense, 
ratification of an international instrument such as the Protocol, triggers and perhaps 
necessitates domestic legal action in an attempt to comply with the instrument in 
question. 21 Such action may turn out to be cumbersome to stakeholders and even 
the political leadership.22 For example, art 1 of the Protocol adopts the precautionary 
approach thereby establishing criterion for the regulation of biotechnology. Whether, 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (accessed 13 January 
2009). The Convention was adopted on 23 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980. 
16 Villiger M (n12) at 363 and 365. 
17 Ibid at 365. 
18 Ibid at 368. 
19 Manzella D and Vapnek J ‘Development of Analytical Tool to Assess National Biosecurity 
Legislation’ (2007):91 ISBN 978-92-5- 105871-8 FAO. 
20 Ibid.  













and the extent to which a member state complies with such criteria can only be 
determined by analysing the relevant domestic legislation. 
While it is invariably difficult to determine the criteria to use in determining 
what system is workable and which one is not, art. 2(4) of the Protocol recognises 
the sovereign right of member states to take action that is more protective of their 
biological diversity. Of necessity, this implies that the precautionary approach 
embraced in art. 2 (1) of the Protocol, constitutes minimum criterion for regulation of 
biotechnology. As a consequence, a Party’s biosafety regime that lacks provisions 
on the precautionary approach falls short of the Protocol’s thresholds for the 
regulation of biotechnology. 
The obligation to take appropriate legal, administrative and other measures is 
intended to ensure that states are able to regulate trans-boundary movement of 
LMOs consistent with the objective and spirit of the Protocol. In the absence of such 
measures, the Protocol would be ineffective. Hence, domestication of the Protocol is 
an important step towards complying with obligations of Parties. It is proof by 
member states of their practical commitment to be bound by, and their willingness to 
ensure viability of the Protocol. 
Second, in the process of domesticating international environmental law 
instruments, states adopt domestic law in furtherance of their domestic agenda and 
policies. States develop their own biosafety regimes and in the process or as a 
consequence, seek to comply with international environmental law regimes on the 
subject. Zambia and Kenya present examples where biosafety legislation was 
adopted simultaneously seeking to comply with the two countries’ treaty obligations 
and, at the same time, addressing local demands for such legislation.23 
Third, the manner and extent to which the selected countries adopt the 
precautionary approach in their domestic legislation is material in assessing 
compliance or variance with the Protocol in respect to minimum criteria for regulation 
                                                 
23 Both the Biosafety Act No 10 of 2007 of Zambia and the Biosafety Act No 2 of 2009 of Kenya are 












of biotechnology. This researcher takes the view that it is mainly24 through adoption 
of biosafety legislation that the precautionary approach may find its way into the 
decision-making process. The various approaches of adopting international law are 
discussed at (5:2) below. 
Adopting the precautionary approach in domestic law or in any other implied 
manner means ‘something rather than nothing’.25 Such adoption will most likely 
influence scientists when they give advice on policy as they will be aware that 
government is guided by the approach in decision-making as is the case in the UK.26 
In such cases, adoption of and the importance given to the precautionary approach 
in domestic biosafety law becomes critical. While scientists play legitimate roles in 
the development of policy and ultimately law, those with vested interests could 
influence decision-making in the regulation of biotechnology. 
International law instruments, except in monist jurisdictions, can hardly bind 
persons in a state unless such instruments have the force of law. Such law derives 
from domestic legislation In addition, it is only through domestic implementation that 
the attitude and priorities of states regarding the issues at hand may be known. 
Fourth, varying approaches to domestic implementation of a treaty, or 
sections of it, provide indicators of the seriousness and commitment (or lack of both) 
of such states towards the treaty in question. The manner and extent to which states 
comply with their treaty obligations has an impact on the reputation of such a state in 
its international relations.  The idea is that states build or damage their reputation 
depending on whether or not they are willing to comply with their treaty obligations.27 
A good reputation materially enhances the credibility of promises, thereby making 
cooperation less cumbersome and expensive. Loss of or a bad reputation may lead 
                                                 
24 In some cases, domestic courts may infer application of the precautionary approach so as not to 
embarrass the country in international fora or in jurisdictions which adopt the monist approach in the 
application of international law. 
25 The phrase ‘something rather than nothing’ was adapted from the Minority Opinion in Iran -US 
Claims Arbitration 21 International Legal Materials (1981):78 at 89.  
26 Haig ‘The introduction of the Precautionary Principle in the UK’ in O’Riordan and Cameron 
Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (1994):242. 












to isolation by other states,28 thereby making such states treat future promises of the 
isolated state with some degree of suspicion.29 
In both cases, it may be argued that the building of or loss of reputation in 
relation to one treaty may not necessarily be transferable to other treaties. In this 
sense, reputation is relative and may, to some extent, depend on the interests a 
state seeks to safeguard in a treaty-by- treaty approach. Such interests may not be 
disclosed openly yet they may be manifested in the attitudes of a state during 
negotiations prior to adoption.  For instance during negotiations prior to adoption of 
the Protocol, the Miami Group30 was opposed to the precautionary principle fearing it 
would arguably be used as a political tool to unnecessarily restrict trade in LMOs. It 
may also depend on how much power, and hence influence, a state wields 
internationally. For example, reluctance of a powerful state such as the USA to ratify 
the CBD and the UNFCCC is an indication of lack of seriousness and commitment 
regarding Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) on its part.  This may be a 
setback to international cooperation in environmental issues. 
More often than not in international treaties, rhetoric is easier to achieve than 
action. Thus, it is often through domestication that states may be categorised as 
being in support of, or in opposition to a treaty. Opposition may, in some cases, be 
manifested by silent opposition. This may arise in situations where a party 
implements a treaty half- heartedly ie in a manner that does not fully satisfy the intent 
and spirit of the treaty. In such circumstances, silent opposition may be a reflection 
of the opposing views such a party had during negotiations on the treaty. Supporters 
of GMOs resisted the introduction of the precautionary principle into the text during 
negotiations on the Protocol. Finally the Protocol embraced it in the form of the 
precautionary approach. This arguably resulted from a compromise, which cannot be 
taken as proof of a changed attitude on the part of such supporters. Hence, attempts 
to implement the Protocol selectively by neglecting to embrace the principle, may be 
regarded as proof of silent opposition. 
                                                 
28 Guzman A (n2) at 33. 
29 Ibid at 38. 












Opposition to the precautionary approach by African countries is paradoxical 
because it was through agitation by developing countries that international regulation 
of biotechnology came to the fore.31 Hence it is through domestication of the 
Protocol that changes in attitude towards the precautionary approach, and GMO 
activities in general in the selected countries may be assessed. The varying 
approaches regarding implementation of the principle constitute a basis for 
establishing–at least in part–the reality concerning the manner and extent to which 
the selected countries have sought to regulate GMOs. It is therefore necessary to 
analyse the modes they have adopted in domesticating international law 
5.2 Mechanisms for Domesticating International Law 
Pertinent questions include how and when an international instrument such as the 
Protocol becomes part of domestic law.32  Also, whether and for what purposes may 
provisions (such as the precautionary approach) in treaties may be invoked in 
domestic courts.33 These issues are material in placing domestic implementation of 
the Protocol in its appropriate context in domestic law. 
Courts in various jurisdictions differ in their interpretation of treaties with the 
effect that a treaty may be applied differently in different countries.34 For example, 
and in contrast to the other three selected countries, South Africa recently amended 
its GMO Act35 and adopted the Protocol as an annexure to the Act. 
Domestic implementation of international law is centred on the relationship 
between international law and municipal law. Whether a treaty is to be transformed, 
as in the case of Germany and Italy or whether treaties apply directly in domestic law 
such as in France and USA or whether application of a treaty depends on the 
process of transformation as in the United Kingdom36 differs from one jurisdiction to 
the other. Thus, the relationship between monist and dualist theories on 
incorporating international instruments into domestic legislation remains a 
                                                 
31 See the discussion in chapter one. 
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contentious jurisprudential issue for many states. These modes of dealing with 
international law in the domestic system become critical in assessing the manner 
and extent to which member states satisfy the objectives of, and their obligations 
under international instruments such as the Protocol. 
Exercise of authority derives from one of the two ways: adoption or monism 
whereby the legislature provides for normative provisions that declare international 
law as forming part of domestic law (as in the Constitution of the USA), and 
transformation or dualism, whereby legislation is passed that embodies applicable 
rules of international law.37 The two approaches are discussed below in a little more 
detail. 
5.2.1 Monist Approach 
Under monism, it is trite law that an incorporating statute has no legislative content 
by itself.  It confirms or complements the treaty into domestic law regime without 
altering the treaty’s international or structural nature.38 Monists such as Kelsen 
maintain that international law and national law are not parts of one normative 
system as they invariably contradict each other yet simultaneously retaining 
validity.39 Monists however emphasise supremacy of international law over domestic 
law. 40 Thus, in the event of a conflict between the two, international law prevails. 
Further, international concerns such as terrorism and pollution that threaten 
humanity have their roots in states, which are unable to resolve such problems, thus 
creating new global challenges.41 In order to offer an effective response to these new 
challenges, the international legal system should be able to influence domestic 
policies of states and harness national institutions with a view to achieving global 
goals.42 In such circumstances, monists believe that international law should be 
                                                 
37 Dugard J International Law a South African Perspective (2005):47. 
38 Pescatore J ‘Conclusion’ in Jacobs F and Roberts S (n32) at 282. 
39 Kelsen H Principles of International Law (7th ed 2007):419. 
40 MacLean R Public International Law (1997):27. 
41 Slaughter M and Burke-White W ‘The Future of International Law in Domestic (or the European way 
of Law) in Nijman J and Nollkaemper A (eds) New perspectives on the Divide Between National and 
International Law (2007):111.  












applied in municipal courts without any act of adoption by the courts or 
transformation by the legislature.43 
Russia44, Switzerland,45 Belgium, France, Netherlands,46 are among the 
countries that adopt the monist approach thereby recognising the supremacy of 
international law over domestic law in the event of a conflict. In such jurisdictions, a 
treaty which is binding on a state becomes part of the law of the state without any act 
of incorporation or transformation.47 Having signed yet being reluctant to ratify the 
CBD,  the USA is not a party to the Protocol and is not  bound by it. It is under no 
treaty obligation to adopt the precautionary approach in its regulation of 
biotechnology. As a result, it is not surprising that, especially using its agencies,48 it 
appears to influence some African countries to shun the precautionary approach in 
their biosafety legislation.49 
In Namibia, Art. 144 of the Constitution requires that unless otherwise provided 
by it or by an Act of Parliament, ‘the general rules of public international law and 
international agreements binding upon Namibia under this Constitution shall form 
part of the law of Namibia’.50 This means that public international law is essentially 
part of the law of Namibia and it does not require transformation by subsequent act 
of the legislature to become so.51 By implication, international law is integrated into 
domestic law.52 Since the integration is effected by the Constitution, international law 
must therefore be in conformity with the Constitution if it is to be applied in 
domestically.53 This leads to an irresistible inference that the Constitution of Namibia 
                                                 
43 Dugard J (n37) at 47. 
44 Article 15(4) of the Russian Constitution states thus ‘Generally recognised principles and norms of 
international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation shall bean integral part of its 
legal system.  If other rules have been established by an international treaty of the Russian 
Federation than provided for by a law, the rules of the international treaty shall prevail’.  Reproduced 
in Hollis, Blakesale (eds) National Treaty Law and Practice (2005):539. 
45 See Aust A Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2008):187. 
46 Jacobs F (n32) at vviv.  
47 Ibid at xxiv. 
48 Including, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
49 See the discussion in chapter seven. 
50 The Constitution (1990) Republic of Namibia.  
51 Gerhard E ‘The Namibian Constitution and the Application of International Law’ 15 South Africa 
Year of International Law (1989-1990):81-110 at 94. 
52 Ruppel O ‘International Environmental Law Reform A Namibian Perspective’ in Ruppel O and 
Schlichting K (eds) Environmental Law and Policy in Namibia (2011):33-78 at 33. 












is international-law-friendly.54 The friendliness creates an environment that may 
enable the courts to deal with a conflict between international law and municipal law 
in favour of the former.55 Substantively therefore, Namibia has adopted a monist 
approach to international law. 
5.2.2 Dualist Approach 
The dualist doctrine on the other hand recognises international law and national law 
as distinct legal systems that regulate different subject-matter. The former governs 
relations between sovereign states and the latter governs relations of citizens with 
each other and with the state.56 In Germany and Italy, a treaty has to be transformed 
into domestic law by a legislative act in order to have effect while in Denmark and 
United Kingdom, the process of transformation determines the effectiveness of a 
treaty.57 
South Africa, Kenya and Zambia essentially adopt the dualist approach in 
relation to treaties and rules of customary international law. The Constitution of 
South Africa provides that: 
Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law 
by the national legislation; but a self – executing provision of an agreement that has 
been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.’58 
Thus, in attempts to make the GMO Act compliant with the Protocol, the GMO 
Amendment Act 23 of 2006 was enacted. The Constitution however recognises 
‘[c]ustomary international law as law in South Africa unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament’.59 
In Kenya, Art. 2(1) recognises the Constitution as the ‘supreme law of the 
Republic’.60 It provides that ‘the general rules of international law shall form part of 
                                                 
54 Devine D ‘The Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law in Light of the Interim 
South African Constitution’ 14 International Law and Comparative Law Quarterly (1995):1-18 at 17. 
55Ibid.  
56 Brownlie I Principles of International Law (2008):31-32. 
57 Jacobs F(32) at xxv.  
58 Section 231(4) of the Constitution (1996) Republic of South Africa. 
59Ibid section 232. 













the law of Kenya’.61 Further, ‘[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form 
part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution’.62 In both cases, the substantive 
approach would appear to be monist but the procedure by which the general rules of 
international law and treaties become part of Kenyan law is dualist as they must 
comply with the provisions of article 2(5) and 2(6) of the Constitution. Thus, in 
restating its position regarding international human rights instruments, the Minister for 
Justice63 in response to human rights activists’ enquiries, asserted that ‘[w]e are a 
signatory and must comply, but within our Constitution’64 
Zambia has no substantive provisions concerning application of international 
law in the domestic sphere. Invariably the government is compelled to explain its 
position regarding international law. For example, in 2008 while engaging with 
human right bodies, the government stated that ‘ [i]t is worth noting that international 
law instruments are not self-executing and require legislative implementation to be 
effective in Zambia as law’.65 However, the country has dedicated part III of its 
Constitution to fundamental rights and freedoms. These include the right to life,66 
personal liberty,67 and prohibition of inhuman treatment68, all of which are a reflection 
of the relevant international instruments. In addition, under s.14 (1) of the 
Constitution, existing rights and obligations under conventions, treaties and 
agreements remain binding and exercisable. Also, Art. 78 vests all legislative power 
in Parliament. These factors strongly suggest that only statutes enacted by 
Parliament form part of the law of the country. It would therefore be correct to assert 
that Zambia has seemingly adopted a dualist approach. 
Transformation grants flexibility which enables states to adjust to their local 
needs and circumstances. In the process however, they may or may not sufficiently 
comply with the relevant rules of international law. The manner and extent to which 
                                                 
61 Ibid Section 2(5) Constitution of Kenya (n60). 
62 Ibid section 2(6). 
63 Hon. Mutula Kilonzo. 
64 See ‘State Agrees to Impalement Alston Report’ available at www.eastdard.net (accessed 10 June 
2009). 
65 Quoted in Killander M (ed) International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa 
(2010):73 Pretoria University Law Press Pretoria. 
66 Article 11 (a) of the Constitution Act No 1 of 1991 Republic of Zambia. 
67 Ibid article 13. 












such domestic legislation may be consistent or at variance with international law 
invariably becomes a matter for courts and academics to assess. 
In both monist and dualist approaches, the fundamental principle is that the 
internal application of treaties (and international law for that matter) is governed by 
domestic constitutional law.69 Compliance with normative provisions will determine 
whether and the extent to which a treaty may be applicable in domestic law. Thus, 
neither  the two systems has the power to create or change rules of the other, 
meaning that when municipal law makes provision for application of international law 
in whole or in part, this is viewed as an exercise of authority in municipal law and in 
the event of a conflict, dualists view municipal law as supreme70 
5.2.3 The Harmonisation Approach 
Difficulties in integrating the monist and dualist approaches have led to an emerging 
theory of harmonisation. It seeks to empower judges to apply their own jurisdictional 
rules the effect of which is to apply customary international law as part of common 
law, yet allow statutory and acts of state to prevail over international law in the event 
of a conflict between the two legal systems.71 
As Dugard argues, difficulties concerning international law are mainly 
attributable to the variance of its sources and the objectives it seeks to achieve - all 
of which are too complex to permit an acceptable rationale of its nature and purpose. 
He further argues (as noted at 3.2) that rules and principles of law provide the ‘flesh, 
blood, organs and bones of international law’. 72 Scholars can only study parts of this 
body as the mind of international law is difficult to understand.73 In the area of 
international environmental law, globalization and emergence of new transnational 
threats (such as climate change, loss of biodiversity and pollution) have drastically 
changed the nature of governance and the purposes of international law.74 
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Harmonisation is likely to be more useful in international environmental law 
which is facing new challenges. In order to address the current anthropogenic 
environmental crises, the international environmental law regime calls for re-thinking 
particularly on how to translate theory into reality in its emerging jurisprudence. The 
divide between monist and dualist approaches to domestic implementation appears 
to be departing from reality from the perspective of advancements in technology, 
increasing globalization and the need for international cooperation to combat, 
alleviate or minimise environmental threats. 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) tend to establish either 
minimum thresholds or general principles (or both) that bind states. However, 
effectiveness of such MEAs largely depends on the willingness of states to comply 
with their obligations within their jurisdictions. For example, art. (2) (2) of the 
Protocol, requires Parties to ensure that dealings in LMOs are undertaken in a 
manner that prevents or reduces the risks to biological diversity and human health. 
This is a general obligation which merely identifies the need to balance trade and 
conservation of biological diversity as well as human health, in dealing with LMOs. 
This researcher argues that in the absence of substantive provisions on the 
precautionary approach, achieving such a balance is almost impossible. 
Further, the right of states to exercise and safeguard their sovereignty is a 
matter MEAs usually recognise.   As a result states enjoy flexibility in the manner 
(and extent) to which they domesticate such instruments. For example, art 2(4) of 
the Protocol recognises the sovereign right of states to take measures that are more 
protective of their biological diversity. Exercise of discretion under Art 2(4) should be 
understood to mean that such protective measures should override scientific risk 
assessment thresholds imposed by Art. 15 and Annex III of the Protocol. The thesis 
argues that public participation is like a mirror which seeks to ensure both 
participation and transparency. It is not intended to override scientific risk 
assessment under the Protocol. 
Further, Art.2(4) of the Protocol allows member states to take into account 
their peculiar interests and priorities in supplementing the domestication of the 
Protocol. In exercising this form of flexibility, one may validly argue that the 












for national laws. The best example is the recently concluded Nagoya – Kuala 
Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety,75 which provides that ‘Parties may use criteria set out in their domestic 
law to address damage that occurs within the limits of the national jurisdictions of 
Parties’.76 It establishes a fault based liability regime, according to which ‘[a] causal 
link shall be established between the damage and the living organism in question in 
accordance with domestic law’.77 
In addition, there is a need to embody environmental rights in many 
constitutions worldwide.78 Countries have, in general, realised the need to 
strengthen environmental protection by creating rights and obligations for 
government and individuals. Such rights may evolve in the future from soft law 
instruments such as the 1972 Stockholm Declaration79 and 1992 Rio Declaration80 
yet they complement the effectiveness of MEAs in such countries. Even so, 
ratification of international instruments is one thing and effective implementation is 
another. 
In essence, monist and dualist approaches are applicable to what Jouannet 
refers to as classical international law.81 With the development of IEL regime 
however, the distinctiveness of monist and dualist theories may soon disappear as 
states seem keen to develop funct onal domestic regimes rather than rely on 
traditional theories. Ultimately, the harmonisation theory seems to be gaining both 
recognition and applicability. 
                                                 
75 Adopted at Nagoya Japan on 16 October 2010.  It is yet to enter into force. 
76 Article 3 (6) of the Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
77 Ibid article 4.  
78 Generally see May J ‘Constituting Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide’ 23 Pace 
Environmental Law Review (2005-2006)113-182. 
79 For example, Principle 1 of the Declaration partly provides that ‘[m]an has the fundamental right to 
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of 
dignity and well being ...’ The Stockholm Declaration is available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97 (accessed 20 March 2010). 
80 For instance, Principle 1 provides that [h]uman beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable 
development.  They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature’. 
81 Jouannet E ‘Universalism and Imperialism: The true-False Paradox of International Law?  
18 (3) The European Journal of International Law (2007):379-407 at 380, where she asserts that 













5.3 The Extent of Incorporation of the Protocol (with reference to the 
Precautionary Approach) by the Selected Countries 
The mechanisms for implementing international obligations in domestic law have just 
been discussed above.  Whatever mechanisms the selected countries engage to 
domesticate their international obligations, the extent and the success of such 
domestication by each of them will now be examined, with particular reference to 
obligations to implement the precautionary approach flowing from the Protocol.  
Since the precautionary approach forms an essential part of the Protocol and 
sustainable development in general, it should be incorporated in domestic 
legislation.82 The extent to which this has been realised is assessed. 
The development of biosafety legislation in the selected countries falls into 
two categories. In the first category South Africa enacted the GMO Act in 1997. The 
Act became operational in 1999. It was amended in 2006 in an attempt to comply 
with international instruments such as the Protocol. Th  other three countries 
(Kenya, Zambia and Namibia) fall in the second category of countries that enacted 
biosafety legislation after the Protocol entered into force. Namibia enacted its 
Biosafety Act in 2006, Zambia in 2007 and Kenya in 2009. 
5.3.1 South Africa 
No sooner had genetic engineering had become possible in the 1970s than 
scientists in South Africa thought of creating an organisation that would deal with 
issues relevant to biotechnology.83 In 1978 the South African Committee for Genetic 
Experimentation (SAGENE) was created - under the auspices of the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) – to deal with contained experiments 
associated with genetic engineering (GE), approval of projects, training courses and 
laboratory standards.84 In 1989 A US seed company Delta and Pine (D&PL) sought 
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approval to carry out experiments on genetic modification (GM) seeds to be sold in 
the USA.85 
In 1994 the government expanded the scope of SAGENE to include the 
release of GMOs into the environment86. Research and field testing of GMOs was at 
that time regulated by the 1983 Agricultural Pests Act and SAGENE served as the 
advisory body.87 In 1997 the Genetically Modified Organisms Act (hereinafter the 
GMO Act) was enacted and became operational on 1 December 1999. 
The GMO Act establishes the Executive Council for Genetically Modified 
Organisms which performs functions that include advising the Minister on all aspects 
concerning GMO activities.88 Importantly, the Council is the decision-making body in 
respect of GMO activities.89 The Act provides for various mechanisms including 
advance informed agreement,90 public input,91 risk assessment,92 risk management, 
socio-economic considerations93 and monitoring.94 It applies to ‘the development, 
production, release, use and application of genetically modified organisms’.95 
In its preambular paragraph, the Act seeks ‘to provide for an adequate level of 
protection during all activities involving genetically modified organisms that may have 
adverse impact on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
human and animal health’. Section 1 defines biosafety as ‘the level of safety when 
risk management measures must be taken to avoid potential risk to human and 
                                                 
85 Gouse M ‘Aspects of biotechnology and Genetically Modified Crops in South Africa’ (2005):3 
available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/... Accessed 15 November 2009.  
Permission to cite this article was granted to me by the author in his email of 14 November 2009, a 
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86 Morris J (n83) at 304. 
87 Gupta A and Falkner R ‘The Cartagena Protocol o Biosafety and Domestic Implementation: 
Comparing Mexico, China and South Africa’ (2006) available at www.chathamhouse.org.uk (accessed 
19 November 2009). 
88 Section 3 (1) and (4) of the Genetically Modified Organisms Act No 15 of 1997 Republic of South 
Africa.  
89 Ibid section 5.  
90 Ibid section 2(a) (iii). 
91 Ibid section 5(2) (a). 
92 Ibid. 
93 Genetically Modified Organisms Act (n88). 
94 Ibid sections 15 and 16. 












animal health and safety to the conservation of the environment, as a result of 
exposure to the activities with genetically modified organisms’.96 
While the Act seeks and recognises the need to protect human and animal 
health from potential harm associated with GMOs, it falls short of making specific 
reference to the precautionary approach. Instead it places emphasis on providing 
criteria for scientifically based risk assessments and environmental impact 
assessments both of which are scientific in nature. Whereas risk assessment has 
inherent precaution by reason of identification of risks (including potential risks), 
Article 1 of the Protocol provides for the precautionary approach within parameters 
the outcome of which is adequate protection of the environment and human health.  
It therefore sought to identify and address the areas of concern for purposes of 
regulation. The element of public participation provided for under Art.23 of the 
Protocol is not part of the scientific aspects of precaution but it is an important source 
of information in respect achieving its objective. It means that while scientists do the 
onerous job of identifying possible risks, the legitimacy of the decisions made largely 
depends on acceptance by the public of such decisions. 
Under the GMO Act, precautionary measures are manifestly reflected through 
risk assessment and risk management. For example, the Act makes it mandatory for 
the Council to take into account sc entifically based risk assessment and proposed 
risk management measures in decision-making.97 In contrast however, the taking 
into account of public input, environmental impact assessment and the potential 
socio-economic considerations in decision-making is discretionary.98 Inevitably, the 
contrast suggests that in respect of risk management, precautionary measures                                                                                                                                                
are within the discretion of the Council. 
Having recognised that there may be potential risks for which risk 
management measures would be needed, one would expect the Act to specifically 
provide for the precautionary approach to address scientific uncertainty. Ultimately, 
the above contrast leads to a presumption that regulation of biotechnology in South 
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Africa hardly establishes a reasonable balance between the competing values that 
characterise the GMO controversy. 
The Regulations 99 remotely refer to a situation that attracts application of the 
precautionary approach by providing that ‘[l]ack of scientific knowledge or consensus 
on the safe use of genetically modified organisms shall not be interpreted as 
indicating a particular level of risk, an acceptable risk or absence of risk’.100 Such a 
situation arising from scientific uncertainty should be addressed by precautionary 
measures yet the regulations do not make specific reference to such measures. 
They provide instead that ‘[t]he Council shall, when taking a decision to approve an 
application, determine appropriate mechanisms, measures and strategies to manage 
or control identified risks during the activity’.101 
Thus the GMO Act seems elusive on the precautionary approach as it 
indirectly implies it in decision-making. Absence of substantive provisions on the 
approach in the Act, and the indirect manner in which the regulations refer to it, may 
suggest that South Africa has not sufficiently complied with the Protocol in so far as 
the precautionary approach is concerned.  Arguably, owing to political considerations 
and the need to safeguard its international relations, the country has embraced the 
precautionary approach within its risk assessment structures without specifically 
using the wording of either Art 1 or Art.10 of the Protocol. This may serve the 
intended purposes under the Act, but legally, it seemingly amounts to incorrect 
incorporation of the Protocol. 
Other laws that contain provisions relevant to the regulation of biotechnology 
in South Africa include the Constitution, the National Environmental Management Act 
(NEMA), the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (NEMBA),102 the 
Consumers Protection Act103 and the Promotion of Access to Information Act.104 The 
Constitution establishes the right of everyone to ‘an environment that is not harmful 
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to their health or well-being’.105 It requires that the environment must be ‘protected, 
for the benefit of the present and future generations, through reasonable legislative 
and other measures...’106 
The National Environmental Management Act provides for principles that 
‘apply throughout the Republic to the actions of all organs of state that may 
significantly affect the environment’.107 Some of these principles include the 
requirement that ‘[e]nvironmental management must place people and their needs at 
the forefront of its concern, and serve their physical, psychological, developmental, 
cultural and social interests equitably’.108 It requires that development must be 
socially, environmentally and economically sustainable.109 Sustainable development 
requires that ‘a risk-averse and cautious approach is applied, which takes into 
account the limits of current knowledge about the consequences of decisions and 
actions’.110 It further requires that, ‘[d]ecisions must be taken in an open and 
transparent manner, and access to information must be provided in accordance with 
the law’.111 In addition, the participation of ‘all interested and affected parties in 
environmental governance must be promoted, and all people must have the 
opportunity to develop the understanding, skills and capacity necessary for achieving 
equitable and effective participation ...’112 
Two of the objectives of NEMBA are (i) the management and conservation of 
biological diversity and of the components of such biological diversity113 and (ii) to 
give effect to ratified international agreements relating to biodiversity which are 
binding on South Africa.114 Such agreements include the CBD and its Cartagena 
Protocol. Additionally, S.7 of the Act requires that the application of the Act must be 
guided by the principles set out in s. 2 of NEMA. The Act also intends to achieve the 
progressive realisation of the environmental rights provided for by s. 24 of the 
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Constitution. The Promotion of Access to Information Act and the Consumer 
Protection Act are discussed in chapters six and seven respectively. 
Cumulatively, these legislative acts are geared towards realisation of the 
environmental rights provided for by the Constitution. The emphasis placed on 
protection of biological diversity, public participation that embodies access to 
information and a cautious approach to environmental protection, are matters that 
are pertinent to the regulation of biotechnology. Adoption of environmental rights and 
the relevant legislation are a clear indication that South Africa has established an 
advanced environmental law regime from which other countries in Africa may draw 
useful lessons. 
5.3.2 Kenya 
The Biosafety Act of Kenya115 aims to ‘facilitate responsible research into, and 
minimize the risks that may be posed by, genetically modified organisms’.116 The Act 
further aims to ‘ensure an adequate level of protection for the safe transfer, handling 
and use of genetically modified organisms that may have an adverse effect on health 
and the environment’.117 These two objectives constitute, at the very minimum, the 
basis for regulation of biotechnology at the international level.118 Thus domestic 
implementation of the Cartagena Protocol is intended to put into effect internationally 
agreed obligations on facilitation of responsible research and the minimising of 
potential harm to the environment and humans. Objectives are important as they 
seek to provide a roadmap of what a document, instrument or legislation seeks to 
achieve. However, the two objectives of the Biosafety Act of Kenya are 
misconceived in two important ways. 
First, the objectives refer to GMOs thereby creating the impression that it is all 
inclusive, encompassing both living organisms and their products. Absence of the 
wording ‘and their products’ at the end of each of the objectives, substantially 
excludes products such as maize flour and other processed foods or products that 
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are derived from modified living organisms (LMOs).The issue as to whether or not 
the Protocol was to include living – organisms and their products was so critically 
contentious   that it threatened the collapse of the negotiations. African States (the 
Like Minded Group) sought an all inclusive instrument while the Miami Group led by 
the USA and Canada lobbied for an instrument that excluded the precautionary 
principle arguing that it could be used to unnecessarily restrict trade in GMOs for 
political expediency.119 
Adoption of the African Model Law (AML) in 1999 by the then Organisation of 
Africa Unity (OAU) now the African Union (AU) was intended to create a more 
restrictive regime that could sufficiently protect the rich Africa biodiversity and human 
health against potential harm caused by GMOs as opposed to the Protocol that is 
limited to LMOs. Taking into account this scenario, one would argue that in so far as 
the objectives of the Biosafety Act of Kenya are concerned, the Act sought to put one 
‘foot’ in the Protocol and the other in the AML but in vain. This lays the basis for the 
next misconception. 
Second, while the Protocol clearly provides for the precautionary approach as 
the guiding criterion in the regulation of biotechnology, the Biosafety Act of Kenya is 
silent on it. Instead it specifically provides for the establishment of ‘a transparent, 
science-based and predictable process...’ for reviewing and decision-making on 
GMOs and related activities.120 By enacting the Biosafety Act in its present form, 
Parliament presumably took the view that GMOs are presumed to be safe until 
proved unsafe. This view is consistent with the position taken by proponents of 
GMOs. It is therefore tenable to argue that, having failed to embrace the 
precautionary approach as envisaged by Article 1 and 10(6) of the Protocol, the Act 
seems to create an imbalance in favour of science and the biotechnology industry in 
the regulation of GMOs. 
In seeking to incorporate the precautionary approach, the Act in its Fifth 
Schedule provides that ‘where there is uncertainty regarding the level of risk, the 
Authority may request for further information on the specific issues or may 
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recommend implementing appropriate risk management strategies and monitoring 
the genetically modified organisms in the receiving environment’.121 It further 
provides that ‘lack of scientific knowledge or scientific consensus shall not 
necessarily be interpreted to indicate a particular level of risk, an absence of risk or 
an acceptable risk’.122 Also, ‘where there is uncertainty regarding the level of risk, the 
authority may request for further information ... or may recommend appropriate risk 
management strategies and monitoring’.123 
Seeking further information or resorting to monitoring have legitimate 
purposes to serve but cannot be substitutes for the precautionary approach. While 
the appropriate risk management strategies envisaged by the Fifth schedule of the 
Act appear precautionary in character, they are not formulated in the wording of 
Art.10(6)124 of the Protocol, which aims to ensure that potential adverse effects are 
minimised. By using the word ‘appropriate’,125 Parliament had good intentions but 
the risk management strategies lack objectivity, particularly in the absence of 
provisions embracing the precautionary approach as envisaged by the Protocol. It 
then becomes difficult to answer the inevitable questions: what are the appropriate 
strategies; what criteria should be used in determining them and in whose interest? 
Having acknowledged that there may be scientific uncertainty as to the level 
of risk, Parliament had an opportunity to make provision for the precautionary 
approach. The approach deals with situations where there is lack of sufficient 
knowledge or information. Indeed s. 4 (f) of the Fifth Schedule of the Act 
acknowledges that there are times when there may be ‘uncertainty as to level of 
risk’. The appropriate measures envisaged by s. 4(f) of the Fifth Schedule merely 
form the basis for the making of recommendations by the NBA for risk management 
and monitoring. This does not appear to provide a clear opportunity for the NBA to 
postpone or even refuse granting authorization by reason of scientific uncertainty in 
the manner envisaged by Article 10 (6) of the Protocol. 
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Other legislation relevant to the regulation of biotechnology in Kenya includes 
the Constitution126 and the Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act 
(EMCA).127 The Constitution obligates the state to ‘eliminate processes and activities 
that are likely to endanger the environment’128 and also to ‘utilise the environment 
and natural resources for the benefit of the people of Kenya’.129 It further obligates 
the state to ‘encourage public participation in the management, protection and 
conservation of the environment’.130 It imposes a duty on every person to ‘cooperate 
with State organs and other persons to protect and conserve the environment...’131 It 
also provides for consumer rights to ‘goods ... of reasonable quality’132 and to 
‘information necessary for them to gain full benefit from goods and services’.133 
Consumers also have the right to ‘protection of their health, safety and economic 
interest...’.134 This researcher argues that lack of substantive provisions on the 
precautionary approach in the Biosafety Act offends the consumer rights provided by 
Art. 46 (1) (c) of the Constitution. 
The Constitution was promulgated about one year ago– the 27 August 2010. 
Its implementation is problematic especially due to infighting that characterises the 
coalition government established after the contentious 2007/8 election results. These 
results gave rise to short lived tribal violence. In addition, the next elections are due 
towards the end of 2012, a factor that appears to cause a shift in the priorities of the 
Parliamentarians from implementation of the new Constitution to strengthening their 
positions in the political arena. Moreover, the Constitution does not create 
substantive environmental rights in contrast to the Constitution of South Africa.135 
Instead it creates an obligation on everyone to cooperate in protecting  the 
environment.136 Realisation of the relevant rights envisaged by the Constitution may 
therefore not be achieved in the near future. Adoption of, and amendments to, 
relevant legislation are essential if such rights are to be realised. Amended 
                                                 
126 The Constitution of Kenya (n60). 
127 No 8 of 1999 Republic of Kenya. 
128 Article 69 (1) (g) Constitution (2010) Republic of Kenya (n60). 
129 Ibid Article 69 (1) (h).  
130 Ibid article 69 (1) (d).  
131 Ibid article 69 (2).  
132 Ibid article 46 (1 (a).  
133 Ibid Article 46 (1) (b).  
134 Ibid Article 46 (1) (c). 
135 See the discussion at (5.3.1). 












legislation should hopefully include the Biosafety Act to specifically provide for the 
precautionary approach. 
The other piece of legislation is EMCA, which provides that ‘[e]very person in 
Kenya is entitled to a clean and healthy environment and has the duty to safeguard 
and enhance the environment’.137 The Act requires that the High Court shall be 
guided by the principles of sustainable development, which include public 
participation, the precautionary principle as well as intergenerational and 
intergenerational equity, in dealing with matters before it.138 It further makes 
provisions for the conservation of biological diversity139 and monitoring.140 By 
requiring the High Court to be guided by principles of sustainable development in 
deciding cases, the Act seeks to rely on the superior courts to develop a 
jurisprudence relating to such principles. Inclusion of the precautionary approach is 
confirmation of a realisation by Parliament of the key role the approach plays in 
protecting the environment. The irony is that the Parliament failed to provide for the 
approach where it is needed most–in the biosafety Act. 
The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act was enacted in 1999. 
Consistent with rationality, one would expect that the Biosafety Act enacted in 2009, 
would reflect increased awareness on the need for a precautionary approach in 
environmental governance. Taking into account the dynamic nature of environmental 
law, and the spirit of the new Constitution, the need to harmonise EMCA, as well as 
the Biosafety Act with the Constitution in the relevant areas is imperative, unless 
litigation should pre-empt Parliament! 
5.3.3 Zambia 
Underlying the regulation of biotechnology in Zambia are two interrelated concepts: 
the precautionary approach and public interest. As a prelude to the precautionary 
approach  is the requirement not to give approval ‘unless there is firm and sufficient 
evidence that the genetically modified organism or product of a genetically modified 
organism poses minimum risk, to human and animal health, non-genetically modified 
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crop, biological diversity or the environment’.141 The Act adopts the precautionary 
approach by providing that: 
‘Lack of scientific evidence shall not be used as a basis for not taking 
preventive measures where there is reason to suspect threats of any 
damage to socio-economic conditions, human and animal health, non-
genetically modified crop, biological diversity or the environment.142 
Further, the Act requires that approval shall not be given ‘where there is reason 
to believe that any harm or damage’ may be caused to human and animal health 
non-GM crop, biological diversity or the environment ‘although there is lack of 
scientific evidence or certainty’.143 It adopts the precautionary approach with two 
outstanding characteristics. First, the approach is adopted in the strongest terms 
extending to all forms of damage. This is evidenced by reference to ‘any damage’. 
As a result, the Act creates a much higher threshold than principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration (upon which the precautionary approach adopted by the Protocol is 
based).  The latter urges States to apply the precautionary approach where there are 
threats of ‘serious or irreversible damage’. The higher threshold established under 
the Act is a manifestation of exercise of sovereign authority that enables States to 
take steps that are more protective of their biological diversity and is recognised by 
Art 2 (4) of the Protocol. 
Second, by providing that socio-economic considerations can attract 
precautionary measures (in addition to the provisions of s. 19), the Act goes beyond 
the biological diversity and human health criteria established by the Protocol. Section 
19 empowers the Biosafety Authority of Zambia (NBAZ) to refuse approval where the 
GMO has adverse socio-economic impacts, does not contribute to sustainable 
development and is not in accord with ‘ethical values and concerns of the 
communities and does not undermine community knowledge and technologies’ 
among other things. Socio-economic considerations may thus be a basis for refusing 
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approval, presumably independent of other factors. However, as we have argued 
elsewhere, 144 socio-economic considerations are as varied as they are complex. 
Bosselmann argues that, like justice, sustainability may be simple or complex. 
Simple because of the unsustainable things we are aware of such as waste, fossil 
fuels, polluting cars and unhealthy food. Complex because it has no uniformly 
acceptable definition and it cannot be sufficiently understood without reference to 
values and principles – a combination of all of which make it an ethical discourse.145 
Thus, inclusion of socio-economic considerations to justify precautionary measures 
further complicates the decision-making process. It also gives rise to new but 
interrelated dimensions for applying the precautionary approach that were not 
envisaged by the Protocol. Even as the Protocol recognised the sovereign right of 
states to take more protective measures to conserve their biodiversity under Art. 2 
(4), it must be understood to mean that it did not seek to achieve a threshold of zero 
risk in the regulation of biotechnology. 
Concerning public interest the Act provides that ‘[t]he Authority may reject an 
application under this part on grounds of public interest’.146 Public interest is neither 
defined nor is it capable of being defined.  It is a broad concept which, according to 
Tamberlin J ‘cannot be defined within precise boundaries. The categories of public 
interest are not closed and different minds will differ as to what is, or what is not, in 
the public interest’.147 When the expression ‘in the public interest’ is used in a 
statute, especially where the Act does not give any positive indication of the 
considerations upon which a decision is to be based, Mason C. J notes that such an 
expression: 
‘classically imports a discretionary value judgement to be made by 
reference to undefined factual matters, confined only in so far as the 
subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments 
may enable ... given reasons to be (pronounced) definitely extraneous to 
any objects the legislature could have had in view’148 
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Such considerations must however aim at a ‘conclusion or determination 
which best serves the advancement of the interest or welfare of the public, society or 
the nation and its content will depend on each particular set of circumstances’.149 
Where the relevant considerations are not specified (as in the Biosafety Act of 
Zambia) ‘it is largely for the decision-maker, in the light of matters placed before him 
by the parties, to determine which matters he regards as relevant and the 
comparative importance to be accorded to matters which he so regards’150 The 
ultimate evaluation of the public interest will encompass as assessment of ‘what are 
the relevant facets of the public interest that are competing and the comparative 
importance that ought to be given to them so that the “public interest” can be 
ascertained and served’.151 
By failing to provide examples of factors that may be taken into account in 
refusing an application on grounds of public interest, it may safely be asserted that 
under the Zambian Biosafety Act, the understanding, interpretation and 
implementation of the public interest doctrine lies within the discretionary powers of 
the ZBA. 
Inclusion of ‘public interest’ as a ground for refusing an application, in addition 
other factors (such as socio-economic considerations, biological biodiversity, 
indigenous knowledge, and ethical considerations152) in decision-making, the 
biosafety legislation of Zambia complicates an already rigorous process. The public 
interest factor materially enhances the strict regulation of GMOs in Zambia. 
By specifically providing for public interest as a criterion for decision-making 
(in addition to the precautionary approach), the Act goes far beyond the thresholds 
for decision-making provided for by the Protocol. A part from being an indeterminate 
criterion, public interest may create problems in decision-making because it gives the 
BAZ wide discretion (subject to the principles inherent in domestic administrative law 
such as good faith, reasonableness and proper purpose), and it may be difficult to 
ascertain the limits of refusing an application. Another characteristic of biosafety 
legislation in Zambia is the provision that the BAZ ‘shall, as a condition for approval, 
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require the applicant to furnish evidence of insurance cover or other sufficient 
arrangement to meet its obligations under the Act’.153 This requirement is, in a 
sense, complimentary to the precautionary approach and the doctrine of public 
interest. A combination of these factors may make investment in the country 
especially by biotechnology companies seem cumbersome. They would opt to invest 
in countries with apparent liberal approaches to biotechnology, such as South Africa, 
Kenya and Uganda. 
Other legislation relevant to the regulation of biotechnology in Zambia include 
the Constitution154 and the Environmental Management Act (EMA).155 As discussed 
at (5.2.2) the Constitution has embraced fundamental human rights including the 
right to life. It does not have specific provisions concerning the environment. 
However, environmental law jurisprudence has established that the right to life 
cannot be realised fully in a degraded environment. For example, the principle of 
intergenerational equity156 is anchored on the need to protect the environment for the 
benefit of the present and future generations. By necessary implication, the right to 
life would supplement the environmental right of everyone to a clean and healthy 
environment. 
EMA is an overall framework legislation that governs environmental protection 
in Zambia. In the event of inconsistency with other environmental protection 
legislation (including the Biosafety Act) EMA prevails.157 Enacted recently in April 
2011, EMA interprets the precautionary approach to mean that, ‘lack of scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason to postpone measures to prevent 
environmental degradation... where there is a threat of serious or irreversible 
damage’.158  By providing for environmental degradation in general, the Act 
embraces the approach in a broad-based manner in respect of environmental 
protection. It provides for the right to a clean and healthy environment,159 principles 
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that govern environmental management such as polluter pays160 and it adopts the 
concept of integrated environmental management.161 These and other mechanisms 
of EMA are a reflection of a growing environmental law jurisprudence. The Act 
strengthens rather than weaken the biosafety regime in Zambia. 
5.3.4 Namibia 
The objective of the Biosafety Act of Namibia is to introduce a system and procedure 
for regulating GMOs with a view of providing ‘an adequate level of protection to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.162 In its attempts to achieve 
this objective, the Act seeks to reconcile three interests. First is the health and safety 
of humans and environment against potential harm of GMOs; second, social, 
cultural, ethical and economic considerations and third, to promoting responsible 
research, development and use of GMOs.163 
Unlike the Protocol that embraces the precautionary approach as a means to 
achieve its objective, the Act does not provide specific means. Instead, the three 
interests the Act seeks to safeguard are the benchmarks for regulation. However one 
needs to ask whether the Act has provisions that may necessitate (or even compel) 
adoption of the precautionary approach? The provisions relating to the risk 
management plan provide guidance on this issue. 
Concerning risk assessment and management the applicant is required to 
prepare and submit a risk assessment report and a risk assessment plan.164 In 
preparing the   plan, the applicant must take into account ‘the means of managing 
any risks posed by those dealings in such a way as to protect the health and safety 
of humans and animals and the environment’.165 In making a decision regarding an 
application within 30 days of the receipt of an application from the Council, the Act 
makes it mandatory for the Minister not to grant an application unless the Minister is 
satisfied, among other things that ‘any risks posed by the dealings proposed to be 
authorised by the permit are capable of being managed in such a way as to protect 
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the health and safety of humans and animals, and the environment’.166 In addition, 
the Act it requires the Minister to be satisfied that GMO activities will be in the public 
interest before issuing a permit.167 
Essentially, the risk management plan submitted by the applicant forms the 
basis for determining the means of managing potential risks. As discussed at earlier 
the Council has the discretion to consult any institution, person or authority in respect 
of the risk assessment and risk management plan, apparently to enable it compile a 
report for the Minister. This strongly suggests that Parliament sought to ensure that 
the Council was at liberty to seek independent views concerning the risk assessment 
and risk management plan, apparently due to possible vested interests of the 
applicant as well as the inherent scientific uncertainty in relation to safety of GMOs. 
The Council prepares a report that it submits to the Minister. In the process it 
apparently undertakes some form of ‘filtering’ process. The Minister has the power to 
request the Council in writing for such further information as the Minister may specify 
and the Minister must make a decision within 30 days of receipt of such further 
information. 168 This necessarily implies that should the Council fail to provide the 
further information requested, the Minister is nonetheless required to proceed and 
‘either grant or refuse’ the application for a permit.169 Thus failure by the Council to 
provide further information (which failure the Act neither envisages nor addresses) is 
not specifically set forth as a ground for refusing an application. 
To the extent that the Minister has power to grant an application even in the 
absence of the further information requested, the Act not only lacks objectivity but 
fails to address uncertainty – a critical concern in regulation. Moreover possible 
failure by the Council to provide further information created an ample opportunity for 
Parliament to empower the Minister to refuse rather than ‘either refuse or grant’170 
the application for a permit. By refusing to grant the application where the Council 
fails to provide further information as requested, the Minister would rely on the need 
to exercise precaution in decision-making. 
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The need for further information presented an opportunity for application of 
the precautionary approach. Having failed to adopt the approach, this researcher 
asserts that Parliament lacked objectivity when enacting the law. Had the Act made 
specific provisions embracing the approach, the Minister would reasonably be 
expected to refuse the application where further information is requested but not 
provided by the Council. This is also one of the problems that emerge from creating 
two centres of power in decision-making. In addition this is a situation similar to the 
provisions of s.4 (f) of the Fifth Schedule of the Biosafety Act of Kenya. It suggests 
that proponents of biotechnology would want   weak but uniform biosafety regimes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
The Act further requires that the Minister must not grant an application for a 
permit unless the Minister is satisfied in accordance with the report and 
recommendations of the Council ‘that any risks posed by the dealings proposed to 
be authorised by the permit are capable of being managed in such a way as to 
protect the health and safety of humans and animals and the environment’.171 This 
provision imposes a mandatory obligation on the Minister yet it fails to provide legally 
recognisable criteria for ensuring the safety of such dealings. Instead the section 
establishes a subjective criterion that merely requires the Minister to satisfy 
himself/herself that any risks posed by the dealing are capable of being managed in 
such a manner as to protect humans, animals and the environment. To this extent, it 
is plausible to argue that whereas the Act creates an ample opportunity for adoption 
of the precautionary approach, it leaves it to the Minister to determine whether the 
potential risks of the dealing in question may be managed in the manner envisaged 
by the Act. 
This thesis submits that these discretionary powers of the Minister under the 
Biosafety Act of Namibia are not only inconsistent with the objective and spirit of the 
Protocol but also superfluous. The Act partly places the destiny of human health, 
animals and the environment in the hands of one person—the Minister. Further, the 
fact that Ministers are usually political appointees who may be reshuffled or even 
dismissed without notice, places the decision-making process in a precarious 
position as the new Minister may in some cases (and for various reasons including 
                                                 












varying attitudes to biotechnology), make a decision that is at variance with that of 
the former Minister. 
The second material consideration is the requirement that the Minister ‘must 
not grant an application for the issue of a permit unless the Minister is satisfied, in 
accordance with the report and recommendations of the Council ... that such 
dealings will be in the public interest’.172 It suffices to note that while the Council and 
the Minister ‘may take into account any factors which the Council considers 
appropriate...’ the Act requires consideration of the extent to which the dealing is 
likely (among others): to contribute to sustainable development, to undermine 
indigenous knowledge or technology or to affect the social and economic 
advancement of people and society, including a particular community.173 These are 
broad yet complex interdisciplinary issues which, in this researcher’s view, may not 
be ascertained within the 30 days a decision is to be made. Moreover, the decision 
might mainly be based on the applicant’s risk assessment report. 
On the one hand, there is no guarantee that the risk assessment report may 
sufficiently cover the broad issues even if the report is subjected to scrutiny by ‘any 
person, body or institution’.174 This may hardly be accomplished effectively within the 
30 days provided for by the law. On the other hand, inordinate delays in decision-
making may be a reason for resentment by the applicant and other stakeholders who 
may be keen to invest in biotechnology. Attempts to reconcile these competing 
imperatives create a dilemma that gives rise to a compelling need for specific 
provisions on the precautionary approach. 
Other legislation relevant to the regulation of GMOs in Namibia include the 
Constitution and the Environmental Management Act.175 Article 95(l) of the 
Constitution imposes an obligation on the state to formulate policies aimed at 
‘maintenance of ecosystems, essential ecological processes and biological diversity 
of Namibia’. The country has adopted a ten year National Biodiversity Strategy and 
                                                 
172 Section 25 (4) (b) Biosafety Act (n170). Public interest has already been discussed at (5.3.3). 
173 Ibid section 25 (5).  
174 Section 24 (a) Biosafety Act (n170). 












Action Plan176 that recognises the intricate link between sustainability and protection 
of biological diversity. The Strategy and Action Plan provides guidance for the 
implementation of Art. 95(l) of the Constitution and the CBD. In an attempt to realise 
this constitutional obligation, the object of the Environmental Management Act is to 
ensure that ‘significant effects of activities on the environment are considered in time 
and carefully’.177 It makes provision for principles that guide environmental 
management. These include the requirement that ‘participation of all interested and 
affected parties must be promoted and decisions must take into account their 
interests, needs and values ’.178 In addition, ‘Namibia’s cultural and national heritage 
including its biological diversity must be protected and respected for the benefit of 
the present and future generations’.179 Further, the Act requires that sustainable 
development must be promoted in all activities that concern the environment.180 The 
arid nature of the country seems to be a critical factor that has influenced the 
development of environmental governance in Namibia. While the country is in the 
process of enacting legislation relating to biological diversity,181 the provisions of the 
Environmental Management Act have a direct impact on the regulation of 
biotechnology. In particular, the important requirement that the interests, needs and 
values of the people be taken into account in decision-making cannot be 
overemphasised. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the various approaches in the domestication of 
international law. The monist approach depicts international law as being part of 
domestic law while the latter requires that such law be integrated into domestic law 
by transformation through an act of Parliament. Namibia’s approach is mainly monist 
while South Africa, Kenya and Zambia’s approaches are mainly dualist. In their 
attempts to domesticate the Protocol, each of the three countries– Kenya, Zambia 
and Namibia has enacted biosafety legislation. South Africa chose to amend its 
                                                 
176 See ‘Biodiversity and Development in Namibia: A 10 year- National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plan for Sustainable Development Through Biodiversity Conservation 2001-2010’ available at 
http://www.met.gov.na/Documents/Biodiversity... (accessed 18 December 2008). 
177 Section 2(a) Environmental Management Act No 7 of 2007 Republic of Namibia. 
178 Ibid section 3(c).  
179 Ibid section 3(g).  
180 Ibid Section 3(f). 
181 Ruppel O and Hinz M ‘Legal Protection of Biodiversity in Namibia’ in Ruppel O and Ruppel-












existing biosafety legislation. While the four countries have sought to implement the 
Protocol, embracing the approach however remains problematic, due to its confusing 
nature and purpose. 
In seeking to avoid too cautious an approach, South Africa, Kenya and Namibia 
implicitly reflect the precautionary approach in their biosafety legislation. In contrast, 
Zambia embraces the approach in the wording of the Protocol but goes further by 
requiring the taking into account of the public interest in decision-making. This thesis 
submits that while implicitly reflecting the precautionary approach in legislation 
amounts to incorrect incorporation of the Protocol, adding the criterion of public 
interest amounts to overregulation. Either way, incorporation of the Protocol (or for 
that matter, enactment of legislation), is theoretical because it is an outcome 
Parliament’s exercise of its legislative power. Translating the precautionary approach 
into reality in decision-making (inter alia from the perspective of administrative 
transparency) is what matters, as it provides the acid test for assessing the credibility 
of the biosafety legislation in the selected countries. The next chapter investigates 













ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH 
IN DECISION-MAKING: TRANSLATING THEORY INTO REALITY 
‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it 
and must be performed by them in good faith’1 
 
6.1 Translating Theory into Reality 
In 1923, writing in the aftermath of World War I, a German jurist, H Triepel, likened 
international law (of which international environmental law is a major component) to 
a field marshal. He argued that it was only through the generals that the orders of the 
field marshal could reach the troops on the ground. Should the generals fail to 
convey those orders to the troops, the marshal would lose the battle.2 
Thus, three things matter. The field marshal must be there to issue 
commands; the generals must effectively communicate the commands to the troops 
on the ground; the troops must faithfully comply with the commands. In the same 
vein, international regulation of biotechnology (as enshrined mainly in the Protocol) is 
anchored on the precautionary approach, as a guiding criterion.3 However, states 
must be willing to implement the Protocol (and by implication, the precautionary 
approach), if they are to comply with their obligations under international law.4 This 
thesis argues that adoption of the precautionary approach may remain theoretical 
and serve no meaningful purpose unless it translates into reality in decision-making. 
Figuratively, the precautionary approach may thus be likened to a field 
marshal because it is a guiding criterion for the regulation. The state may be equated 
with the general because it is under an international law obligation to domesticate 
the Protocol. The institutions may be regarded as troops as they are agents of the 
state in implementation and enforcement. The extent to which institutions may apply 
                                                 
1 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 8 international Legal Materials(1969): 
679. The Convention was adopted in 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980.  
2 Cassess A International Law in a Divided World (1990):15. 
3 Article 2 (1) of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 39 International Law Materials (2000):1027. 












the approach in decision-making, is material in achieving an effective balance 
between science and societal needs and priorities. 
In the same breath, the Cartagena Protocol (the Protocol)—like most 
international instruments, impresses upon each party to ‘take necessary and 
appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement its obligations’ 
contained therein. 5 Such implementation reveals the willingness of parties to be 
bound by the international instrument.  In assessing the importance of the domestic 
implementation of treaties, Jacobs and Roberts assert that: 
‘[F]or the great majority of international treaties in our time, the way in 
which these treaties are executed and implemented by the contracting 
states in their internal order is of primary concern. It may even be said that 
many of the treaties have no use and no substance if they are not duly put 
into operation in the sphere of domestic law...’6 
The implementation of the precautionary approach, in whatever form, is one 
thing and putting it into practical effect is another. Justice Stein asserts that 
translating the rhetoric of the precautionary principle into reality on the ground 
(especially) in decision-making is a major challenge of the twenty-first century.7 He 
argues that if the principle is to become genuinely operational and inspirational, it 
‘must be given specific work to do’ by the decision-makers who should be informed 
on the role of the principle and how it should be applied.8 
Against this backdrop, this chapter examines implementation of the 
precautionary approach within the parameters of institutional governance.  It 
investigates how public participation and access to information constitute external 
forces, which could provide the checks and balances required to enhance 
transparency in decision-making.  This in turn improves the credibility of biosafety 
legislation.  The chapter first analyses why it is necessary to reconcile science and 
transparency in decision-making. 
                                                 
5 For instance Article 2(1) the Cartagena Protocol (n3). 
6 Jacobs F and Roberts S The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law (1987):274-275 Sweet and Maxwell 
London 
7 Stein J ‘A Cautious Application of the Precautionary Principle’ 2 Environmental Law Review  













6.1.1 Reconciling Science and Transparency in Decision-making 
The relevance of the precautionary approach arguably derives largely from the 
decision-making process. This is partly because the principle provides a form of 
‘bridge’ in seeking to reconcile the supremacy of science9 in the development and 
use of biotechnology as against environmental protection and human health. 
Moreover there is a compelling need for science and technology to become more 
responsive to social concerns and values;10 they require a precautionary approach in 
this complex technological age.11 This is the justification for risk assessment and risk 
management that inherently focus on precaution. Conflicting values are embedded in 
the various perspectives regarding genetically modified organisms (GMOs). 
Monsanto is a case in point. Williams notes that at the height of its success in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, Monsanto promised to revolutionise agriculture, 
alleviate hunger and move the world towards sustainable development. He argues 
that due criticism attributable to uncertainty concerning safety of GM crops, that 
dream is yet to be fulfilled.12 It was not until much later that, in seeking to assess 
reasons for failure, Monsanto admitted that: 
‘With a booming stock market promising high rewards, Monsanto focused 
primarily on its relationships with investors, regulators and agricultural 
customers... officials cared much less for the onerous process of building 
trust with end consumers... In the vacuum of reliable information, a swirling 
tide of opinion, fact, fiction, and hearsay surrounded the subject of GMOs, 
creating the perception that Monsanto’s business is a danger to public 
health and safety. This initial tide of fears (legitimate or otherwise) did not 
go away’.13 
Possibly the consumption of GM food for more than twenty years may alter the initial 
fears, in favour of safety. 
Further, environmental problems mainly result from the interaction between two 
linked yet complex systems: the Earth system (a domain of natural sciences), and 
social systems (a domain of social sciences such as law, political science and 
                                                 
9 Such supremacy emanates from two main sources: innovation as a purely scientific field and 
decision-making that is dominated by scientists and also dependent upon scientific advice. 
10 Some of which are discussed in chapter two. 
11 Raffensperger C and Tickner J Protecting Public Health and the Environment (1999):264. 
12 Williams A ‘Value and Values in the Age of Transparency’ (2003) available at 













sociology)–the latter playing a vital14 as it could neglect, ignore, downplay or adopt 
science.  Additionally and in contrast, in this 21st Century, threats to openness in 
scientific fields emanate from increasing influence of science in society compared to 
dictatorial regimes.15 
Thus, a systematic integration through multidisciplinary approaches of studies 
in natural sciences and social systems is required16 with a view to achieving two 
objectives. First is to understand these linked complex systems and, on the basis of 
such knowledge, design more workable systems of governance.17 Second is to 
translate theory (in the adoption of the precautionary approach) into practice on the 
ground.18 However, attempts to reconcile advancements in natural sciences 
including biotechnology, and social systems particularly as regards regulation of 
biotechnology, have become emotive, and have increasingly attracted public 
interest. Attaining a reasonable balance between these conflicting interests requires 
high levels of transparency–an integral part of good governance in decision-making. 
6.1.2 Good Governance and Decision-making 
Decision-making is the ‘cornerstone’ in the regulation of biotechnology. At this stage, 
science, socio-economic environmental cultural and political interests clash, raising 
matters of public concern, which include good governance. This is a continuous 
process through which varying, and at times, opposing interests may be 
accommodated. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce 
compliance.19 In A. P. Pollution Control Board,20 the Supreme Court of India (Justice 
Jagannadha Rao) noted that ‘[g]ood governance is an accepted principle of 
international and domestic laws. It comprises of the rule of law, effective State 
institutions, transparency and accountability in public affairs, respect for human 
                                                 
14  Zaelke D, Stilwell M and Young O ‘Compliance, Rule of Law and Good Governance’ in Zaelke D, 
Kaniaru D and Kruzikova E Making Law Work: Environmental Compliance and Sustainable 
development (2006):37. 
15 Jasanoff  S ‘Transparency in Public Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits’ 68(21) Law and 
ContemporaryProblems (2006):21-45 at 21. 
16 Zaelke D et al (n14) at 37. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Bosselmann K The Principle of Sustainability (2008):207. 












rights and the meaningful participation of citizens ... in decisions affecting their 
lives’.21 
Zaelke views good governance as a concept which entails: 
‘Openness, participation, accountability, predictability and transparency. 
Good governance depends, in turn, on the rule of law, which is generally 
characterized as referring to States where conduct is governed by a set of 
rules that are applied predictably, efficiently, and fairly by independent 
institutions to all members of society, including those who govern’.22 
Where the public is concerned, a salient principle of democratic theory requires that, 
in order for the exercise of power to gain legitimacy and to be seen as such, 
decisions must be made in line with public opinion.23 This may significantly apply to 
political decisions. However, in order for policy, and the resulting biosafety legislation 
and decisions made pursuant to such legislation to gain a sense of legitimacy, 
democratic requirements such as public participation embodying access to 
information, have become imperative. 
Further, ‘the environmental community is generally an open one that relies on 
public access to information and is accustomed to demanding public participation... 
in decision-making ... because the public views environment as “their” issue’.24 
Moreover, when assessing the seriousness or irreversibility of a threat, a range of 
views is needed and this calls for professional expertise as well as public 
involvement in order to enhance chances of identifying uncertainties and also reach 
a consensus.25 Considering that difficult questions of causality are essentially policy 
decisions, potentially impacted publics must be involved in the decision-making 
process.26 
One of the ultimate tests of evaluating the success of the biotechnology industry is 
whether and the extent to which the public trusts the decision-makers who interpret 
                                                 
21 A.P Pollution Control Board v Prof. M.V. Nayudu and others (1999) (n20) at 736 par 42. 
22 Zaelke D et al (n14) at 40. 
23 Lewis J, Inthorn S and Wahl-Jorgensen K Citizens or Consumers (2005):82  
24 Weiss E Jackson J Reconciling Environment and Trade 2ed (2008):13. 
25 Deville A and Harding A Applying the Precautionary Principle (1997):26-32. 
26 Ticker J and Raffensperger C ‘The Precautionary Principle in Action A handbook’ available at 












scientific information and use it to assess and manage risks.27 Insufficient or lack of 
trust is attributable to the nature of biotechnology, an area where decision-making 
is,for the most part, guided or even driven by scientific criteria. In addition, science 
plays a significant role in the governance of GMOs.28 While role of scientists in the 
GMO governance is legitimate, objective communication (on their part) with the 
public on matters concerning GMOs would enhance the credibility of the decisions 
made. 
Decision-making institutions mainly rely on experts’ framing problems and 
options, yet public understanding and perception of biotechnology is material in 
supporting the authority of such persons. 29 This study argues that the decision-
making process creates an opportunity of addressing various concerns including 
those emanating from risk assessment and public participation. Regrettably, the 
public may or may not understand biotechnology as expounded by scientists.30  
Such lack of understanding is: 
‘exacerbated by illiteracy among most peasant farmers and the general public 
in many parts of Africa. Thus the need to reconcile science in decision-making 
vis-à-vis transparency for purposes of making such decisions acquire a sense 
of legitimacy cannot be overemphasised.31 
Increased understanding is crucial partly because the social aspects of biosafety 
regulation and value based judgements cannot be ignored.32 They could include 
issues such as whether or not biotechnology will improve or worsen lives in a given 
locality. 
If the decision-making process is to be credible, it must be transparent and 
accountable to the public. Transparency encompasses ‘candor, integrity, honesty, 
ethics, clarity, full disclosure, legal compliance and a host of other things that allow 
                                                 
27 McGarity T and Hansen P ‘Breeding Distrust: An Assessment and Recommendations for 
IMPROVING Regulation of Plant Derived Genetically Modified Foods’ (2001):7 A Report prepared for 
the Food Policy Institute of the Consumer Federation of America available at 
http://www.biotech.info.net/breeding... (accessed 18 June 2009) 
28 McGarity T ‘Resisting Regulation with Blue Ribbon Panels’ 33 Fordham Urban Law Journal 
 (2006):1157-1197 at 1158. 
29 Rayner S and Malone E Human Choice and Climate Change (1998):37. 
30 Ibid.   
31 Ayele S ‘The Legitimation of GMO Governance in Africa’ 34(4) Science and Public Policy 
(2007):241. 
32 Kingiri A ‘The Contested Framing of Biosafety Regulation as a Tool for Enhancing Public 












us to deal fairly with each other’.33 Unfortunately, these attributes present 
transparency as an illusionary concept incapable of being achieved yet law is 
essentially concerned with reasonableness rather than perfection. Regulation is thus 
intended to achieve tolerable levels of effectiveness.34 In order for a biosafety 
regulatory system to be ‘open, transparent and understandable’ it should provide 
information to the public such as details on: the regulatory procedure, public 
participation and how the competent authority will conduct the decision-making 
process, including the basis of the decisions made.35 
Claiming to be transparent is one thing; translating such claim into reality is 
another, even for corporations and states36 For example, in the case of corporations 
(the principal institutions of capitalism,37  including biotechnology companies) the 
people who run such corporations are intelligent with outstanding leadership 
qualities. 38 However, their first responsibility as corporate executives is to act in the 
best interest of such corporations as opposed to acting in a manner that serves the 
interests of any other person or thing.39 As a result, some critics subjectively view 
corporations as entities that have a dynamic that does not take into consideration the 
concerns of the ‘flesh-and-blood’ of human beings who form the world in which such 
corporations exist40. 
Multinational corporations such as Monsanto (which control 91% of the global 
GM seed market41), Syngenta, DuPont and others are major stakeholders in 
biotechnology. Such corporations are ‘not merely dominant economic actors, they 
are the dominant political actors as well’.42  Often, it is in the corporation’s interest to 
                                                 
33 Bennis W, in his Preface to Bennis W, Goleman D and O’Toole J Transparency: How leaders 
Create a Culture of Condor (2008):vii- vii. 
34 Galligan D ‘Citizens’ Rights and Participation in the Regulation of Biotechnology’ in Francioni (ed) 
Biotechnologies and International Human Rights (2007):355-359 at 335. 
35 Mugoya C ‘Biosafety Research and Regulatory Policy in East Africa: Emerging Trends and 
Implications’ in Sengooba T, Cohen J and Zawedde B (eds) ‘Regulatory Cooperation, Using 
Information, Regional, and national Expertise’ (2005):18 Proceedings of an East Africa Biosafety 
Policy Roundtable April 18-20 2005 Entebbe, Uganda available at 
http://www.biovisioneastafrica.com/publications... (accessed 27 June 2009). 
36 Bennis W et al (n33) at 2. 
37 Speth G and Haas P The Bridge at the Edge of the World (2008):7. 
38 Bakan J The Corporation (2004):50. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid at 71. 
41 See ‘Power Hungry: Six Reasons to Regulate Global Food Corporations’ (2005) ActionAid 
International available at http://actionaid.org.uk/_content/documents/po... (Accessed 19 July 2010). 












conceal information (whether confidential or not), that the government and the public 
may not easily obtain.43 The result is ‘a tug of war between corporate power and 
citizen power, and in the day-to-day world of politics, it is generally not an equal 
match’.44 In order to address this mismatch, institutions responsible for decision-
making must be accountable to the general public, which elects political leaders and 
pays taxes so as to sustain such institutions. Such bodies constitute an integral part 
of the institutional framework that governs GMOs in the selected countries. 
Accountability arguably results mainly from transparency in decision-making. 
Consequently, the thesis argues that whether a decision is good or not may not 
concern the public as much as a decision taken in circumstances that lack 
transparency. Even if the decision-maker claims to be transparent, questions that 
arise and which are invariably difficult to determine include, transparent in whose 
opinion, to whom and in whose interest45 The difficulty arises partly because, in 
practical terms, there will be situations where there is a gap between what the 
decision-maker ‘knows’ concerning risk or may be told by science and what the 
public are concerned about.46 Achieving an effective balance between the two may 
appear almost impossible. That is why the precautionary approach has been 
identified as remedial, at least from the international biosafety regime from the 
perspective of the Protocol. 
The approach is an important tool that may be used to reconcile the 
development and use of biotechnology as against other socio-economic, 
environmental, ethical and other considerations that concern the public. In this sense 
then, the principle may be seen as serving two important purposes. The first one is 
addressing scientific uncertainty concerning potential risks in which case the 
principle may be seen as a scientific tool. The second one is recognition is seeking 
to safeguard societal values and needs in which case the principle may be seen as a 
political tool. Relevance of the precautionary principle in both cases may largely 
depend on the manner and extent to which institutions may reasonably succeed in 
reconciling these conflicting interests. In turn success arguably depends on the 
extent to which the decision-making process is accountable to the public. 
                                                 
43 Speth G (n37) at 169. 
44 Ibid at 168. 
45 See the discussion in chapter seven. 












Accountability is particularly important because, essentially, environmental 
law is embedded in political aims and goals manifested in scientific standards.47 For 
this reason, decision-making in environmental protection has largely become a 
process of balancing political and other values, as institutions attempt to achieve the 
objectives of policy and legislation.48 Complications may also arise because, often, 
those people who exercise power are not always the same people with those over 
whom it is exercised’.49 In addition, we live in an age of the ‘hermeneutics of 
suspicion’ in which the general public intuitively views those who exercise power as 
people who must be ‘up to no good, corrupt or corrupted, bent, hiding the real truth 
beneath a tissue of lies’.50 Accordingly, decision-making has attracted increased 
public demands for accountability51. These demands require that science and 
transparency be reconciled in decision-making. 
In seeking to reconcile science and transparency, the levels of success that 
may be achieved is material in enhancing the functionality of institutions in the 
regulation of biotechnology in Africa. Such institutions must be functional. It means 
that that they should be founded on rationality and objectivity. Rationality because, 
the decisions made require legitimacy; objectivity because of the need to achieve the 
desired goal: safe and responsible use of biotechnology. Institutions are therefore 
useful tools of assessing whether and the extent to which biosafety laws in the 
selected countries are workable. The functionality of such institutions provides what 
this researcher refers to as a litmus test of analysing the relevance of the 
precautionary approach in the domestic sphere. 
6.2 Institutional Governance of GMOs 
The importance of institutional governance in the regulation of biotechnology need 
not be overstated. Decision-makers have the difficult task of resolving scientific 
disagreements, defining where science stops and policy making begins, and 
                                                 
47Bell S and McGillivray D (n46) at 48. 
48 Ibid at 14. 
49 Mill J Stuart, (John Gray ed 1991):8 On Liberty and Other Essays Oxford University Press Oxford; 
Laes E, D’haeseleer W and Weiler R ‘Addressing Uncertainty and Inequality in Nuclear Policy’ 18(3) 
The Journal of Enterprise Information management (2005):357-376 at 357. 
50 Darch D and Underwood P Freedom of Information and the Developing World (2010):2. 












establishing policy to fill the gaps left by insufficient scientific information.52 This is in 
addition to being responsible for activities involving GMOs domestically and being 
agents of the state in such matters internationally. 
Article 19 of the Protocol obligates each party to ‘designate one or more 
competent national authorities, which shall be responsible for performing the 
administrative functions required by the Protocol and which shall be authorized to act 
on its behalf with respect to those functions’. Decision-making in respect of living 
modified organisms (LMO) as envisaged by art 10 of the Protocol is among the most 
important administrative functions such competent authorities perform at the 
domestic level. In that process, they are required to take into account risk 
assessments carried out in a scientifically sound manner and in accordance with the 
provisions of the Protocol.53 At the same time, the Protocol provides for the taking of 
precautionary measures in instances of lack of scientific certainty regarding the 
extent of potential adverse effects of an LMO on biological diversity and humans.54 
Institutions play a key role in decision-making seeking to establish and 
maintain a balance between the competing interests. They implement various legal 
requirements such as risk management that requires precautionary measures in the 
event of scientific uncertainty. Thus, the composition, powers and duties of 
institutions are crucial to their realisation of transparency in decision-making. This 
may be assessed by examining how and the extent to which the law obliges those 
who grant or refuse applications concerning GMOs to serve the common interest of 
society as a whole.55 That common interest must essentially reside in the safety of 
GMOs for the environment and human health. Under the Protocol, risk assessment 
and risk management are among the key mechanisms that seek to minimise, 
alleviate and control known and potential risks associated with GMOs.56 
Decision-makers may apply the precautionary approach yet if the process 
lacks transparency, the relevance of the precautionary approach may diminish. The 
critical question that arises is whether biosafety legislation in the selected countries 
                                                 
52 McGarity T (n28) at 1157. 
53 Article 15(1) of the Cartagena Protocol (n3). 
54 Ibid article 11(8). 
55 Allott P‘ The True Function of Law in the International Community’ 5 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies  (1997-8):399 391-413 at 399. 












provides sufficient checks and balances in the institutional governance structures to 
achieve or enhance transparency in decision-making. 
Owing to the complexities of biosafety (such as determining acceptable levels 
of risk), decision-making is a difficult task. Additionally, experts may have knowledge 
in their fields - such as molecular biology or ecology, but the public is interested in or 
affected by the decisions made by such experts. 
Based on the above, this study argues that implementation of the 
precautionary approach cannot serve a meaningful purpose in the absence of 
functional institutions responsible for decision-making. It is at decision-making that 
theory concerning implementation of the approach translates (or should) translate 
into reality, in an attempt to balance conflicting interests.  Success is indicated by the 
extent to which scientific and non-scientific criteria are taken into account. It is 
against this backdrop that institutional governance in each of the selected countries 
is discussed below. 
6.2.1 South Africa 
Institutional governance of GMOs in South Africa is vested in the Executive Council 
for GMOs, the Registrar, the Advisory Committee and the Minister. Section 3(1) of 
the Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Act57 establishes the Executive Council 
for Genetically Modified Organisms (ECGMOs)–a juristic person which shall consist 
of no more than 10 members to be appointed by the Minister. The Council comprises 
representatives from eight government ministries including Agriculture, and Science 
and Technology.58 The ECGMOs’ objectives are twofold: to advise the Minister on all 
activities concerning GMOs and to ensure that such activities are performed in 
accordance with the Act.59 
The Registrar60 shall be an experienced and suitably qualified person who 
shall be accountable to the Executive Council.61 . One of his or her important 
                                                 
57 No 15 of 1997 Republic of South Africa. 
58 Section 3 (2) (a) Genetically Modified Organisms Act No 15 of 1997 Republic of South Africa. Other 
members of the Council are those representing the ministries of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
Labour, Health, Trade and Industry, Art and Culture and the Ministry of Water and Forestry 
59 Ibid section (4). 
60 Appointed under section 8(1) GMO Act (n58). 












functions is to satisfy himself or herself that ‘all users apply the appropriate 
measures to protect the environment and human and animal health during the 
exercise of any activity’ with GMOs. Importantly, the Registrar has power, subject to 
the terms and conditions laid down by the Council, to extend permits for a GMO 
activity in respect of which a permit had been issued previously.62 
Extension of such a permit may have serious implications especially because 
the Council exercises discretionary powers under s. 5 (2) (d) to consult the 
Committee ‘on such issues as the Council may consider necessary to come to a 
decision’. Since the law does not provide a limit as to when a permit may expire or 
as to when it may require renewal, the discretion to extend certain permits by the 
Registrar could be exercised arbitrarily. This discretion appears to be premised on 
the assumption that no potential harm may have been detected between the time of 
first issue and the time of extension. Cases of extension of a permit which has 
expired recently (within one year for example), may be justified but cases where the 
previous permit expired a number of years earlier could be problematic. Moreover 
(as discussed in chapter two), ecological changes are as complex as biotechnology 
itself, hence, the need for constant monitoring. 
This thesis argues that to the extent that the Act empowers the Registrar to 
exercise some of the powers that should be exercised by the ECGMO, it creates two 
centres of power within the GMO governance structure. Like the Registrar, the 
ECGMO is a legally constituted body. It is accountable to the general public as part 
of the criteria for good governance and to the Biosafety Clearing House in 
compliance with the requirements of the Protocol.63 
The Advisory Committee (the Committee)64 consists ten persons65  appointed 
by the Minister after recommendation by the Council.  It plays a national advisory 
                                                 
62 Section 9 (3) GMO Act (n58). 
63 Article 19 of the Cartagena Protocol (n3) requires each Party to designate one or more competent 
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House if no separate focal point is designated. 
64 Established under section 10(1) GMO Act (58). 
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ecological matters and GMOs and the other one shall have knowledge of potential impact of GMOs 












role on all matters concerning or related to GMOs.66 In particular the Committee is 
obligated, upon request (and may on its own accord), advise the Minister, the 
Council, the Registrar and other appropriate bodies on all aspects concerning 
introduction of GMOs into the environment among other things.67 The Act requires 
any member of the Committee to recuse himself or herself where such member has 
vested interests or where his/her participation may give rise to a conflict of interest.68 
By implication, the Committee is therefore expected to play a neutral role. 
On the face of it, the composition of the Council may seem well balanced. 
However, it must be noted that all members are appointees of the Minister who 
exercises discretion to appoint69 and remove members from office by reason of 
incompetence, misconduct or for any other reason.70 These powers of the Minister 
may make the position of Council members and those of the Committee precarious. 
This gives rise to an irresistible inference that in order for such members to keep 
their positions, they must be complacent to Minister. The Minister’s decisions are 
often influenced by or even dictated by political considerations not only in making 
appointments but in establishing priorities. Moreover, the Minister makes the final 
decision in respect of appeals.71 It implies that the Minister is not necessarily bound 
by decision of the Appeal Board. These problems could be particularly more 
pertinent or relevant in many African countries. 
Considering that governments are significant actors in the area of 
biotechnology, they have vested interests that the Minister (and by extension the 
ECGMOs and the Committee) may be keen to safeguard. Should the GMO Act be a 
reflection of the values of such interests and seek to protect them, the little or lack of 
sufficient attention on the precautionary approach in the Act may be easy to 
understand but difficult to defend. 
In a sense, the composition of institutional structures in South Africa, strongly 
suggests that all matters concerning GMOs are regarded almost entirely as a 
government project. Exclusion of representatives of important stakeholders such as 
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consumers and the non-technical general public from such structures remains a 
serious oversight on the part of Parliament. 
On decision-making, the ECGMOs exercises discretion to grant permits in 
respect to activities concerning GMOs where the Council is satisfied that the 
application conforms to the requirements of the Act.72 The Council shall determine 
whether an applicant should submit an assessment, (in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the National Environmental Act–NEMA)73 ) of the impact on the 
environment and an assessment of socio-economic considerations relating to such 
activities.74 Further, the Council shall have regard to scientifically based risk 
assessments and proposed risk assessment measures.75 
Before making a decision, the Council may consider three other factors: public 
input, the environmental impact assessments and the potential socio-economic 
impact of such activities.76 By using the word ‘may’, the taking into account of these 
three is discretionary in decision-making. In exercising that discretion, the ECGMO is 
not obligated to take any or all of them into account. The effect is that the Act creates 
a situation the ECGMO may exploit to exclude public input and socio-economic 
considerations in decision-making. 
Public input is important because the general public expresses its views freely 
and is not constrained by any rules of professional conduct or code of conduct. 
Socio-economic considerations may raise issues such as trade that fall outside the 
realm of risk assessments. These two areas are non-scientific in nature and would 
arguably attract the application of the non-scientific aspects relevant to the 
precautionary approach. As a consequence, there is no guarantee that the Council 
will not grant a permit relying on scientific risk assessments while disregarding public 
input and the potential socio-economic impact of GMO activities. 
                                                 
72 Section 5 (2) (b) GMO Act (n58). 
73 No 107 of 1998 
74 Section 5 (1) (a) GMO Act (n58). 
75 Ibid section 5 (1) (c).   













Institutional governance of GMOs in Kenya is centred on the National Biosafety 
Authority (NBA) and the Minister. The NBA is a corporate body77 managed by a 
Board of sixteen members.78 These are a chairperson, representatives from nine 
government Ministries including certain departments79 and six other persons 
appointed by the Minister. The six (two of whom shall be from either gender) shall be 
appointed and gazetted by name. Three of the six shall be experts in the respective 
sciences namely: biological, environmental and social sciences; the other three shall 
each represent the interests of consumers, farmers and the biotechnology industry. 
The Chief Executive Officer performs functions that are essentially administrative. 
Such functions include the management of the affairs and transactions of the 
Authority.80 
The object and purpose of the Authority is to exercise overall supervision and 
control of GMOs with a view to ensuring safety of human and animal health and, 
provision of an adequate level of protection of the environment.81 By seeking to 
achieve an adequate level of protection without specifically providing for the 
precautionary approach as provided by the Protocol, the Act adopts lower 
thresholds. This falls short of the minimum criterion provided for by the Protocol on 
how to ensure an adequate level of protection. The resulting ambiguity weakens the 
Act and negatively impacts on the credibility of the legislation. The ambiguity may 
undermine attempts to establish a predictable process of reviewing and making 
decisions concerning GMOs and related activities as envisaged by s. 4 (1) (c) of the 
Act. 
The Authority is the overall body that governs all activities concerning GMOs 
in the country.82 The composition of the Authority is of concern to both opponents 
and proponents of biotechnology, who differ on how to achieve an appropriate 
                                                 
77 Section 5 (1) Biosafety Act No 2 of 2009 Republic of Kenya.   
78 Ibid Section 6 (1). 
79 The representatives are from the Ministries of Technology, Finance, Agriculture; the Director 
General of the National Environmental Management Authority, the Managing Director of the Kenya 
Bureau of Standards, the Managing Director of the Kenya Plant Health inspectorate Services, the 
Director of the Department of veterinary Services, the Secretary of the National Council of Science 
and Technology and the Chief Public Health Officer. 
80 Section 13 (2) Biosafety Act (n77). 
81 Ibid section 7 (1).  












balance of the various stakeholders within the governing body.83 In addition to 
decision-making, the Authority is required, among other things, to co-ordinate, 
monitor and assess activities relating to GMOs; co-ordinate research and surveys in 
matters concerning GMOs; identify national requirements for manpower 
development and capacity building; establish and maintain a biosafety clearing 
house through which relevant information concerning living modified organisms 
(LMOs) may be availed of and exchanged.84 
Promotion of awareness and education among the general public in matters 
relating to biosafety85 is one of the key roles of the Authority that relates to the 
precautionary approach and transparency.  While the Authority is compelled to 
promote such awareness and education, the Act does not indicate on how this 
should be achieved. Absence of broad provisions concerning workshops, seminars 
and public gatherings significantly reduce opportunities for public involvement. This 
thesis argues that in as much as risk assessment is central in identifying risks and 
potential risks, public awareness and education on GMOs is equally important as it 
enhances an understanding of biosafety. Increased understanding may significantly 
promote both transparency and legitimacy of the biosafety regime. 
There is another dimension of awareness and education: content. Here 
questions such as what is and who determines the content of such programmes are 
relevant. Biosafety is a wide concept that covers many areas of study many of which 
are scientific, others non-scientific and yet others legal, on all of whichexperts hold 
divergent views in all these areas. Using people with neutral views (however few 
they may be) is essential in disseminating objective information concerning GMOs. 
An illustration from the 2005 referendum86 that sought approval of a new draft 
constitution, duped the ‘Wanjiku’ or ‘Wako’ draft may suffice. 
The then Electoral Commission of Kenya sent out a large number of lawyers 
to various parts of the country a few days before the referendum for the purpose of 
increasing the peoples’ education, understanding and awareness of the content and 
                                                 
83 Cooke J and Downie R ‘African Perspectives on Genetically Modified Crops: Assessing the Debate 
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84 Section 7 (2) Biosafety Act (n77).The Authority thus acts as the Focal point for purposes of 
information exchange envisaged by Article 20 of the Protocol. 
85 Section 7 (2) (f) Biosafety Act (n77). 












implications of the draft Constitution. Large sections of Kenyans were of the view 
that many of the lawyers were hardly neutral culminating in indirect campaigning in 
support of either Bananas for a Yes vote - representing the government, or Oranges 
for a No vote – representing the opposition. The people rejected the draft constitution 
on various grounds, such as allegations that married women( including those as old 
as 90 years), would have rights to inherit land of their parents contrary to custom. 
Likewise, the content of the public awareness and education programmes 
under the Biosafety Act may be acceptable to some degree but the ‘educators’ may 
be biased. Moreover, the Act does not place the precautionary approach  at the 
centre of the regulatory regime meaning that the Authority’s educators will hardly 
disseminate objective information concerning the approach, if at all. 
Concerning decision-making, the Authority is empowered to carry out risk 
assessment87 (in a scientifically sound manner88) a major factor in decision-
making.89 The risk assessment report of the Authority is final for purposes of 
decision-making.90 In the absence of any other independent scientific council or body 
that may evaluate the scientific soundness and transparency91 of the Authority’s risk 
assessment report, there is no guarantee that such risk assessment report may be 
objective. As a consequence, the Authority’s decisions based on its own report may 
be geared towards serving selfish ndividual or group interests yet simultaneously 
being presented as serving the common interest.92 Knowing whether and the extent 
such decisions may prioritise environmental protection and human health is a difficult 
thing. However, taking into account industry’s leadership and dominance in 
biotechnology, it is highly unlikely that such decisions will be detrimental to its 
interests. In such a scenario, expecting the Authority to place emphasis on the 
approach when the law itself seems to have neglected the approach, may be 
equated with trying to force an elephant to stand on a ‘mosquito’s legs’. 
                                                 
87 Section 27 (1) (a) Biosafety Act (n77). 
88 Fourth Schedule of the Biosafety Act (n77). 
89 Section 29 (1) (c); and the Fourth Schedule of the Biosafety Act (n77), which provide that ‘the risk 
assessment shall be used by the Authority to make informed decisions regarding genetically modified 
organisms’. 
90 Section 27 and 29 of the Biosafety Act (n77). 
91 As envisaged by Section 4(c) of the Biosafety Act and section 3 (a) of the Second Schedule of the 
Biosafety Act (n77). 












Further, the Board has discretionary powers to ‘appoint such officers, agents 
and other staff of the Authority as are necessary for the proper and efficient 
discharge of the functions of the Authority’.93 Such appointment primarily seeks to 
ensure that the Authority functions properly and efficiently.94 The question that arises 
is whether the Authority can delegate the carrying out of risk assessment to any 
other person or agent, and if so, what impact that may have on the credibility of such 
risk assessment. Considering that risk assessment is one of the main functions of 
the Authority and since s. 14 of the Act gives the Board wide discretionary powers to 
appoint an officer, agent or any other staff to carry out risk assessment, such 
delegated assessment squarely falls within such discretionary powers of the NBA. In 
such circumstances such risk assessment may lack credibility for three main 
reasons. 
First, in the absence of an independent scientific advisory council, or any 
other independent body to verify or evaluate the objectivity of the risk assessment 
report of such officer, agent or staff, it may be almost impossible to prove whether or 
not the risk assessment was carried out in a scientifically sound manner. 
Consequently, risk assessment may become a routine function merely intended to 
satisfy the procedural requirements of the law rather than being used as an essential 
criterion that should objectively inform decision-making. 
Second, the Act does not provide any safeguard against appointment of an 
officer, agent or staff that may have vested interests in the risk assessment. Only 
members of the Board are required to disclose any direct or indirect interest in any 
application before the Board or any other matter which is the subject of consideration 
at a meeting of the Board.95 Unfortunately, the requirement for disclosure of interest 
does not extend to an officer, agent or staff, envisaged by s. 14 of the Act, who is not 
a member of the Board. The result is that there is no safeguard against the 
appointment of cronies of some members of the Board or people with vested 
interests to carry out risk assessment. 
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Third, no provision is made in the Act as to the qualifications or other 
experience of such officer, agent or staff appointed under s. 14 of the Act.  Failure to 
insert the words ‘duly qualified’ or any other suitable words between the words ‘such’ 
and ‘officers’ in the first line of s.14 of the Act defeats the good intentions Parliament 
may have had. 
This thesis argues that risk assessment which lacks transparency can hardly 
objectively evaluate potential adverse effects that would attract the taking of 
precautionary measures. It may merely confirm absence of, or ‘negligible’, scientific 
certainty; it may be manipulated to serve selfish interests as it has not been 
subjected to a non-partisan review. 
By empowering the Authority to carry out risk assessment without providing 
safeguards to ensure objectivity or independence, the Act may at worst be described 
as ‘a rubber stamp’ that aggressively endorses introduction of GMOs in Kenya. Lack 
of objectivity is partly attributable to the double role the NBA plays: selling and 
regulating biotechnology. Selling derives from overall control96 and the carrying out 
of risk assessment; regulatory by reason of decision-making. As a result, the NBA 
can neither be neutral nor be seen to be neutral in discharging its functions. 
Neutrality is an essential component of objectivity. Lack of it leaves very little room (if 
any) for application of the precautionary approach which proponents view as a 
barrier to the development and use of biotechnology. 
The NBA is further obligated to advise the Government on ‘legislative and 
other measures relating to the safe transfer, handling and use’ of GMOs. This 
enormous responsibility is placed on it for two main reasons. First, the NBA is the 
sole body that administers the Biosafety Act; the government is likely to or should 
take NBA’s advice seriously. Second, based on its day-today activities the NBA is 
well placed to identify areas of policy and law that require improvements so as to 
enhance effectiveness of the biosafety regime. 
In essence, the NBA is the sole body that carries out risk assessment, 
identifies potential risks, determines appropriate measures and monitors 
implementation of such measures. In the absence of any other independent body, a 
                                                 












combination of all these and other functions gives rise to a conflict of interest that 
minimizes the credibility of the NBA as the government agent in relation to GMO 
activities. 
The Minister plays a key role in the administrative structures which govern 
GMOs in Kenya. He appoints the chairperson of the NBA,97 six out of the sixteen 
members of Board,98 the Chief Executive Officer,99 biosafety inspectors (on 
recommendation of the NBA)100 all members of the Appeals Board including the 
chairperson.101 The Minister is further empowered to make regulations (in 
consultation with the NBA) for ‘the better carrying into effect’ of the provisions of the 
Act.102 
The functions of the Minister place him at a powerful influential position in a 
powerful and influential position in the regulation of biotechnology. Appointment of 
the Minister is invariably political and not based on expertise in a particular discipline. 
Likewise, nothing in the Act prevents the Minister from appointing individuals who 
may be considered to be politically correct, whether or not such individuals have 
sufficient expertise in biotechnology. Moreover, often the Minister has a political 
agenda he may need to promote and safeguard. Biotechnology (like most 
technologies), is not politically neutral. 
6.2.3 Zambia 
Institutional governance of GMOs in Zambia is vested in the National Biosafety 
Authority (NBAZ)103, the Scientific Advisory Committee (SACZ) 104 and the Minister. 
The NBAZ is a body corporate comprised of thirteen part-time members appointed 
by the Minister105 . Seven of the members are representatives from various 
ministries including science and technology environment and natural resources, 
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103 Section 4 (1) Biosafety Act No 10 of 2007 Republic of Zambia 
104 Ibid section 6 (1). 












agriculture and justice.106 Other members include one from each of the following 
groups: consumers, religious, farmers and traditional authorities; plus two other 
people.107 
By drawing members representing a wide range of interests, Parliament 
sought to embrace biotechnology but within an environment acceptable to, tolerated 
or approved by consumers, farmers, religious groups, traditional authorities and the 
public. Absence of a requirement that the chairperson or vice-chairperson be a 
scientist enables the Minister to appoint any member to such positions. Even if the 
chairperson or vice-chairperson or both were to be scientists, the composition of the 
NBAZ appears complex with the result that anybody wishing to introduce GMOs is 
likely to find it quite challenging. Moreover, the interests of the biotechnology industry 
are not represented (as opposed to Kenya) in the NBAZ. In addition, a person with 
vested interests in biotechnology is not eligible to be appointed as a member of the 
NBAZ.108 
The NBAZ is empowered among other things, to make decisions in 
consultation with the SACZ concerning GMOs, promote public awareness and 
education, establish and maintain a data base on GMOs and GMO products, 
prescribe criteria, standards and guidelines that facilitate implementation of the Act, 
review or make a risk assessments of GMO or any GMO product, keep any GMO or 
any GMO product under constant review, designate inspectors and undertake 
inspections.109 It serves as the National Biosafety Focal Point consistent with the 
requirements of the Protocol,110 appoints members of the SACZ,111 and appoints ‘a 
suitably qualified and experienced person’ as the Registrar of the NBAZ.112 
The SACZ performs two important functions. It conducts risk assessments;113 
it is the consulting agency for the NBAZ as it is required to provide ‘scientific and 
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107 Section 2 (b) First Schedule of the Biosafety Act (103). 
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110 Ibid section 5 (2). 
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other technical advice and assistance to the Authority’.114 For these and other 
reasons, the SACZ may be regarded as the ‘Think Tank’ for the NBAZ especially in 
relation to relevant scientific matters. However, while the SACZ is comprised of 
experts from entirely scientific fields such as agronomy, weed science and molecular 
biology, the NBAZ has members from a wide range of interests covering both 
scientific and non-scientific fields. In these circumstances, it implies that the scientific 
advice given by the SACZ at the request of the NBAZ must be viewed together with 
the various interests represented in the NBAZ before such advice is used as a basis 
for decision-making. 
Inclusion of members from Ministries responsible for information and justice 
within the NBAZ is of particular interest. The Department of Information has many 
opportunities to gather information from government and the public regarding GMOs. 
Some of the information may be of interest to the decision-makers. Hence the 
representative may, if requested or where necessary, give an opinion concerning 
public perceptions regarding GMOs. In turn, the NBAZ may use the Department to 
disseminate information expeditiously. 
In essence representation of the Department of Information may significantly 
facilitate the flow of information discussed below. Where the public may have 
reservations concerning a GMO application, the NBAZ will have to consider such 
reservations together as against the risk assessment report and other factors. These 
considerations may dictate precautionary measures with a view to harmonising 
conflicting interests in the decision-making process. 
Representation from the Department of Justice constitutes recognition of the 
two broad categories of biosafety: scientific and regulatory. The recognition confirms 
that biosafety is an interdisciplinary subject and that regulation is an integral part of 
it. Further, the Department of Justice is closely associated with the drafting of and 
amending legislation. Expertise from the Department will enhance the NBAZ’s 
knowledge of relevant legal issues. Such knowledge translates into a better 
understanding of the international context within which regulation of GMOs takes 
place. It is essential in appreciating the important role the precautionary approach 
plays in regulating biotechnology. 
                                                 












The Minister plays two crucial roles: appointment of members of the NBAZ115 
and appointment of an Appeals Tribunal.116 The appeals are to be lodged with the 
Minister. This study suggests that the neutrality of opinion concerning GMOs on the 
part of such members constitutes objectivity in decision-making. Objectivity is 
essential as decision-making involves balancing competing interests. It also plays a 
key role in determining the outcome of decisions made. This thesis submits that 
members of the NBAZ and the Tribunal with biased attitudes concerning GMOs lack 
neutrality. 
The composition and the functions of the NBAZ (among other factors) place it 
in a defensively powerful yet decisive position that prioritises safeguards against 
potential over the development and use of GMOs in Zambia. The emphasis on 
safeguards to address potential harm creates more opportunities for application of 
the precautionary approach. Such emphasis (already discussed in chapter five) 
gives rise to a more restrictive biosafety regime than was intended by the Protocol. 
Apparently, strict regulatory aspects of the Act outweigh by far the research and 
development (R&D) activities in Zambia. 
6.2.4 Namibia 
The administration of GMOs in Namibia is mainly vested in the Biosafety Council 
(BCN) and the Minister. The BCN is not a legal person and does not make binding 
decsions. It considers an application, makes its report and recommendations.117 It 
submits these to the Min ster, through the National Commission on Research, 
Science and Technology (the Commission), together with the application and any 
other submissions received in relation to the application.118 The Minister is required 
to make a decision within 30 days of receipt of the application from the BCN.119 The 
Registrar is appointed by the Commission, and performs administrative functions 
(such as issuing permits120) subject to the control and direction of the BCN.121 
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The BCN comprises seven members appointed by the Commission (with prior 
approval of the Minister122) under the relevant legislation123. Such members124 ‘must 
be persons bringing skills or experience in the membership of the Council’.125 Before 
such appointments, the Commission is required to ‘invite nominations from 
interested persons and organisations of persons with suitable skills or experience…’ 
by way of notice in the Gazette and in at least two newspapers circulated widely in 
the country.126 
The composition of the BCN has four material attributes. First, it represents a 
reasonable number of varying areas and interests that are relevant to regulation. 
These include environment issues, public health, food hygiene and food safety, all of 
which constitute proof that Parliament clearly placed emphasis on the need to 
protect the environment taking into account human health. These are the two 
imperatives the precautionary approach seeks to balance under the Protocol. 
Representation from areas such as molecular biology; research, science and 
technology however strongly suggests that the producers of GMOs are well 
represented. However, lack of representation from stakeholders such as consumers 
and the public raises more questions than answers, especially in relation to 
democratic governance. Institutions are not headed by elected representatives. In 
addition, the GMO controversy is a cross cutting phenomenon that requires 
participation of all interested or affected people or groups. Moreover, as argued at 
(6.2.1) the public speaks freely as it is not constrained by any rules of ethics or code 
of conduct. 
Freedom of expression arguably enables the public to openly express its 
views including raising objections concerning GMOs. Objections may particularly tilt 
the balance in favour of precautionary measures in decision-making especially 
where communities are vehemently opposed to GMOs. This researcher submits that 
lack of representation of consumers and the general public remains a serious 
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oversight on the part of the drafters of the Act for which Parliament should take 
responsibility. 
Second, the mandatory requirement of skills or experience127 as a 
precondition for appointment to the BCN, is a manifestation of the seriousness with 
which the Act treats both knowledge and expertise about GMOs as it attempts to 
enhance the quality of GMO governance. Third, by empowering the Commission to 
invite nominations from interested persons and people in organisations,128 the Act 
seeks to make the appointments to the BCN competitive. It also inculcates a sense 
of transparency thereby enhancing legitimacy of the appointment process. Fourth, by 
opening to all Namibians, Parliament did not intend to make GMO governance an 
exclusive government domain. This is one of the strong attributes of the regime. 
In exercising executive authority however, the Minister is mandated to 
approve nominations129 to the BCN. Failure by the Act to reserve the power of such 
approval to Parliament creates an avenue for political interference in an otherwise 
reasonably democratic process of GMO governance. Another important point relates 
to refusal by the Minister to grant a permit for an activity which is likely to undermine 
indigenous knowledge or technology, and /or affect ‘the social and economic 
advancement of people and society, including a particular community’.130 
The BCN is mandated to perform various functions including requirements to 
report and make recommendations to the Minister in respect of applications for 
permits to deal with GMOs or GMO products; provide information and advise to the 
public in relation to the regulation of GMOs; encourage public participation in 
decision-making while maintaining confidentiality of information; undertake research 
in connection with risk assessment and the Biosafety of GMOs; and to be the focal 
point for purposes of the Protocol. The BCN is also mandated to advise the Minister 
on ‘the effectiveness of the legislative framework for the regulation of GMOs and 
products of GMOs, including possible amendments of relevant legislation’.131 
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These functions constitute an indication towards effective regulation of 
biotechnology in Namibia. However, the powers conferred upon the Minister 
including those of decision-making132 on applications for dealings in GMOs, 
negatively impacts on the role of the BCN in various ways. They deprive the BCN of 
an important role which it could play on GMO governance as the Minister is the 
ultimate decision-maker. Further, the immense powers vested in the Minister may 
complicate and undermine attempts to reconcile the competing interests relevant to 
regulation discussed in chapter two. As mentioned earlier, the Minister is a political 
appointee and may have vested political interests in relation to GMOs. 
Further the Minister is empowered to ‘prescribe exemptions from any of the 
provisions of this Act in relation to any GMO or GMO products or any class of GMOs 
or GMO products…or make provision for the granting by the Council of 
exemptions’.133 The Act does not provide any reason for granting the Minister such 
wide powers, nor does it require her/him to consult the BCN or any other person 
committee or Parliament. These are therefore wide discretionary powers, abuse of 
which could fundamentally undermine the spirit and purpose of the Act. Should the 
Minister exempt an applicant from submitting a risk assessment report and a risk 
management plan, application of precautionary measures could become irrelevant. 
In addition, exemptions from public consultation could, needless to say, frustrate the 
democratic aspects of decision-making in the regulation. While exemptions are part 
of law-making and may be useful, care must be exercised when establishing 
permissible limits, in a discipline such as biotechnology that is marred in controversy. 
6.3 Public Participation and the Precautionary Approach 
The precautionary approach is not only normative in nature; it provides a holistic 
environment of everyday social learning. 134 In that process, public participation 
reveals the actual instrumental pressures in which the political and economic 
phenomena play a key role.135 In attempts to address these pressures, participation 
can be seen, not only as ‘a normatively driven feature of democratic governance, but 
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fundamentally as a means to enhance the relationship between appraisal and wider 
processes of governance’.136 Public participation is therefore the key to the 
implementation of the precautionary approach because of the need for decision-
makers to make value judgments when assessing the human and environmental 
risks of activities in the regulation of biotechnology.137 The role of the public may 
include submissions to decision-makers, involvement in administrative hearings, 
citizen suits, and access to information.138 
Further, public participation arguably enhances the credibility of the decision- 
making process. This is partly because successful adoption and use of 
biotechnologies is mainly attributable to active involvement of scientists, 
entrepreneurs, financiers, policymakers, journalists and the general public.139 Such 
involvement is essential in assessing the functionality of biosafety regimes in the 
selected countries. This study argues that the extent and quality of such functionality 
gives rise to an enabling biosafety regime within which efficacy of the precautionary 
approach may be realised. If it takes place in the early stages of a project Public 
participation may make implementation of the precautionary approach more 
meaningful by taking account of views expressed by the public.140 Such participation 
may also facilitate more flexible socially responsive research and design modification 
as the project gets underway, thereb  minimizing resistance to technology 
development.141 
Early public participation also enables product developers to work in a 
challenging environment which demands that they address negative sentiments 
expressed by the public concerning the products and by so doing they may 
ultimately improve the quality of their products.142 For example, Germany has 
become the global leader in the production and use of renewable energy (using 
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photovoltaic solar panels), mainly by involving people at an early stage thereby 
making the initiative people driven – initiatives that are supported by credible policy 
and legislation.143 
Public participation is also important especially in cases where institutions are 
powerful and self-centred. 144 Such institutions are often unwilling to accept change; 
they invariably inhibit or discourage it.145 Such institutions which the environmental 
historian Nicholson describes as ‘dead but they won’t lie down’ have a habit of easily 
dismissing environmental lobby groups thereby responding defensively and 
negatively towards criticism.146 
6.3.1 Public Participation and GMOs: an International Environmental Law 
Perspective 
Though non-binding, the Stockholm Declaration proclaimed that citizens, 
communities, enterprises and institutions must take responsibility for protection of 
the environment.147 It further declared that the ‘free flow of up-to-date scientific 
information...’ was essential to ‘facilitate the solution of environmental problems’.148 
About twenty years later, the Rio Declaration recognised that ‘[e]nvironmental issues 
are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant 
level’.149 In addition ‘each individual shall have appropriate access to information 
concerning the environment... and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes’.150 
These soft law instruments have materially influenced the development of the 
jurisprudence on public participation, of which access to information forms an 
integral part. Both instruments illustrate the need for public involvement in matters 
concerning environmental protection. Moreover, states are abstract sovereign 
entities. It is people that must accept responsibility and also take action in order to 
protect the environment for the benefit of the present and future generations. 
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The Convention on Biological Diversity provides for public education and 
awareness by requiring Parties to ‘promote and encourage understanding of the 
importance of, and the measures required for, the conservation of biological 
diversity...’151 It further obligates Parties to cooperate with other states in developing 
educational and public awareness programmes with respect to conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity.152 This researcher argues that promotion of 
an understanding of the importance of and the need to conserve biological diversity 
will remain abstract unless the people who have gained such knowledge (or part of 
it) are involved in the decision-making process. Public involvement inculcates a 
sense of ownership which in turn will enhance acceptance of responsibility–an 
essential ingredient of achieving appropriate levels of environmental protection. 
The Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters recognises the 
concern of the public about the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment.  It 
reiterates the ‘need for increased transparency and greater public participation in 
decision-making in their regulation.153  Its objective is to ensure that parties 
guarantee the right of access to information, public participation and access to 
justice.154 While it is a regional instrument155, the Aarhus Convention is a milestone 
on issues relating to access to information, public participation and in turn, 
accountability as well as transparency in decision-making. The selected countries 
are not parties, but its object and spirit applies equally to them in respect of 
environmental decision-making, in particular, the regulation of GMOs. 
Public participation under the Cartagena Protocol has two important 
obligations for parties: to consult and to inform the public the results of the decisions 
made.156 Concerning both obligations the Protocol requires parties to ‘consult the 
public in the decision-making process regarding living modified organisms and shall 
make the results of such decisions available to the public, while respecting 
confidential information in accordance with Article 21’. 
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Consultation arguably serves a meaningful purpose in an environment where 
member states fulfil their obligation under Art. 23 of the Protocol to ‘promote and 
facilitate public awareness, education and participation’ concerning the safe transfer, 
handling and use of living modified organisms (LMOs). By placing this obligation on 
the Parties, the Protocol recognises that public understanding and education 
concerning issues of biosafety in relation to LMOs is an essential component of 
public participation. In order for people to make informed decisions concerning 
issues of biosafety, those responsible for decision-making should understand what 
people know and what people want to know rather than what such decision-makers 
seek to impose on the people. 
By requiring the Parties to make the results of decision-making known to the 
public, the Protocol obliges transparency in decision-making. This is reasonable as 
compliance with such an obligation is the only way the public may know whether and 
the extent to which, their views were taken into account in decision-making. Should 
such views not be taken into account the public will at least know some of the 
reasons why not. In addition, where the public considers that its participation did not 
make much difference, the legitimacy of such decisions and future participation by 
the public in the process will significantly be affected.157 Objective balancing of views 
expressed by the public and the reasons given for rejecting such views or parts of 
them, will enable one to assess levels in both transparency of both the institutions 
responsible for decision-making and the decision-making process. 
6.3.3 Public Participation, GMOs and Decision-making 
Owing to divergences in opinions concerning agricultural biotechnology, public 
participation, as discussed here, neither implies nor means consensus. It means that 
stakeholders, including the affected or interested public are given a chance to 
express their views concerning GMOs meaningfully. Equally important (and as 
discussed in chapter two) GMOs, in one way or the other, interfere with the 
traditional life of the people, either through farming methods or the food people eat. 
For example, the farming methods may be affected in cases where farmers may not 
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be allowed to plant seed from their previous harvests by patent holders of the GM 
seeds in question. It is necessary that the people whose traditional lives are being 
affected should be given an opportunity to participate in deciding-making.158 
Over the years, public participation is the hallmark of democratic societies, in 
which elected leaders enact legislation and make decisions that bind the people.159 
The legitimacy of such decisions (including unpopular decisions) derives not so 
much from their content but rather from the fact that such leaders are elected.160 
Issues of legitimacy become complicated due to delegation of decision-making to 
government agencies or the exercise of statutory power by regulatory bodies that are 
neither elected nor directly accountable to the democratic process.161 Public 
participation becomes an important mechanism of bridging the gap between 
government agencies and the general public in many areas including the regulation 
of biotechnology. In addition, a key objective underlying participatory rights is to 
enhance the credibility of decision-making through improving the quality or range of 
the ideals and information upon which decisions are based.162 
Aware of the need to fill such a gap, among other considerations, the selected 
countries have made provision for public participation in varying formulations 
discussed below. Critical questions that arise include how to ensure that the views 
expressed by the public are taken nto account in decision-making. Such views may 
arguably influence or even require the taking into account of precautionary 
measures. There may be variations from one country to the other regarding the 
manner and extent of participation but the underlying principle is that members of the 
public are hardly bound by any codes or rules of conduct. They can express their 
views freely apart from any legal limitations on freedom of speech that may exist. 
By taking into account the views (most of which may be informed by criteria 
other than scientific considerations) expressed by various stakeholders, decision-
makers may possibly extend the application of the precautionary approach beyond 
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the limits of scientific uncertainty. To the extent that application of the approach is 
derived from or is partly be influenced by the  views of the public, decision-making 
may become more credible. Such legitimacy could significantly minimise apparent 
scepticism of proponents of biotechnology towards the precautionary approach. 
Whether, and the extent to which, the selected countries meaningfully 
embrace public involvement in their biosafety legislation is essential in facilitating 
application of the precautionary approach. Two aspects of public involvement, ie 
access to information and public participation are discussed below. The third aspect–
access to justice, falls outside the scope of this study. 
6.3.4 Public Participation and GMO Governance in South Africa 
The GMO Act has no substantive provisions concerning public participation or 
consultation.163 In relation to decision-making however, it provides that ‘[t]he Council 
may…before making a decision regarding an application submitted in terms of this 
section consider…public input…’ Other factors to be considered include the 
environmental impact assessment and the potential socio-economic impact of such 
activities. These two factors are also discretionary. In addition, the Act does not 
define ‘public input’ or give examples as to what it entails. Even worse, the 
Regulations164 are also silent on this issue but instead provide for public 
notification165 that may trigger public input. 
The Regulations166 under the GMO Act contain some provisions concerning 
public notification. In respect of a proposed release or commodity clearance of 
GMOs, they require that, ‘[p]ublic notification shall be in the form of a notice 
published in the print media informing the public of the application’.167 The applicant 
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is required to publish the notice in at least three national newspapers in respect of a 
proposed general or commodity release and in at least two (2) newspapers 
circulating in the immediate area and ‘one (1) newspapers’ circulating nationally.168 
Where no newspapers circulate in the immediate area of the proposed trial release, 
the applicant ‘shall inform the public through other means of effective communication 
... record of such proceedings must be provided to the Registrar as proof’.169 
The applicant must then submit to the registrar one hard copy and one 
electronic copy of the public notice within seven (7) days from the date of its 
publication.170 The public notice published by the applicant must contain a request 
that interested parties submit comments or objections in connection with the 
application within a period not less than 30 days after the date of the last publication 
in the media.171 Such comments or objections are to be submitted to the registrar.172 
Essentially, the GMO Act and these subsidiary rules, provide the fabric for 
public participation. Such participation derives from, and it is triggered by situations 
where there is a proposed release of a GMO. This has two main implications. The 
first  is that failure to provide substantively for public participation means that the first 
time the public or interested parties may learn about a GMO is when a project is 
about to commence. It would make a difference if the Act had general provisions for 
public participation and awareness, thus making transparency about GMOs 
obligatory and a continuous process. 
Second, the Regulations emphasise the immediate area where a release is to 
take place. This may provide awareness to the people in the vicinity the area in 
question. The oversight however is that although cultivation of GM food may take 
place in a particular area, distribution and consumption may be nationwide. This 
makes the requirement for effective communication other than by newspapers 
superfluous. This is because the obligation for media publication is nationwide. 
Restricting effective communication to the immediate area where the release is 
intended to take place creates disparity since people in other areas where no 
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newspapers are available will not have an opportunity to make comments or raise 
objections. If distribution and consumption are nationwide, the release should be 
interpreted as being nationwide with the result that consultation should be wider than 
the immediate area where the release is to take place. 
The Regulations’ failure to provide criteria for determining what constitutes 
effective communication is an oversight that makes the provision vague. Effective 
communication is a complicated phenomenon in itself and another question is 
effective in whose view? In the event of a challenge, effectiveness will be decided by 
a court. The Regulations create loopholes as well as ambiguity because, even if the 
records of an alternative means of effective communication are sent to the Registrar, 
the test for determining the effectiveness of such communication remains subjective. 
Vague as it may be, the provision could be used to call public hearings. In such 
hearings the people could freely, or through appointed experts, express their views. 
Even if such a hearing may not necessarily satisfy fully the requirements for effective 
participation, it is a step in the right direction. 
The comments of, or objections raised by the public or other stakeholder 
could dictate that more appropriate or additional measures on risk management be 
taken. However, neither the Act nor the Regulations make provision concerning 
feedback in relation to such comments or objections. Regulation 3(8) requires the 
Council to ‘provide reasons for any decision taken...’ There is no provision as to how 
the interested or affected people and the public may become aware of a decision 
made by the Council under Regulation 3(7). It would be difficult (or impossible) for 
the public to know whether and the extent to which their comments or objections 
were taken into account. 
The right to be informed of decisions made by the Council has another 
dimension. The Act provides that ‘[t]he liability for damage caused by activities 
relating to a genetically modified organism shall be borne by...user concerned’173 
and user is defined as ‘a person who conducts an activity with a genetically modified 
organism’174 This study argues that the majority of users are the peasant farmers 
most of whom have insufficient or no knowledge concerning potential harm 
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associated with GMOs. These are the same people the Act appears to preclude from 
knowing the decisions made by the Council. They are also people who cannot afford 
to appeal, to which the discussion now turns. 
Appeals are important as an appellant may successfully seek the taking of 
precautionary measures if she/he establishes scientific uncertainty. Lack of 
knowledge (mentioned above) about decisions made by the Council may negatively 
impact on appeals. The Act provides thus ‘[a] person who feels aggrieved by any 
decision or action taken … may … appeal against such decision or action to the 
Minister…’175 By granting a right of appeal to any person aggrieved (including the 
public) yet failing to make provision for the public and other stakeholders to be 
informed of decisions made by the Council, the Act is deficient, and at the very least, 
unrealistic. 
The fees payable for appeals are also an impediment to meaningful public 
participation. Whereas an import/ export licence attracts fees of R 400.00 and 
contained use R 1180.00, an appeal costs R 4280.00.176 This does not include legal 
fees, if any, as there is a right to legal representation provided by the Regulations.177 
In so far as it may be desirable to promote research in GMOs, the high fees 
chargeable for appeals, is inhibitive against victims. It defeats logic to expect a 
person who cannot afford money to buy a newspaper (where a public notification is 
to be published) to raise a huge sum of money for an appeal. Presumably, the high 
fees payable for appeals is intended to discourage or at least minimise the lodging of 
such appeals– which is a process in which the public or affected parties may 
participate by seeking judicial review of decisions. This raises questions of access to 
justice that fall outside the scope of this study. 
While the GMO Act is unsatisfactory on public participation, its provisions on 
notification are fairly elaborate. The provisions extending notification to areas where 
no newspapers are available suggest that Parliament sought to address the plight of 
the communities and other stakeholders who live in almost inaccessible areas. Such 
people also have few financial resources. The Act also provides for appeals if an 
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applicant is not satisfied. The requirement that the Council and the Appeal Board 
give reasons178 for decisions enhances the credibility of such decisions. 
6.3.5 Kenya 
In the regulation of biotechnology, public participation is provided for in two 
interrelated situations: where a person submits an application seeking introduction of 
a GMO into the environment;179 and in decision-making.180 Upon receipt of an 
application for introduction of a GMO into the environment, the Authority shall: 
‘publish in the Gazette, at least two newspapers with nationwide circulation, and 
in an appropriate electronic media, notice concerning any application for release 
into the environment of a genetically modified organism, for the general 
information of the public’181 
Within thirty days from the date of publication of the notice, any person may ‘make 
representations to the Authority regarding such an application, and the Authority 
shall address appropriately any relevant concerns raised by such a person’.182 
It is worth noting that National Biosafety Authority (NBAK) is responsible for: 
publishing the notices and addressing ‘appropriately any relevant concerns’ raised 
by the person concern183 and ultimately determining the application by taking into 
account, among other things, ‘any relevant representations submitted by members of 
the public’. This study argues that even on this point alone, public participation in 
issues of biosafety in Kenya is placed under the direction, scrutiny and control of the 
NBAK. By so doing Parliament seems to have flagrantly yet regrettably ignored the 
apparent conflict of interest the NBAK will undoubtedly have. Playing the three roles 
of receiving representations, addressing them and taking submissions by the public 
into account in decision-making, in an environment of conflicting interests may defeat 
the purposes of public participation in GMO governance in Kenya. A critical question 
that seems to have escaped the attention of Parliament (assuming that Parliament 
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was keen about it), and remains unanswered, is how to ensure transparency of the 
public participation process. 
In relation to public participation, the Biosafety Act of Kenya violates a 
cardinal principle of law which entails that justice done must be seen to be done. The 
NBA publishes the notices, addresses concerns raised by the public, and determines 
the application for introduction of a GMO into the environment within a set up where 
only the applicant is entitled to reasons for rejection of the application.184 The result 
is that the public is effectively deprived of the right to know which representations 
were made, whether and the extent to which such representations were taken into 
account in decision-making as the NBAK is not under any legal obligation to provide 
a feed back to the public. 
Concerning publication of the notice in at least two newspapers with 
nationwide circulation and in an appropriate electronic media, two observations 
based on accessibility, cost and language may suffice. On accessibility circulation of 
newspapers in many rural areas is still a problem for two main reasons. Road 
transport - the most common and fairly affordable means of transport - is poor, with 
dilapidated roads some of which are impassable during heavy rains that occasionally 
sweep away some bridges in rural areas.185 Newspapers are hardly taken to such 
remote yet fertile agricultural areas with a high peasant population. Moreover it is 
widely known that poor infrastructure is a major barrier in African agriculture. Poor 
infrastructure in turn becomes a key factor supporting the claim of this researcher, at 
least in part, that GMOs are intended to serve the interests of large scale farmers 
who are, in most cases, served with a good road network. 
Poor people who have no food will hardly think of nor would they have money 
for newspapers. In addition, many people may listen to the radio, yet the language of 
communication can be a barrier. Even if the language was to be a local one, 
translating scientific terminology such as ‘genetically modified crops’ accurately into 
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a local language is almost impossible. In Kenya for example, GM seeds are referred 
to as mbegu mpya meaning new seeds in Kiswahili.186 
Distortions associated with language are likely to lead the public to the idea 
that GM crops and food are merely a new brand intended to increase farm yields. 
This may be true but, as argued earlier, it lacks objectivity. In addition poor people 
find it difficult to understand policy and legal issues concerning biotechnology,. a 
factor that is exacerbated by absence of trust in legal systems.187 Thus the public is 
likely to have an idea about the potential risks and forces that underpin the regulation 
of such crops – a factor that may impede its awareness about and the need for 
precautionary measures in decision-making. 
Concerning decision-making, the NBAK is required to take into account ‘any 
relevant representations submitted by members of the public’.188 While this is 
mandatory, the discretionary power of determining what is relevant makes sense, 
since not everything the public may say is relevant or important. Concerning public 
comments however the Act provides for ‘any person to submit written comments on 
a proposed decision for any application for placing a genetically modified organism 
on the market, within thirty days from the date the notice is posted’.189 
The Biosafety Act of Kenya requires the NBAK to ‘give notice in the Gazette 
of all decisions made regarding applications for approval’.190 The comments are of 
course restricted to applications for the release of GMOs onto the market, yet one 
wonders what role such comments would play in relation to a decision that has 
already been made. Even if they were useful in a review of the NBAK’s decision, a 
review may only take place when the Council receives ‘significant new scientific 
information relating to biosafety of the genetically modified organism or contained 
use activity involved’.191 Such information applies to scientific issues many of which 
the public can hardly be aware of. Moreover obtaining such information requires 
time, cost and expertise – matters that arguably go beyond the ability of individuals 
and the public to procure. The Biosafety Act neither makes provision for the contents 
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of the notice to be published nor does it require it to be placed at or near the site of 
intended release of the GMO. 
The Regulations192 just published under the Biosafety Act contain no 
provisions on public participation meaning that only the parent Act applies to such 
participation. The only relevant provision is the one relating to unauthorised 
importation of GMOs. Regulation 5 (a) and (b) merely provide discretionary power for 
the NBA to inform and advise the public in relation to unauthorised entry of a GMO 
into the country.193 
In contrast to the Regulations under the Biosafety Act of Kenya, the 
Regulations under the GMO Act of South Africa (discussed at 6.3.4), provide an 
elaborate procedure for public participation, meaning that South Africa is 
progressively enhancing the credibility of its legislation. One would expect that 
Kenya should have learnt from South Africa the need to adopt credible biosafety 
legislation right from the start, instead of adopting a regime that is widely believed to 
be weak and start amending it later. 
In 2008, the government launched a six year (2008-2013) National 
Biotechnology Awareness Strategy (BioAWARE-Kenya) aimed at improving the 
public understanding of biotechnology.194 Public awareness and dialogue 
encompassing all stakeholders may change the negative perceptions on the part of 
the public from viewing regulation as a domain of scientists to a negotiating tool 
between science and politics.195 While the government had good intentions, the 
drafting process of the Biosafety Act was seen by sections of the civil society as 
allegedly ‘a boardroom process with inadequate representation of stakeholders’.196  
These views may be those of opponents and thus subjective but they indicative lack 
of effective implementation of the Strategy.197 
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The Biosafety Act of Zambia provides ‘The Authority shall consult the public prior to 
the grant of any authorization under this Part, in such manner and within such period 
as may be prescribed’.198 Further, the ‘Authority shall, upon receipt of an application 
and the information referred in section thirteen, avail the information to the public and 
any relevant government institution’.199 
Section thirteen provides for a mandatory notification procedure that includes 
requiring an applicant to provide detailed information as provided in the Second and 
Third Schedules. Such information includes the qualifications of the personnel 
involved in carrying out the release of GMOs,200 potential environmental impact,201 
health considerations,202 the emergency response plan203 and labelling which must 
specify any known reaction or allergies or other side-effect.204 Further information 
required by section thirteen includes information on previous approvals and 
rejections of GMOs or their products,205 a declaration confirming that the information 
provided is correct206 and a clear environmental monitoring plan.207 
Of importance also is the mandatory obligation that ‘[t]he Authority shall, 
within such period as may be prescribed, inform the applicant and the public of its 
decision’.208 The Act further empowers the Minister in consultation the NBAZ to 
make regulations providing for matters that include the procedure and manner of 
consulting or making information available to the members of the public209 and also 
on the conduct of public hearings.210 
The Biosafety Act of Zambia provides for an elaborate notification procedure 
that has material implications both for the public and the applicant. It gives the public 
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greater recognition of its role in the regulation. Such recognition and role, including 
the immense amount of information that must be made available to the public, 
enhances public awareness, especially concerning the potential harm of GMOs. The 
detailed mandatory requirements in section thirteen and the Second and Third 
Schedules in particular, enable the public to access a wide range of scientific 
information about GMOs. Relying on such detailed information, the public is better 
placed to express its views as may be appropriate including demanding additional 
precautionary measures. 
Mandatory requirements such as ‘[t]he Authority shall, in making or reviewing 
its decision regarding any application, take into account the views or concerns of the 
public, any relevant institution or other stakeholder made in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act’,211 are arguably intended to ensure that the actors 
representing the varying interests are heard and their views taken into account in 
decision-making. Taking these views into account is particularly important, not only 
because it may minimise negative perceptions as at (discussed at 2.6.5) concerning 
GMOs but also because it enhances the effectiveness, and hence the credibility, of 
the decision-making process. Such views are not only geared towards satisfying 
democratic considerations in the regulati n but also in regulating modern (and hence 
civilized) societies in general. 
Concerning appeals only the applicant has the right to appeal.212 Thus the Act 
excludes other stakeholders, including the public, from appealing against a decision 
of the NBAZ. Enacting an elaborate biosafety regime that vehemently promotes 
public participation, yet failing to grant the public or other interested or affected party 
the right to appeal remains a serious flow (on the part of Parliament) that erodes any 
internal checks and balances the Act seeks to embrace. Since the NBAZ is required 
to consult the public,213 take into account its views or concerns in decision- 
making214 and inform it of its decision,215 it is essential that aggrieved persons be 
granted a right to appeal against decisions of the NBAZ. The requirement to take 
views or concerns into account is mandatory thereby enabling the public to play a 
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crucial role in decision-making. Granting the public greater recognition in that 
process is logical, yet failure to grant it a right to appeal is not reasonable. 
The Act apparently places the applicant - and by necessary implication the 
proponents of biotechnology - in an immensely cumbersome and seemingly weak 
position. The notification procedure contains several requirements that may, more 
often than not, scare and subsequently discourage potential applicants by reason of 
the apparent high costs involved and the time required to gather and compile all the 
detailed information required in the Second and Third schedules. Of course the Act 
did not intend the applicant to provide information that she/he is not capable of 
accessing as some of the required information constitutes an integral part of risk 
assessment provided for in the Fourth Schedule. Yet genetic engineering being a 
technology founded on scientific experiments characterised by scientific uncertainty 
which the precautionary approach seeks to address, it is unrealistic and possibly 
unfair to expect the applicant to present GMOs – organisms whose safety is 
contested globally - as extremely safe. Moreover, the Protocol seeks to achieve an 
adequate level of protection of the environment and human health using the 
precautionary approach as the minimum guiding tool. 
In essence, the Act takes an approach that is significantly protectionist of the 
environment and human health. By empowering the general public in the manner it 
does, it seeks to ensure that GMOs are subjected to rigorous regulation. As a result, 
then, it is tenable to assert that Parliament seems to have said ‘yes’ for ‘NO’ to 
GMOs in Zambia. 
6.3.7 Namibia 
Save for the exemptions provided for in the Biosafety Act.216 ‘[a]person must not deal 
with a GMO or GMO product unless… the person is authorised by a permit issued 
under this Act to deal with the GMO or GMO product’.217 In considering an 
application for a permit the BCN ‘may take any action it considers appropriate’ … 
including appointing any person or committee of persons to carry out an 
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investigation, including a process of public consultation’.218 Such action may also 
include ‘holding a public hearing’.219 Where a public hearing is to be held, the 
Registrar is required to issue a notice at least 14 days before the date of the public 
hearing - such a notice shall be issued in writing to the applicant and to each person 
from whom a submission was received; the notice shall also be published in at least 
two newspapers widely circulated in Namibia. 220 The notice must specify the date, 
time and place of the public hearing and must also contain a brief description of the 
nature of the application.221 
Thus under the Act, public consultation is discretionary. It is part of the 
process of investigation to be carried out by the person or committee of persons 
appointed by the BCN. Requiring such a person or committee of persons to report to 
the BCN on matters including those concerning the application, the risk assessment 
and the risk management plan,222 means that the public is entitled to make 
submissions or comments on a wide range of aspects concerning biosafety. For 
example a risk management plan is a mechanism of which precautionary measures 
form an integral part. By giving an opportunity to a third party comprising of a person 
or committee of persons, to report to the BCN on matters concerning the risk 
management plan, it is tenable to argue that the Act seeks to subject  potential risks 
associated with GMOs to independent review before a decision is made. Such a 
process may to some extent enhance objectivity of GMO governance in Namibia. 
Having given the BCN the power to delegate duties such as public 
consultation to a person or a committee of persons, the Act neither creates a 
relationship between public consultation and risk assessment together with the risk 
management plan nor does it specify at what stage such public consultation may be 
carried out. There is no dispute that risk assessment - if carried out objectively – may 
determine potential harm of GMOs to the environment and human health.223 It 
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follows that the risk assessment report and the risk management plan224 should be 
accessible to the public to enable it to make informed comments and submissions.  
The same argument applies to the holding of a public hearing by the BCN. 
Such public hearings will serve a meaningful purpose only when the public is, 
at least, vaguely aware of any potential harm stated in the risk assessment report 
and the proposed risk management plan. This argument may not be acceptable to 
stakeholders who are keen to introduce the GMO as far as possible without undue 
delay, thus raising the critical question whether the report and the plan are public 
documents? In the absence of any provisions in the Protocolor domestic legislation 
making such report and plan confidential documents, this researcher submits that 
such report and plan are public documents. Thus all stakeholders including the 
public are entitled to inspect them and make such comments as may be appropriate. 
It is partly by making comments on the report and plan that the public may 
make meaningful contributions  to and feel involved in regulation. Moreover, the 
report of the BCN to the Minister must obviously reflect what is contained in the 
report, which forms the basis of the plan. Since the law is silent on the stage at which 
public consultation is to be carried out, should the BCN conduct such consultation 
without giving the public an opportunity to access thereport and the plan such action 
would be inconsistent with the tenets of transparency and could be somewhat 
discriminatory. 
Carrying out public consultation without making available the report and the 
plan – even in summary form – to the public, would be tantamount to asking it to 
comment on issues concerning human health and the environment, of which issues 
it is not aware and probably does not sufficiently understand. This would raise 
serious doubts on the credibility of the public consultation process. An important 
question would for example be whether public participation is for ‘rubber stamp’ 
purposes or whether it serves legally recognised purposes? 
This thesis argues that public participation can only serve legitimate purposes 
when conducted in an environment of openness and transparency. This would give 
the public an opportunity to access the report, which may enable it to make 
                                                 












submissions and express opinions on the precautionary measures proposed in the 
plan. Further in relation to the holding of a public hearing, the Registrar is required to 
issue a notice in terms of s. 24 (2) which among other things contains ‘a brief 
description of the nature of the application’. The concern of this researcher is that 
this provision is lacking as it does not specifically provide for - even briefly -the 
benefits and potential harm of such GMO. Moreover the application must, where 
required, be accompanied by a risk assessment report and a risk management 
plan.225 By the time the Registrar issues the notice to the applicant, those who made 
submissions and to the general public, s/he is already aware of any potential harm 
and how the  plan addresses such harm. Transparency entails that such information 
be conveyed to the general public in the notice issued by the Registrar. This 
researcher takes the view that failure by the Act to provide for information on  
benefits and potential risks in the notice is inconsistent with the  transparency and 
unfair. The Act does not prohibit anybody from carrying out an independent risk 
assessment but this may be costly and time consuming. 
The wide discretion of the Minister to make exemptions discussed at (6… 
above) is a factor that may immensely and negatively impact on public participation. 
For example should the Minister make or cause exemptions relating to the 
appointing of any person, or committee of persons, to carry out an investigation, 
including a process of public consultation, or to the holding of a public hearing, the 
democratic aspects of regulation would  not only be ignored but the decision-making 
process as a whole would lack legitimacy – an essential component of credibility. 
The Act does not make provision for the public to be informed of the decision 
made by the Minister on an application to deal with GMOs or any GMO products. It 
provides ‘[u]pon deciding an application for the issuance of a permit, the Minister 
must in writing notify the applicant and the Council of his or her decision and, if the 
application is refused, state the reasons for the refusal’.226 It appears unreasonable 
to seek the views of the public and deny them the right to know the decision made 
on the application. Such denial undermines the public’s and other stakeholder’s 
willingness and motivation to attend future public hearings or make submissions - 
unless of course that was the hidden intention in the  Act. Failure of the public to 
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participate in future public hearings or make submissions is a sure way of ensuring 
that the public does not raise issues which could dictate application of precautionary 
or additional precautionary measures. 
6.4 Access to Information and the Precautionary Approach are 
Interdependent 
Access to information may be regarded as a prerequisite for public involvement in 
decision-making.227 It promotes accountability, minimises corruption and is an 
essential component of good governance.228 Three main reasons make access to 
information held by government compelling. First many governments habitually tend 
to conceal information from the public (even if such information is not legally part of 
the state secrets) making abuse difficult to determine.  Second, insufficient 
accountability to the public by government contributes to lack of transparency on its 
part and it negatives impacts on good governance. Third, access to information 
enables the public to assert their right to live in a healthy and clean environment and 
also to observe its duty to protect the environment.229 
Access to information held by the private sector is also crucial because most 
of the available scientific information relating to GMOs is in the possession of 
corporate and research institutions.230 Consistent with the discussion in chapter 
seven, the intentions of such entities are invariably questioned.  They are seen as 
having vested financial interests by reason of which they constantly seek to ensure 
that GMOs are viewed as positive contributions to the well-being of humanity.231 
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Information and data are power.232 Whoever has one of them, or both, has the 
power and ability to influence and  possibly (indirectly) manipulate the decision-
making process. Thus, insufficient data and lack of information are impediments to 
effective regulation.233  Possession and control of data and information may, to some 
extent tend to concentrate power in the hands of a few,234 but one must, appreciate 
for example that biotech seed producers are no more selfish than traditional seed 
producers.  Such control leaves many consumers and the general public without 
‘sufficient power and knowledge’ about what they purchase and eat.235 Such people 
know very little or nothing concerning GMOs let alone the precautionary approach. In 
addition, a limited flow of information has a negative impact on transparency.236 This 
concept is closely associated with the tenets of governance that include increased 
participation, accountability, as well as democratic environmental and risk 
governance.237 
The avenues of transparency with respect to access to information include 
continuous information collection; complete and proper organisation of existing data; 
facilitation of access to information; quick response to demands presented; continual 
transmission of information data and the option of confirming and discussing the 
information given.238  Hence, lack of access to or insufficient information negatively 
impacts on transparency. Arguably, the right to know is a normative goal that 
governance by disclosure seeks to achieve 
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6.4.1 South Africa 
The Constitution239 establishes the right of access to information.240 It provides that 
everyone has the right to access ‘any information held by the state ... and ‘any 
information held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection 
of any rights’.241 Among other things, the Environmental Management Act (NEMA)242 
requires that ‘...access to information must be provided in accordance with the 
law’.243 Currently, the Promotion of Access to Information Act244 is the primary piece 
of legislation that governs access to information. Among other things,  seeks to give 
effect to the constitutional right of access to information and to promote 
transparency, accountability and effective governance of all public bodies and private 
bodies.245 
While access to information is a normative right in South Africa, enactment of 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act is  a manifestation of the political will to 
safeguard access to information. It is a step forward towards the development of a 
jurisprudence on such a  right. However realisation of the right in a contested area 
such as biotechnology raises more questions than answers. One such question is 
whether, and if so, to what extent the GMO Act ensures that interested parties and 
the general public have access to reasonably sufficient information concerning 
GMOs. 
The GMO Act does not contain specific provisions on access to information. 
Under the regulations, access to information and public participation are largely 
intertwined. In the public notification discussed earlier, the notice by the applicant is 
required to contain information about the name and address of the applicant,246 
objective of the application247 and a general description of the GMO in question.248 In 
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addition it  may ‘where appropriate’ provide a description of the place of release, 
including the town, the size of the release and information concerning the 
surrounding environment.249  It must also contain the address of the Registrar to 
whom comments and objections may be submitted.250 
Neither the Act, nor the Regulations require the applicant to provide 
information on any potential harm associated with the GMOs in question in the 
notification to the public. The applicant is required to provide data on which risk 
assessment was based251 and to include measures to manage potential risks 
identified with a proposed project252 in the application to the Registrar. There is no 
requirement that this information be included in the notification to the public. This 
excludes the general public from readily accessing material information concerning 
potential harm that would form the basis of comments or objections by interested 
parties or the general public. 
Further, the applicant need only disclose the place of release ‘where 
appropriate’ ie where circumstances permit. Appropriateness is an objective term, 
but the parameters of which may be wide but not unlimited thus admitting 
considerable discretion in interpretation. The context in which the term has been 
used by the Act raises a presumption that it is within the applicant’s discretion to 
decide the circumstances in which disclosure is appropriate. In addition, the 
associated ambiguity defeats the notion of effective communication envisaged by the 
Regulations.Moreover, one may argue that not knowing where the site(s) is would 
strengthen the case that the potential risks are high. 
Absence of provisions on access to information is, in this researcher’s view, 
part of a concerted effort to adopt legislation that is as permissive as the 
circumstances allow. In the same vein failure to make specific provisions embracing 
the precautionary approach was not by oversight but rather a deliberate attempt to 
minimise what proponents of biotechnology view as barriers to its rapid 
development. Arguably, the idea is that by keeping GMOs in as much secret as 
possible, demand for precautionary measures by the public diminishes as well. 
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Moreover information is knowledge hence a source of power and control. The less 
information the applicant releases concerning potential adverse effects the longer 
the public may remain ignorant to the commercial advantage of the former. 
In relation to appeals a person aggrieved by any decision or action taken by 
the Council, the registrar or an inspector may appeal to the Minister.253 The appellant 
is however required by the regulations to state the reference number and the date of 
the document by means of which such appellant was notified of that decision.254 This 
is information members of the public can hardly access mainly because neither the 
Act nor the regulations require the Council’s decision to be made public as opposed 
to a decision of the Appeal Board which is to be made public within 30 days of the 
final decision by the Minister.255 
Problems with access to information concerning GMOs are best illustrated by 
the Biowatch case256 in which Biowatch (the applicant - a non-governmental 
organisation) sought on four occasions information that included: whether the first 
respondent (the Registrar) had any information on the location of field trials; whether 
any Bt maize (a GMO) had been released; access to a selection of risk assessments 
in order to determine their adequacy in relation to certain licenses that had been 
granted; under which legislation field trials licenses had been granted prior to the 
GMO Act coming into operation; and permission to inspect records regarding 
compliance with public participation provisions under the GMO Act.257 Some of the 
requests had been granted while others such as the location where field trials had 
been conducted had been refused.258 Among other things Dunn J  held that ‘the 
applicant’s right of access to information did not only accrue or crystallize when it 
launched the present proceedings: its rights accrued or crystallized on each of the 
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occasions on which it submitted its requests for information to the Registrar’.259 The 
Court further held that: 
‘the applicant had established that it had a clear right to some of the 
information to which access was requested; that the Registrar’s failure to 
grant it access to such information as it was legally entitled to constituted 
a continued infringement of the applicant’s rights under s. 32 (1) (a) of the 
Constitution’.260 
The applicant was condemned to pay costs to the fourth respondent (Monsanto) by 
reason of the inept way in which the requests were made and the manner in which 
the notice of motion was formulated all of which compelled Monsanto as well as the 
fifth and sixth respondents (Stoneville and D&PL respectively,  neither of which 
sought costs) to come to court to protect their interests. 
In setting aside the order as to costs and replacing it with an order compelling 
the government to pay Biowatch the costs it incurred in the High Court, Sachs J in 
the Constitutional Court noted that 
‘The government’s duty was to act as impartial steward and not to align 
itself either with those who had furnished the information or with parties 
seeking access to it. It was important that the objectivity not only be 
present, but be seen to be present in circumstances where information 
related to questions of general public interest and controversy, and there 
was no lawful ground to withhold it. This required objectivity and distance 
in respect of any competing private interests that might be involved’. 261 
In the Biowatch case part of the information sought by the applicant for 
example related to access to a selection of risk assessments in order to determine 
their adequacy in relation to certain licenses that had been granted. Such information 
would have enabled the applicant, and by extension the public, to know whether the 
risk assessments in question had identified any potential harm to the environment 
and humans, and if so, whether appropriate precautionary measures had been put in 
place and whether the regulatory system was doing its job or not. 
Refusal to provide non-confidential information, delay and lack of impartiality 
in supplying information as well as failure to provide it in full to an interested party, is 
conduct that creates suspicion, thereby aggravating existing negative public 
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perceptions concerning GMOs. In such circumstances any precautionary measures 
adopted may become irrelevant due to lack credibility of decision-making institutions, 
the custodians of information sought. 
By aligning itself to biotech companies, the government seems to have 
formed some kind of ‘unholy alliance’ not only to continue keeping information 
secret, but also to frustrate efforts by  the public to access such information. 
Moreover using courts to get information is costly and time consuming. This is unfair 
especially taking into account acknowledgement by the Minister for Communications 
that information is power and yet most South Africans have no access to the 
information.262 
6.4.2 Kenya 
The Constitution263 provides for the right of ‘access to information held by the 
state’.264 Access also extends to information held by another person, which 
information is required for the exercise or protection of any right or fundamental 
freedom.265 The state is required to ‘publish and publicise any important information 
affecting the nation’. This is the new Constitution. Many Kenyans believe it was 
people driven. Promulgated less than a year ago266, its implementation is in its 
infancy. Its success is unpredictable. Currently, the right to access information is only 
normative. It needs statutory law to provide the necessary details that would make 
implementation feasible. Absence of a provision requiring the state to enact such 
legislation places a heavy burden on Courts to formulate the content and 
significance of the right in more detail. This however depends upon relevant matters 
being filed in the courts. 
The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act (EMCA)267 has no 
specific provisions on access to information. The Authority is however required to 
cause to be published an environmental impact assessment report for two 
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consecutive weeks in the Gazette and in a newspaper circulating in the area or 
proposed area of the project in question.268 The notice is to contain a summary 
description of the project,269 the place where it is to be carried out,270 the place 
where the report may be inspected271 and a time limit not exceeding sixty days for 
the submission of oral or written comments on the report.272 The Regulations273 also 
provide for a public hearing in which a proponent of a project makes a presentation 
and responds to presentations at the public hearing.274 This face to face 
engagement may result in exchange of information that may enrich popular  
understanding of the project in question. However, the relationship between EMCA 
and other legislation associated with environmental protection such as the Biosafety 
Act appears obscure. 
There is no indication that the provisions of EMCA significantly apply to 
activities under the Biosafety Act or any other Act. In turn the Biosafety Act makes no 
reference to the provisions of EMCA. This is in contrast to NEMA–framework 
legislation containing Principles that apply throughout the Republic of South Africa in 
respect of ‘actions of all organs of state that may significantly affect the 
environment.275 It also provides for Integrated Environmental Management in its 
chapter five. The GMO Act contains provisions to the effect that, where required, an 
environmental impact assessment shall be submitted in accordance with the 
provisions of the NEMA.276 
Like the Constitution, the Biosafety Act is also relatively new. The Act was 
enacted in 2009. It has not been tested in the courts as it is yet to become 
operational due to the absence of relevant regulations. Even so, questions still arise 
as to how realistic the Act is in respect of access to information by interested parties 
and the general public. 
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The Act obligates the National Biosafety Authority (NBAK) to ‘avail to any 
person copies of records kept under section 32 of the Act, including details of any 
application that do not qualify as confidential information’.277 Section 32 provides for 
a register that contains a copy of every application, the risk assessment report, the 
decision document, the approval and any other information the Authority may 
consider necessary. These documents contain information essentially supplied by 
the applicant which information is used for decision-making. Relying on these 
documents the public are likely to understand biosafety from the point of view of the 
applicant. 
An applicant can hardly reveal information that is detrimental to her or his 
application. Moreover the Act gives immense protection to confidential information 
including requiring the NBAK ‘not to use confidential information for any other 
purpose not authorized under this Act, and shall ensure that such information is 
protected by any other person involved in handling applications under this Act’.278 
The Act requires the NBAK to ‘promote public awareness and education… 
through the publication of guidance documents and other materials aimed at 
improving understanding of biosafety’.279 Of importance is the content, presentation 
and the targeted audiences of such publications and other materials. Objective 
public understanding of issues concerning biosafety may be enhanced through 
dissemination, at the right time, of correct and accurate information. This may be 
achieved by using people with a neutral stand concerning GMOs – a stand that is 
rare to find taking into account the varying interests that have complicated GMO 
governance. Moreover, issues public awareness touch on aspects of democracy 
raising critical questions such as how does one determine what is good for the 
people using what criteria and how does one achieve objectivity in disseminating 
information (and what information) about GMOs to the public. 
The Act has no provisions on identification and labelling, a strong indication 
Kenya does not regard GMOs as being different from foods that are non-GM. As a 
consequence consumers will not be able to differentiate between GM and non-GM 
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food. For this reason such consumers and the public in general are denied important 
information that will enable them to know and choose the kind of food they want to 
eat. 
Failure by the Act to provide substantive rights of access to information 
confirms the contempt with which the right to such access is treated in favour of 
commercial interests. The resulting imbalance necessarily prohibits the public from 
knowing crucial information on alleged benefits and potential harm of GMOs. This 
serious concern must be addressed if domestic implementation of the precautionary 
approach is to make any sense. 
6.4.3 Zambia 
The Constitution280 has no provisions relating to access to information. Hence, 
issues concerning access in the governance of GMOs depends upoon the relevant 
provisions of Biosafety Act.281 Upon receipt of an application with the information 
required by s. 13 of the Biosafety Act, the NBAZ is obligated to make such 
information available to the public and any government institution.282 After public 
makes comments on the application283 the Act requires that ‘[t]he Authority shall, in 
making or reviewing its decision regarding any application, take into account the 
views or concerns of the public, any relevant institution or other stakeholder made in 
accordance with the provisions of the this Act’.284 
The Act further empowers the Minister to make regulations by statutory 
instrument that makes provision, among other things, for ‘the procedure and manner 
of consulting or making information available to the members of the public for 
purposes of this Act’.285 These and other requirements are crucial in assessing the 
opportunities the public have to access information and importantly the extent to 
which such access impacts on awareness of and the need for precautionary 
measures. 
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Availability of relevant information and the opportunity to raise concerns are 
material considerations that enable the public to make informed decisions, express 
their views and make  relevant objections. By commenting on the ways in which the 
GMO in question may benefit people or prejudice socio-economic, cultural, 
environmental and other interests, the public provides the NBAZ with an opportunity 
of more effectively analysing the various interests in decision –making, particularly 
the taking into account (at least in part) of the public interest provided for by s. 18 (4) 
of the Act. The weighing of interests that takes place during decision-making, not 
only provides justification for the taking of or for refusal to take precautionary 
measures, it enhances both the legitimacy and transparency of the decision-making 
process as a whole. Such an outcome translates adoption of the precautionary 
approach into reality. 
6.4.4 Namibia 
Neither the Constitution of Namibia nor the Biosafety Act286 has provisions 
concerning access to information. Instead, the Act has two aspects that indirectly 
relate to access to information. The first is that a public hearing may be held by the 
BCN.287 The Act does not specify the issues that may be the subject matter of a 
public hearing. By reason of being a public hearing except on matters relating 
commercially confidential information288 one may, by implication, argue that the 
public may raise any other issues concerning biosafety including the application in 
question. 
By making provision for the public hearing to be conducted by the BCN as opposed 
to a person or committee of persons, it does appear that the Act seeks to provide an 
independent opportunity for the BCN to hear the views of the public directly. This is 
useful especially because in compiling its report the BCN may compare the 
information gathered from the members of the public with that gathered from the 
public consultation process conducted by the person or committee of persons 
appointed by the BCN pursuant to the provisions of s. 24 (1) (b). 
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Second is the requirement that ‘[t]he Minister must not grant an application for 
the issue of a permit unless the Minister is satisfied … that such dealings will be in 
the public interest’.289 In determining what constitutes public interest the Act provides 
guiding principles that include the extent to which such dealing is likely to: contribute 
to sustainable development; undermine indigenous knowledge or technology or to 
affect the social and economic advancement of the people and society.290 These are 
complex issues which include social-economic considerations that lie at the centre of 
the global GMO controversy discussed in chapter two. Such issues require the views 
of various stakeholders including both expert and public opinion. If the Minister does 
not applyhis/her mind objectively to this section, then, it is tenable to assert that 
his/her  decision would be controversial provisions of the Act. Taking into account 
the wide discretionary powers given to the Minister under s.25(4) of the Act, one may 
argue that application of precautionary measures also fall, at least in part, within the 
discretionary powers of the Minister. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the important role institutions and the public  play in  
making domestic implementation of the precautionary approach a reality in the 
selected countries. The composition and powers conferred upon institutions, access 
to information and public participat on in the decision-making processes provide the 
litmus test for assessing the credibility of the biosafety regimes (and by implication, 
the precautionary approach) in the selected countries. Consistent with the belief of 
Wolff, the political philosopher, only if even the meagre provisions on public 
involvement were absent could the people in the selected countries know of its 
importance in the regulation of GMOs.291 Having discussed the thesis in parts, an 
overall analysis follows. 
                                                 
289 Section 25 (4) Biosafety Act of Namibia (n117). 
290 Ibid Section 25 (5).  














ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
‘... not about the influence of power but the power of influence’1 
 
7.1 Barriers to Transparency in the Regulation of GMOs 
In the mists of a mountainous terrain, Bilbo the hobbit, with his friends the dwarves, 
and Gandalf the Wizard, found themselves in a dilemma. In their attempts to avoid 
being killed by the goblins of Middle Earth of the Third Age, they flee thereby 
exposing themselves to a serious risk: being captured by the wolves. In trying to find 
an acceptable solution, Bilbo wondered: ‘What shall we do, what shall we do!’ 
‘Escaping goblins to be caught by wolves’. This is the great myth that formed the 
origin of the popular proverb: ‘out of the fryingpan into the fire’, or so suggests J.R.R 
Tolkien, creator of the mythology of the Middle Earth. 2 
Seemingly, the above mythology is analogous to the precautionary approach. 
For example, while hunger, undernourishment and starvation may result in deaths, 
failure to meaningfully embrace the precautionary approach in biosafety legislation 
exacerbates exposure of the environment and humans to potential risks that include 
irreversible harm. The precautionary approach is intended to find a middle ground to 
resolve this dilemma. In Africa the adoption of precautionary approach is even more 
compelling. The continent has an increasing population that needs more food and a 
rich biodiversity that needs to be protected against the many threats including 
potential harm associated with GMOs on one hand. On the other is the need of 
African states to comply with their existing obligations under international law 
particularly under the WTO regime. 
The dilemma concerning implementation of the precautionary approach has 
been stated succinctly as follows: 
                                                 
1 Stengel R TIME Magazine 10 May 2010 p. 4. 












‘[i]f the precautionary principle is used to block ...innovation, public welfare 
is damaged. An unbalanced and excessive caution can undermine 
economies, jobs, human aspirations, health and the environment. 
Unjustified fears can lead to counterproductive behaviour (as, for example, 
when consumers avoid eating fruit because of the exaggerated fear...). 
Trade restrictions arising from the misuse of the principle strain international 
relations and hurt consumers and producers’.3 
These conflicting interests at the decision-making level are a challenge in the 
development of jurisprudence on implementation of the precautionary approach.  
States have different interests and priorities with respect to biotechnology, as well 
as varying attitudes towards the precautionary approach.  In addition, misuse of 
the precautionary approach for political expediency is difficult to determine, the 
same way it may be cumbersome to reverse the decisions made. 
Another issue is that the factors that impact on the world food situation include 
climate change, globalisation, high energy demand as food crops are being used for 
fuel and pricing. It implies that the determination of issues such as food production, 
what food and marketing are gradually going beyond the powers of individual states. 
For example by 2009, the GM seed market globally was worth $10.9 billion and the 
crops produced from that seed were worth $ 130 billion.4 Thus, with economic power 
comes political power that has enabled corporations to exert great influence over 
laws and policies resulting  in weaker regulation, which in turn, may have negative 
impacts on health, safety and the quality of food.5 
The primary aim of transnational companies (TNCs, of which multinational 
biotechnology companies form part), appears to be the need to maximise profits as 
opposed to giving priority to improving the lives of the common people. Acquisitions 
and mergers by large multinational biotechnology companies, such as Monsanto 
together with increases in patent protection, have tended to change farmers from 
‘seed owners’ to ‘licensees’ of patented products.6 Such  farmers are art of the 
public, which has  little or no knowledge about potential risks and benefits of GMOs.  
                                                 
3 Hunter D, Salzman J and Zaelke D International Environmental law and Policy  4ed (2011) 481. 
4 Barton J ‘The Success of Genetically Modified Crops Provides Opportunities to Win over Critics’ 
(March 2010) available at http://www.asnapp.org (accessed 2 November 2010). 
5 See ‘Power Hungry: Six Reasons to Regulate Global Food Corporations’ (2005) ActionAid 
International available at http://actionaid.org.uk/_content/documents/po... (accessed 19 July 2010). 
6 Tansley G ‘Farming, Food and Global Rules’ in Tansley G and Rajotte T (eds) The Future Control of 












They may have little opportunity and no forum to raise their concerns about adverse 
effects. In such circumstances, a transparent biosafety regime becomes an essential 
tool for promoting social harmony and legitimacy of biotechnology, enhancing rather 
than hindering these objectives. 
Thus, regulation is a form of social contract that provides the terms under 
which state, society and commerce agree (or should agree) to accept the costs, risks 
and benefits of biotechnology.7 The terms of such a contract are manifested in the 
mechanisms of a particular biosafety regime. For a regime to be workable, it must be 
transparent and accountable to stakeholders, in particular, the public. There is 
however a significant lack of transparent communication among actors, the result of 
which is that assessment of biotechnology is lagging behind its development.8 It is 
for this reason that the precautionary approach plays a central role in assessing 
transparency. As already discussed in chapter one, the precautionary approach 
places emphasis on transparency and accountability among other things.9 
Decision-makers may invariably find themselves in a dilemma when resolving 
scientific disputes. They may find it difficult to determine where scientific criteria end 
in the event of scientific uncertainty and where policy considerations begin.10 In 
addition law is an instrument of social power and it can be manipulated by the 
powers of the moment to serve their interests.11 In the area of biotechnology such 
manipulation could seek to serve the vested interests of powerful stakeholders such 
as the biotechnology industry and powerful environmental non-governmental 
organisations – thus, making transparency an elusive concept to the detriment of 
precautionary decision-making. 
                                                 
7 Jasanoff S ‘Product, Process, or Programme: Three Cultures and the Regulation of Biotechnology’ 
in Bauer M (ed) Resistance to New Technology (1997):55. 
8 See ‘Executive Summary of the Synthesis Report of the International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology (IAASTD)’ (April 2008):14 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_04_08_sr_exec_sum_130408_final.pdf (accessed 5 
May 2010). 
9 Ticker J and Wright S ‘The Precautionary Principle and Democratizing Expertise: a US Perspective 
Science and Public Policy (2003):213-218 at 213.  
10 McGarity ‘Resisting Regulation with Blue Ribbon Panels’ 33 Fordham Urban Law Journal (2006) 
1157-1197 at 1157. 
11 Jouannet J ‘Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of International Law? The 












In seeking to enhance the credibility of decision-making in environmental 
governance, the Canadian government has formulated guiding principles that 
enhance precautionary decision-making. The key provision obligates decision-
makers to observe ‘[a]greater degree of transparency, clearer accountability and 
increased public involvement’.12 The importance of transparency in GMO 
governance cannot be overemphasised because questions of who is accountable 
and transparent, to whom and on what terms represent crucial dimensions in any 
regulatory regime and therefore deserve critical analysis.13 
The ways in which accountability and transparency are manifested in the 
regulatory regime fundamentally impact on the way in which power is negotiated and 
shared and may lead to consequences with potentially substantial costs and 
benefits.14 For example, the approval of Monsanto’s GM soy in Paraguay enabled 
large scale farmers to make profits by exporting the crop as animal feed to provide 
meat for the West, resulting in the destruction of traditional methods of agriculture 
that provided food for the local people.15 
While some of the political leaders in Africa as well as sections of the public 
may be aware of the potential harm associated with GMOs,16 adoption of the 
precautionary approach in biosafety legislation remains problematic, thus placing 
transparency in the regulation of biotechnology at the crossroads. In assessing 
transparency of biosafety legislation throught the lens of the precautionary approach, 
it is necessary to examine, by way of comparison, the varying approaches in the 
domestic implementation of the approach and account for them. 
                                                 
12 Benidickson J Environmental Law 3ed (2009):26 Irwin Law Toronto. 
13 Lodge M ‘Accountability and Transparency in Regulation: critiques, doctrines and instruments’ in 
Jordan and Levi-Faur (eds)The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age 
of Governance  (2004):124 -144 at 124 Edward Elgar Publishing Limited Cheltenham (UK). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ennart H ‘Small-scale Farmers Will Lose Their Jobs’ (2010) available at http://www.gmwatch.org/ 
accessed 13 December 2010. 
16 For example in 2008 while emphasising the need to adopt biosafety legislation in Kenya, William 
Ruto, the then Minister for Agriculture is reported to have noted that biotechnology was a ‘highly 
divisive technology’.  See The Standard 15 February 2008 available at www.eastandard.net accessed 












7.2 Applicable Thresholds for the Precautionary Approach 
Permissible thresholds in the relevant international law instruments – the Cartagena 
Protocol (the Protocol) in particular – provide a basis for analysing the various ways  
ways  towards adoption of the approach in the selected countries. The Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development requires application of the 
precautionary approach in situations ‘where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage...’17 The Declaration was part of the soft law instruments that 
formed the basis of future developments in international environmental law, as the 
international community realised the compelling need to take steps to protect the 
environment. 
The Protocol adopted the approach as contained in principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration. In addition, it imposes limitations on the application of the approach to 
living modified organisms resulting from biotechnology ‘that may have adverse 
effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also 
into account human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary 
movements’.18  Annex III of the Protocol also identifies the manner in which risk 
assessment should be conducted. It provides that ‘Lack of scientific knowledge or 
scientific consensus should not necessarily be interpreted as indicating a particular 
level of risk, an absence of risk, or an acceptable risk. 
These limitations are justifiable when considered within the broader context of 
the Protocol being a protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 
This precautionary approach was thus embraced by the Protocol with 
limitations that raise many unanswered questions that include: 
• How and using what objective criteria, does one determine what amounts to a 
serious or irreversible threat and when? 
• Who should oversee that the decision-maker (usually a competent authority) 
takes appropriate action consistent with the permissible thresholds of risk 
management? 
                                                 
17 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration Rio 31 International Legal Materials (1992):876 












These are issues that are difficult to resolve. They arguably become barriers to 
assessing transparency in decision-making, especially because of the emphasis 
placed on scientifically sound risk assessment under the Protocol and domestic law 
The Protocol and the biosafety regimes in the selected countries provide 
mandatory and detailed requirements on scientifically sound risk assessment. These 
are binding on States and applicants dealing with living modified organisms (LMOs) 
and GMOs respectively. From this perspective, transparency is therefore understood 
and measured using scientific criteria. The question that then arises is: who benefits 
most from the introduction of GMOs into Africa? Part of this question may be 
answered by analysing emerging trends in the selected countries and the implication 
of such trends for regulation. 
7.3 Implementation of the Precautionary Approach in the Selected 
Countries: Emerging Trends 
The various approaches to implementation of the precautionary approach reveal two 
trends, namely permissive and strict regimes. The classification is not entirely distinct 
due to overlaps especially in decision-making. These terminologies are used by way 
of contrast only for purposes of distinguishing the approaches among the selected 
countries.  This is because every country exercises its sovereign powers to 
determine what is best for its people and the Protocol thus established minimum 
criteria for regulation. 
7.3.1 Permissive Regimes 
The term ‘permissive’ connotes those biosafety regimes that progressively promote 
introduction of GMOs into a country. Enactment of legislation is itself a form of 
precaution.  However, permissive regimes arguably seek to ensure that barriers that 
may delay or frustrate advancements in biotechnology are minimised. While the 
biosafety legislation of South Africa and Kenya contain relevant provisions for 
appropriate measures to manage risks identified in risk assessment,19 the discussion 
in chapter five and six shows a trend that tilts towards permissiveness in the 
regulation of GMOs. It suggests that governments with permissive regimes place 
                                                 












importance on sound science and cost-effective analysis with deep-rooted suspicion 
that the precautionary principle may hinder economic growth and rational policy 
making.20 
7.3.1.1 South Africa 
In 2008, a senior official from the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR) of South Africa, in seeking to rebut claims of lack of transparency in the GMO 
Act by reason of lack of provisions on the precautionary approach, claimed that the 
principle was indirectly implied in the Act.21 This is because the Advance Informed 
Agreement (AIA) is precautionary in itself.  It gives parties to the Protocol an 
opportunity to weigh their options and make a decision in relation to the GMO in 
question.  Hence, transparent use by the decision-maker of the AIA procedure may 
be regarded in part as the practical application of the precautionary approach. 
The executive may initially imply the precautionary approach and act 
accordingly by enacting legislation, but this interpretation and action can later be 
tested by a court of law that will determine finally whether the precautionary 
approach may be implied from the Act.  Implying the precautionary approach would 
be a legitimate role of the courts in interpreting the Act or sections of it in litigation 
before them.  This has cost implications; it raises issues about access to justice. 
Moreover Art. 10 (6) of the Protocol provides, in a clear manner, the operational 
aspects of the precautionary approach, which should be embraced in the same or 
similar words in domestic law. This thesis submits that the scenario manifested in the 
GMO Act22 falls short of the provisions of the Protocol that requires each party to 
‘take...appropriate legal... measures to implement its obligations...’.23 
The biosafety legislation of South Africa and Kenya include the requirement 
for scientifically sound risk assessment is justifiably given prominence, the same way 
                                                 
20 Jordan A and O’Riordan T  ‘The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary Environmental Policy and 
Politics’ in Raffensperger C and Tickner A (eds) Protecting Public health ns the Environment 
(1999):15-35 at 33. 
21 These claims were made  by a senior official from CSIR (name in file with this researcher) at a 
Biosafety Workshop ‘Benefits, Opportunities, and risks from the Release of GMOs in Africa’ organised 
by the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) and other 
stakeholders at Cape Town 15-19 September 2008 which this researcher attended. 
22 The Genetically Modified Organisms Act No 15 of 1997 Republic of South Africa. 












the Protocol does. Precaution is itself a scientific phenomenon inherent in risk 
assessment.  However, regulation attracts varying complex socio-economic, cultural, 
political interests and a multiplicity of actors that include industry and consumers. 
Effectiveness of regulation in turn, is (or should) be analysed within the parameters 
of the mechanisms provided by such permissive regimes. Absence of specific 
provisions on the precautionary approach as provided by Art.1 and 10 (6) of the 
Protocol or in similar terms, may mislead the general public to think that regulation is 
an exclusive realm of science.  This is not the case because, to the  contrary, the 
precautionary approach does not devalue science.24  It instead offers governments 
wide flexibility in choosing appropriate action, once taking some measures becomes 
necessary.25 
Problems arise however when comparing the thresholds provided for by the 
biosafety legislation of South Africa and Kenya as against the spirit and thresholds of 
the international regime as provided for by the Protocol to which both countries are 
parties. By agreeing to the precautionary approach, the parties established binding 
minimum criteria and standards for international regulation of biotechnology. Both 
South Africa and Kenya are therefore bound to comply with the Protocol. In 
attempting to comply with its obligations, South Africa enacted the Genetically 
Modified Organisms Amendment Act26 ‘so as to give effect to the Protocol pertaining 
to genetically modified organisms to which South Africa is a party’.27 
Like the parent Act, the GMO Amendment Act does not specifically provide for 
the precautionary approach, but implicitly reflects it in risk management. Thus it is 
plausible to argue that the GMO Amendment Act reflects, at least in part, a political 
arrangement intended to convince the general public and the international 
community that South Africa is keen to comply with its obligations under international 
Law.  Moreover, the way a particular technology apportions risks and benefits, the 
                                                 
24 Hunter D et al (n3) at 479. 
25 Ibid at 478. 
26 No 23 of 2006 Republic of South Africa. 












social and political interests that technology might favour and the real purpose of the 
technology are political questions28 to be determined by government. 
Absence of provisions on the precautionary approach (save for precaution 
attributable to risk assessment), the gaps in the GMO Act may be remedied by 
provisions in other legislation.  These include the environmental right provided for by 
the Constitution;29 the principles of environmental protection under NEMA (two of 
which are that, a risk-averse and cautious approach shall be taken and decisions be 
taken in an open and transparent manner in particular);30 the relevant provisions 
under the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act31 and the 
Consumer Protection Act.32 These provisions may appear to fill the gaps and also 
provide limitations in the GMO Act but a careful analysis suggests otherwise. For 
example, NEMBA requires that no permit for the release of GMO may be issued 
under the GMO Act where the Minister ‘has reason to believe that the release of a 
genetically modified organism into the environment…may pose a threat to any 
indigenous species or the environment…unless an environmental impact 
assessment has been conducted’ in accordance with chapter five of NEMA as if 
such a release were a listed activity contemplated in that chapter.33 The irony is that 
under NEMA GMOs are listed as activities that require basic assessment34 as 
opposed to a full environmental impact assessment. 
The Consumer Protection Act35 makes provision for labelling GMOs, but the 
Regulations made under the Act, provide for labelling for goods or products that 
‘contain at least 5 per cent’ GMOs.36 Products containing less than one per cent 
                                                 
28 Lee M  ‘Beyond Safety? The broadening Scope of Risk Regulation’ 62 Current Legal Problems 
(2009) 242-285 at 243 
29 Section 24 Constitution Act No 108 of 1996 Republic of South Africa 
30 Section 2 National Environmental Management Act No 107 of 1998 Republic of South Africa.  
31 No 10 of 2004 Republic of South Africa. 
32 Act No 68 of 2008 Republic of South Africa. 
33 Section 78(1) of the National Environmental Management : Biodiversity Act No 10 of 2004 Republic 
of South Africa. 
34 Regulation 25 of Environmental Impact Assessment published in Gazette Notice No 33306 of 18 
June 2010 (made under the National Environmental Management Act No 107 of 1998) that took effect 
on 2 August 2010. (See Gazette Notice Listing Notice No 1 of 2010 published in Gazette Notice No 
333411 of 30 July 2010). 
35 No 68 of 2008 Republic of South Africa. 
36 Section 7(3) of the Regulations contained in Government Gazette No 34180 of 1 April 2011 
Republic of South Africa. The Regulations are yet to take effect.  Section 7 (10) of the regulations 
requires the regulations to take effect six months after commencement of the Act which Act took 












GMO need not be labelled.37 This may create confusion as to the permissible 
thresholds for labelling because if Parliament intended that products containing more 
than one per cent should be labelled, there was no need of making provision relating 
to ‘at least five per cent’. It further provides that where it is scientifically impracticable 
or not feasible to test the percentage of GMO ingredients a product contains, such a 
product must be labelled ‘[m]ay contain genetically modified ingredients’.38 This  
thesis argues that this provision is problematic as it gives stakeholders such as the 
investers and producers of GMOs, a leeway to further protect their interests.  
Moreover, scientists do innovation, thetesting of GMOs and often  form the majority 
of the decision-making bodies.  Some of them may have vested interests and often 
work closely with the proponents.39 It is thus tenable to argue the GMO Act and the 
other legislation (such as NEMA and NEMBA) systematically seek to safeguard the 
interests of the proponents. 
The GMO Act of South Africa was seemingly ‘based on an expert-ruled 
policy’.40 This suggests that the Act was influenced by an ‘early narrow framing often 
exercised by experts’ before issues of safety became part of the political agenda.41 It 
may thus be argued that public participation was limited compared to the situation 
today.  Moreover, the Act was enacted to facilitate commercial release of transgenic 
crops as the lawmakers were struggling to keep pace with scientific innovation that 
had already taken place in agricultural biotechnology.42 In addition, the country had 
attained constitutional democracy barely three years before adoption of the GMO 
Act. Hence, the Act was passed at a time when most institutions of government and 
the people were arguably preoccupied with issues associated with the newly attained 
democracy. 
                                                 
37 Section 7(6) of the Regulations (n36). 
38 Ibid section 7(8) of the Regulations (n36). 
39 See the discussion at (2.6.7). 
40 Aerni P and Bernauer T ‘Stakeholders Attitudes Toward GMOs in the Philippines, Mexico and 
South Africa: The Issue of Public Trust’ 34 (3) World Development (2006) 557-575 at 557.  The Policy 
referred to is the National Biotechnology Strategy for South Africa (June 2001). 
41 Anderson K, Britt-Marie and Drottz-Sjöberg et al ‘Models of Transparency and Accountability in the 
Biotech Age’ 26 (46) Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society (2006) Bulletin of Science 
Technology and Society (2006):45-56 at54. 
42 Cooke J and Downie R ‘African Perspectives on Genetically Modified Crops’ A Report  for the 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2010) available at www.csis.org  












Being a party to the CBD,43 South Africa enacted the GMO Act about four 
years of the Convention’s entry into force.  The country had already started 
conducting laboratory experiments of Bt maize and Bt cotton; enactment of the Act 
was therefore intended to make their commercial release possible.  Further, 
enactment of the Act was in compliance with the provisions of Art. 8 (g) of the CBD, 
which sought to ensure that parties embraced biotechnology responsibly.44  The Act 
was therefore enacted at a time when implementation of the CBD was yet to be 
realised by many African countries, in respect of the regulation of biotechnology. 
Enactment of such a regime was also critical as it took place at a time when the 
parties to the CBD were preparing a protocol on biosafety. By 2000 when the 
Protocol was adopted, South Africa did not need new legislation but instead sought 
to amend the GMO Act, in order to comply with its obligations under the Protocol. 
Cumulatively, the GMO Act implicitly reflects the precautionary approach, 
rather than specifically providing for it in the same manner as the wording of the 
Protocol. In addition, the Regulations45 under the GMO Act, explicitly empower the 
Council to impose further mechanisms where appropriate (in respect of risk 
management), in addition to mechanisms, measures and strategies proposed by the 
applicant. Regulation 9 also provides for an elaborate procedure, the outcome of 
which would be improved public participation. 
7.3.1.2 Kenya 
Like South Africa, the Biosafety Act of Kenya has no substantive provisions on the 
precautionary approach, similar to the wording of the Protocol. This commonality in 
the two countries’ approaches in relation to the precautionary approach, raises a 
number of pertinent questions including what were the driving forces behind the 
drafting of the Biosafety Act of Kenya; why should a process spanning the period 
1999-2009 come up with a piece of legislation that falls below the minimum criteria 
set by the Protocol and whether the approach taken by South Africa had a role to 
play. 
                                                 
43 South Africa signed the Convention on Biological Diversity on 4 June 1993 and ratified it on 2 
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44 See the discussion at (4.2). 













At the outset, it is important to note that, unlike South Africa where the 
strategy preceded the GMO Act, the Biosafety Act of Kenya46 was drafted in the 
absence of both a biotechnology policy and strategy.47 Even so, the policy published 
in 2006 had ten objectives, key of which were to ‘prioritize, promote, and coordinate 
research in basic and applied sciences in biotechnology and to create enabling 
administrative and legal frameworks for biotechnology development and 
commercialization’.48 Since the Biosafety Bill preceded the policy, it may imply  that 
the latter shed light on the former. Instead of legislation being guided by policy, the 
vice-versa was the case. 
Like the GMO Act of South Africa, the Biosafety Act of Kenya has no specific 
provisions embracing the precautionary approach.  It instead implicitly reflects it 
within its risk management procedures.49 Absence of specific provisions on the 
precautionary approach in both the policy and the Act and taking into account that 
the Act was drafted independent of the policy yet both promote a permissive 
approach to biotechnology strongly suggests that the permissiveness was the 
ultimate goal of the drafters. Moreover the policy is said to have been influenced by 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)50 among other 
proponents of GM technology in Kenya. 
Kenya chose to enact a new law (the Biosafety Act No 2 of 2009) to regulate 
GMOs as opposed to amending existing law. By 2003 some experts in government 
and others had expressed the view that adapting existing laws (as was the case in 
the USA) was less expensive and less time consuming but it could lead to regulatory 
gaps and redundancies.51 This was four years after the initiative to enact biosafety 
legislation had started and it was the year the Protocol entered into force. The 
                                                 
46 Act No 2 of 2009 Republic of Kenya. The first Biosafety Bill in Kenya was drafted  in 2003. 
47 Karembu M Otunga D and Wafula D ‘Developing a Biosafety Law: Lessons from Kenyan 
Experience’ (2010):1-61 at 11 available at www.isaaa.org (accessed 8 August 2010). 
48 A National Biotechnology Development Policy 2006 Republic of Kenya available at 
www.biosafetykenya.co.ke (accessed 12 October 2010). 
 
49 See the discussion at (5.3.1). 
50 See ‘Africa Developing Biosafety Regulations for GMOs’ available at 
http://www.organicconsumers.org/ge/africa102703.cfm (accessed 14 July 2010). 
51 Traynor P and Macharia H ‘An analysis of the Biosafety system for Biotechnology in Kenya: 
Application of a Conceptual Framework’ (2003):25 A Report prepared for the International Service for 
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assertion by these experts created the impression that the country was keen to 
develop a holistic biosafety regime. A holistic biosafety regime is arguably one that is 
based on the precautionary approach covering all activities from research and 
development (R&D) to commercialization and post-release monitoring. 
Kenya was one of the countries that attracted Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF)52 funding within the context of the development of National Biosafety 
Frameworks (NBF) that started in 2001. The GEF is the designated financial 
mechanism of the CBD and the Protocol.53 The United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) is the GEF’s main implementing Agency in respect to 
development of NBFs in developing countries54. Other Agencies include the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank (which acts as 
trustee55). 
The GEF Initial Strategy had three objectives, namely assisting countries to 
prepare for the entry into force of the Protocol through stablishment of national 
biosafety frameworks (including strengthening capacity for risk assessment and 
increased stakeholder participation); promoting information sharing and collaboration 
at regional and sub regional level among countries that share similar ecosystems 
and promoting identification, collaboration and partnerships with bilateral and 
multilateral organizations.56 
By 2002, soon after the NBF initiative was put in place, UNEP launched a 
$38.4 million scheme to help establish 100 biosafety bodies in developing 
countries.57 Critics of the GEF project argued that the money was too little to achieve 
                                                 
52 Established in 1991, the GEF is currently the largest funder of projects to improve the global 
environment.  See ‘Global Environmental Facility: Investing in our Planet’ available at www.thegef.org 
(accessed 7 September 2009). 
53 See ‘Evaluation of the GEF Support to Biosafety’ (2006):5 available at www.gef.org (accessed 20 
May 2009). 
54 See ‘A Comparative Analysis of Experiences and Lessons From the UNEP_GEF Biosafety 
Projects’ (2006):6 UNEP-GEF Unit available at www.gef.org (accessed 15 July 2010). 
55 Chazournes ‘The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) A Unique and Crucial Institution’ 14(3) 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2005) 193-201 at 194. For 
further information about GEF see Clemencon R ‘What Future for the Global Environmental Facility?’ 
15(1) Journal of Environment and Development (2006) 50-74. 
56 See ‘Global Environmental Facility: Initial Strategy for Assisting Countries to Prepare for Entry Into 
Force of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’ (2000) available at 
ww.unep.org/biosafety/Documents/GEF_strategy.pdf 
http://www.unep.org/biosafety/Documents/GEF_strategy.pdf  (accessed 12 August 2011). 












any meaningful purpose and that the main focus of the project was financial 
enticement to ‘buy ratifications’ for a Protocol that was not enjoying much support.58 
The consultants seconded to UNEP denied the ‘buying ratifications’ allegation and 
argued that the project was an incentive for countries to think harder on the 
implications of the Protocol.59 Nonetheless, the GEF project was therefore 
instrumental in assisting Kenya to develop biosafety legislation. 
The heated debate among proponents and opponents did not spare the GEF 
support for NBFs. The opponents saw GEF as being in favour of biotechnology 
industry while the proponents saw it as being against industry. At its November 2004 
meeting, the GEF Council requested an evaluation of GEF activities financed under 
the GEF’s Initial Strategy. This culminated in a 2006 report which exonerated the 
GEF from the claims of lack of neutrality in carrying out its mandate.60 
The government of Kenya seemed to be torn between the two opposing camps.  
The US led group of countries including Canada on on  hand, and the one led by the 
EU on the other.61 Both were said to be working ‘behind the scenes, trying to 
influence the government to either put or remove certain things in the proposed 
Biosafety policy and law to accommodate their interests’.62 For example, analysts 
claim that the proponents wanted to ensure no labelling while the opponents insisted 
on inclusion of such provisions.63 The proponents of biotechnology in Kenya sought 
a permissive regime while opponents sought a strict regime, thus placing the 
government in a dilemma. It did not want to rush the matter for fear that it may ‘burn 
its fingers or hurt other stakeholders’.64 This suggests that the government was 
unable to take a decision on whether the country was to adopt a permissive or a 
strict biosafety regime. 




60 See ‘Evaluation of the GEF Support to Biosafety’ (2006) available at www.gef.org  
(accessed 20 May 2009). 
61 Okwemba A ‘Kenya: Intrigues Behind Biosafety Bill’ (2006) available at 
http://www.checkbiotech.org/ (accessed 12 August 2010). 
62 Ibid. 













This dilemma seems to have been a departure from the attitude displayed in 
August 2005 when the Agriculture Secretary ordered the destruction of all Bt maize 
crops undergoing field trials because their adverse environmental impact had not 
been fully assessed. The Secretary further noted that there was an emerging 
tendency of local scientists succumbing to pressure from international collaborators 
(the Secretary never disclosed) who sought to expedite approvals for their research 
in disregard to established procedures.65  She/he did not disclose names of the 
alleged collaborators. 
Table 1 
GM activity Stage of development Collaborative Partners 
Sweet potato engineered for 
disease resistance 
Contained laboratory and 
confined field trials 
Kenya Agricultural Research 
Institute (KARI), Monsanto, 
Agricultural Biotechnology 
Support programme (ABSP), 
International Service for 
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech 
Applications (ISAAA), 
Michigan State University, 
Kenyan universities 
Bt maize-IRMA project 
engineered for resistance to 
insects (African maize stem 
borer 
Contained laboratory and 
green house and confined 
field trial 
KARI, International Maize 
and Wheat Improvement 
Centre (CIMMYT), Syngenta, 
Rockefeller Foundation, 
United States Agency for 
International Development 
(USAID), Kenyan universities 
Cassava engineered for 
cassava mosaic disease 
(CDM) resistance-African 
Cassava Mosaic virus and 
East African Mosaic virus 
Contained laboratory and 
green house application has 
been pending for confined 
field trials 
KARI, Danforth Center-USA, 
USAID, Cornell University, 
ISAAA and Kenyan 
universities 
Bt cotton engineered for 
insect resistance-cotton 
bollworm 
Contained greenhouse and 
field trials 
KARI, Delta-Pine South 
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Table 1 on the previous page (adapted from Kingiri and Ayele (2009)66 gives an 
indication of some of the international collaborators involved in GMO activities in the 
country. 
Considering the time taken,67 the expenses incurred by these international 
collaborators in funding research activities and the nature of multinational 
corporations in general (discussed earlier), it is tenable to conclude that these 
collaborators and other proponents of biotechnology may have put pressure on the 
government to enact weak biosafety legislation. 
In May 2006 a high level delegation of Members of Parliament (MPs) from 
Kenya and Malawi visited GM farms in South Africa68. The trip was organised at a 
time when the two countries were debating bills that would allow commercialisation 
of GMOs.69 Observers claim that the US producers of genetically modified corn 
(USGC) influenced the passing of the Kenyan Bill; USGC alleges that the Bill was a 
direct result of many years of work promoting biotechnology in the East African 
region.70 
At the end of the trip, those MPs resolved to fast-track the introduction of 
GMOs into their respective countries.71 Fast-tracking seems to have become a 
reality in Kenya especially because of the haste with which the Bill was introduced 
into Parliament as the coalition government was struggling to consolidate its unity 
and legitimacy following the 2007-2008 post election violence. 
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It is not surprising that soon after the Act was enacted GM maize imported 
from South Africa was allegedly already on the market in Kenya72 and even though 
the Act was yet to become operational in the absence of the relevant regulations. 
Taking into account the permissive nature of the legislation finally enacted, one can 
conclude that the proponents of biotechnology won the ‘battle’, but perhaps not the 
‘war’ against GMOs in Kenya. As Karembu and others note, the Act was a ‘sweet 
victory for the Biosafety Consortium members and for science, technology and 
innovation in Kenya’.73 Additionally, the Assent for the Act given by the President on 
12 February 2009 was applauded by those who had been involved in the process of 
developing the biosafety legislation, thus: 
‘a palpable wave of excitement was felt in the hearts and offices of those who 
had been involved in the development and passage of the Biosafety Bill, 2009... 
One would not imagine that a signature on a 43-page document would mean 
much...’74 
However, some scholars including Kingiri argue that the regulatory process was 
limited in scope as it did not sufficiently address issues concerning public 
participation, representation and potential manipulation by actors with vested 
interests.75 
Currently public opinion is however still divided on the risks and benefits of 
GM crops and competing political priorities may slow full implementation of the Act.76 
An obvious example is the priority given to the implementation of the new 
Constitution.77 By seemingly being one-sided, the Act failed to reconcile the 
‘scientific push for innovation and the legal system’s concern for precedent’78. 
Moreover, enactment of a permissive regime does not necessarily mean that the 
opponents ceased to exist. While resistance to GMOs in Kenya persists and it 
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seems to be growing,79 there is disagreement on the most suitable way of 
introducing GMOs into the country.80  A win by proponents essentially results in a 
shift of the struggle from institutional governance to the public arena and the courts. 
The Act became operational on 1 July 2011. Essentially, this makes it 
possible for the NBA to allow commercial release including importation of GMOs into 
the country.81  Commencement in the absence of regulations to be made under s.51 
of the Act, raises questions, the key one being why would the Minister bring the Act 
into operation in such circumstances. It is also an indication of lack of transparency 
in decision-making.  In addition, it is widely believed by the general public that millers 
had seemingly taken advantage of the ongoing food shortages to import GM maize 
from South Africa and Europe before the Act became operational.82 
By way of contrast, South Africa did not bring the GMO Act into effect without 
the enabling regulations. This thesis takes the view that by bringing the Biosafety Act 
of Kenya into effect in such circumstances, the Minister seemingly acted in bad faith. 
This may set a bad example to countries, such as Namibia, where regulations are 
yet to be approved. 
Six weeks after making the Act operational, the Minister published the 
Regulations,83 which seek to ensure safe movement of GMOs into and out of Kenya 
while protecting human health and the environment.84 They prohibit importation of 
GMOs without authorisation.85 In the event of unauthorised importation, the NBA 
‘shall initiate remedial actions such as refusal of entry, destruction or set conditions 
of use...and may ‘inform and advise’ the public of such GMOs.86 In contrast to the 
Regulations under the GMO Act of South Africa, the Kenyan Regulations have no 
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2011). 
80 See ‘Dialogue Key to GMO Introduction, Say Scholars’ (2011) Standard Newspaper (Kenya) 
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July).  
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provisions on aspects such as risk assessment, risk management and public 
participation. 
The over simplicity and lack of detail of these Regulations confirm both the 
haste with which they were drafted and the argument raised above in respect of the 
actions of bad faith on the part of the Minister.87 In addition, by empowering the NBA 
to set conditions for the use of unauthorised GMOs, the Regulations contradict the 
parent Act that places emphasis on transparent science based criteria for regulation.  
The Regulations also offends the Protocol which requires that illegal importations of 
LMOs be disposed of by ‘repatriation or destruction, as appropriate’ at the expense 
of the country of origin.88 Further the Regulations supersede the Act that has no 
provisions on illegal importations, save for the requirement that all GMO activities 
require written approval.89 
In the absence of any legally convincing grounds, it appears that the Minister 
approved the flawed Regulations with the possible ulterior motive of legalising the 
GMO maize that may have been ordered into the country illegally. Should this be the 
case, the flawed Regulations, are, at the very least, an afterthought and thus 
unsupportable in law.  It would be difficult to convince many that such Regulations 
were subjected to public scrutiny. 
The study notes two other glaring anomalies in s. 2 of the Act.  It defines 
“genetically modified organism” as ‘any organism that posses a novel combination of 
genetic material obtained through the use of biotechnology techniques’.90 The thesis 
submits that use of the word ‘techniques’ at the end of the definition is unnecessary 
and may cause confusion because biotechnology involves the use of various 
techniques of which genetic engineering is key.  The second one relates to the 
definition of  “modern biotechnology” as one that includes the application of — 
a) in-vitro nucleic acid techniques including the use of ...(DNA) and direct injection 
of nuclei acid into cells or organelles; or 
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b) fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome natural 
physiological, reproductive and recombination barriers and which are not 
techniques used in traditional breeding and selection;91 
The Protocol recognises that the processes involved in both (a) and (b) are those 
that overcome natural barriers and are not used in traditional breeding and selection.  
Integrating the (italicised) qualifying words with (b) to the exclusion of the techniques 
in (a) is inconsistent with the Protocol which recognises that the qualifying words 
apply to the techniques in (a) and (b).  Moreover the separation is unreasonable as 
both processes do not use traditional breeding or selection.  Thus the section should 
be amended to read as follows: 
a) In-vitro..... 
b) fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family’ 
that overcome natural physiological, reproductive and recombination barriers and 
which are not techniques used in traditional breeding and selection; 
The third shortcoming relates to the objective92 where the Act refers to genetically 
modified organisms leaving out the important words ‘and its products’, which would 
represent the non-living component of regulation. By so doing, the Act creates an 
impression that it applies to living modified organisms (LMOs) rather than LMOs and 
their products. Thus, it creates an impression that it is intended to regulate GMOs 
when, in fact, its objective seems to be limited to LMOs leaving out their products 
such as maize flour, which constitutes large portions of imports.  The reference to 
LMOs is consistent with the objective of the Protocol but the Act clearly seeks to 
regulate GMOs.93 
These anomalies in the Act confirm the haste with which Parliament passed 
the Act, much the same way the Minister brought it into effect, in the absence of the 
enabling regulations.  In addition, analysts claim that the Kenyan Biosafety Bill94 was 
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shrouded in secrecy.95 Such anomalies adversely affect the credibility of the Act, 
raising questions that include the interests both the drafters and parliament seek to 
protect. Importantly, it suggests that there is a need for the lawmakers (including 
drafters of Bills) to engage more closely with issues concerning the GMO 
controversy. This should be done in a manner that may enable them to appreciate, 
even more, the importance of enacting credible biosafety legislation, for the benefit 
of all stakeholders. With that understanding, making provisions specifically 
embracing the precautionary approach may become easier. 
Developments in GMO activities in Kenya may have an impact on other states 
in the East African region. For example, in Uganda a GM banana has already been 
developed and is awaiting commercial release,96 the same way as it is happening in 
Kenya where GM crops such as maize were ready for commercialisation but 
awaiting legislation to be in place.  Proponents argue that the GM banana will 
contribute to the alleviation of poverty as well as compliance with the Millennium 
Development Goals and overall sustainable socio-economic development.97 
After adoption of the biosafety legislation in Kenya, the attention of USAID, 
GEF and other proponents of biotechnology is now concentrated on Uganda. The 
Biosafety Bill 2008 is awaiting Cabinet approval.  Critics of the Bill argue that it is 
almost a duplicate of the Kenyan Act and with no provisions on the precautionary 
approach. 98 One would conclude that the two were drafted by the same persons.99 
In addition, the Ugandan Bill has little or no resemblance to African Model Law on 
Biosafety (AML).100 
Over the years, Tanzania seems to have adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach in 
relation to biotechnology pending developments in Kenya.101 This attitude seems to 
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be changing rapidly, particularly after Kenya adopted its biosafety legislation. In June 
2011, a study carried out by the Oakland Institute revealed that proponents are 
starting large genetically modified (GM) based food projects in Tanzania at refugee 
camps in Lugufu Kigoma province, and Katumba as well as Mishamo both in Rukwa 
province. These projects promise increased food production, in which an acre is 
expected to yield 195 bushels as opposed to non-GM crops that currently yield 17.5 
bushels. Apparently, the Local people have not been consulted and have no 
bargaining power.102 
Introduction of GMOs into Tanzania in such circumstances, and in the 
absence of biosafety legislation, raises pertinent issues. Most notable are those 
pertaining to the ability of African governments to ‘regulate, to correct, to protect, to 
resist...’ and leaving biotechnology conglomerates (such as Monsanto and 
Syngenta) and other proponents to ‘redirect flows of finance, knowledge and food to 
suit themselves’.103 Within this context, it is no wonder that proponents dictate the 
terms of involvement of the people and by implication, the government, which is 
pressurised to enact special laws that permit GMOs.104 Such developments may 
easily amount to an abuse of the process which should result in enacting credible 
biosafety regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The thesis argues that using hunger 
to push for GMOs in the apparent absence of public involvement is likely to attract a 
strong backlash from the public. To the contrary, public participation could in the long 
term be very supportive of the introduction of the appropriate GMOs. 
7.3.1.3 Namibia 
In 2002, Namibia rejected GM food Aid provided by the USA (unless milled) during 
the food shortages in southern Africa.105 This was evidence of the political will to 
adopt a precautionary approach to biotechnology. However, the country’s Biosafety 
Act enacted 2006 has no specific provisions embracing the precautionary approach. 
It instead requires the Minister to ensure that the dealings in the GMO or GMO 
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product ‘will be in the public interest’ before the Minister issues a permit. As 
discussed earlier,106 public interest is a concept subject to many interpretations, 
which may complicate regulation.  This thesis argues that in the absence of specific 
provisions on the precautionary approach, considerations of public interest give the 
decision-maker wide but not unlimited discretion in deciding whether or not to issue a 
permit. 
Overall however, even with such favourable legislation, GMO activities appear 
to be slow due to many factors, including lack of sufficient institutional and human 
resource capacity107 and of funding. The regulations made under s. 49 of the Act are 
pending approval before the Minister.108 Based on those factors, it is plausible to 
argue that having a permissive regime is not a guarantee that GMO activities will 
flourish in Africa. Sufficient capacity building and investment is needed. 
7.3.2 Strict Regimes 
A classic example of a strict biosafety regimes is one of Zambia. In 2002 there were 
severe food shortages that threatened the lives of more than 14 million people in 
southern Africa. The shortages were attributable to a complex web of factors 
including drought, HIV/AIDS, structural adjustments,109 debt, collapsing public 
services and poor governance.110 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
international relief bodies including the World Food Program (WFP) appealed to 
developed countries for financial assistance.111 
The USA respo ded expeditiously and by August 2002, it had provided three 
quarters of the donations received.112 It provided the Aid in kind however by way of 
GM (yellow) maize. That triggered protests from the government of Zambia,113 which 
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in turn, requested that organic food be bought locally, a request the USA rejected on 
the grounds that it had bought the maize using tax payers money.114 The Zambian 
rejection was based a number of reasons including that GMOs would lead to: an 
increase in herbicide use; dominance of corporate monopoly; reduce emphasis on 
sustainable agriculture; potential environmental problems and loss of European 
markets.115 
Zambia’s opposition, even with the 2002 hunger crisis in the country, presents 
an extreme contrast in the development of biosafety legislation with that in the other 
selected countries. Opposition from non-governmental organisations and a fact-
finding mission to Europe by local civic groups and scientists exacerbated existing 
scepticism about GMOs.116 After visiting India, South Africa and Europe the group 
concluded that ‘GMOs are a health hazard’.117 Taking this view into account and the 
public debate concerning GMOs, the government decided to embrace the 
precautionary approach.118 The then President (Mwanawasa) openly declared that 
‘we may be poor and experiencing food shortages ... but are not ready to expose 
people to ill-defined risks... I am not prepared to accept that we should use our 
people as guinea pigs’119 no matter the level of hunger in the country. 120 
The hunger debate however ‘shifted to focus on socio-political and historical 
issues, and was marked by the sharp tone of statements concerned with colonial 
and apartheid legacies, and to some extent with the techno-scientific vulnerability of 
the region’.121 Most importantly, the government raised economic concerns arguing 
that GM crops may subsequently contaminate local non-GM crops and become a 
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barrier to Zambian agricultural exports to Europe122 which maintained stringent 
guidelines on GMOs.123 
Having found itself in a dilemma between international trade and sustainable 
agriculture, the government rejected the GM maize (including milled maize).124 It 
took the view that international trade superseded the urgency of hunger.125 Its  
refusal increased tension and accusations between the proponents of GMOs in the 
USA and the opponents of biotechnology in non-governmental organisations and the 
EU.126 In the continuing tension, the USA claimed that the refusal by the EU to certify 
GM food as safe made the latter culpable in the African food crisis and provided part 
of the justification127 for filing the 2003 Biotech case128  before the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The USA was further angered by Egypt’s withdrawal as a co-
complainant in the Biotech case due to the need to protect its fresh fruits and 
vegetable exports to European markets.129 
On the one hand, by rejecting GMOs, the government of Zambia sought to 
protect the long-term interests of the country,130 - international trade in particular. On 
the other the National Farmers Union of Zambia claimed that the USA was using the 
famine to expand the market for the American biotechnology industry, thus reframing 
the debate into ‘a theory of collusion between the US and multinationals’.131 Analysts 
viewed these claims as a political-economic move that brought into question 
relations between Western powers, global capital and foreign investment.132 The 
American government rejected the claim by the National Farmers Union of Zambia 
arguing that Zambians should instead appreciate the efforts of the USA government 
in responding to the crisis. The latter rejected the claim by the National Farmers 
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Union on the grounds that  it was spending its tax payers money to supply the 
food.133 
Zambia’s approach was in contrast to Kenya where some MPs (as opposed to 
Zambia’s experts) visited South Africa in 2006 and upon their return, they vigorously 
supported the passing of the Biosafety Bill 2007. They further urged the Finance 
Minister to allocate enough funds for bringing the Act into operation in 2008, even as 
the Bill was undergoing debate.134 In Zambia, the panel of scientists who went on a 
fact finding mission to South Africa and other countries in Europe, concluded that 
GMOs were potentially harmful. Relying on the scientific advice of the panel, the 
government relied on the precautionary approach  to reject GMOs. Another tactic the 
government seemingly used was to actively marginalise the views of those who 
sought to promote GMOs.135 
The government regarded the GM food issue as a matter of national concern 
in which it apparently played the critical role of leading opposition to such food. 
Triggered by the hunger crisis in a region that was hitherto a bread basket for the 
country, the competing interests of proponents and opponents of biotechnology 
came face to face. Insistence by the American government to provide GM food 
rather than funds for the purchase of organic foods locally and the risk of losing its 
European markets if it accepted such food, ultimately placed Zambia at the 
crossroads between addressing the immediate hunger problem and safeguarding 
the long- term commercial interests. By giving priority to the commercial interests, it 
would be reasonable to conclude that Zambia seems to have succumbed to advice 
(and possibly pressure) from the EU to reject the GM food. Rejection does not 
necessarily mean that Zambia would be a GM free zone, particularly because 
neighbouring countries such as Swaziland accepted the whole grain - without being 
milled,136 and if planted could be a source of gene flow. 
The hunger crisis in Zambia provides a classic example of the manner, extent 
and success with which protagonists have sought to test the balance of power in the 
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global GMO controversy. The hunger crisis merely triggered emotions about an 
already contested issue concerning the risks and benefits of biotechnology. The 
ensuing conflict on whether GM food was potentially harmful or safe exacerbated the 
hunger crisis. Importantly however, it shifted the focus from the hunger crisis to the 
underlying fundamental issues that underpin regulation of biotechnology: how to 
establish and maintain an acceptable balance between safety of GMOs and 
international trade in general. 
Ultimately, the government gave priority to commercial interests and took an 
early stand, thus leading the opposition by rejecting the GM food. It sought to justify 
rejection on grounds of potential harm, thereby evading part of the problem, namely 
the influence by the EU. Zambia’s rejection was a win for the opponents of 
biotechnology.  Arguably, the resulting WTO Biotech case was partly intended to 
teach the EU a lesson. 
The strict biosafety regime developed by Zambia is therefore  a manifestation 
of the struggle for the balance of power that was triggered by the 2002 hunger crisis. 
The legislation amounts to overregulation yet there is no guarantee that Zambia is a 
GM free zone as pollen is not a respecter of political boundaries.  Acceptance of GM 
food by Swaziland and the willingness of Mozambique (which borders Zambia to the 
North-West and South Africa to the South) to allow such food to be transported 
through its territory (on condition that it was covered and milled)137 rules out any 
guarantee that Zambia is or will remain a GM free zone. 
While the government had taken a strict view in favour of regulation, the 
country seems to be moving slowly towards embracing GMOs. It has developed a 
GMO laboratory system at Mount Makulu under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Science Technology and Vocational Training.138 This suggests that it seeks to build 
appropriate capacity in the testing of GMOs before allowing their commercial release 
– a process that seems to have discouraged investments in biotechnology, hence, 
the slow pace of GM technology in the country. 
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The slow pace of GMO activities in Zambia is an indication of failure on the 
part of the government to commence capacity building initiatives. This would include 
empowering local scientists to carry out objective research that would ultimately 
justify the strict stand taken by government concerning GMOs. Due to the strict 
stand, not many R&D activities in biotechnology took place during the period 2002 to 
2010. At the same time, there is no indication that production of conventional food 
increased as many of the country’s people are still  starving as in many other 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This argument does not nor is it intended to resolve 
the question whether or not biotechnology would have solved the hunger problem. 
Rather, capacity building and empowering local scientists could possibly have 
justified rejection of GMOs on grounds of safety instead of taking sides in the 
transatlantic divide on GMOs. One of the main reasons is because these issues are 
not only interlinked but also highly political.139 
Current developments suggest that the pace of biotechnology development in 
Zambia may improve soon. In a recent meeting of stakeholders on biotechnology 
and biosafety held on 8 October 2010 in Zambia, groups such as the Cotton 
Development Trust, the Cotton Association of Zambia and representatives of 
smallholder farmers strongly appealed to the Biosafety Authorities to approve trials 
of Bt cotton. They urged the government to learn from experiences in Uganda and 
Kenya both of which have been conducting trials of GM crops thus building biosafety 
capacity in an incremental manner. 
The then Deputy Minister for Science and Technology, Lameck Mangani, 
expressed the view that Zambia needs to rise above the ideological divide on 
biotechnology and work in partnership with stakeholders towards what is rational and 
of benefit to the country’s future.140 This leaves the question unanswered as to 
whether the apparent slight change of attitude is coming too late in much the same 
way as whether the guinea pig allegations are still valid or not. 
The slow approach adopted by Zambia shows a diametric contrast to the 
rapid development of GM technology in South Africa and Kenya. These varying 
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approaches are an indication that most African countries are willing to embrace GM 
technology in their agricultural practices with inevitable differences in the pace they 
take to achieve the intended objectives. Countries that adopt a precautionary 
approach such as Zambia go at a slow pace and hardly attract substantial private 
investment while countries with permissive regimes such as South Africa and Kenya 
may benefit from such investements and become demonstration centres for GMO 
activities in the relevant regions. 
Arguably, long-term experimentation and consumption of GM food coupled 
with effective communication of potential risks and benefits may result in more 
home-grown GMO activities and reduced resistance in SSA. 
7.4 Main Findings of the Study 
Having analysed the issues raised and also accounted for the emerging trends in 
implementation of the precautionary approach in the selected countries, the study 
makes findings as follows. 
7.4.1 The implementation of the precautionary approach is obligatory but it is 
not a Panacea for Solving the GMO Controversy in SSA 
This thesis finds that while the implementation of the precautionary approach 
consistent with the Protocol is obligatory, it is not a panacea for solving the GMO 
controversy in SSA.  First, extreme stand points for or against GMOs may not be 
helpful in this twenty first century, as they take political dimensions that attract 
entities and multinational companies with varying interests over GMO activities.  
Moreover, ‘such mismatched opponents cannot generate balance, which depends, 
above all, on equality of knowledge by both parties’.141 These standpoints may thus 
delay or even divert attention of many countries from immediate need of making 
informed decisions on the most suitable way of embracing biotechnology. Moreover, 
biotechnology cannot solve all the problems of the environment and development, 
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thus calling for a realistic approach by governments in seeking to meet peoples’ 
expectations.142 
Second, to be meaningful, the precautionary approach must  effectively be 
implemented in decision-making.  Some of the countries including South Africa, 
Kenya and Namibia have implicitly reflected it in the risk management procedures.  
While these countries embrace precaution as part of risk assessment, the irony is 
that the biosafety legislation in those countries falls short of making specific 
provisions embracing the approach. Importantly, the relevance of the approach can 
only be tested within the context of the extent to which it may be used in decision-
making in a manner that may achieve an effective balance between safety of the 
environment and humans on one hand and investment in biotechnology on the other. 
7.4.2 Implementation of the precautionary approach or its absence reveals the 
reality of the global GMO controversy in SSA 
One of the key assumptions that form an integral part of the conceptual framework of 
this study is that GMOs remain a contentious issue globally. This assertion was 
based on the historical opposition to GMOs especially in Europe – opposition that 
immensely influenced negotiations on the Protocol. However, learning about the 
GMO controversy in distant parts of the developed world in the latter part of the 
twentieth century is one thing and experiencing how such a controversy manifests 
itself closer to home in parts of African is another. The former provides the historical, 
socio-economic and political context within which the Protocol was adopted. The 
latter reveals the reality of the GMO debate on the ground ie the practical aspects 
arising from domestic implementation of the Protocol in an African context. These 
two aspects provide a contrast that serves two important purposes. 
First, adoption of the Protocol was dictated by political and diplomatic factors 
that resulted in a compromise agreement. Second, domestic implementation of the 
Protocol reveals realistically, the attitude of individual states towards biotechnology. 
By examining domestic implementation of the precautionary approach from a 
comparative perspective, this study finds that domestic biosafety legislation is a 
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powerful tool for assessing not only the functionality of the Protocol, but also how 
and the extent to which Parties - the developing countries in particular - are willing to 
comply with it. Quite often at the international level, states are guided by 
considerations of diplomacy in signing agreements. However, the subsequent 
ratification of such instruments is an issue that may partly fall within the realm of 
domestic law, and as such, may be subject to democratic processes in the state that 
include public accountability. The implementation of such instruments is however 
obligatory from the perspective of international law. Consequently failure to 
implement or incorrect implementation will generally be a breach of the states’ 
international obligations.143 
Public demands for strict biosafety regimes or rejection of GMOs altogether, 
concerted efforts by scientists and the biotech industry (supported by powerful states 
led by the USA) to promote GMOs and the almost one sided nature of the emerging 
permissive or strict biosafety regimes in the selected countries, confirm that the 
GMO controversy remains as emotive as ever. For example, the proponents of 
biotechnology aggressively lobbied and succeeded in obtaining a permissive 
biosafety regime in Kenya while opponents of the technology successfully influenced 
adoption of a strict Biosafety regime in Zambia. These developments represent the 
varying attitudes and approaches towards domestic implementation of the 
precautionary approach and hence the Protocol. 
Neglect of the African Model Law (AML) which seeks strict regulation, the 
skewed approaches to implementation of the precautionary approach and the 
involvement of UNEP as well as NEPAD strongly suggest that the initiatives towards 
harmonisation are largely promotional of GMOs. 
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7.4.3 The precautionary approach: varying attitudes and skewed approaches 
South Africa and Kenya readily embraced biotechnology since the 1990s. South 
Africa went further and joined the Miami Group in lobbying for a weak international 
biosafety regime. Adoption of a permissive biosafety regime by South Africa was 
therefore expected as American biotechnology companies were the first to introduce 
GM crops into the country. Thus far, South Africa shares the same views on 
biotechnology as the USA and other proponents of biotechnology. 
Being the first country to sign the Protocol, Kenya demonstrated its support 
for it and set a good example for African states and other proponents of a strong 
biosafety regime in general.  However, adoption of a similar (or even weaker) 
biosafety regime in Kenya raises more questions than answers. This study found 
that adoption of a permissive regime in Kenya is seemingly attributable to external 
factors that include the influence of huge multinational companies and powerful 
states such the USA. 
As a result, South Africa, Kenya and Namibia adopted biosafety legislation 
that does not specifically provide for the precautionary approach in the wording of 
the Protocol. The risk management strategies in the legislation may reduce 
uncertainty, (which reduction is a precautionary measure144).  However, to avoid 
any ambiguity and also promote the development of a jurisprudence on 
implementation of the precautionary approach, incorporation of the approach in the 
wording of the Protocol would enhance compliance with it and improve the 
credibility of such legislation. Section 25 (4) (b) of the Namibian biosafety Act 
requires that the public interest be satisfied before granting a permit. This may be 
an indirect way of restricting GMOs but the term is subject to conflicting 
interpretations and purpose. 
Indirect implementation of the precautionary approach may serve a 
meaningful purpose where strict liability penalties are imposed and insurance 
mechanisms put in place, in addition to environmental impact assessments, risk 
assessments, environmental audits and life-cycle analyses.145 However, the 
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Nagoya-Kuala Lumpar Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety146 and the biosafety legislation in South Africa, 
Kenya and Namibia are based on fault liability.  Furthermore, these regimes are 
silent on insurance.  On penalties for example, the Regulations under the Biosafety 
Act in Kenya, prescribe a heavy penalty of twenty million Kenya shillings (the 
equivalent of approximately $200, 000) or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
ten years or both.147  However, the regime is so flexible to the extent that the NBA 
has discretion to allow (conditionally) the use of GMOs brought into the country 
without authorization. Such loopholes defeat the otherwise deterrent punishment. 
Zambia remains sceptical of biotechnology. Its strict approach explains why it 
had no problems embracing the precautionary approach. Namibia took some time 
before allowing field trials for GM crops. This thesis submits that the varying 
attitudes and approaches indicate a lack of understanding or deliberate attempts by 
some of the selected countries to downplay the requirements of the Protocol on 
what appropriate legislative measures would entail. 
7.4.4 Scepticism on the role of the precautionary approach persists and is 
growing 
As discussed in chapter four, by adopting the precautionary approach as the guiding 
criterion for the regulation, parties to the Protocol were keen to ensure that a 
cautious approach was adopted. Recognition of the sovereign rights of states to take 
more protective measures to conserve their biodiversity (subject to their other 
obligations under international law),148 implies that parties are at liberty to adopt 
higher thresholds than those provided by the Protocol. Accordingly, it is reasonable 
to assert that the precautionary approach provides minimum criterion for regulation. 
By failing to specifically provide for the precautionary approach in their 
biosafety legislation, South Africa, Kenya and Namibia have failed to comply with this 
minimum criterion. In addition, such failure is a clear indication that the scepticism 
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concerning the precautionary approach that complicated negotiations on the 
Protocol, still persists. Two examples may suffice. 
On the one hand, the proponents of biotechnology including industry, and 
countries such as the USA and South Africa, are determined to ensure that, as far as 
possible, African countries minimise barriers on the adoption of permissive regimes.  
Kenya is a classic example where proponents working with local scientists seem to 
have largely influenced adoption of such a regime. They used tactics that included 
delay in adoption of legislation, indirectly influencing sections of Parliament by taking 
them on a trip to South Africa (whose biotechnology companies have vested 
interests in Kenya149), allegedly operating in secrecy, and seeking to promote 
uniform permissive regimes in the region. Uganda is a case in point where the tactics 
used in Kenya are currently being applied. 
On the other hand, countries such as Zambia that have close agricultural 
export ties with the EU, embraced the approach in its strongest formulation. Attempts 
by the USA to impose GM food on Zambians during the hunger crisis of 2002, 
seems to have strengthened the case for the adoption of the precautionary approach 
in Zambia and the requirement to satisfy the public interest criterion before issuing a 
permit. In developing its biosafety legislation however, Kenya ignored what 
happened in Zambia, possibly because it needs to address the hunger crisis and 
GMOs might provider part of the solution.  Hence, developments in the regulation of 
biotechnology in Kenya and Zambia create a paradox which may confuse other 
countries on how best to regulate GMOs.  This may hinder adoption of holistic 
biosafety regimes in SSA.  
7.4.5 Lack of access to the GM food technology may threaten global food 
security 
Unless relevant to local needs, patenting of GM food crops may make people almost 
entirely dependent on such crops. The associated  monopoly  by huge biotechnology 
companies (and powerful states that promote GMOs) could endow these entities 
with immense economic power, which they could use to dominate food markets (and 
politics globally) for commercial advantage. Furthermore, the adventitious presence 
                                                 












of GM food could ‘corrupt’ and ultimately eliminate or replace conventional foods. 
Biotechnology has already changed agriculture and the food many of us eat.150 A 
combination of these factors could plunge the world into an unprecedented global 
food security crisis. The establishment by Norway of a world seed bank in the frozen 
Arctic with the capacity to store over 4.5 million seeds from around the world to 
shield such seeds from man-made and natural disasters151 was imperative. 
7.4.6 The precautionary approach and public involvement are interdependent 
Implementation of the approach serves many purposes, including implementing 
states’ obligations under international law. However, for such implementation to 
translate into reality, transparent decision-making institutions and processes are 
required. Currently information concerning biotechnology is ‘misdirected, 
misinterpreted, and often borders on scare-mongering by its critics and naive 
optimism by its proponents... a communication strategy that brings all stakeholders 
together is lacking’.152 Hence, transparency can hardly be achieved unless there is 
open and effective involvement of all stakeholders and the public as well as 
meaningful access to information. 
The public may freely provide information that is not within the knowledge of 
experts as it is not subject to the professional ethics such as confidentiality of such 
experts. Public participation could gradually enable the government and the people 
to make informed decisions and enhance the legitimacy of the decision-making 
process. Furthermore, the study finds that in order to inform and educate the public 
about risk effectively, the risk communicator must know the level of trust enjoyed by 
the regulator as well as be aware of the public perception of the risks.153  Thus, 
implementation of the precautionary approach in legislation and transparency in 
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decision-making that encompasses meaningful public participation and access to 
information are interdependent. 
The study finds that effective and functional institutions - that embrace good 
governance, acceptable levels of access to information and public participation - will 
seek to ensure that the approach is applied in a manner that recognises and reflects 
priorities, aspirations and legitimate expectations of the people in relation to 
biotechnology. 
7.4.7 The precautionary approach is not and should not be an impediment to 
the promotion of GMOs 
By adopting the approach as a pillar in regulation, parties to the Protocol intended 
that it be used as a guiding criterion for balancing conservation of biodiversity and 
human health with trade.  Article 1 of the Protocol limits such a balance to the 
threshold of ‘ensuring an adequate level of protection’. This means that once such a 
level has been achieved, the objective of the Protocol has been realised. Arguably 
on the one hand, the negative perceptions concerning the approach that culminated 
in its exclusion or incorrect implementation in South Africa, Kenya and Namibia, 
seem to be embedded in considerations that include political expediency. This thesis 
submits that such negative attitudes to the approach is contrary to the objective and 
spirit of the Protocol. 
On the other hand, Zambia has adopted the approach in strict terms yet it is 
still making some progress in R&D in biotechnology, albeit at a slow pace due to 
many factors including lack of human and institutional capacity. The pace is no 
different from that in Namibia which does not embrace the approach in the wording 
of the Protocol. One may conclude  that implementation of the approach is not and 
should not be an impediment to the promotion of biotechnology. Moreover, strigent 
regulation would in fact offend the precautionary approach.154  A co-evolutionary 
                                                 
154 Sunstein C ‘Precautions Against What? Perceptions, Heuristics and Culture’ in Wiener J Rogers M 












approach that balances environmental protection with developments in 
biotechnology is instead most suited for African counties.155 
7.4.8 Whether, and the extent to which, governments are players, referees, 
linesmen or spectators in the regulation of GMOs remains uncertain. 
In South Africa, leading American biotechnology companies, such as Monsanto, and 
scientists played a significant role in the adoption of a permissive biosafety regime. 
In the process of enacting the GMO Act,156  the government seems to have played 
merely an administrative role: endorsement. 
In Kenya and Zambia, the development of biosafety legislation provided 
playgrounds where opposing views came ‘face to face’. In Kenya local scientists 
working with huge multinational companies including Monsanto, state agencies 
including USAID and other agencies, including UNEP were all involved in the 
process leading to adoption of the National Biotechnology Policy on Biotechnology 
and the Biosafety Act.157 These actors seem to have influenced or dictated, at least 
to some extent, adoption of a permissive regime. These developments may have 
placed the government in a somewhat precarious position in relation to its role as the 
public trustee of the environment and the health of the population. Currently,  
government action in allowing commencement of the Biosafety Act in the absence of 
regulations (that were published six weeks later) could suggest that it was less able  
to resist undue pressure from industry. The latter  had hitherto invested in R&D 
activities and was  therefore keen to release GM crops into the environment, even as  
the public  is yet to know much about such crops.. The then absence of regulations 
tended to diminish transparency in decision-making and could negatively impact on 
implementation of the precautionary approach. 
By way of contrast, in Zambia the government took the lead in rejecting GM 
food. Owing to the influence of the EU, Zambia vehemently opposed introduction of 
GMOs. The government’s open and firm stand was instrumental in the adoption of a 
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strict biosafety regime that essentially says yes for NO to GMOs, with the effect that 
introduction of GMOs into the country is rather cumbersome.These differing roles of 
government raise many questions, some of which remain unanswered, such as was 
the government a  player, referee, linesman or spectator in the development of 
biosafety legislation. 
7.4.9 The interplay between biosafety and trade still tilts in favour of the latter 
The Protocol was adopted at a time when the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) 
trade regime was already well established. The WTO regime158 seeks to safeguard 
international trade by minimising barriers to such trade, among other things. It’s 
policies and actions are largely influenced by the powerful developed countries such 
as the USA. In accordance with the precautionary approach, the Protocol seeks to 
ensure safety in the transfer, handling and use of LMOs in the transboundary 
movement of such organisms.159 
By adopting the precautionary approach, the Protocol itself seems to have 
become a trade barrier under the WTO regime. The WTO’s Disputes Resolution 
Panel’s rejection that the precautionary approach had attained the status of a 
principle of customary international law and its ruling in favour of the USA in the 
Biotech case,160 indicate an overriding interest to safeguard trade as against safety 
in respect to regulation of biotechnology.  It is therefore apparent  that while the 
WTO is trying to integrate protection of the environment in its mandate, the interplay 
between biosafety under the Cartagena Protocol and trade under the WTO regime 
still seems to tilt in favour of the latter. 
7.4.10 Reconciling the cross roads in relation to the regulation of GMOs is 
possible but for political factors that go beyond legal jurisprudence 
Proponents of the precautionary approach view it as one that offers hope of avoiding 
serious, and possibly irreversible harm to human health and the environment while 
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opponents view it as an assault on science, reason, free trade and commerce.161  
The selected countries belong to the two camps that hold opposing views on the 
precautionary approach. Such approaches may not stand the test of time in the 
evolving jurisprudence on the approach.Two considerations support this. First is the 
2000 Communication of the EU that 
‘Recourse to the precautionary principle presupposes that potentially dangerous 
effects deriving from a phenomenon, product or process have been identified, 
and that scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with 
sufficient certainty’.162 
The EU guidelines clearly illustrate that the precautionary principle has fundamental 
elements that include identification and evaluation of risks, both of which together  
trigger implementation of the principle in decision-making. This contrasts with the 
claims of opponents that it is an assault on science. 
The second consideration is the concept of proportionality in the implementation 
of the precautionary principle. The EU Communic tion on the precautionary principle 
mentioned earlier requires that: 
• measures envisaged must make it possible to achieve the appropriate level of 
protection. 
• Measures based on the precautionary principle must not be disproportionate 
to the desired level of protection and must not aim at zero risk, something that 
rarely exists 
• An incomplete assessment of the risk may considerably limit the number of 
options 
• Measures must be non-dicriminatory in their implementation and subject to 
review in the light of new scientific data 
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Community law requires that measures adopted should not exceed the limits of 
what is appropriate and necessary to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the 
relevant legislation; where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, 
recourse must be had to the least onerous; and the disadvantages caused must not 
be disproportionate to the aims pursued.163 The costs of some of the measures may 
vary significantly depending on the economic and social importance of the issue at 
stake and whether invocation of the precautionary principle would interfere with 
planned activities or would involve varying degrees of remediation.164 
Further, Justice Preston notes that the concept of proportionality ‘introduces a 
bias to conventional cost-benefit analysis to include a weighing function of 
ignorance, and for the likely greater dangers for future generations if life support 
capacities are undermined when such risks could consciously be avoided’.165 The 
concept of proportionality therefore requires the weighing of the available options 
and seeks to enhance rationality in the application of the precautionary approach. 
Apparently, the usefulness of the proportionality criterion is dependent upon 
functional decision-making authorities that have sufficient infrastructural, financial 
and appropriate human capacity. 
This thesis finds that the strict approach of Zambia in implementing the 
approach and the remote implication by South Africa, Kenya and Namibia cause 
confusion. This unnecessarily complicates regulation of biotechnology. 
It is submitted that claims by the proponents of biotechnology discussed in 
chapter four that the approach may be used as a political tool to restrict trade 
unnecessarily, are not legally supportable. The claims are issues of governance that 
must be dealt with at the domestic level. They seem to be founded on the belief that 
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the precautionary approach is ‘... not law but politics-smuggled into law’.166  While 
this claim is rebuttable, the thesis argues that in cases where the approach may be 
used to unnecessarily restrict trade, this should be treated as abuse of law or 
discretion, the same way scientific risk assessment may be manipulated to achieve 
politically induced uncertainty discussed at (3.3.4) to serve narrow political ends. 
 Abuse of law is a practice that is as old as the law itself. Such abuses are 
worsened by the simultaneous and increasing intensity of the forces pulling law 
towards and away from politics with almost equal strength, thereby creating tension 
within legal jurisprudence.167 
This thesis submits that African countries should not allow themselves to be 
misled or succumb to external forces either to neglecting the precautionary approach 
or asdopting its extremist strict versions. Rather, they should view the approach as a 
tool that is essential in GMO governance and capable of being applied within 
permissible limits. 
The approach is flexible enough to accommodate the legitimate interests of 
stakeholders. This requires a paradigm shift in favour of honesty. Part of what is 
lacking appears to be failure by African p litical leaders to revisit issues concerning 
GMOs, and with vigour, adopt a common stand that may ultimately help the 
continent to take decisive action. Current trends have left most countries vulnerable, 
thereby providing a playground for testing the relative balance of power between 
proponents and opponents of biotechnology. 
The apparent ‘tug of war’ between proponents and opponents about 
introduction of GMOs in Kenya and Zambia has persuaded this researcher to 
borrow the words of Stengel, who in May 2010, made an attempt to identify the 
100 most powerful people globally. He found that it was not the influence of 
power but the power of influence that counted.168 Likewise, this thesis finds 
that, in the regulation of GMOs in the selected countries, it is the winning side in 
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the contest between powerful actors pulling in opposite directions that may 
largely define the quality of legislation. For this reason, the thesis finds that the 
factors in favour of implementation of the precautionary approach are 
outweighed by political considerations that may go beyond legal jurisprudence. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Domestic implementation of the precautionary approach provides an acid test in 
assessing the credibility, and in turn, the transparency of the biosafety regimes in the 
selected countries. This is mainly because the objective of and by implication, 
consequent activities under the Protocol are founded on the precautionary approach. 
Owing to scientific uncertainty concerning the safety of GMOs, it is essential that 
biosafety regimes be credible, and thus workable. Credibility is a notion founded 
upon many factors key among which is transparency of both the legislation that 
constitute the theoretical aspects of regulation and the decision-making process that 
implements such legislation. A combination of these two aspects is intended to 
ensure that theory translates into reality in seeking to reconcile the various interests 
that underpin the regulation of GMOs. 
This study finds that the relative struggle for the balance of power in the regulation of 
GMOs between the proponents and opponents in the selected countries has 
deprived governments (and hence the people) an opportunity to genuinely accept or 
reject GMOs. The conclusion that follows informs the way forward, which is a 
credible source of workable suggestions on how regulation of GMOs and 














‘[t]he real “power” lies with the one who is able to impose his/her definition of 
the problem at hand, because together with the problem definition, the 
available scope for the solution finding is “smuggled” furtively into 
the decision-making process’.1 
 
8.1 Highlighting the Key Issues 
The introduction of genetically modified crops and food into global agriculture in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century gave rise to controversy rooted in fear, suspicion 
and distortions concerning the safety of the environment and humans.  In 2000, the 
Cartagena Protocol (the Protocol)2 was adopted to provide minimum thresholds for  
regulation of transboundary movement of GMOs, one of which is the  precautionary 
approach . Opponents of GMOs view the approach as an important risk 
management tool that addresses scientific uncertainty, the latter being inherent in 
scientific innovation. Proponents are sceptical as the approach may be used to 
restrict trade unnecessarily.3 Being parties to the Protocol, the selected countries are 
under an international law obligation to d mesticate the Protocol, which they claim to 
have done by enacting biosafety legislation. However, implementation of the 
precautionary approach remains problematic as there is confusion as to its meaning 
and purpose.4 
By discussing the intertwined socio-economic, environmental, ethical and 
political interests relevant to biotechnology, the thesis found that these often 
conflicting interests interact in a globalised economy, thus complicating regulation.5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
In an attempt to resolve the controversy, the Protocol is founded on the 
precautionary approach in order to ensure adequate protection of biological diversity 
and the safe use of biotechnology.6 However, the selected countries have adopted 
                                                 
1 Laes E, D’haeseleer W and Weiler R ‘Addressing Uncertainty and Inequality in Nuclear Policy’ The 
Journal of Enterprise Information Management 18:3 (2005) 357-376 at 359. 
2 See the discussion at (4.3). 
3 See the discussion at (1.2). 
4 See the discussion at (1.2 and 3.3.2). 
5 Discussed in chapter two. 












varying attitudes to implementation of the approach thus raising concern about 
whether or not a jurisprudence can be developed in them and across SSA. 
An assessment of biosafety legislation revealed that South Africa and Kenya 
do not specifically provide for the precautionary approach, but imply that it will be 
implemented in decision-making. Namibia does not specifically embrace it, but it 
requires the Minister to be satisfied that GMO activities will be in the public interest 
before issuing a permit.7 By way of contrast, Zambia has taken a strict view of 
regulation. It specifically provides for the precautionary approach, but also requires 
that public interest is taken into account in decision-making. The study argues that 
by merely implying the precautionary approach in their legislation, South African, 
Kenyan and Namibian legislation amounts to incorrect implementation and is thus a 
breach of their international obligations.  At the same time, while Zambia embraces 
the precautionary approach, inclusion of the public interest criterion falls outside the 
thresholds provided by the Protocol, resulting in overregulation. 
The seemingly heavy presence of proponents (particularly giant multinational 
biotechnology companies) in South Africa and Kenya and their increasing interest in 
Tanzania and Uganda, strongly suggest that regulation in SSA has tilted towards 
permissive biosafety regimes. This has frustrated efforts by the African Union to 
adopt a seemingly strict stand on regulation, culminating in ongoing initiatives to 
adopt a revised African Model Law (AML). The intention is to reflect international 
trends and align the AML with reality on the ground while retaining a cautious 
approach to regulation of GMOs. 
The thesis found that the influence of huge multinational biotechnology 
companies, their monopoly over GMO activities, including patenting, and their 
partnership with scientists and government, has tilted the balance in regulation 
towards permissive regimes.8 The spreading of that trend to other countries in SSA 
is an indication that governments need to take a more active role to ensure that the 
precautionary approach is adopted in GMO regulation. Moreover, the thesis argues 
that implementation of the approach does not impede promotion of biotechnology. 
                                                 
7 Section 25 (1) (4) (b) of the Biosafety Act No 7 of 2006 Republic of Namibia.  See the discussion at 
(5.3.4). 













Biotechnology presents opportunities and challenges which require African countries 
to be realistic in making decisions about GMO activities. Extremist standpoints for or 
against GMOs may not be helpful in this twenty first century. The many social and 
economic problems, including hunger and malnourishment, have created a need that 
should make African countries reconsider their views on GMOs. Moreover, for many 
of the hungry and undernourished, food is food. Should the food be safe, sufficient 
and nutritious, the better. GM food may satisfy the last two attributes, but safety 
remains contentious―an issue the intensity of which should be weighed against 
consumption of such food for more than fifteen years, apparently with no potential 
harm reported. 
Apparently GM food is here to stay, in much the same way as its traditional 
breeding counterpart. Once the former is properly entrenched in the food chain and 
accepted by consumers as well as the public in many countries in Africa, opposition 
to it may significantly reduce. In the mean time however, we can only learn how best 
we may live with GM food and this should be reflected in legislation.  To be credible, 
jurisprudence on biosafety legislation must therefore take into account developments 
in biotechnology since the 1970s and the current socio-economic and environmental 
problems Africa is facing. An effective balance between these imperatives is needed.  
Stakeholders must be prepared to change their attitudes and be flexible, if they are 
to be realistic. Legislation should also be workable. 
However, the transatlantic divide between proponents and opponents of GM 
food is unfolding in Africa, raising questions such as for whom and in whose interest 
they should be introduced. Proponents rely on anticipated increases in farm yields to 
promote them. For them biotechnology presents opportunities for solving the hunger 
problem in Africa. They are keen to ensure that as many countries as possible 
embrace it. They view such food as safe until proved unsafe, arguing that in some 
cases it may be substantially equivalent to food produced by traditional methods.9 
Efforts to promote GMOs are hampered by resistance from opponents, 
including environmentalists and civil society. They perceive GM food as being 
                                                 












potentially harmful to the environment and humans, claiming that it is unsafe until 
proved safe. Public demands for safety are therefore justifiable on those grounds. In 
addition, ethical issues relating to the patenting of living organisms and the 
associated monopoly over seeds, question the real intentions of proponents and the 
interests that biotechnology seeks to serve, particularly in Africa. 
Most African governments are grappling with whether they should accept or 
reject GM crops. Their introduction into African agriculture presents both 
opportunities and challenges, which require decisive government action to benefit 
the majority of the people. The challenge is how African countries can develop 
workable biosafety regimes that safeguard the continent’s rich biodiversity and the 
health of its people, while at the same time supporting the introduction of GM food 
that may alleviate starvation.10 For example, the current food crisis in the Horn of 
Africa is a major concern for the international community.11 It demonstrates the need 
for improved or new methods of food production. Biotechnology may provide part of 
the solution. 
Regulation of biotechnology must be done in compliance within the thresholds 
established by the Protocol. It provides for the precautionary approach as the guiding 
criterion for regulation. The Protocol also recognises the sovereign right of states to 
take more protective action to safeguard their biodiversity.12 The functionality of the 
Protocol is dependent on effective domestic implementation. By enacting biosafety 
legislation, the selected countries sought to domesticate the Protocol, but their 
implementation of the approach remains problematic. Further, except for Zambia, the 
other three countries developed legislation that has no resemblance to the non-
binding African Model Law (AML). The AML was founded on the precautionary 
approach which is intended to be a benchmark in the development of biosafety 
legislation. These and other factors were the rationale for this study13, as apparently 
little or no research had been carried out regarding regulation of GMOs in the 
selected countries. 
                                                 
10 See the discussion at (2.2 and 2.6.4.2). 
11 See the discussion at (1.1). 
12 See the discussion at (4.2). 












As indicated earlier,14 the objective of the thesis was to investigate whether, 
and if so, how a jurisprudence relating to the precautionary approach can be 
developed in the regulation of biotechnology in an African context.  To achieve this 
goal, the study sought to answer three sets of questions. First, what makes GMOs 
controversial globally and how does the controversy impact the development of 
biosafety legislation in the selected countries? Second, what are the emerging trends 
in implementation of the precautionary approach and what accounts for such trends? 
Third, from the perspective of the precautionary approach, how may regulation be 
made more relevant in addressing the needs, priorities and interests of the key 
stakeholders? 
8.2.1 The GMO controversy and its impact on the development of biosafety 
regimes 
The debate about GM crops and foods arose at a time when the international 
community was beginning to address environmental threats associated with climate 
change and loss of biodiversity. To date, neither scientists nor policymakers have 
established with certainty the potential harm of GMOs. Due to the inherent 
uncertainty of scientific innovations, principally by reason of being based on 
experiments, the safety of GMOs remains a contentious issue globally. 
The Protocol provides binding criteria for regulation of LMOs, key of which is the 
precautionary approach. In the negotiations, African states sought a strict regime 
embracing the precautionary approach. Only Zambia has specifically embraced the 
precautionary approach but the other three countries have implicitly reflected it in 
their biosafety legislation. Consistent with the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
contained in Art. 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ‘every treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’. 
Impliedly reflecting, rather than specifically providing for the precautionary 
approach in domestic legislation may amount to less than good faith. In theory, 
African states sought strict regimes. In practice they do otherwise. Thus, the thesis 
submits that it is untenable to argue that implying the precautionary approach 
                                                 












satisfies the requirements of the Protocol. It amounts instead to a breach of 
international law.  
The study found that competing socio-economic, environmental, ethical and political 
interests remain at the centre of the debate. Increased interest by proponents to 
invest in biotechnology in Africa and the varying responses of the selected countries, 
reveal that the controversy is unfolding in Africa. In South Africa and Kenya for 
example proponents, including Monsanto, engaged in research and development 
(R&D) activities, including field trials, long before biosafety legislation was enacted. 
At the time of enactment, multinational biotechnology companies already had GM 
crops, such as GM cotton, that were ready for commercialisation.15 These 
developments took place in the context of a globalised economy in which 
commercial interests must be reconciled with environmental protection. The thesis 
concludes that once there are GMOs that are ready for deliberate release into the 
environment in the absence of substantive legislation, the later introduction of strict  
laws could be seen as a discouragement for continuing investment in biotechnology. 
This could negatively affect food production.  
8.2.2 Emerging trends 
Apparent increased presence of proponents of GMOs, particularly in South Africa 
and Kenya, working closely with government, may have contributed to the 
development of permissive GMO regimes. Thus, multinational biotechnology 
companies may be sufficiently powerful to influence indirectly even the functioning of 
parliaments in some African governments.16 Conversely (or in the alternative), one 
may argue that permissive regimes could have attracted increased investment in the 
three countries. Furthermore, the influence of the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF, funded by the 
World Bank), also played a significant role in the development of biosafety legislation 
in South Africa, Kenya and Namibia. 
The thesis takes the view that the ongoing GMO activities in Tanzania and 
Uganda in the absence of substantive biosafety legislation, confirm that proponents 
                                                 
15 See the discussion at (7.3). 












have developed a somewhat uniform approach to promoting biotechnology in SSA. 
The approach entails starting investment in biotechnology in the absence of 
substantive legislation, which makes it difficult for the country to adopt a credible 
biosafety regime once the investors are ready to commercialise GM crops. They 
have successfully used this approach in South Africa and Kenya. Such approaches 
are likely to be used to secure permissive legislation elsewhere. In contrast Zambia 
rejected introduction of GM food in the absence of legislation. While this was partly 
intended to safeguard its organic markets in Europe, the rejection culminated in the 
adoption of a strict biosafety regime. This thesis submits that this amounts to 
overregulation and is thus out of touch with reality. Even the AML is being revised by 
the AU to reflect emerging trends in the regulation of GMOs. 
The thesis concludes that the process of adopting biosafety legislation in the 
selected countries, notably Kenya and Zambia, provided a forum for testing the 
relative power of the opponents and proponents, most notably, the EU and the USA 
respectively. The prize in this contest is control of global agriculture, and, by 
implication, international trade in food. Within that scenario, and as stated earlier, the 
real power lies with the one who may impose his /her definition of the problem, 
thereby influencing the development of favourable legislation.17  While the GM 
controversy persists African countries need to consider how best they may 
responsibly embrace biotechnology without succumbing to undue (and possibly 
unnecessary) pressure from entities and groups with vested interests.  A home 
grown practice on both the GM technology and the development of a jurisprudence 
for its regulation may enhance public acceptance of GMOs. This is essential and 
desirable. 
8.2.3 The Precautionary approach and the credibility of biosafety legislation 
Implementation of the precautionary approach in whatever formulation, remains 
theoretical unless it translates into reality in decision-making. To achieve this goal, 
the objectivity, and thus the credibility, of decision-making bodies become critical. 
The other element is meaningful public participation. The thesis argues that such 
participation may act as an external force that provides checks and balances in the 
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decision-making processes. That may be achieved through access to information 
and presentations made by the general public or both.The thesis concludes that, 
although embracing the precautionary approach in biosafety legislation by African 
countries is imperative, its implementation requires transparency in decision-making 
and public participation, so much so that these two may even serve as incentives for 
effective implementation of the approach and may reinforce it. Courts will also play a 
key role in developing a jurisprudence relating to implementation of the approach. 
8.3 The Way Forward: Taming the ‘Dragon’ 
The conceptual framework of the thesis18 was inspired mainly by the sentiments 
expressed by Justice Holmes, who in 1897, equated law to a dragon. He argued that 
it could either be killed (neglected) or be tamed (embraced) and become a useful 
animal. Applying Holmes’ views to the precautionary approach, this researcher 
concluded that the precautionary approach is a useful tool in the regulation of 
biotechnology but states need to tame it. 
The way forward is informed by the conceptual framework, the analysis of the 
issues raised, the findings and conclusions. It suggests how the precautionary 
approach could, figuratively, be tamed and become a useful animal (tool) in the 
regulation of biotechnology in the selected countries and other countries in SSA. 
These recommendations provide practical ways on how to minimise the barriers that 
hamper implementation of the precautionary approach and credibility of  legislation. 
Where applicable, the thesis identifies the duty bearer or bearers ie the person or 
persons responsible for the implementation of the recommendations made. 
8.3.1 The need for reforms to biosafety legislation is compelling in the 
selected countries 
The rationale for reform cannot be put better than in the words of Justice Scalia in 
his dissenting judgement in United States v Virginia19 in which he noted that ‘[t]he 
virtue of a democratic system... is that it readily enables the people, over time, to be 
persuaded that what they took for granted is not so, and to change their laws 
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accordingly’.20 Thus, South Africa, Kenya and Namibia need to reconsider their 
position in relation to domestic implementation of the precautionary approach. 
Neglect to implement the approach, amounts to conduct that is inconsistent with their 
obligations under the Protocol, hence, a breach of international law. Moreover, the 
sovereign right of states is clearly recognised under the Protocol, a right that 
empowers parties to take more protective measures to conserve biodiversity.21 By 
limiting the exercise of the sovereign right to taking more protective measures, the 
Protocol intended to ensure that parties do not use the right to undermine its 
objective. 
Equally important, is the need to enhance transparency in decision-making 
domestically which is largely characterised by exercise of discretion. Absence of 
specific provisions on the precautionary approach may constitute a lack of legislative 
guidance for those exercising discretions. Effective implementation of the 
precautionary approach will ensure achieving a balance between potential risks and 
benefits of introducing GMOs. Such implementation may not necessarily change the 
attitudes of all opponents. The thesis argues that it only needs to satisfy essential 
jurisprudential attributes of the rule of law, in particular, reasonableness. 
Within the parameters of such reasonableness, there is a need for reform of 
biosafety legislation in South Africa, Kenya and Namibia. This should enable them to 
comply with their international law obligations, especially in respect to 
implementation of the precautionary approach as enshrined in the Protocol. This will 
also enhance transparency in decision-making. The strict approach to regulation by 
Zambia may amount to overegulation. To be workable, it needs elements of flexibility 
in decision-making, especially in relation to requirements relating to public interest. 
Academics, civil society and the general public can play important roles in relation to 
reform of biosafety legislation. The draft revised AML discussed at (4.4), seeks to 
promote flexibility for the purpose of making regulation realistic. It is a useful 
benchmark for adoption of credible legislation. Courts are also useful as they may 
make decisions that trigger amendments to legislation. Since judges man the courts 
it is important to address the role they should play in developing a jurisprudence 
relating to the precautionary approach. 
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8.3.2 Judges should play key roles in developing a jurisprudence relating to 
the implementation of the precautionary approach 
Changing public values require shifts in the day-to-day interpretation of 
environmental and other laws to address such changes. Judicial attitudes are critical 
here.22 In Fuel Retailers,23 the Constitutional Court of South Africa noted that: 
‘[t]he role of courts is especially important in the context of the protection of the 
environment and giving effect to the principle of sustainable development... the 
present generation holds the earth in trust for the next generations. This 
trusteeship carries with it the responsibility to look after the environment. It is the 
duty of the court to ensure that this responsibility is carried out’.24 
The reasoning of the court in the above case, it is submitted, is equally applicable to 
the precautionary approach. As discussed previously,25 judicial law-making can play 
a key role in making the precautionary approach an effective tool for the regulation of 
biotechnology. Judges may adopt a conservative approach and eschew the 
approach until given clear direction by the legislature or they may adopt a creative 
approach and enhance the development of the precautionary approach.26 For 
example, using the precautionary principle as a tool of interpretation in evidence27, 
they may modify the meaning ‘even of a relatively clear text in favour of greater 
environmental protection in the face of uncertainty’.28 This necessarily implies that in 
jurisdictions such as South Africa and Kenya, which do not have substantive 
provisions on the precautionary approach in their biosafety legislation, courts may 
use their inherent judicial discretion to apply the precautionary approach in the cases 
before them on account of scientific uncertainty. 
                                                 
22 Bell S and McGillivray D Environmental Law (6th ed 2006):49 Oxford University Press New York. 
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SA 4 at 39 par. 102. 
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26 Justice Stein ‘A cautious Application of the precautionary principle’ Envtal L. Rev. 2:1 (2000) 1 -10 
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In Leatch 29 Stein J considered absence of the precautionary principle in the 
governing legislation and took the view that it was a principle of common sense. He 
held that: 
‘It is clear that the purpose of these provisions is the protection and care of 
endangered fauna ... While there is no express provision requiring consideration 
of the “precautionary principle”, consideration of the state of knowledge or 
uncertainty regarding a species, the potential for serious or irreversible harm to 
an endangered fauna and the adoption of a cautious approach in the protection 
of endangered fauna is clearly consistent with the subject maker, scope and 
purpose of the Act’30 
In Vellore,31 the Supreme Court of India held that the precautionary principle 
and the polluter pays principle are part of the law of the land.32 The Court further 
noted that the precautionary principle in the context of municipal law means that 
‘...Environmental measures – by the State Government and the statutory authorities 
– must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation... the 
“onus of proof” is on the actor or the developer/industrialist to show that his action is 
environmentally benign’.33 In A.P Pollution Control Board,34 Jagannadha Rao J, 
citing Vellore, took the view that while the precautionary principle and polluter pays 
principle had briefly been referred to (in Vellore), ‘it is necessary to explain their 
meaning in more detail, so that courts and tribunals or environmental authorities can 
properly apply the said principles in the matters which come before them’.35 
In these three cases (Leatch, Vellore A.P Control Board) courts made a 
significant contribution towards the emerging jurisprudence on the precautionary 
principle by apply the principle in domestic courts prior to the principles’ statutory 
enactment. In Vellore for instance, Kuldip Singh J was guided by the consideration 
that the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle were essential 
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30 Ibid. 
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32 Ibid at 14. 
33 Ibid at 11. 
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features of sustainable development.36 Thus, the court emphasised the need to 
strike a balance between the economy and the environment.37 
In the area of human rights also, courts have sought to take a more proactive 
approach in safeguarding such rights where the law is inadequate or inequitable. In 
Grootboom38 the Constitutional Court of South Africa held that ‘rights must be 
understood in their social and historical context … socio-economic rights must all be 
read together in the setting of the Constitution as a whole’.39 
Courts also play a crucial role in the interpretation of domestic law so as to 
conform to international instruments. Prior to the United Kingdom incorporating the 
European Convention of Human Rights in the form of the Human Rights Protection 
Act 1998, the House of Lords, in KD (A Minor) (Termination of Access) Re40, 
endorsed the proposition that ‘it is at least desirable that the domestic law of the 
United Kingdom should accord with the decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights under the Convention’. In Derbyshire CC v Tim s Newspapers Ltd,41 the 
Court of Appeal took the view that ‘where the law is uncertain, it must be right for the 
court to approach the issue before it with a predilection to ensure that our law should 
not involve breach…’ of the Convention. 
Independent courts require both an independent judiciary and judges who 
think pragmatically and independently. Pragmatic judges are hardly interested in 
‘whether the facts of a case bring it within the semantic scope of the rule agreed to 
govern the case than in what the purpose of the rule is – what consequences it 
seeks to induce or block – and how that purpose, those consequences, would be 
affected by deciding the case one way or the other’.42 Pragmatic thinking was 
illustrated in Save the Vaal,43 in which the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa 
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42 Posner R How Judges Think (2008):243. 
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(Olivier JA) held that ‘by including environmental rights as fundamental Justiciable 
human rights, by necessary implication requires that environmental considerations 
be accorded appropriate recognition and respect in the administrative processes in 
the country’.44 Thus the interpretative power of Judges gives them an opportunity to 
decide matters over which there is often a high degree of consensus in both society 
and the judiciary.45 Often, such decisions, as that in Save the Vaal, may confirm or 
constitute public policy.  
Independent judges are those whose thinking and judgements are devoid of 
deference to the government or any other persons. Such independence was recently 
illustrated in the International Commission of Jurists (Kenya Section) case46 in which 
the High Court (Ombija J) gave orders in favour of the applicant for the issuance of a 
provisional warrant for the arrest of Omar Al Bashir, President of Sudan. In effect the 
order compels the Government of Kenya to execute an exisitng warrant of arrest 
issued by the International Criminal Court. In respect to the independence of judges, 
the reverse would be that in situations of legal uncertainty, their decisions may be 
dictated by emotion, personality, policy intuitions, ideology, politics, background and 
experience.47 
Thus independent judges should analyse things from a broader perspective 
especially in the developing countr es, which have limited options in relation to such 
technologies, otherwise these countries will ‘sink or swim’.48 Hence, in common law 
systems (like Kenya) where courts develop law on a case-by-case basis in step with 
the changes in public policy and conceptual development,49 courts play a key role in 
striking a balance between the benefits and potential risks of new technologies – 
biotechnology in particular. As noted most recently by the Chief Justice of South 
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Africa, Sandile Ngcobo, ‘courts have a duty, in an appropriate case, to identify 
defects in legislation or executive action, and may indicate how these defects may 
be cured..’50 
This thesis recommends that once scientific uncertainty becomes apparent in 
the pleadings, courts should infer application of the precautionary approach from 
biosafety legislation, in countries such as South Africa and Kenya which reflect the 
approach in legislation or from the environmental right as enshrined in the relevant 
constitutions. Judges in common law jurisdictions in particular, need to be more 
proactive in interpreting the precautionary approach (including where no specific 
provisions on the principle exist in domestic biosafety legislation). Hence they would 
contribute to the development of a jurisprudence on the implementation of the 
precautionary approach in decision-making. 
Specialist Environment Courts such as those in New South Wales – Australia, 
which are responsible for interpreting and enforcing environmental law,51 should be 
established in each of the selected countries. In A. P Pollution Control Board, the 
Supreme Court of India noted that the Environment Court in New South Wales was 
ideal in environmental matters as it is composed of Judges and technical and 
conciliatory assessors ‘rather than leaving complicated disputes regarding 
environmental pollution to officers drawn from the executive’.52 If implementation is 
to be effective, its success will in turn depend on good institutional governance and 
capacity building. 
8.3.3 Good institutional governance and capacity building are needed in order 
to enhance transparency 
As discussed in chapter six, good governance entails effective state institutions, 
transparency and accountability in public affairs. These attributes should be reflected 
in biosafety governing authorities that perform administrative functions associated 
with GMOs. The decisions of the GMO governing bodies affect the interests of many 
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stakeholders including the general public. Moreover, the practical value of the 
precautionary approach may significantly be realised depending on how far it 
becomes effective in legislative, administrative and judicial law-making at the 
domestic and regional levels.53 Hence, the composition of such bodies and the 
decision-making processes need to be transparent. Appointment and the expertise 
of people appointed to serve on these bodies as well as financial, infrastructural and 
human capacity are material factors that impact on the legitimacy, and hence, 
effectiveness of the decision-making processes. 
Often, biosafety governing bodies provide advice, including expert advice 
concerning GMOs to the government. Such advice often forms the basis of policy 
and ultimately law. The authorities may also be a useful source of persuasive 
technical and expert opinion for courts. For example, in A.P Pollution Control 
Board,54 Jagannadha Rao J of the Supreme Court of India held that: 
‘to ensure that there is neither danger to the environment nor to the 
ecology and, at the same time, ensuring sustainable development, it has 
to be held that the Supreme Court can refer scientific and technical 
aspects for investigation and opinion to the expert bodies...The authority 
comprises... members having technical expertise in environmental matters 
whose investigation, analysis of facts and opinion on objections raised by 
parties, could give adequate help to the Supreme Court or the High 
Courts and also the needed assurance’.55 
Further, good institutional governance and acceptable levels of capacity 
building serve many other purposes, including contributing to public opinion 
concerning GMOs. Should stakeholders and the public view such bodies as ‘rubber 
stamp’ instruments for approving or rejecting GMOs, governance will remain a 
complex area. Thus, good institutional governance and capacity building are 
essential in ensuring transparency and accountability in decision-making. Capacity 
building requires expert personnel and financial resources, among other things. 
However, attainment of acceptable levels of good governance and the necessary 
capacity building are largely dependent upon favourable political will. 
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8.3.4 Requisite political will is essential in accelerating reform: education 
makes a decisive difference 
Favourable political will is essential in developing holistic biosafety regimes in Africa. 
This may however remain abstract unless suggestions are professed on how such 
political will may be achieved in practice. There are many factors that contribute to 
lack of political will and many more that may enhance such a will. Education makes a 
difference. It has the potential to improve the understanding of and minimising the 
extreme conflicts in biotechnology.56 
The need to educate policy and lawmakers in matters relevant to 
biotechnology cannot be overemphasised. As discussed in chapter seven, during the 
parliamentary debate on the Biosafety Bill 2007 of Kenya, one of the members of 
parliament, told the august House that he had eaten raw transgenic maize to prove 
that there was nothing to fear about the technology.57 Needless to say, this assertion 
was not only misconceived, it misled parliamentarians as well as the general public 
on issues concerning safety of GMOs. It created the impression that once a person 
eats transgenic foods, the adverse effects were to be felt on the spot and if not, the 
food would be safe and have no adverse effects. This was not true as issues in 
question remained contentious globally. Further, the assertion arguably offends 
precaution. 
Thus, policy and lawmakers need an average knowledge (not necessarily 
university education or a doctorate) to enable them have a broader understanding of 
such issues. This may enhance understanding and appreciation of the science, the 
power dynamics, the policy and ultimately the legislation that underpin regulation of 
biotechnology. As Leopold a conservation expert asserts, education must precede 
rules.58 
The foundation of such knowledge lies in the teaching of environmental 
protection from the earliest age in formal education. People in developing countries 
need to understand the environment to enable them to change their ways of thinking, 
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attitudes and values concerning interaction between humans and nature.59 It is 
therefore incumbent upon governments to put in place the relevant curriculum and 
emphasis on environmental protection, and as far as practicable, make the subject 
compulsory up to an appropriate level. 
The ultimate goal will be to inculcate a sense of responsibility towards 
protection of the environment in all people, especially the youth,60 who are both 
future leaders and beneficiaries of a clean and healthy environment. The 
responsibility will, in turn, give rise to a sense of loyalty towards the environment. 
This inherent loyalty will go a long way towards building up the necessary political 
will for increased environmental protection. 
Organising seminars and taking parliamentarians on tours in other countries 
may be useful. However, they merely provide a form of first aid in a complex field. 
Moreover, parliamentarianism in most African countries seems to have largely turned 
into a form of employment. Members are increasingly being viewed by the general 
public as serving selfish interests rather than the public. For this reason, public 
involvement is a material factor that may contribute towards achievement of the 
required political will. 
8.3.5 Public participation should be tailored to suit local circumstances 
The Protocol provides umbrella provisions relating to public awareness and 
participation. The study argues that it is the duty of each party to take into account its 
individual local circumstances and determine how best they may be served. The 
situation in many African countries requires more effort and may even be costly due 
to many factors including poor infrastructure, language constraints and lack of 
financial and human capacity. Such barriers need to be addressed if people are to 
be empowered to participate meaningfully. 61 
In many countries, poor governance exacerbates the problem. Apparently, 
there is the general belief, especially in the biotechnology industry, that the greater 
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the awareness on the part of the public, the greater the resistance to biotechnology. 
The history of such resistance globally has aggravated the situation. This may be 
true to some extent, but with increased knowledge about biotechnology and 
transparency in GMO governance structures, such resistance may, in the long term 
slowly translate into acceptance. This is a formidable but surmountable task. 
The ultimate test for the success of the biotechnology industry is whether the 
public trusts the decision-makers who interpret scientific information and use it to 
assess and manage risks.62 Distrust raises questions about  the motives of the 
decision-makers, resulting in little face-to –face dialogue.63 The previous practice of 
experts and policymakers formulating decisions behind closed doors needs to be 
changed into an open public forum involving interested and affected stakeholders, 
including the general public.64 Decision-making must be rejected especially where 
there are complaints about partiality and irrationality among other things.65 
Public awareness and involvement should be commensurate to the level of 
knowledge of GMOs in each country. Hence, the more the ignorance there is about 
GMOs, the higher the level of awareness and education is required on the part of the 
public. Information in newspapers and arranging symposiums may work for the elite. 
However, for peasants and other communities who may be interested in or affected 
by the technology, some of whichmay be illiterate (or semi-illiterate), a pragmatic 
approach is needed. This may include holding joint stakeholders meetings. 
One of the ways of advancing awareness and public participation is to hold 
joint stakeholders meetings, with sufficient notice given at grass root level. In those 
gatherings, the relevant communities may be informed about  the essence of 
biotechnology and the relevant activities to be undertaken in a language of their own 
choice. The peasants will be able to exchange ideas and raise concerns that may be 
relevant to decision-making. Some of the concerns may attract application of the 
precautionary approach, and thus make participation meaningful. In such 
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circumstances, the use of a language full of technical terms is a barrier to 
administrative transparency.66 
In practice, public participation in the selected countries with respect to GMOs 
seems to be limited to a few people and favoured target groups to the detriment of 
the general public. Public awareness and participation in the regulation of 
biotechnology should be promoted in a language people understand and in ways 
that are suited to local circumstances. However, (as discussed in chapter six and 
seven) lack of access to or insufficient information is an impediment to meaningful 
public participation. 
8.3.6 Barriers to access to information should be minimised 
Existing legislation in the selected countries governs access to information within the 
parameters of pending applications. Moreover the information required by law, 
especially in permissive regimes is scanty and essentially formal. It includes the 
name of the applicant and non-contentious basic information about the GMO in 
question. Even with such scanty information, a copy of the application should be 
provided in an efficiently managed website in addition to obtaining it from the 
relevant authority. 
The thesis suggests that information about GMOs should be provided to the 
general public on a regular basis by the representative of the Biosafety Clearing 
House. Environmental law is an interdisciplinary subject.67 Hence reliable information 
and analysis is also required in the fields of biology, ecology, law, economics, 
ecosystem management and social policy.68 Such information should be published 
not only in papers of wide circulation (which would, in many of the selected 
countries, be English) but also in other local papers or other forms of media that may 
easily be accessible to the people concerned. 
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Establishment of reliable and a regularly up dated database run by the 
independent commission or other appropriate body discussed below (at 8.4.7) may 
also be a useful source of information, at least for the elite. In India the government 
has made public most of the information relating to GMOs (and other environmental 
issues) by establishing a website (www.moef.gov.in) with a section ‘Contact the 
Minister’. In that section the Minister invites public comments. The section reads in 
part ‘I welcome your feedback and suggestions... your comments are important to 
us... I assure you that every one of your comments and questions will be duly looked 
into’.69 
Thus, access to information in respect to GMOs in African countries should be 
tailored in a manner that minimises barriers to such access, including government 
bureaucracy. In this respect, formulation of guide-lines on application of the 
precautionary approach would be a step in the right direction. 
8.3.7 Guidelines on application of the precautionary approach should be 
developed 
Governments should draw up guidelines on application of the precautionary 
approach in decision-making. Such guidelines would be an indispensable point of 
reference for both decision-makers and the public in general. They should be in the 
form of a handbook or other simplified manual that explains how, when and the 
circumstances in which the approach may be applied by giving examples. They 
should be based on two criteria: first, reasonable scientific possibility based on 
scientific data (as opposed to mere hypothesis, speculation or intuition); second, 
reasonable scientific probability or likelihood derived from general agreement among 
scientists that the available data and methods used to interpret the data are valid 
and reliable.70 
In 1997 New South Wales published a handbook - applying the precautionary 
principle, meant for tertiary level students taking courses in ecological sustainable 
development and members of the public who want to understand the precautionary 
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approach and its influence in decision-making.71 In relation to how to reach 
consensus when assessing the seriousness or irreversibility of a threat, the 
handbook provides detailed guidelines under each of these three criteria: (i) involve 
a range of views in assessing whether threats are serious or irreversible (ii) Try to 
define types of threats that most people would see as serious or irreversible (iii) 
consider all aspects of the threat to determine its overall significance.72 Such 
guidelines will enhance application of the approach, hence, transparency in decision-
making. The guidelines may be drawn in consultation with the independent 
commission that the discussion now turns to. 
8.3.8 An all encompassing independent commission that is accountable to 
parliament is needed. 
Currently in the selected countries GMO governance is largely under the control of 
the government. Decision-making bodies oversee public participation, and make final 
decisions regarding risk assessment –a material sourc  of determining whether or 
not precautionary measures should be taken, how and by whom. Each of the 
governments in the selected countries should establish an independent commission 
with a specific mandate in respect to GMO governance in addition to other 
responsibilities. For example, the commission may be mandated to ensure that 
public participation is arranged by people who have a neutral stand on GMOs. In 
addition, the commission may be required to ensure that information is disseminated 
to the right audiences, at the right time and in the right places. It could carry out an 
independent verification of risk assessment reports and act as a watch dog on 
consumer protection. 
In the long run, the commission would improve GMO governance as issues of 
policy would be discussed freely, as opposed to in decision-making bodies that 
primarily deal with applications relating to GMO activities. In essence, the 
commission would provide checks and balances in the decision-making processes.73 
It could oversee the monitoring of GMO activities. 
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The commission should be national in its composition bringing together most 
of the stakeholders in biotechnology. These would include representatives from the 
relevant departments of government, scientists, the biotech industry, civil society, 
farmers, the general public, religious and other interested or affected groups. 
Scientific bodies such as the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) of 
South Africa74 and the National Council for Science and Technology in Kenya75 
serve the important purpose of advising the government on matters of science and 
technology. In countries such as South Africa, Namibia and Kenya, such advice is 
biased in favour of industry in the area of biotechnology as evidenced (at least) by 
the kind biosafety legislation that has been adopted in these countries. Such bodies 
are apparently agents of government, with no specific mandate to represent the 
interests of the people and the various stakeholders in biotechnology. The 
commission should be accountable to parliament. 
8.3.9 Partnerships between government and the actors should be improved 
Financial aspects however raise critical issues concerning the funding of R&D 
activities, most of which are dominated by the private sector in Africa. Considering 
that the biotechnology industry has inherent commercial interests to protect, its 
research agenda is therefore geared to maximization of profits. The high costs of 
research and its application have made many African countries develop research 
that primarily serves the interests of developed countries.76 
Creating knowledge through research is one thing; translating such 
knowledge into products and processes is another.77 Thus, research findings in 
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public institutions such as universities are not easily accessible and hardly used by 
local small and medium sized entrepreneurs.78 By providing most of the resources 
for R&D, it is easy to influence, and even dictate adoption of favourable policies and 
legislation in developing countries. As a result the funders determine the kind of 
research to be carried out and the crops upon which R&D activities should focus. In 
India for example, the government has well developed scientific man-power and 
several R&D institutions and infrastructure for the conduct of research.79 It provides 
a good model that may be emulated by countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Globally, the private sector is the major player in R&D activities in 
biotechnology.80 As long as these activities are dominated by the private sector, it 
will dominate trends in regulation that neglects adoption of the approach. In future, 
the situation may get worse as public funding of R&D activities requires huge 
resources that may impact negatively on national government expenditure. In many 
African countries areas of government expenditure such as education, health, 
infrastructure (including transport, energy and water) and security, compete for 
resources with agriculture, environmental protection and other departments. 
Thus, there is an increasing need to have meaningful partnerships between 
government and the private sector in R&D activities within an environment that 
promotes meaningful public involvement, acceptable levels of transparency and 
public accountability. This is necessary because overreliance on donor-sponsored 
capacity building initiatives is not a sustainable approach of strengthening and 
maintaining a workable and credible biosafety regime.81 Moreover, the traditional 
‘pipeline’ approach of promoting development in which researchers develop new 
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technologies and requiring agents to convince farmers to adopt such technologies is 
outdated and must be abandoned in favour of inclusive and holistic approaches.82 
Even if biotechnology may be regarded as a significant strategy for 
sustainable development, its full potential cannot be realised unless accompanied by 
effective government action to provide incentives, research and regulation.83 One of 
the ways of doing this is to involve all actors and provide adequate support to 
institutions such as universities that are involved in agricultural innovation, and to 
use the information these institutions provide to improve decision-making at all 
levels.84  These actions by government should not go hand in hand with permissive 
or weak biosafety regimes. 
Government action must be based on objective criteria that promote 
transparency in matters concerning biotechnology. Inevitably, domination of 
regulation by the private sector (which owns the technologies85) partly by reason of 
control in funding, may have a negative impact on knowledge generation and the 
flow of information. 
8.3.10 Knowledge generation and the flow of information: the need for 
transparency 
Biotechnology is a highly scientific field where knowledge creation is mainly the 
hands of scientists, many of whom may have vested interests. These interests 
largely emanate from innovations and patenting from which financial benefits could 
accrue. By reason of being experts, scientists also legitimately dominate the 
decision-making processes. These attributes places them in an advantageous 
position(in contrast to the public)  with regard to knowledge creation and information 
flow. Questions such as what knowledge, by whom, for what purpose and in whose 
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interest are critical in determining what information may be made public and what 
information may be regarded as confidential in decision-making. 
In the selected countries, the applicant controls public participation, meaning 
that such an applicant arguably creates knowledge and determines the flow of 
information. Should such information be disseminated to audiences that are 
sympathetic to biotechnology, there will be lack of objectivity in knowledge 
generation and the flow of information. This is mainly because the scientists 
(whether local or foreign) involved in innovations are under an implied obligation to 
comply with their terms of reference, which terms cannot be expected to contradict 
both the disclosed and undisclosed underlying objectives of the funders. 
Thus the funding of R&D activities has a direct impact on the type of 
knowledge to be generated, what information is to be disseminated to whom and by 
whom. As discussed earlier86 governments have significantly lost the ability to 
control the flow of money in and out of their country and are increasingly finding it 
difficult to control the flow of ideas, technology, goods and people.87 There is a need 
for the government to ensure transparency in the generation and flow of information 
especially with regard to the potential harm of GMOs. This is an area where the 
independent commission discussed earlier may play a key role. 
8.3.11 Further Research on GMO Activities in SSA is Imperative 
Biosafety (and environmental law for that matter), is an interdisciplinary regime that 
is still evolving. Only a few countries in SSA such as South Africa, Kenya, Zambia, 
Namibia, Burkina Faso and Cameroon have biosafety legislation in place. Regulation 
of biotechnology entails consideration of a wide range of socio-economic, 
environmental, political and other interests in decision-making. Thus the need for 
further research on GMO activities in developing countries is compelling so as to 
promote transparency in legislation in SSA. 
Areas where further research is needed include socio-economic considerations, risk 
assessment, the role of international bodies in the development of legislation and the 
relationship between biosafety under the Protocol and trade under the WTO regime. 
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Further, research that may include fieldwork in these and other relevant areas will 
provide indispensable information that may be used to objectively analyse the 
credibility of emerging biosafety legislation and the interests such legislation serve in 
Africa. 
8.4  Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has demonstrated that a jurisprudence relating to the precautionary 
approach can be developed in order to enhance the credibility of biosafety legislation 
in the selected countries. Extreme standpoints towards the approach are, in varying 
degrees, barriers to the development of such jurisprudence. These standpoints may 
still be used by proponents or opponents to influence African countries in making 
decisions about GMOs.88 A more participatory approach to regulation will instead 
enable countries in SSA to increasingly adopt workable biosafety regimes.  Such 
regimes may objectively address the interests of stakeholders consistent with the 
requirements of the Protocol and the increasingly changing realities that seem to 
favour biotechnology. Ultimately, predictability and transparency in decision-making 
would be enhanced. 
The outcome is that countries in SSA would achieve an effective balance 
between safety of the environment and humans on the one hand and investment in 
biotechnology on the other hand. The findings, conclusions and suggestions are 
intended to be used by governments, policymakers, scholars, the public, investors 
and other stakeholders. 
Finally, it suffices to note that ‘a dream is the place where a wish and a fear 
meet. When the wish and the fear are exactly the same... we call the dream a 
nightmare’.89 In essence, people want to have food but some are scared of having it.  
Whereas this assertion could have been true in the 1970s in respect of GMOs, 
Mehez, a diet expert most recently observed that concerning food, ‘the era of myth 
and marketing is at last giving way to an era of hard fact’.90 The consumption of 
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GMOs over the last twenty years may constitute a hard fact in favour of safety, which 
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